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ABSTRACT 
The concept of organizational effectiveness is of vital 
importance to accountants because it forms the ultimate criterion 
for the design of accounting information systems for control. It 
also has close conceptual links with the concept of corporate 
accountability. Depending on how an accountant defines effective 
organizational behaviour he/she will seek to design management 
information systems that implement and achieve this perspective. 
Depending on how and in whose interests a corporation is seen to 
be working towards accountants will design appropriate corporate 
reports. 
This thesis examines the concept in detail and argues that 
theories of effectiveness have" generally been developed on what 
Habermas calls a technical level of interest. Little research 
attention has been paid to developing concepts of effectiveness 
on the hermeneutical and critical levels of interest. 
Critique, however, is felt to be vital for the moral and 
intellectual development of social theory and social science, of 
which accounting is constitutive. Indeed, Habermas argues that 
the function of theoretical and practical discourse is to help 
lead to an ideal situation of rational consensus and of free 
speech which is unconstrained by sources of domination. 
Based on this epistemological stance, the thesis develops a 
technically-interested theory of O.E. This and the research 
inSights it produces are evaluated and an integrated, critical 
theory of O.E. is proposed. This is then used to generate 
additional information from the same empirical base~ a process 
which shows the inadequacy of developing only technical theories 
of effectiveness. 
Finally, the implications of such an integrated theory of 
O.E. for accounting are examined and new research directions are 
suggested. 
The structure of the thesis itself has attempted to be an 
analogue of critique~ beginning with a technical theory of O.E., 
evaluating this and proposing an enriched, integrated alternative. 
It has also attempted to be a thesis in the social science, 
emphasiZing the holism of social knowledge • 
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Chapter 1: Accounting, Accountability and the Concept 
of Organisational Effectiveness (O.E.) 
The object of this thesis is to argue that an integrated, emancipatory 
theory of organizational effectiveness (O.E.) is required in order to 
understand and evaluate man's actions. Effectiveness does not appear to 
be a central concept for accountants but we argue that it is the raison 
d'etre for the design of accounting systems. Accounting and the concept 
of accountability are well-nigh inseparable. Since the publication of 
Paciolo's Summa which contained the first slender tract on book-keeping 
"de Computis et Scripturis" in 1494, accountants have been concerned with 
the reporting and assessment of accountability for wealth. Indeed, "accounting" 
records da~e from much earlier times and it has been argued that ancient 
Greek and Roman records show the existence of an "accounting" officer whose 
task it was to keep an accurate record of acquisitions and outgoings, in 
money and kind, in order to expose any losses due to dishonesty or 
negligence and to hold accountable persons who committed these acts. Emerging 
from these early days of identifying individual accountability, accounting 
information has been expanded to assess and manage collectivities, whether 
they be a feudal estate or a joint stock venture. Today in the 1980's 
accounting information has vastly increased in significance and is used not only 
to assess the actions of both private and public enterprises but also entire 
nations. External financial reports provide some measure of organisational 
assessment and is used by a wide variety of users. The bottomline, profit 
figure and measures of profitability are often included in indices of O.E. 
(Steers, 1977~. Internal, so-called management accounting information, with 
its armoury of budget and variance analysis is similarly used to assess the 
performance of individual departments and even individual managers. 
But what does "accountability" mean when one refers to institutional 
accountability? Official text-book answers substitute this notion with 
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ill-defined ideas of "efficiency and effectiveness". Accountants, so we 
are told, are concerned with the assessment and achievement of a "rational", 
"optimal", "effective" allocation of resources, but nowhere in the accounting 
literature are these terms rigorously defined. Some questions remain 
unanswered and at times unasked. 
What is an effective organisation? 
What does accounting for organisational performance entail? What 
organisational characteristics ought to be measured by the accounting 
system? 
How should an accounting information system be designed in order to 
ensure O.E.? 
The organization theory literature has tended to adopt profit or 
profitability measures without much investigation of the basis on which profit 
figures are built up and the accounting literature has generally assumed 
that financial measures must give us valuable information about a firm's 
effectiveness. This assumption of accountants is based on seemingly common-
sense equations: profit/profitability = financial success = survival imperative 
for the organization = medium of need satisfaction for organization participants, 
and indirectly society. Without monetary gain (cash surpluses), profitability 
and the maintenance of a physical and monetary stock of capital, so the 
accountant points out, a firm operating in a competitive market would not 
survive. It would go bankrupt. Indeed, such assumptions have helped fuel 
research into financial leading indicators of corporate collapse; ratio 
analysis became fashionable in the 1960's and accountants spoke of the 
predictive ability of accounting numbers as a criterion of an effective 
accounting system (see Beaver et aI, 1968). Accountants were allowed and enabled 
to continue for a while to equate accountability and effectiveness to 
profitability and other related financial measures. Their lack of detailed 
theoretical analysis on the concept of effective institutional functioning 
was glossed over. Moreover, their finanCial measures of effectiveness 
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meshed in well with a dominant ideology of capitalist relations which was 
consonant with individualist, marginalist theories of income, value and 
the need for capital maintenance. However, complex social forces which 
as yet are not well-understood* forced the accountants to grope for new 
measures of effectiveness in the 1970's. There were increasing criticisms 
that accountants failed to account for the "human resources" in organizations 
i.e. to value its most important and valuable asset - its people. In 
addition, accountants did not "encourage" or "force" organizations to be 
"socially responsible" and to account for their benefits and disbenefits 
to society. Economists began to pOint out the externalities created by 
organizations which were borne by the state and the community at large. 
Accounting academics pointed out the inadequacies of a stokehol~theory of 
the firm and proposed a more comprehensive stakeholder theory of the 
organization (see Lowe and Mclnne~ 1971). In short, it was felt that 
profitability was no longer an adequate measure of effectiveness and 
organizations had to be answerable for more e.g. their treatment of "human 
resources", their effects on the environment and on society at large. 
Research effort began to be expended on ways of accounting for human resources 
and of drawing up socially responsible balance sheets of the benefits and 
disbenefits to society. Human resource and social responsibility accounting 
became distinct sub-knowledge areas within accounting and emerged in textbooks 
on accounting (see Briston, 1981; Glautier and Underdown, 1976). But such 
responses were essentially ad-hoc, superficial, fragmentary reactions to a 
critical media, state agencies and the academy. Few attempts were made to 
re-examine the notion of effectiveness per se and to relate this to prevailing 
accounting measures of effectiveness. Indeed, from the standpoint of the 
1980's, those sub-cultures of accounting appear almost as a fad which emerged 
only at a particular historical period and have since faded away in the wake 
of changed political, economical and social conditions. Neither human 
resources nor socially responsible accounts are produced on a significant 
* An attempt is made to analyse these relations in chapter 13 of this thesis. 
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scale on a voluntary basis by organizations and nor are they made mandatory 
by the decision-makers of the professional institutes. Profitability 
measures continue to be the main objects measured and reported by accountants 
and few people have bothered to analyse why this is so. 
Further, accountants have assumed that accounting information systems 
do help to promote financial success; that if information systems were well-
designed and control systems more efficient the organization would find 
itself on the road to financial wealth. However, as Burchell et al (1980) 
pointed out, organizational research is beginning to question even this 
automatic presumption of a positive and causal relationship between accounting 
systems and financial success. Whilst accounting systems are most certainly 
important in the design and functioning of organizations as we know them, 
there is some emergent research which questions the link between strict 
controls and financial success. Firms seem to be successful even when there 
are only informal planning and assessment practices (Child, 1974) and multiple 
and overlapping flows of information (Grinyer and Norburn, 1975). 
"Indeed, it might be the 'newly poor' (Olofsson and Svalander, 1975) 
or the externally threatened (Khandwal1a, 1978; Meyer and Rowan, 1978) 
that invest heavily in additional mechanisms for internal visibility 
and control as they attempt both to allocate their ever more scarce 
resources or to negotiate a new legitimacy with external agents." 
(p. 13, Burchell et aI, 1980). 
So accounting information systems may not be as necessary as we thought to 
financial success. 
The following equivalence of relations thus appears to be crumbling: 
accounting control systems + financial success + organizational effectiveness. 
Research suggests that accounting information may not contribute as much 
to financial success as widely believed and such success may not be the 
only element in the effectiveness set. Despite these emergent questions, 
the accounting profession continues to persist in traditional forms of 
accounting. One could suggest that such persistence is not merely an expected 
inertia in a conservative profession but is the result of the domination 
of powerful, capitalistic interests which would be threatened by a fundamental 
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examination of the meaning of O.E. and the manner to account for it. A 
hegemony between corporate capitalists and a stability-seeking state 
apparatus could be proposed as the main reason for the existence of certain 
kinds of accounting despite increased scepticism of the role of accounting 
in organization and society. Cooper (1980), for example, suggests that 
"neo-classical" accounting continues to be rigorous because current accounting 
is overwhelmed by the assumptions of capitalism and takes for granted the 
existence of markets, private property, private costs and private profit. 
That such a domination relation exists and prevents more radical theories of 
accounting for O.E. could be part of an answer but it appears not to be the 
complete answer. For there exists special theoretical and methodological 
problems when we discuss the concept of O.E. which are intrinsically bound 
up with the notion of organizational goals. 
One of the main difficulties is the epistemological and methodological 
status of the notion of organizational goals. Does or can a collectivity 
like an organization have a goal except when unanimous consensus exists 
among participants as to the purpose of their interaction? Or do only 
individuals have goals? Are organizations rational, goal-seeking organizations 
or are they characterized better as confused, semi-anarchic coalitions which 
rationalize retrospectively their action by creating rationales? Are they 
better described as negotiated orders rat_her than as orderly systems? Do 
they have problems which require accounting solutions or does the accountant, 
armed with his solutions, create problems which legitimate his social 
function? Do organizations and their goals exist in any meaningful sense or 
do the contradictions observed indicate that they are fictitious concepts 
which live only in the minds of the academic isolated in his ivory tower? 
These questions illustrate the kind of problems accountants face when they 
seek to analyse the concept of O.E. and look to the notion of organizational 
goals as providing the norm/standard against which performance can be measured. 
The goal controversy lies at the heart of the O.E. debate. 
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As Otley (1980) pointed out the question of organizational objectives 
and the notion of O.E. require urgent clarification if a contingency theory 
of management accounting is to be forged. 
"Objectives are an essential part of a contingency framework not only 
because they are themselves one contingent variable that is likely to 
affect the nature of an accounting system but also, and more importantly, 
because they form the criterion against which the effects of different 
configurations of controls must be evaluated." (p. 423-424, Otley, 1980) 
In order that accountants be able to progress beyond the mere association 
of particular contingencies and accounting systems, a judgement has to be 
made about the impact of the accounting system in aiding organizational goal 
achievement. Similarly, in the field of external reporting, there is a need 
to know what the criterion of organizational evaluation is and ought to be 
in order that "relevant" and "desirable" characteristics are reported. 
However, accountants have made little effort' to look in depth at the concept 
of organizational goals and its relationship to the design of accounting 
systems. 
Not only have, accountants been unable to deal satisfactorily with the 
concept of organizational assessment, social scientists in a variety of 
other diSCiplines have similarly failed to find an adequate answer. The 
bulk of work on O.E. stems from the loosely defined area of organization 
theory. As recent reviews have shown (Steers, 1975, 1977; Goodman and 
Pennings, 1977; Spray, 1976) the concept has so far defiec measurement. 
Definitions of O.E. proliferate and when measured, each bears little 
empirical correlation with another. Worse, measures of effectiveness used 
in the same study do not inter-correlate well to form a cohesive set, and 
consequently studies of the causal determinants of O.E. are inconclusive. 
Welfare economists in the normative public choice area have also 
wrestled, somewhat independently of organization theorists, with the concept 
of O.E. but at a lower resolution level of analysis. They are concerned 
with what the goals of a society should be, how to achieve them and how 
to assess this degree of achievement. From the seminal work of Bergson 
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(1938), Samuelson (1947), Arrow (1951) through to Rawls (1971), Harsanyi 
(1977) and Buchanan and Tullock (1962), welfare economists have sought ways 
of avoiding Arrow's Impossibility Theorem by relaxing one or more of his 
axioms, but reluctantly have come to the conclusion that in order to define 
a single, socially preferred alternative on the Pareto frontier it is necessary 
to define cardinal, interpersonally comparable individual utility indices 
or their equivalent. This conclusion has so dismayed economists that since 
then apart from Ng's (1975) work relatively little effort has been made to 
measure these cardinal utilities and discuss what form the welfare function 
could take. An important point to be noted here is that accountants and 
organization theorists have consistently failed to see the connection between 
O.E. and the ethical issues so explicitly studied in economics. It is felt 
I 
that this has seriously crippled the usefulness of much of the research done 
on defining O.E. 
Given these difficulties, some academics - organization theorists like 
(Connollyet aI, 1980) and accountants like Hopwood, 1979 and Otley, 1980) 
- have argued that the concept of O.E. per se does not exist apart from 
speaking of "effective for whom" and "to what purpose?". That is, O.E. is 
necessarily equated with the interests of a particular interest group. 
(Interestingly enough, welfare economists have not come to the similar 
conclusions). Ontologically, these positions amount to the proposition that a 
collectivity, in some essential way, is not definable. That is, one cannot 
speak of a collective organizational goal but only of individual and group 
goals (Cyert and March, 1963). Increasingly, accounting academics feel that 
accounting information systems do not play the "official" role of ensuring 
effective, rational, organizational dec'ision making. Instead, because what 
is accounted for can shape the allocation of wealth with ramifying effects on 
the level of individual and collective welfare and can shape the definition 
of organizational and social reality, accounting systems influence the 
creation and aid the persistence of certain patterns of organizational and 
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societal power. Accounting information, therefore, serves the interests of 
particular power groups within organizations and societies. (See Rose, 1977; 
Becker and Neuhauser, 1975~ Meyer and Rowan, 1978; Gambling, 1977~ Wildavsky, 
1976) • 
The implicit call from much of this research is to abandon the search 
for a normative criterion such as D.E. by which the usefulness of accounting 
information systems may be evaluated. Instead, as Hopwood (1979) points 
out, criteria of corporate effectiveness are social constructs, and their 
roles and meanings stem from the social interests and concerns of particular 
social contexts. Consequently, more research should be carried out in 
increasing our understanding of the processes by which certain definitions 
of effectiveness are legitimated within organizations and the effects which 
these different definitions have on organizational and societal life. For 
example, accountants should no longer view financial criteria of effectiveness 
as non-problematic in both concept and operationalization. A profit is not 
just a profit. Instead of asking how we can measure profits more accurately 
accountants should seek to question why "profits" is an important notion, how 
it has attained its position of importance and the effect which this dominant 
definition of D.E. has on the action and life of an organization. 
Such analyses of the concept of D.E. and the role of accounting 
measures of effectiveness in organizations and societies are welcome for 
they make us re-examine our assumptions about the functioning of accounting 
systems. In Haberrnas's language, they represent efforts to move knowledge 
from a technical base to a hermeneutic level where more emphasis is placed 
on deciphering the meaning of everyday notions and the processes by which 
social realities are created in micnrand macnrcollectivities. Such 
research enables us to analyse in-depth legitimation and political processes 
of reality-construction and highlights that criteria of D.E. or theories of 
accounting value are not scientific, neutral facts but are political 
compromises. But to stop at this level of analysis is inadequate for such 
-9-
"descriptive", process-oriented research strategies offer few signposts 
for change and in the hands of less subtle researchers could easily degenerate 
into a conservative ideology for maintaining the status quo. The process of 
description is not a value-free methodological choice but ethical choices 
guide what we describe, how we describe and what we see as relating elements 
in a system of relations. As will be discussed later, the accountants' 
seemingly neutral, scientific theory of value and measurement is inherently 
coupled with a machine-image of man and a capitalist set of relations. By 
merely describing how criteria of effectiveness, of profitability, come to be 
powerful, the theorist may not uncover such assumptions. Or his process of 
description may, in fact, be guided by implicit normative assumptions which 
are a theoretical contradiction to the "objective observer" surveying human 
behaviour and faithfully recording the scene he surveys. 
And even if the describer is able to highlight particular legitimation and 
political processes and hidden ethical assumptions, even if such forms of 
knowledge somehow manage to emerge in the absence of a particular norm of 
critique and of a "better society", what then? After we have described A has 
more power over B and therefore A is able to advance his theory of 
effectiveness, so what? What role then remains for the describer - to retire 
from this arena of description and move on to another descriptive sphere? Is 
enlightenment equal to emancipation? It could be that the describer assumes 
that once having made A and B aware of their differential power that B will 
automatically move to change the relation of power. But is resistance so 
immediate, feasible and efficient; is the power to resist as widely distributed 
as the power to dominate and to impose normative structures? 
In the absence of critique and of an explicit normative criterion, recent 
changes in accounting and organizational theory could identify operative goals 
and relations and imply that such notions should continue in the future. 
Tinker et al (1982), speaking in particular about marginalist theories of value, 
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similarly argue that although a political focus has shifted accounting 
away from technical notions, this shift has not resulted in fundamental 
modifications of the marginalist theories of value. While the market of 
competing interest groups has replaced the idea of neutral accountants, 
and the utilitarian calculus has been extended to incorporate transaction 
costs, a series of marginalist and ideological assumptions remain unquestioned. 
And this opens the way for the asocial, ahistorical theory of Watts and 
Zimmerman (1979) and the non-intentional, non-hegemonic ideas of Burchell et al 
(1982). Behaviour is now cynically accepted as being guided by self-interest 
and economic rationality. Or it emerges from a mysterious, anonymous 
process of filtration and osmosis which lacks a sense of intention and 
objective-seeking action. 
We argue that such changes ~re inadequate. An explicit prescriptive 
notion of "better" organizations is required to anchor our theory of O.E. 
for without such explicitness we are either fooling ourselves as to the 
descriptive nature of research or incapaci tati.IB the power of knowledge to 
herald change. As Habermas argues, it is a critical level of interest in 
human discourse which allows the emergence of emancipatory ideas which link 
an ideal speech condition to that of a "good and just" society. Theories 
of O.E. and accounting have to date proceeded from either the assumption 
that accounting and accountability have little to do with moral, social 
choice or the assumption that an organization's financial success equals 
benefit to society. Neither of these assumptions is a scientific pre-given. 
In evaluating and accounting for organizational behaviour, accountants cannot 
ignore the relation of the micro-organization to society; for not only is the 
organization a part of society and is ,a microcosm of it, it also cannot be 
understood prior to a critique of the macro-processes and structures in 
which organizations exist. To evaluate an institution, to call it to 
account is also to call society to account. To criticise an institution 
is also to criticiSe the society which is constituted by and constitutes 
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micro-institutions. Not only do we need a theory of what a "better" 
organization means and how to measure such degrees of goodness, this theory 
needs to recognize the part-whole relation between organizations and society. 
The technical theories of O.E. have begun to show their inadequacies and it 
is insufficient for a holistic understanding of human behaviour to attempt 
to describe political processes of legitimation. Description is intrinsically 
bound up with prescription, a suggestion for change, and a critical notion 
of what ought to be. We propose that such an explicit prescriptive 
criterion should recognize the organization - societal coupling in an 
emancipatory theory of O.E. We set out detailed arguments in subsequent 
chapters to support these initial, polemical assertions. 
1.1 Purpose of Thesis 
The initial aim of this thesis was to study equally the concept of O.E. 
and its relationship to the design of accounting systems. However, the 
first task has proved long in itself and it now forms the bulk of this 
thesis. Detailed progress on the second issue is now being taken up by 
Richard Laughlin and ~contained in a second thesis. Nevertheless, a 
succinct indication of the major implications of the present study of O.E. 
and its relationship to the study of accounting will be given at the end 
of this thesis. 
In order to analyse and explain the purpose of this thesis, it too 
must be placed within its historical and social context. The author comes 
from an accounting background developed within the specific context of 
Sheffield University during the late 1970's. Due to the dominance of the 
natural science matrix for social research, this research began with a 
contingency model of O.E. similar in essence with early work by Mott (1977) 
and Steers (1977). However, whilst collecting field data, the importance of 
a hermeneutical understanding of the empirical situation became apparent 
and so did the possibilities of extending the theory of O.E. Theory and 
empirical observations were both then developed and interpreted from three 
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quite different matrices - a conventional functionalist mode, a 
hermeneutical mode and a critical, integrated perspective. This dialetical 
form of investigation enriched both the initial theory of O.E. and the 
interpretation of the empirical context. This emergent learning process is 
now understood as representing different constructions of reality that need 
to be integrated and underpinned by an epistemological belief that the 
purpose of all knowledge is to lead to self-reflection and emancipation of 
man, both individual and collective, i.e. to the ideal state of affairs 
in which non-alienating work and free interaction can be manifested. The 
process of integration in this thesis is sequential in the sense that we began 
with a technical theory of O.E. which was subsequently found to be inadequate and 
which was then enriched with interpretive knowledge. Attempts were then made 
to unite both nomological and interpretive knowledge in order to critically 
evaluate the effectiveness of the system under analysis. 
The major purposes of this piece of research are thus: 
(a) to analyse and define the notion of organizational effectiveness; 
(It will be argued that, contrary to Hopwood's (1979) proposition, 
it is insufficient to merely study the process of O.E. definition. An 
integrated criterion of O.E. that is tightly coupled with societal 
concerns is required and an emancipatory theory of O.E. is offered.) 
(b) to indicate the implications of such a theory of O.E. for the 
development of accounting systems design; and 
(c) to accomplish (a) and (b) with a research methodology that is 
an analogue of critique and which shows clearly the limitations of 
working consistently within one matrix. 
The process of integration used in this thesis proceeds at two 
related levels. Firstly, a theory of O.E. is developed at the 
technical and hermeneutical levels of interest but this is shown to be 
• 
an inadequate explanation of social behaviour. These forms of analysis 
are shown to be insufficient explanations in themselves. This opens the 
way for an integrated theory of O.E. which seeks to interweave technical 
and hermeneutical knowledge with critique •. Integration thus consists of 
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(a) showing clearly the inadequacy of remaining at the technical and 
hermeneutical levels of analysisJ and 
(b) attempting to unite technical, hermeneutical and critical insights in 
an integrated theory of O.E. Such integration is based on Habermas's 
notion of discourse which shows that perfect discourse is concomitant 
with an ideal social world. 
In order to achieve the above objectives, the thesis is organised in 
the following way. Chapter 2 reviews in depth the major O.E. research 
completed on both sides of the Atlantic. Chapters 3 to 5 argue that 
conceptualizations of O.E. to date are deficient in a number of ways and 
outline the epistemological principles which also form the organization 
principle of this thesis. They explain in detail the typologies of 
Laughlin et a1 (1981), Burrell and Morgan (1979) and, most importantly, 
that of Habermas (1972). Chapters 6 and 7 describe the entree into the 
research site and argue the justification for our chosen research methods. 
Chapter 8 sets out the technical and hermeneutical·model of O.E. that was 
created from a concern with technical and hermeneutical rationality. 
Chapter 9 describes the detailed derivation of empirical measures and 
chapter 10 discusses the validity of the empirical data in relation to the 
model in chapter 8. Chapter 11 examines the limitations of stopping at a 
technical level of interest. It then extends the theory of O.E. developed 
in chapter 8 and proposes an emancipatory theory of O.E. Chapter 11 also 
outlines the method of measurement of emancipatory O.E. and an assessment 
is made of the research organization. Chapter 12 ends with an important 
note of the implications which an emancipatory theory of O.E. has for the 
, 
\ 
designers of accounting information systems. Finally, chapter 13 provides a 
short "conclusion" to the thesis and points out the research opportunities 
for the future. 
The sample questionnaires, and graphs are found in the Appendices. 
.Chapter 2: A Dominant Subject Matrix and Dominant 
Theories of Accountability 
2.0 Introduction 
The introduction in the first chapter has argued that there is 
a need for accountants and social scientists in general to study in 
depth the concept of O.E. and organisational assessment; because 
what we account for creates our social reality and the social 
world in turn shapes our definition of what ought to be accounted. 
Research on O.E. have not proved insightful. This is because a 
functionalist methodology coupled with a technical interest has 
mobilized bias (Bachrach and BaratZ,1962) and has severely limited 
the parameters of debate. 
This chapter, therefore, starts a new debate in the field of 
O.E. by reviewing and classifying work to date. 
In order that we might begin to acquire new perspectives into 
the concept of organizations and their effectiveness, it is 
necessary to review how past and present research have tried to 
tackle the problems. As Newton is often reported to have said, one 
can see further if one stands on the shoulders of those who have 
already tried. A historical critique thus helps us to know the 
current state of the art and how we got to where we are, what is 
unsatisfactory about the status quo and where we might and should go 
in the future. It also leads to a definition of the research problem 
in terms of the scope and approach. Finally, the review partially 
justifies the choice of this particular research problem as it shows 
clearly, the importance and ubiquity of concepts of organizational 
effectiveness and the necessity for further research. It also shows 
that all the research to date (apart from two exceptions) reside 
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squarely in the functionalist matrix and are comfortably within 
the parameters of mainstream empirical theory. 
2.1 Criteria for Selection of Research for Review 
Research in this area tends to be fragmentary and non-
cumulative. Also, as will be shown, the. concept of effective 
organizations underlies implicitly a vast amount of organizational 
research and one could reasonably argue that the entire literature 
in organization theory, parts of accounting, cybernetics, general 
systems theory, economics and sociology are all concerned with 
developing efficient and effective organisations. Hence, a review 
of the literature must necessarily be highly selective and the 
following one will reflect both the author's awareneSf of current 
research and her criteria of choice of literature that is deemed 
more relevent. The review presented here will build on the work of 
previous reviews (see Price, 1968; Campbell et al., 1974; Steers, 
1977; Goodman and Pennings, 1977; Hopwood, 1979). 
The main criteria for inclusion of research within this review 
was that the researchers showed an explicit concern for the notion 
of D.E. Implicit references to effective organizations were 
excluded from the review for then we would have reviewed an enormous 
part of social science literature. It is for this reason that we 
have excluded detailed discussion of, for example, Arney's (1969) 
study of business efficiency and SolOmon's (1965) discussion of 
divisional performance measurement. Clearly there are underlying 
notions of effectiveness in both these pieces of work and it is 
interesting to note that Arney restricts himself to a discussion of 
efficiency and not effectiveness. It could also be argued that 
Solomon's concept of the division is but another name for an 
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organization and should be included. However, the specific 
problems of divisional performance tends to raise technical 
problems of a specific kind and these concerns, though important 
are less central to our present concerns. To get into these 
arguments would have distracted somewhat from the main task of 
developing a theory of O.E. Thus, it was decided to exclude from 
debate such kinds of work, which tended to have specific technical 
interests. 
The review unavoidably draws mainly on work within organization 
theory and welfare economics for it is here that the term appears to 
have generated more explicit research. However, accounting studies 
of O.E. are naturally included and the work of Tinker (1975) and 
Hayes (1977) will be discussed though the latter is actually a study 
of the determinants of departmental effectiveness. Discussion will 
also be made of the rather reactionary, thoughtless growth of 
"social responsibility" and "human resource accounting". Such 
bodies of literature begin to supplement but does not question 
fundamentally traditional modes of corporate assessment. Indeed, 
there is little discussion even within this area on the notions of 
accountability and O.E. per se. The literature is, nevertheless, 
discussed because it is by far the nearest attempt made by 
accountants to look at the issue of O.E. 
This chapter is divided into the following sections with these 
purposes; 
2.2 to distinguish the notion of O.E. from efficiency; 
2.3 to look at the conceptual and practical difficulties 
of defining and measuring O.E.; 
2.4 to develop a comprehensive classification of O.E. 
onwards 
literature within the functionalist matrix. 
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2.2 Effectiveness Differentiated from Efficiency 
Although much controversy surrounds the definition of D.E. 
most theorists and organizational analysts agree that D.E. is logically 
not identical to efficiency (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Katz and 
Kahn, 1978). 
Efficiency is defined in a purely 'economic' sense, that is, 
by the ratio of inputs used to outputs produced. Inputs and outputs 
may refer to quantifiable physical elements or to qualitative 
affective elements. For example, one of a company's outputs may be 
widgets or racial discrimination, its inputs may include raw materials 
or employee loyalty to the company. Katz and Kahn (1966) refer to 
such a ratio as the "energetic ratio" of inputs and outputs, thus 
conceptualizing both inputs and outputs as sources of energy. The 
concept of efficiency is concerned with the question; given that one 
knows the level of output desired, what is the least economic cost 
combination of inputs that will produce that level of output? Dr 
what amounts to the same thing, what is the maximum level of output 
that can be produced given a specific level of input. The question 
asks 'how much is produced at what cost?' and is based on an 
assumption that there is complete knowledge of and agreement about 
the outputs desired. That is, the nature of organizational goals 
and objectives is taken as known, given and unproblematic. 
The concept of effectiveness asks a different question. Though 
there is little agreement amongst theorists as to a universally 
accepted definition of D.E., it is nevertheless evident that 
effectiveness is concerned with evaluating organizational performance 
and action against some criterion, standard or goal. The past and 
current literature on D.E. may be classified broadly into 
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'descriptive' and prescriptive or normative theories of O.E. So-
called 'descriptive' theories of O.E. attempt to provide answers 
to two questions: 
(a) What are the goals of the organization? 
(b) How far has the organization achieved these goals? 
Prescriptive theories of D.E. attempt to go beyond this level of 
analysis and evaluate the currently perceived operative goals of an 
organization against some value-based prescriptive criterion, e.g. 
social justice. (These distinctions between the two types of 
O.E. theories will be discussed later in more detail.) 
As can be seen, efficiency considerations do not evaluate the 
nature and value of organizational outputs except in conventional 
economic market terms; since efficiency is taken to be 'good' a 
positive valuation is placed on a bigger ratio of output to input. 
The issue of effectiveness, on the other hand, does question the 
degree of goal achievement and more important the 'value' (social 
and individual) of these outputs. As efficiency and effectiveness 
are not the same, an organization may be efficient but not effective 
(however one defines this) or effective but not efficient. 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) illustrate the distinction with 
two examples, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Agency,N.A.S.A. and Famous Artists School, F.A.S. If one defined 
effectiveness as the degree of goal achievement, then the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration during the 1960's was possibly 
an effective but inefficient organization. President Kennedy had 
set a national goal of landing Americans on the moon in a aecade. 
In 1969 after eight years of intensive research and an investment 
of more than twenty-six billion dollars, the mission was accomplished. 
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~n terms of achieving this goal, the organization was clearly 
effective. However, if one defined O.E. as the ability of an 
organization to meet the demands of participant groups and thus be 
viable in the long-run, then N.A.S.A. even during the 1960's was 
probably both ineffective and inefficient. This is because soon 
after the moon landing, the resource flow into N.A.S.A. was severely 
curtailed; it was obviously not satisfying the needs of one of its 
interest groups - the United States Government. 
If one continues with the latter definition of O.E. then the 
F.A.S. International was an example of an efficient but ineffective 
organization. F.A.S. advertised in popular magazines for readers to 
learn to write or draw under expert guidance of famous authors and 
artists by using a corresponde~course. However, it was soon 
discovered that initial qualifying tests were always positively 
evaluated and that guidance was provided by hired staff personnel 
who were relatively lowly paid. The F.A.S. then came under severe 
public criticism and government scrutiny. Eventually, the company 
filed for re-organization under bankruptcy laws in 1970. It had been 
a profitable and efficient business until its legitimacy was 
undermined and it failed to survive. 
\. 
2.3 The Problems of Definition and Measurement 
The nature of effectiveness is still one of the grey areas of 
accounting and organizational research. Explicit research into O.E. 
began to emerge some thirty years ago but as Steers (1977) pointed 
out there is no generally recognized theory on the concept, no 
'> 
agreement on its dimensions, determinants, influences and facets. 
Indeed, we do not really know whether the concept of effectiveness 
is a useful or meaningful one. 
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The fundamental reason behind this lack of agreement is the 
ambiguity that surrounds the notion of organizational goals. As we 
have seen, effectiveness required the comparison of action against 
some criterion or standard. There is little agreement about what this 
standard should be, despite the fact that the goal concept is central 
to the analysis of organizations. Indeed, Weber (1947) argues that 
one of the defining properties of an organization is the existence 
of some purposively, co-ordinated, collective activity. Because the 
difficulties involved in defining organizational goals are well-
known (see Simon, 1964; Etzioni, 1960; Mohr, 1973; Hannan and 
Freeman, 1977) the following discussion will be brief and will 
concentrate on the major points of the goal controversy. 
Difficulties with the goal concept lie at two levels: empirical 
and ontological. To begin with, theorists like Cyert and March (1963) 
argue that individuals have goals but organizations do not. Similarly, 
Silverman (1970) suggests: 
" .... to say that an organization has a 'goal' may be to 
involve oneself in some of the difficulties associated with 
reification - that is, with the attribution of concrete 
reality, particularly the power of thought and action, to 
social constructs ...... It seems doubtful whether it is 
legitimate to conceive of an organization as having a goal 
except where there is ongoing consensus between the 
members of the organization about the purpose of their 
'interaction." (p9, Silverman, 1970) 
Silverman's proviso illustrates the empirical difficulties of 
the goal concept; the fact that all organizations have multiple 
and usually conflicting goals, that multiplicity and conflict among 
goals prevent any organization from being fully effective (in the 
sense of simultaneously meeting diverse demands) and that an 
organization which is effective on one set of partiCipant criteria 
may not be effective on another, (Friedlander & Pickle, 1968; 
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Steers, 1975; Hall, 1972). 
Recent research also appears to question the ontological 
status of the notion that organizations act teleologically and are 
guided by a purpose. The early work of Lindblom (195~, Weick 
(1979), and the "garbage can" model of organization decision-making 
by March and Olsen (1976), have been used to support the argument 
that because organizations do not have a clear-cut, unitary, 
organizational goal that, therefore, the goal concept is of obvious 
limited analytical usefulness (Clegg and Dunkerley, 1980). That is, 
it does not exist as a valid social construct. 
Such conclusions (typical of parochial theorising of O.E.), 
however, are hasty for their logical end leads to the argument that 
an organization as a whole is a reified example of random action; 
essentially the organization in a fundamental sense does not exist, 
only its parts do. Such reductionism when pursued to extremes will 
fail to explain the action of a complex whole and could all too easily 
fall into the social psychological penchant for confining study of 
the social world to group behaviour. A totality is not the sum of 
its parts (Ashby, 1956; Von Bertalanffy, 1968). Further, a close 
reading of Weick's views on organizational goals (1979) and O.E. 
(1977) shows in fact that he does not discard either concept. What 
he does argue is that rational, goal-directed, instrumental 
behaviour plays a relatively unimportant role in organizing which 
is treated as an evolutionary process of variation (enactment plus 
ecological change) and selective retention. Though Weick does not 
see organizations as material, SUbstantive entities with objective 
properties but as sets of interlocked organizing processes that 
create order (remove equivocality), he does speak of organizing 
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effectiveness and indeed defines long-run adaptability in all its 
guises (e.g. diversity, hypocri~y, etc.) as the means to ultimate 
effectiveness. For him, evolutionary processes may not evolve 
toward anywhere consciously but they do evolve away from where they 
are and the degree of long-run adaptability and survival remains the 
appropriate criterion for evaluation effectiveness. Weick's concept 
of teleology is of "an away from" mode rather than "a towards 
somewhere" mode. 
Though rationales for behaviour may be developed retrospectively 
(after the behaviour has been completed and is available for 
'bracketing' and 'sense-making') goals, even to Weick, are valid 
constructs though he emphasizes to an excessive degree goals as 
emergent ex post rationales rather than goals as preset guides for 
instrumental action. Therefore, it is contended that the work of 
researchers like March and Olsen and Weick show rather that simple, 
naive interpretations of an organizational goal are inadequate but 
they do not invalidate the notion of an organizational goal as a 
holistic idea. 
Further, such empirical properties of ambiguity, conflict and 
contraditions are to be expected when studying complex purposes. An 
organization like a single human being may possess internal 
contradictions but one does not automatically proceed to deny the 
existence of individual goals. Why should one deny the existence 
and analytical usefulness of organizational goals? As Hall (1972) 
states: 
'. 
"Even when forgotten or ignored, the goal is still 
the basis for the organization, since the means 
would not have developed without it in the first place". 
(p94, Hall, 1972) 
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The dynamics of goal conflict, change and negotiation do not 
alter the fact that goals still guide what happens in an 
organization. Without this concept, organizational behaviour 
becomes a completely random occurrence, subject only to arbitrary 
forces and pressures. Since organizations do have continuity, do 
act, achieve, fail, the theoretical construct of organizational 
goals remains a valid explanatory and predictive tool. (See Mohr, 
1973; Haworth, 1959; Mandelbaum, 1955.) Just because a concept is 
difficult to define is no reason for discarding it unless the 
usefulness of knowledge is judged by the relative ease or 
otherwise of obtaining it. Clegg and Dunkerley (1980) further 
contend that there is a tendency for goal analyses .to stereotype 
research findings in that organizations are inevitably found 
wanting. Again this appears to be rejecting a theoretical construct 
on flimsy epistemological grounds; knowledge needs to be 
evaluated with respect to 'some definition of purpose, and not to 
some notion of a normal distribution of its results. 
So far this review has argued that the concept of an 
organizational goal is analytically valid and so is the notion of 
organizational effectiveness but disagreement still reigns as to 
their definitions. 
Much of the voluminous literature on goals and O.E. to date 
(with the exception of Weick's work) lies within the "functionalist 
paradigm" of Burrell and Morgan (1979) and reflects the 
psychological type of the Analytical Scientist (Laughlin et al., 
1981; Mitroff and Kilmann, 1978). They also reflect an inherent 
interest in "technical administration" and is impregnated with a 
technical rationality (Habermas, 1972). The implications of this 
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and the different classifications themselves will be discussed in 
detail in the next chapter. 
2.4 O.E. Research Within the Functionalist View of Social Reality 
Research within this matrix shares fundamental assumptions 
on three levels: ontological, epistemological and methodological. 
Ontologically, researchers here generally view man as basically 
deterministic and a part of the naturalistic world which can be 
objectively studied just like other natural objects, e.g. plants and 
animals. The proper study of man is conceived to be the problem 
and nature of social order and as in the natural sciences, attempts 
are made to formulate universal laws of behaviour that will predict 
and explain causal human behaviour. The search for hypothetical-
deductive theories, which permit the deduction of empirical 
generalizations from lawlike hypotheses and the requirement of 
controlled observation and experimentation indicate that 
"theories of the empirical sciences disclose reality 
subject to the constitutive interest in the possible 
securing and expansion, through information, of 
feedback-monitored action. This is the cognitive 
interest in technical control over objectified 
processes". (p309, Habermas, 1972) 
Though there are broad similarities on these three sets of assumptions 
there are nevertheless, differences amongst the different theories 
of D.E. It is contended that these differences are on two levels: 
ontologically, as to the existence of an organization as a reified 
whole and epistemologically, as to the degree of value neutrality 
present and admissible in social theory. These two differences 
\ 
may be represented as two dimensions which can be used to classify 
the literature. 
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The first dimension is often labelled as a distinction between 
'descriptive' and normative/prescriptive theories. 'Descriptive' 
theories purport to be explanations and predictions of empirical 
phenomena that are value-free. They merely 'report' without 
incorporating any of the value judgements of the researcher 
investigating the situation. Hence, descriptive theories of O.E. 
limit themselves to the two following questions: 
(a) What are the actual, real goals in an organization? 
(b) How far has the organization achieved these goals? 
Empirically, descriptive theories that seek to demonstrate 
causal relationships have tried to show that 'effective' 
organizations have distinctive characteristics, that is, their 
definitions of O.E. are given constructively (Pondy, 1977). (See 
Price, 1968; Lawrence and Larsch, 1967). 
Normative theories on the other hand include within their 
formulation explicit consideration of values, ethics or morals 
(this distinction between positive, descriptive theories and 
normative ones is clearly shown in the various branches of 
economics). Normative theories of O.E. attempt to ask a third 
question: what~hould the goals of an organization be and how 
successful is the organization when measured against these goals? 
In general these theories attempt to evaluate observable 
organizational behaviour and goals against a clearly explicated 
normative standpoint. In order that organizations may be 
effective, they 'ought to be' or must pursue certain strategies. 
That is, O.E. is defined ostensibly (Pondy, 1977). The work of 
Keeley (1978) and Cummings (1977) are clearly in this area. 
It is argued that such labels are logically and analytically 
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unhelpful. To the extent that no theory is value-free, except 
possibly a 'pure' mathematical theory, it is impossible to describe 
all phenomenon without prescribing from some value premise- (Allen, 
1975; Blackburn, 1972). As already discussed brilliantly by Berlin 
(1962) and Bernstein (1976) all knowledge is a product of the social 
world and so is the means by which knowledge is acquired, 
compartmentalised, conceptualised and evaluated. 'Facts' are always 
creatures of specific historical, social, economic and political 
conditions. Therefore, beliefs and values will influence the 
choice of objects of 'description', the language and concepts used 
in 'describing'. For these reasons, our first dimension used in 
classifying O.E. theories will be re-labelled 'implicitly 
prescriptive' and explicitly prescriptive'. The implicitly 
prescriptive bias of so-called descriptive theories is revealed in 
that they often assume that current, observable goals are 
sacrosansct and ought to prevail in the long-run. 
The second dimension may be labelled as parochial versus 
holistic views on the nature of organisations, goals and O.E. A 
parochial theorist argues that O.E. does not exist per se and argue 
for adopting the goals and values of a particular participant 
group as the criterion against which to measure O.E. For example, 
a theorist could argue that the goals of shareholders/equity owners 
were the most important in assessing O.E. A holistic researcher, 
on the other hand, views the organisation as a whole and evaluates 
effectiveness from the standpoint of the totality. For example, 
the satisficing notions of Simon (1964) and Tinker's F-set (1975) 
attempt to maintain a holistic view of the organisation. There 
are also O.E. theories which lie midway on this dimension, which 
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argue that whilst one must view the organisation as a total coalition 
with different stakeholders, D.E. can only be assessed via an analysis 
of the separate effects of corporate action on different interest 
groups. Hence, a particular strategy should be assessed by looking at 
its individual effects on, say, customers, suppliers, etc. 
These two dimensions are not put forward as a priori categories 
which classify all functionalist social theories. Rather, they 
are put forward as empirical classifications that pertain 
particularly to functionalist theories of organizational assessment. 
Their validity stems primarily from the fact that they strike at 
the heart of prevailing controversy within this matrix. The first 
dimension, for example, is an epistemological assumption about the 
nature and limits of scientific knowledge. The second is an 
ontological belief about the nature of social reality, a belief as 
to whether social collectivities can in any sense be analysed and 
studied as a whole. As such, this classification of functionalist 
D.E. theories strikes at the fundamental differences and 
assumptions which underlie each approach. It highlights deep-seated 
differences in rules of guidance; unlike the classifications of 
Steers (1977) and Campbell (1977) which but skate on the surface of 
methodological differences between different D.E. theories. Neither 
of these two reviews attempts to derive a comprehensive argument 
as to the root causes of differentiation; they also fail to locate 
functionalist, mainstream D.E. theories within the larger framework 
of different modes of social inquiry. It is, therefore, contended 
that the classificatory matrix shown below in Diagram 2.1 will 
prove a more useful analytical tool. 
Parochial 
Holistic 
Implicitly 
prescriptive 
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Explicitly 
prescriptive 
Diagram 2.1: A Classificatory Matrix for Functional 
Theories of Organisational Effectiveness 
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2.S Implicitly Prescriptive Level of Analysis 
within this category fall several variants of the so-called 
'goal model of D.E.'. This term, however, is somewhat of a misnomer 
as the concept of organizational goals has at times been wholly 
equated with these theories. Hence, inherent weaknesses in these 
approaches to D.E. have led some researchers to reject outright 
the notion of organizational, as opposed to group, goals. Second, 
the oft-made distinction in the literature between a 'goal-model' 
and a 'systems model' of D.E. is not helpful and tends to imply that 
system analysts do not consider the notion of organizational goals. 
The term 'a goal-model of organizational effectiveness' will hence 
be avoided and if used will always be put in ,parentheses to indicate 
that it has a limited meaning, viz to refer solely to the official 
goal model, the operative goal model and the dominant coalitional 
goal model. 
2.5.1 Implicitly Prescriptive, Parochial Approaches to D.E. 
The legitimated authority (or official) goal model falls within 
this cl assification. It focus~ on the 
"general purposes of the organization as put 
forth in the charter, annual reports, public 
statements by key executives and other 
authoritative pronouncements". (p8SS, Perrow, 1961) 
Hence, it argues that O.E. be evaluated against the currently stated 
goals of the officers within the organisation, including those 
contained in corporate policy statements and procedure manuals. 
This approach to D.E. has close affinitie to what Gouldner (19S9) 
called the rational systems approach to organisations which argued 
that goals are the rational outcome of organisation practice which 
are themselves rational phenomena and that they contribute to the 
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overall rationality of organisations. Such a perspective has its 
roots in the Weberian concept of functional rationality which sees 
organisations as rational instruments set up to attain expressly 
announced organisational goals. As such a rational instrument the 
organisation represents an economy whose main lack is the systematic, 
rational manipulation of scarce resources, including labour for the 
attainment of these specific goals (Selznick, 1948). The rational 
systems perspective on organisation tends to focus on the means 
activities, while the official goal model focusses on the ends 
announced by key figures in an organisation. 
This model is exemplified by much of the work done in accounting 
for non-profit organisations (NPO) - so-called 'evaluation research'. 
This area of work expanded rapidly in the u.S. during the 1960's 
especially due to the Federal Government's emphasis on rationalised 
decision-making in the Department of Defence. Techniques for 
evaluation such as PPBS, cost-benefit analysis, cost-effectiveness 
analysis and zero-based budgeting were and still are widely used 
in evaluating the effectiveness of welfare, educational and voluntary 
institutions. However, such approaches often take the "official" 
version of organisational goals and no effort is made to provide a 
normative, critical analysis. For example, the work of Sorenson and 
Grove (1977); Weathersby and Balderston (1972); Sizer (1979); 
Cameron (1978) and Norris (197g) all start from the premise that 
the goals of a university relate to teaching, research and the 
promotion of societal progress through increasing its stock of 
knowledge. 
Such an analysis of organisational goals is extremely naive 
as tofficial l or legitimated authority statements are not useful 
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standards for evaluating effectiveness; being often vague, non-
operational and subjected to a variety of interpretations. 
Though such statements may give some guidelines as to the 
objectives of an organisation, they may equally be pieces of 
managerial propaganda. In any case, they are not representative 
of the goals of all organisational participants and hence, in no 
sense can they be representative of the whole organisation. 
Yet another rather unsatisfactory parochial approach which has 
gained some acceptance amongst organisation theorists is the dominant 
coalitional model. This identifies the notion of organisational 
goals with the goals of the 'dominant coalition' within an 
organisation. It is argued that since o~ganisations are 
collectivities they do not have goals. What one observes is but 
organisational behaviour which is indicative of the goals of 
powerful individuals within the organisation, that is, the goals 
which are currently operational within an organisation are in 
reality those of this dominant sub-group (Cyert and March, 1963). 
Similarly, Goodman and Pennings (1977) define organisational 
goals as desired end states specified by the dominant coalition; 
an organisation is effective if it satisfies relevant constraints and 
approximates or exceeds a set of referents for those multiple goals. 
Thompson (1967) is yet another proponent of this theory and he 
poses two questions with regard to identifying goals: (i) how can 
one define the goals within and (ii) how can one discover the 
dominant goals? 
\ 
While this concept of a dominant coalition is useful and leads to 
a fruitful emphasis on the politics of goal-setting and change, 
much empirical work remains to be done in order to establish that 
_ 32 _ 
such a stable coalition can be identified. It may be that interest 
and participant groups are so tightly coupled and inter-dependent 
that it is not possible for organisational behaviour to be fully 
determined by the goals of anyone dominant group. It is often 
observed that the goals of top management are considerably modified 
by lower level participants. As Georgiou (1973) argues: 
"Organisations' behaviour cannot be so fully determined 
by the goals of anyone group. These goals are 
modified, conditioned and limited by the need to 
satisfy the demands of other groups upon which the 
ostensibly dominant group is dependent to achieve its 
goals, or more accurately, some part of them". (p297, 
Georgiou, 1973) 
Georgiou illustrates pointedly from Perrow's (1961) own work 
on hospitals; where none of the three groups - trustees, 
administrators, or doctors - could achieve the degree of control 
required by a dominant group, because the goal attainment of each 
was firmly dependent on the resources possessed by the others. 
Further, power could be widely distributed within an organisation, 
or the influence of interest groups could be curtailed by 
environmental factors beyond their control - legislation, social 
changes, etc. 
In addition, assessing effectiveness in terms of the extent to 
which the goals of the dominant coalition have been achieved does 
not appear to be assessing organisational effectiveness. The word 
organisational has effectively been replaced by the words 
'dominant coalition'. This stems directly from a parochial as 
opposed to a holistic analysis of an organisation. By concentrating 
\ 
on the achievement of dominant coalition needs, this approach 
neglects to consider the needs and contributions of other ('non-
dominant') members. How do their goals fit into the effectiveness 
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picture? What is their opinion of how effective the organisation 
is in terms of their interests? Surely organisational evaluation 
should seek to assess the organisation as a whole and to incorporate 
the voices of all member groups in such an assessment. 
This criticism reflects a fundamental difficulty with parochial 
approaches to the study of O.E. - their inability to understand the 
organisation as a whole. In effect, these theories deny the 
concept of a holistic coalition and substitute a partial analysis 
for a general one. Because of this partial analysis, these theories 
fail to discriminate satisfactorily between the goals and non-goals 
of an organisation. Because organisations are holistic systems, 
there are outcomes or events which are properly called the outcomes 
of the organisation. These are irreducible to the acts of specific 
individuals (Haworth, 1959; Maudelbaum, 1955). But how does one 
distinguish a sub-set of all these outcomes as the goals, the intended 
functions of the organisation? Often, member intention has been 
used by theorists as a means of distinguishing these outcomes. That 
is, those outcomes which were intended and planned for by members of 
the organisation are designated as goals, while those which are not 
presumably are the non-goals. But this solution ignores the fact 
that these members m~y not have intended other outcomes which are 
generally considered goals. For example, the activities of employees 
or customers may contribute to profits without being so intended but 
this does not mean that profits are not a goal of a company. This 
issue of goals is further confused when one begins to speak of 
official and unofficial goals and the concept of "goal displacement". 
These are value-laden terms that tend to view the goals of management 
as being the only legitimate ends of an organisation. All else, so 
it is implied, are deflections from the proper course of action. 
Finally, highlighting the goals of particular interest groups 
may not adequately resolve the problem of conflicting preferences 
and goals amongst different interest groups. Friedlander and 
Pickle (1968) showed, for example, that the demands of various 
groups (the community, government, customers, suppliers, creditors, 
owners and employees) could not be concurrently satisfied and, in 
fact, some demands were negatively correlated with others. Though 
the dominant coalition model does attempt to incorporate some 
analysis of interparticipant group bargaining, there is a danger 
that one concentrates only on the powerful individuals within the 
organi~ation, while neglecting the needs and goals of the 'less 
dominant' and 'the rest of the organisation'. 
2.5.2 Implicitly Prescriptive, Holistic Approaches to D.E. 
In contrast to the official, legitimated authority model, the 
'operative goal model' attempts to focus on the 
"ends sought through the actual operating policies 
of the organisation; they tell us what the 
organisation actually is trying to do, regardless 
of what the official goals say are the aims". 
(p855, Perrow, 1961) 
This general rubric of operative goals includes the decisions made 
in choosing the priority of multiple goals and the unofficial 
goals pursued by various participant groups within the organisation. 
Unlike the two approaches discussed above, this model does try to 
analyse organisational behaviour as opposed to the behaviour of 
particular groups and individuals. Perrow, however, did add that 
operative goals would be shaped by the dominant group, but this 
influence is seen as being illustrative of participant group 
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influence. Uruike the dominant coalitional model, the notion of 
operative goals does not ignore the interests of 'less dominant' 
participants. 
Compared with the earlier approaches Perrow's distinction between 
official and operative goals is useful. However, as Keeley (1978) 
pointed out, there are difficulties with the model. Firstly, it 
is difficult to determine what organisations are actually doing or 
trying to do. In some cases the activities of organisational members 
may suggest a clear-cut goal, but more often activities are capable 
of a variety of social interpretations and there may be 
inconsistent accounts of the purpose of a given choice. To propose 
that one can discover what an organisation is actually doing by 
looking hard enough naively assumes that there is only one 'objective', 
substantive reality that influences organisational behaviour. It is 
far more likely that organisational participants act and behave on 
their subjective, value-laden, perception and construction of reality. 
And, therefore, to propose that one tries to discover what an 
organisation is 'actually' doing may be looking for the needle in 
the haystack (Schutz, 1967; Weick, 1979). 
Secondly, this approach does not resolve the problems of 
conflicting preferences amongst participants and hence internally 
conflicting 'operative goals'. Hall (1972) noted that the 'operative 
goal' model may not be applicable to the organizatjon as a whole 
(to the extent that intra-organizational conflict exists) and it 
may not be possible to employ the concept across organizations 
(to the extent that operative goal-sets differ). Steers (1975) 
attempted to provide a preference ordering to 'operative goals' by 
suggesting that such goals be weighted according to the effort 
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expended in their pursuit. Effectiveness was then measured by the 
degree to which a weighted 'operative goal' set was optimised, 
subject to internal and external constraints. But this approach 
fails to r2cognise that the amount currently expended on 'operative 
goals' may not be what should be expended in terms of long-run 
survival or some other evaluative norm. 
Indeed, what the organisation is trying to do may not be what it 
should be doing! This third criticism touches on a central 
diffic~lty with these uncritical so-called 'descriptive' theories 
of O.E. That is, in the course of avoiding explicitly prescriptive 
criteria of organisational worth, they appear to embrace a 
conservative philosophy that elevates the status quo to a normative 
ideal. Such an approach concludes that the particular goals that 
are observed to be operative, official or dominant at an arbitrary 
point in time - that of observation - are assumed to indicate a 
"proper" course for the organisation. These theories fail to ask 
higher order evaluative questions - should these be the goals of the 
organisation, should the organisation be doing in the future what it 
is now doing? Should the goals of the dominant coalition be 
dominant? By neglecting to ask these questions, these theories, 
in fact, promote the existing social and power structure within an 
organisation and its societal environment. They provide few signposts 
for change and in cybernetic terms lack a feedback control device. 
2.6 Approaches to D.E. which Lie on the Boundaries of the Two 
Dimensions 
The following are approaches to D.E. which are not easily 
categorised into one of the four boxes and, in fact, fall 
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approximately in the middle of the diagram. Included in here 
is the so-called 'multiple-constituency' approach of Connolly, 
Conlen and Deutsch (1980). 
They argue that though organisations are holistic coalitions, 
nevertheless they cannot be assessed holistically. Essentially, 
there is no such concept as "?rganisational effectiveness". One 
can only speak of effectiveness for a particular group of participants 
which might mean ineffectiveness for another group. As seen in 
the next chapter, this practice has been advocated by Hopwood (l979). 
Empirical support for this position, so it is argued comes from such 
work as that of Friedlander and Pickle (1968) who discovered that 
participant group demands on small business organisations had low and 
at times negative correlations. Therefore, since different group 
demands cannot be statistically correlated they must be assessed 
separately in order to avoid interpersonal comparisons of trade-
offs. 
Much of the social responsibility accounting literature also 
adopt this 'separate effect' argument. For example, the AAA Report 
on "Non-Financial Measures of Effectiveness" (197l) argues that 
"except where goals are clearly specified, the 
best we can hope to achieve is to provide 
information which might potentially aid individual 
users in evaluating effectiveness. In this sense 
it might be more appropriate to substitute non-
financial measures of "events" or "effects" in place 
of "effectiveness"." (pl67, AAA, 1971) 
Consequently, most social reports on company performance set out 
separately corporate effects on customers, suppliers, stockholders, 
the "physical environment", the "social environment", etc. (see, 
Schreuder, 1979; Dierkes, 1979; Brockhoff, 1979). 
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Though practically unassailable, this theory of D.E. ignores the 
vital empirical 'fact' that managers and organisations continually 
make decisions and choices which have unequal effects on different 
participant groups, i.e. unequal as well as different (the former 
adjective implying a common standard of assessment being possible) . 
Further, as with parochial approaches this denies the existence of 
an organisation as a whole. 
2.7 Explicitly Prescriptive Level of Analysis 
These theories of D.E. attempt to articulate some prescriptive 
criterion against which organisational behaviour may be evaluated. 
They escape the weaknesses of the above approach but prescriptive 
analysis is not without its problems. Firstly, should social 
scientists attempt to prescribe organisational behaviour? Dr should 
one leave judgements of 'what ought to be done' to participant 
groups within the organisation? As argued before, no theory is 
completely value free and even so-called 'descriptive' approaches 
to D.E. embrace a rather conservative philosophy. Therefore, it 
is not possible to merely 'describe' without prescribing and it is 
imperative that one recognises and articulates the value premises 
and assumptions of one's theoretical position. Further, it is only 
by having a vision of 'what ought to be' that one may induce change 
that may be required in prevailing systematic relationships and 
thus improve the collective human welfare of organisations and 
societies. Without such a vision human relationships reduce to 
adhoc, random responses that may not contribute to the full 
development of man's abilities. Secondly, there are prescriptive 
approaches which are parochial and therefore are unable to predict 
and explain the workings of the organisation as a whole. However, 
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prescriptive, holistic approaches to D.E. do also exist and they 
point the way forward towards an adequate theory of D.E. within 
the functionalist paradigm. 
2.7.1 Explicitly Prescriptive, Parochial Approaches to D.E. 
These attempt to argue that the criteria, goals, values and 
beliefs of particular participant groups ought to be used as the 
standard for evaluating organisational effectiveness. Much of 
classical economic and accounting theory which is based on a stockholder 
theory of the firm falls within this category. These approaches 
emphasize profit-maximisation as the optimisation criterion and 
financial surrogates of effectiveness such as profitability, profits, 
return on investment, earnings per share and dividends. 
As Tinker (1975) points out such approaches derive from early 
ideas about the motivation and behaviour of man; whose behaviour 
could be prescribed and explained in terms of the maximisation of 
the net (present) value of expected flows of benefits and sacrifices. 
In the market economy these flows were approximated to monetary 
(exchange) flows and subsequently accountants accepted the general 
premises of the advocates of economic income, subjective profit and 
net present value and struggled to 'patch over' the equivocations of 
earlier theorists. Thus, Edwards and Bell (1961) have proposed two 
'objective' definitions of income - business profit and realisable 
profit. The difficulty with such so-called 'objective' financial 
measures of organisational worth is that current market values may 
not reflect the unique talents and'.skills of a particular, enterprise. 
Though these discrepancies may work themselves out in the long r~ in 
the short run they are inevitable, and consequently could mislead 
the users of such information. 
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A similar emphasis on the goals of the 'owners' of the firm is 
exhibited in the work of Becker and Neuhauser (l975), who argue that it is 
only the owners, i.e. the holders of property rights to the total 
organisation who have the right to shape and mould the organisation. 
Their entrepreneurial theory of the firm is based on an assertion 
that organisations are owned and hence can be treated with transferable 
rights. According to the theory, the owners of a privately owned 
company are the shareholders whilst those of a publicly held 
organisation like a hospital, are probably the chief executives or 
board of trustees. 
Their approach to O.E. is highly questionable. Firstly, it 
closely resembled the 'official goal model' in its naivety. Secondly, 
it fails to take into consideration the preferences and values of 
other participant groups; such neglect may lead to the ultimate 
detriment of the organisation as a whole. However, the approach may 
still be fruitful in that it highlights the notion of satisfying 
the needs of participant groups. But one must not only concentrate 
on the need satisfaction of one particular group but of the coalition 
as a whole, since only in that manner can one reach valid 
predictions and explanations. 
A radically different parochial perspective is taken by two other 
theorists. Because prescriptive approaches to O.E. centre on issues 
such as the allocation of benefits and contributions in the face of 
conflicting interests, and the feasibility of defining an optimum 
position on an organizational social welfare function, theorists 
have also (perhaps inevitably) turned to moral and ethical philosophy 
and welfare economics in an attempt to legitimize their particular 
parochial positions. Cummings (1977) for instance, argues that an 
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effective organization is one in which the greatest percentage of 
members perceive themselves free to use the organization and its 
subsystems and instruments for their own ends. This approach 
clearly echoes the classical utilitarian principles of Bentham and 
Mill which stress the greatest satisfaction of the greatest number. 
However, there are defects with this focus on the satisfaction of 
needs of 'as many members as possible'. First, it is difficult to 
generalize. Second, it is theoretically suspect in a number of 
disciplines: in economics since interpersonal comparisons of 
satisfaction are frowned upon; in philosophy since a 'just' distribution 
of satisfaction may not be assured; and in sociology since there is 
no clear-cut connection between aggregate social utility and system 
stability. Thirdly, a satisfied coalition may not be a physically 
productive one, and clearly the concept of D.E. should include some 
notion of productivity; more to the point nor may the state of 
satisfaction be conclusive to the survival of the whole enterprise, 
upon whom the survival of the satisfaction of the individual member 
is said to depend. 
Nevertheless, these suggestions are useful in that though 
parochially-oriented the ethics of allocation are being explicitly 
considered. To date accountants and organization theorists in a 
seemingly concerted conspiracy have studiously avoided any mention 
of a value-based, moral criterion of organizational assessment. 
Lip service has been paid to the necessity of reporting on the social 
consequences of corporate action but the welfare issues of allocation 
have been deflected by taking a conservative 'separate effects' 
approach. Unlike welfare economists, hardly any attempt has been 
.made to rigorously analyse the value basis on which judgements of 
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'worthiness' and 'effectiveness' must necessarily be based. Few 
O.E. researchers recognize or acknowledge that questions about O.E. 
are linked tightly to questions about the social desirability of a 
particular allocation of inducements and contributions. 
The work of Keeley (1978) is, therefore, a refreshing 
reminder of this. He rightly saw the links between theories of 
O.E. and welfare economics and went on to explicate the work of 
Rawls as a theory of organizational assessment. He argues for a 
moral norm - maximising the utility of a system's most 
disadvantaged (and regretful) participants on the grounds that this 
is what rational human beings would choose if they were behind a 
"veil of ignorance". 
Rawls' theory of justice is based on two principles, 
"first, each person is to have an equal right to 
the most extensive basic liberty compatible with 
a similar liberty for others" and second, "social 
and economic inequalities are to be arranged so 
that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of 
the least advantaged and (b) attached to position 
and offices open to all under conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity". (p83, Rawls, 1971) 
Rawl's work has been much criticised, particularly his maximin 
principle, i.e. maximising the satisfaction of the least 
advantaged participants. As Orr and Rarnm (1974) point out the 
Rawlsian argument is not hard to rationalise in terms of any 
criterion and Keeley proves the point. He changes the criterion 
to that of a minimax regret principle! Further, Rawl's 
principles may prove insufficient for policy making when extended 
beyond a two-individual two-state world, as in the following 
situation. 
Consider an organization of three individuals who must choose 
between two mutually exclusive states of the world Xl and X2 each 
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~ State of the world .1 2 .3 
u. = 50 u 2 = 20 u 3 = 10 1 1. 
U. = 50 u 2 = 10 u 3 = 20 2 1. 
u = utils of satisfaction 
Diagram 2.2: A Welfare Matrix 
\ 
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of which leads to only one state of the world and satisfies Rawls' 
two conditions of justice equally. The welfare realized by the 
members of the organization in the social states resulting from 
these actions are: Xl and X2· 
Suppose Xl is chosen; setting X2' then, would ~e more just and 
effective, since it would increase the welfare of the least 
advantaged individual from 10 to 20. However, if X2 were chosen, 
Xl would once again become just, because X2 makes individual 2 the 
least advantaged individual. Such trade-offs in fact, could leave 
a system vacillating between two or more situations, all of which 
are just and effective. Rawls, in fact, does not discuss well such 
~yclical problems of the type suggested. He assumes, rather 
conveniently, that society is 'chain-connected'. That is, the 
effect of any benefit to the least advantaged will also benefit 
everyone .else. Also Rawls' definition of the least 'advantaged' 
is difficult to operationalize. Does one use income as a surrogate 
measure? But income is well known as being only an approximation 
of happiness. 
Secondly, Rawls claims that one of the important advantages 
claimed for the principles derived from the original position is 
that they stand a greater chance of compliance in the real world than 
any of their competitors. For this to be true, however, it is 
necessary that the principles be formulated so that all 
individuals can determine fairly readily what conduct compliance 
requires, and, of course, all must be compelled by the nature of 
the arguments for compliance based upon a consensus reached in the 
original position. Hart (1973) shows by some simple illustrations 
how the rights to exclude trespassers exercised by a farmer could 
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conflict with the rights to free movement of a hiker. That is, 
the priority of liberty principle explicated by Rawls will do nothing 
to promote compliance with the social contract if the farmer and 
hiker, or any two people selected at random, are not likely to 
agree on whose right is to be preserved upon adopting the 
reflective frame of mind called for in the original position. 
Problems of compliance could also arise among the various 
candidates for the worst off position (Klevorick, 1974). As Arrow 
(1973) and Harsanyi (l97S) have noted, these are likely to include 
the mentally and physically ill and handicapped as well as the very 
poor. But with the set of primary goods defined over several 
dimensions, individuals in the original position would be forced 
into the same kind of interpersonal utility comparisons as the type 
Rawls seeks to avoid (Arrow, 1973). 
A third criticism of Rawls can be seen in the works of Nagel 
(1973) and Nozick (1974). They point out that individuals may 
want to consider the context and process by which outcomes are 
determined, perhaps along with those outcomes, in choosing 
principles of justice. That is, the fun of a game is in playing, 
and all of the rules would govern the process by which winners are 
selected and not the final positions of the winners. It is 
dangerous, of course, to draw too close the analogy between life 
and the choice of social states with a game of chance. However, 
it is ironic that Rawls' theory which derives its conception of 
justice from the process by which principles are chosen, rules out 
all consideration of principles that deal with the subsequent 
process of social interaction. 
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Lastly, like Cummings, Keeley fails to recognise that different 
participants control resources which differ in terms of their 
strategic utility to the coalition as a whole. Hence, those who 
at present are the most regretful members may require less attention 
because one must consider the needs of other dissatisfied members 
who possess more critical resources. In other worlds, if the system 
as a whole is to continue to survive as a need-satisfier in the 
long-run, then a simple blanket optimization principle such as that 
advanced may not be sufficient. 
The debate about Rawls' work could go on for many pages but 
it is hoped that some of the essential points have been dealt with 
here., The reason for concentrating on his work is that he, more 
than any other economist has tried to suggest principles for defining 
a unique social optimum. As argued before, few economists have tried 
to systematically define such an optimum and have confined themselves 
to delineating the set of conditions necessary for Pareto 
optimality. Rawls' work attempts to conform to Arrow's axioms and 
to derive a theory of social optimality that focusses on the 
process or context in which decisions are made. 
As can be seen, prescriptive approaches to O.E. have tried to 
draw on welfare economics as a way forward in assessing organizations. 
But parochial approaches suffer from inherent weaknesses by being 
parochial, and lacking a concept of the totality of interactions. 
The individualistic basis of economics, reflected in the way in which 
welfare functions are conceptualized as mere aggregates of individual 
utilities, in which the concept of inter-personal comparison of 
utilities (though an acknowledged explanation of empirical phenomena) 
is seen as inimical, renders much of this line of inquiry impotent. 
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However, welfare economists at least recognize the value assumptions 
which underlie their work. 
We turn now to the last 'box' for review. Here theories of 
O.E. will be considered which take a totalistic perspective of 
the organization. 
2.7.2 Explicitly Prescriptive, Holistic Approaches to O.E. 
An approach which falls into this box is the systems resource 
model of Yuchtman and Seashore (1967). Their theory is not strongly 
prescriptive and hence is placed towards the left-hand corner of 
the box. 
Yuchtman and Seashore define effectiveness as the ability of 
the organization in either absolute or relative terms, to exploit' 
its environment in the acquisition of scarce and valued resources. 
The Yuchtman and Seashore model, sets out explicitly to 
reject the notion of goals being used for organizational 
evaluation but, in fact, retains that concept. (See Hall, 1972; 
Keeley, 1978.) According to the model, the acquisition of resources 
from the environment is based upon an 'ultimate criterion' which is 
unfortunately left unspecified. They argue that since this 
ultimate criterion (whatever it may be) is impossible to measure 
(sic) it is more feasible to specify penultimate criteria. As can 
be seen, their ultimate criterion is identical to previous 
concepts of universal goals and their penultimate criteria to 
'operative goals'. Hence this issue of goals versus resource 
acquisition is in many ways an a:r:,gument over semantics. Further, 
the acquisition of resources does not just happen. It is based on 
what the organization is trying to achieve - its goal. As Mohr (1973) 
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points out, the definitions of 'valued' and 'scarce' resources 
may be ambiguous in the absence of more specific goals. Hence, 
the Yuchtman and Seashore model merely places its emphasis on the 
attainment of means towards unspecified organizational goals. It 
differs from the 'official goal' and 'operative goal' models only 
in terms of abstraction and emphasis in its definition of 
organizational goals. 
The model is further criticised for implying that the 
effectiveness issue is one that must be handled organization by 
organization, or at least type of organization by type of 
organization, since different types of organizations or parts of 
cn organization require different resources. One is, therefore, 
not surprised when empirical studies which implicitly utilise 
the model show that penultimate criteria of effectiveness could 
vary from one department to another within the same organization 
(Mahoney, 1967; Mahoney and Weitzel, 1969). Essentially, this 
model denies a holistic perspective that assesses the organization 
as a whole, and one is left rather unsatisfactorily with assessing 
departmental effectiveness. 
Though this particular systems model of O.E. did not gain 
widespread acceptance, the systems model of organizations did. 
From the early 1950's onwards 'the systems approach' has assumed 
increasing importance in a wide variety of social sciences -
from organization theory, sociology, psychology to archaeology. 
Though Naughton (1979) is correct to some extent in suggesting 
that systems theory is not a totally coherent body of thought but 
rather a "melange of insights, theorems, tautologies and hunches", 
it is argued here that there are strands within the literature 
which identify systems thinking and which set it apart as a 
distinctive mode of thought and methodology. 
The central concept of systems thinking is that of a 'system' 
itself - defined as a whole of interacting parts (Von Bertalanffy, 
1968). Systems analysts stress that complex, high level systems 
like micro-organizations, and human societies must be studied 
holistically in contrast to the reductionist approach of much 
natural-scientific activity. As Checkland (1972) points out 
"the systems movement .•... represents an attempt 
to be holistic, and to find out the consequences 
of being holistic, in any area of endeavour". 
(p2, Checkland, 1972). 
This approach emphasizes the importance of emergent properties, 
i.e. properties that are characteristic of the system but not of 
its parts. This concept of holism may be and has been further 
extended. Phillips (1977) produces a useful classification of the 
ways in which 'holism' has been conceptualized. Holism 3 states 
that it is necessary to have terms referring tc the wholes and their 
properties whilst Holism 2 states that a whole, even after it is 
studied cannot be explained in terms of its parts. 'Holism'I, the 
strongest form of the 'holism' thesis states that: 
(i) the analytic approach, as typified by 
the physico-chemical sciences, proves 
inadequate when applied to certain cases, 
e.g. to a biological organism, to society, 
or even to reality as a whole; 
(ii) the whole is more than the sum of its parts; 
(iii) the whole determines the nature of its parts; 
(iv) the parts cannot be understood in isolation from 
the whole; and 
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(v) the parts are dynamically inter-related or 
interdependent. 
As Otley (1981) points out, it is not often clear which 
meaning of the term 'holism' is intended by system theorists. 
However, the tenets of Holism 1 (see Phillips, 1977) have been 
most often implied by system analysts. A second unifying strand 
in systems research is the belief that the purpose of systems 
thinking is to understand, explain, predict and thereby control 
the underly~ng structure and behaviour of the system as a whole. 
A causal analysis of the determinants of order and change is, 
therefore required and so is an analysis of the inter-relationships 
,amongst the parts of a system. 
Within the limits of these general, unifying strands, there are, 
however, a wide variety of systems models. As Morgan (1979) and 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue systems theorists have used a 
number of analogies or metaphors to represent the phenomena being 
studied. They identified five commonly used systems metaphors: 
mechanical, organismic, morphogenic, factional and catastrophic. 
The first three of these have been developed within a "functionalist 
paradigm" whilst the latter two have been linked with the more 
radical approaches. 
The mechanistic model of organization argues that 
organizations are basically in an underlying state of dynamic 
equilibrium or homeostatis. All disturbances from the environment 
or elsewhere can only lead to temporary disequilibrium as the 
system will arways be able to cope with such influences. This 
systems metaphor, however, soon lost its importance as 
researchers began to recognize that its basic assumption of 
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equilibrium was not empirically valid and that environmental 
change could radically change and destroy the very structure 
and essence of a system. 
Today the majority of systems models used in the social sciences 
tend to be built on the organismic analogy. Such analyses are 
usually organized around the following general principles: 
(a) that the system can be identified by a boundary 
drawn at a resolution level that reflects the 
researcher's interest; 
(b) that the system is essentially processual in 
nature; 
(c) that this process can be conceptualized in terms 
r 
of a basic model which focusses upon input, 
transformation, output and feedback; 
(d) that the system is composed of subsystems which 
contribute to the satisfaction of the system's 
overall needs; 
(e) that these subsystems, which themselves have 
identifiable boundaries, are in a state of mutual 
interdependence, both internally and in relation 
to their environment; 
(f) that the critical activities within the context 
of system operation are those that involve 
boundary transactions, both internally between 
subsystems and externally in relation to the 
environment; and 
(g) that in the context of system effectiveness, this 
is identified with the satisfaction of system needs 
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such that the long-run survival of the system is 
ensured. 
One of the earlier attempts to define O.E. using just such an 
organismic analogy of the organization is the work of Etzioni 
(1960). He starts from the premise that an organization is a 
'working model of a social unit which is capable of achieving a 
goal'. An organizational goal is further defined as a desired 
state of affairs which the organization attempts to realize. 
Etzioni thus concentrates on what Perrow (1961) terms operative 
goals. He also attempts to explicate two criteria for the 
assessment of O.E. First, there is a 'system survival model' 
which has an 'optimal', 'balanced' allocation of resources. Then 
there is a 'system effectiveness model' which is most effective 
in the service of a given goal, (operative goal). Though Etzioni's 
suggestions sound useful, upon scrutiny they are not. With the 
systems survival model one is not told what is an optimum or how it 
is to be achieved. Etzioni does suggest, however, that the analyst 
determines for himself what a highly effective allocation means! 
In the system effectiveness model, operative goal achievement 
appears to be the norm. We have discussed already the 
difficulties with such an approach. 
Other systems attempts at defining O.E. prescribe a list of 
systemic needs which ensure long-run survival. For example, 
Georgopoulos and Tannenbaum (1957) define O.E. as the extent to 
which an organization as a social system, given certain resources 
'. 
and means, fulfills its objectives without incapacitating its 
means and resources and without placing undue strain upon its 
members. They measure O.E. on three criteria: (i) organizational 
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productivity, (ii) organizatiollal flexibility and (iii) the absence 
of intra-organizational strain. Similarly, formulations are made 
by Parsons (19~O) who defines four functional imperatives and 
'problems' which must be met: adaptation, goal attainment, 
integration, latency or pattern maintenance. (See also Caplow, 
1964 (stability, integration, voluntarism); Katz and Kahn, 1966~ 
1978 (morale, public image, customer satisfaction, etc.l; Miller 
and Rice, 1967; Price, 1968 (productivity, conformity, morale, 
adaptiveness); Mott, 1972 (productivity, flexibility, adaptability); 
Duncan, 1973 (goal attainment, integration, adaptation); Gibson 
et al., 1973 (long-run survival); Negandhi and Reiman, 1973 (optimal 
balance between technical and social subsystems); Webb, 1974 
(cohesion, efficiency, adaptability, support).) 
The list grows and there have been precious few attempts to weed 
out the overlap between studies an~ ge~ down to core variables. 
Also, researchers differ in the way in which they define, 
operationalize and measure what ostensibly is the same construct. 
Steers (1977) found that out of seventeen studies on O.E. ten of 
them measured 'adaptability' as an aspect of effectiveness. However, 
each of these studies tended to differ in Uleir mode of measurement. 
In addition, researchers are often unclear and/or differ as to whether 
they define their criteria of O.E. as ends or means to an end. 
For example, organizational adaptability might be treated as a facet 
of the construct called O.E. or it could be considered as a means 
by which effectiveness is attained. Clearly, whether a measure is 
considered a means or an end involves value judgements on the pE.o.rt 
of the theorist whilst formulating his assumptions but theorists 
have not often been explicit enough about these assumptions. However, 
the issue is only of minor consequence as it is perfectly legitimate 
to argue that a characteristic is both a facet of effectiveness 
and a determinant of it. This is because circular reasoning is 
problematic only in an Aristotelian logic of linear causality but 
not in mutual or cybernetic causality (Maruyama, 1976). Also 
there are some time-honoured precedents for using the same property 
. 
both to define a concept and to describe its behaviour. For example, 
Dalton used the observation that chemical elements combine only in 
fixed proportions both to define and to state a property of chemical 
compounds (Kuhn, 1970). Nonetheless, as Campbell (1977) notes 
rather wryly, it would be nice to have some explicit overall 
hierarchical map of how the criteria fit together in terms of 
their generality-specificity and means-end relationships. 
Yet another criticism levelled at most organismic systems 
theories of O.E. is that they have reified the behaviour of 
individuals and people into a 'non-existent', omnipotent 
organization (Silverman, 1970). Reification in this sense means 
the attribut.ion of concrete reality, particularly the power of 
thought and action to social constructs; to the objectification of 
subjective, human process to external forces distanced from the 
acts of people and individuals. Some partial recognition of this 
criticism has been made in the latter organismic theories of O.E. 
The work of Georgiou (1973), Simon (1964) and Tinke!.' (1975) draws 
heavily on the work of Barnard (1938) in their conceptualizations 
of an organizational goal and th,~ir definitions of O.E. Tinker's 
work also relies on cybernetic models of organizations and lik~ 
Hayes' work (1977) shows the influence of contingency theories of 
management accounting. Collectively, this body of work may be 
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termed a participant-satisfaction model of organizations and O.E. 
The central idea of this approach is that an organization 
is an artefact set up within society by particular sectors of that 
society for the satisfaction of certain human needs. The organization 
is not some reified system that exists to pursue its own ends. It 
exists ultimately for the satisfaction of the needs of both its 
'internal and external' interest groups. This functional 
perspective argues that organizations, like any other creation of 
humans exist not within but because of human needs which they have 
a comparative advantage in fulfilling. (See Lowe and McInnes, 
1971; Lowe and Tinker, 1976; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978.) 
The argument is illustrated in Diagram 2.3. The 
existence of an organization depends on its ability to manaCJe the 
relationship between internal partici'pant needs and those if its 
environment and external participant groups. The term substantial 
environment is used to delineate those aspects of an organization's 
environment which more closely affect its functioning. This is to 
distinguish its environment from more general influen·:::es (general 
environment). The interaction between these two sets feeds back 
through time to influence subsequent needs and interaction 
\ 
patterns. (See Lowe and 500, 1980.) 
An early proponent of this approach was Barnard (1938) who 
defined 'efficiency' as the aggregate satisfaction of individual, 
subjective purposes for co-operation. 'Efficiency' reflected the 
ability of a system to maintain itself by returning human 
\ 
satisfaction in sufficient degree to induce continued participant 
co-operation. Within this notion of 'efficiency' Barnard implied 
that satisfactions among different participants need to be balanced 
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i"f the organization is to be viable. Simon (1964) also developed 
the notion that an organization being a coalition of diverse 
participant groups with diverse interests had to satisfy a variety 
of constraints and demands. An organizational goal was, therefore, 
comprised of a set of feasible constraints which when met satisfied 
participant groups enough to ensure ~1at they continued to provide 
their necessary support towards ensuring that appropriate activities 
were carried out. The participant-satisfaction model of O.E. may be 
represented by the following diagram which shows their linkage to 
the goal models of O.E. that have been discussed (Diagram 2.4). 
Such a model argued normatively that organizations ought to 
satisfy their parti~ipant needs in order to survive. An extension 
of these ideas has been made by Tinker (1975) and Lowe and Tinker 
(1977). Firstly, they argue that, as in Diagram 2.3, participants 
may be conceptualized as requiring a minimum level of inducements 
(which reflects their opportunity cost and their set of needs) 
before they join an organizational coalition. In exchange for this 
adequate level of inducements, each member then contributes to the 
organizational process 'qualities' that are necessary for the 
organizatjon's 'need-satisfying' activities. The participant 
contributions J;Jay be regarded as 'factors I and the inducements 
offered to him as products. Thus, the organizational coalition 
transforms a diverse range of contributions into 'need-satisfiers'. 
(See Tinker, 1975; Simon, 1947.) These ideas are further 
illustrated in Diagram 2.5 shown on the next page. 
Secondly, it is argued that societies differ in terms of the 
range of choice permitted to individuals and groups in satisfying 
their needs. This determines the range of alternative employments 
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or organizational coalitions which these individuals or groups 
could join; which in turn affects the level of 'need-satisfying' 
activity required on the part of an organization. It is 
postulated that in order for an organization to survive and be 
viable there is a minimum need-satisfaction level that is defined 
in terms of the total set of all members' opportunity cost of 
participation. This minimum need satisfaction level may also be 
termed the minimum viability level since, below that, the 
organization as such does not exist. In economic opportunity 
cost terms it may be defined as 'the minimum compensation (or 
sacrifice) to maintain each and every factor in its present 
employment in the long-run'. If an organization operates above 
this minimum, it enjoys a comparative which is relative to the 
best alternatives available to coalition members. 
These considerations give rise to a weak optimality 
condition which is in terms of meeting these opportunity cost 
constraints of participants such that the organization survives. 
However, if each and every factor is willing to carry on as it 
now is in the long-run it may be defined more strongly as an 
optimal solution. These ideas are illustrated in Diagram 2.6. 
The organization is viewed as a coalition of different groups 
with varying interests and preferences. Participants are 
classified operationally as belonging to a specific interest 
group, when in general, they make similar demands and contribute 
similar resources. That is, participants within a particular 
group would have similar expectations regarding organizational 
benefits and similar criteria for evaluating organizational 
utility. Each segment represents the needs and preferences of 
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each group (e.g. shareholders, management) and hence the alternative 
strategies which are favoured. The shaded intersection space 
represents the set of alternatives which are acceptable and 'good 
enough'for all participant groups. This set is termed the 
F-set (feasible-set). 
In order to survive now and in the future, the organization 
must induce a point in the F-set. In the context of such a model 
effectiveness is related to an organization's relative ability 
over time in satisfying the needs of its various participant 
groups in such a manner that organizational survival and 
satisfaction of the whole may be a continuing expectation. Note 
that the substantial environment in Diagram 2 ,,6 has been 
elaborated and examples of possible external interest groups are 
given such as overseas competitors, government legislation, 
trade unions, etc. 
The work of Tinker and Lowe and Tinker are dealt with in 
detail here because their functional approach with its emphasis 
on holistic analysis and its normative stress on the satisfaction 
of a feasible set of participant needs is potentially useful in 
developing an adequate theory of O.E. A brief discussion of what 
is deemed an adequate theory of social processes and structure 
will be presented in chapters 4 and 5. 
The F-set is based on a technical interest, concerned as it 
is to investigate, predict and control an external reality which 
is seen from the standpoint of the observer analyst. It seeks to 
develop a general theory of O.E. that is applicable to organizations 
in general irrespective of the prevailing societal context. Such 
a concern stresses the vital role of developing knowledge that is 
national 
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universally applicable in enabling man to manage each other and 
nature in order to keep within the narrow bandwidths of survival 
(Wiener, 1950). 
It offers an explanation of a participant group's desire to 
join and remain within an organization. In common with theories 
within a functionalist matrix the notion of the F-set attempts 
to provide an explanation of why the social fabric of a micro-
organization holds together. It is geared to providing an 
explanation of the regulated nature of human affairs, of the 
reasons and necessities for social order. However, implicit within 
its framework are also the embryonic strands of a normative 
theory of O.E. that analyses a participant group's decision to 
produce and act in a meaningful way. As March and Simon (1958) 
argue, these two sets of decisions underlie the structure and 
behaviour of micro-organizations. 
In addition, its reliance on systems and cybernetic concepts 
ensures that analyses will be concentrated on the organization as 
a complex whole with interacting sub-systems; it is felt that 
general systems theory is of vital importance in the study of 
complex wholes. Lastly, in developing the ideas of the F-set 
within a technical level of interest an opportunity is thereby 
provided whereby the insights from a participant satisfaction 
model may be synthesized with detailed analyses of systematic 
imperatives. 
For these reasons, chapter 8 attempts to build upon the F-set 
ideas to develop a theory of O.E: that is located within the 
functionalist matrix. Later in the thesis, the implications and 
limitations of such a theory will be discussed. 
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Before leaving this section a brief word will be made on 
Hayes' (1977) attempt to develop a contingency theory of 
management accounting that sought to measure departmental effect-
iveness. Like Solomons (1965) Hayes did not embark on a clear 
definition of organizational effectiveness; unlike welfare 
economists or management development practitioners, his concern 
was with the individual department within an organization. Hayes 
hypothesized that departmental effectiveness was dependent on three 
major contingencies: the sub-units - environment relationships, 
the relationships amongst sub-units and the level of inter-
dependence amongst them. These contingencies were themselves 
reflected in criteria of sub-unit assessment and included measures 
such as productivity, work group cohesion (internal), reliability, 
flexibility (interdependency) and share of market, environmental 
stability (environmental). 
Hayes' work clearly did not address the issue of O.E. nor did 
he develop in detail his derivation of measures of effectiveness 
which were problematic in that they were identical to his 
contingent constructs, i.e. to the means of achieving 
effectiveness. Further, his work and results have been extensively 
criticised by Tiessen and Waterrlouse (1978) who show that the use 
of a factor analytic methodology gives rise to problems in 
interpretation and comparison. Theoretically his theory of 
effectiveness is loosely linked to systems theory via 
contingency theory and hence is subject to the issues already 
discussed. Nevertheless, it is one of the few major empirical 
accounting studies on the assessment of effectiveness and uses 
a contingency framework. However, it has not yielded fresh 
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insights into the D.E. problem. 
2.8 Peripheral Functionalist Approaches to D.E. 
We move on to review the work of Weick and his contribution 
to the study of organizations and D.E. Weick's theory of 
organizations (1967, 1979) departs from the conventional view of 
organizations as concrete realities capable of goal-directed, 
'rational' behaviour. As pointed out earlier, to Weick, the 
organization is not an object, a thing but a series of interlinked 
organizing processes. The organization environment is, in part, 
enacted by the organization itself, not just given in a 
predetermined, independent variable sense. For Weick realities 
are always socially 20nstructed and communication and language 
are important processes for study. Weick, in fact, draws heavily 
on the works of Bateson (1972) and other theorists working in an 
interpretative matrix. However, Weick is not a theorist in 
this paradigm. As Burrell and Morgan (1979) point out it is easy 
for functional theorists who have a subjective view of reality 
to be equated with ethnomethodologists, phenomenologists or 
symbolic inteTClctionists. But whilst these theorists often make 
reference to 'the work of phenomenologists and ethnomethodologists 
they do not follow the full implications of the latter's point 
of view. Functional, subjectivistic theorists like Weick do tend 
to retain the standpoint of the observer, albeit an informed 
observer. Interpretative theorists on the other hand are 
primarily concerned with the understanding of the subjective 
experience of individuals; their theories are constructed from 
the standpoint of the individual actor. Further they reject the 
view that the world of human affairs can be studied in the 
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manner of the natural sciences but there is little indication 
in Weick's work that he totally rejects these methods. More 
importantly, Weick is concerned with understanding, predicting 
and hence controlling organizational life. Emphasis is merely 
placed upon the importance of developing scientific explanations 
enriched by individual, participant interpretations of social 
reality; whereas interpretative theories are concerned per se with 
a study of the ways in which social reality is meaningfully 
constructed and ordered from the point of view of the actors 
involved. This bias of Weick's is seen in his definition of O.E. 
Weick (1977) describes the concept constructively, i.e. by 
definlng the finished or effective product by listing the rules 
for producing it, just as a recipe defines a cake (Pondy. 1977). 
This is contrasted with ostensive definitions (characteristic of 
organismic systems models) which describe properties of the 
finished product. He argues that an effective organization is 
(1) garrulous; (2) clumsy; (3) superstitious; (4) hypocritical; 
(5) monstrous; (6) octopoid; (7) wandering and (8) grouchy. 
As Pondy (1977) points out his definition has an implicit 
emphasis on organizations as creative, problem-solving systems 
that need to maintain an optimal level of adaptability, 
flexibility and stability in order to survive in the long-run. 
Ultimately Weick refers to the systems biological metaphor of 
long-run adaptability and survival for his theory of O.E. (Pondy, 
1977). There are even indications of the population ecology 
approach (Aldrich, 1979; Hannan and Freeman, 1977) in his 
suggestion for the study of a collection of organizations as 
opposed to individual organizations. For these reasons Weick is 
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placed on the borders of the functionalist matrix. His theory 
of O.E., however, borrows a systems metaphor and hence is more 
holistic-oriented whilst being implicitly prescriptive. 
This same functional, subjectivistic approach is true of 
the work of Checkland (1972, 1979a, 1979b, 1981) who advocates 
a 'soft' systems methodology as opposed to 'hard' systems methods 
which impose an externally defined goal on micro-organizations. 
As discussed earlier, the organismic model of systems has been 
subjected to widespread criticism. In addition, systems theory 
has been accused of being ideological, of maintaining the status 
quo by emphasizing organizations as essentially co-operative 
systems tending towards equilibrium. Checkland (1981) has tried 
to counter these criticisms by using systems ideas only in a 
process of inquiry, "an exploration of the meanings which men 
attribute to what they observe". His soft systems methodology 
starts with a stage of analysis that is deliberately undertaken 
in non-systemic forms with the analyst familiarizing himself 
with the rich, complexity of the situation being studied. Next, 
multiple 'root definitions' which reflect different 'world 
views' are exposed. One is recommended - Checkland suggests that 
this root defini ti on should be acceptable and revealing to those 
involved in the problem situation, although little guidance is 
given concerning how this might be achieved. The third stage of 
the methodology involves the formulation of a conceptual model of 
the system being studied by constructing the minimum necessary 
system that achieves the root definition and validating this 
system by comparing with the data gathered in the analysis stage. 
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Checkland's approach, like Weick, emphasizes the importance 
of arriving at actors' definitions of the situation but maintains 
the observer who attempts to relate what they observe to what 
they regard as important elements in a wider social context 
(Otley, 1981). It avoids the imputation of pre-defined purposes 
to organizations but keeps the concept of goal-oriented behaviour 
to derive propositions for administering organizations. These 
assumptions justify Checkland being classified within the 
functionalist matrix though his work clearly has interpretative 
overtones. This is in contradiction with Checkland's own 
estimate. He himself (1981) places it within the functionalist, 
interpretative and radical humanist paradigm. This represents 
a failure to understand in depth that these different paradigms 
reflect essentially different assumptions which are not found 
within his methodology. 
Useful though soft systems methodology may be, it has a major 
drawback in that it does not provide any theoretical basis for 
the study of D.E. and organizational control; indeed it 
discounts the possibility of such general theories, arguing that 
each problem situation is unique and must be treated within its 
particular context. Such a contention raises the issue of how a 
methodology is to be evaluated, for different methodologists 
will produce different recommendations for action. Indeed, 
different analysts, attempting to implement the soft systems 
approach, will produce different conceptual models and different 
recommendations for action. As a methodology is a means to an 
end the appropriateness of a particular methodology can be 
. assessed, given sufficient time, by the contributions that it 
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makes to that end. But whereas the contribution a methodology 
has made to the theoretical development of a discipline can be 
assessed (albeit with difficulty), the contribution made by a 
methodology designed to handle supposedly unique situations 
cannot be assessed. This is an important issue, and one which 
does not appear to have been discussed by those involved with 
the methodology, save for a mention that confidence in a 
methodology can be built only by using it to solve problems. 
In spite of the difficulties with both these approaches to 
O.E. their emphasis on the actors' subjective definitions of 
their situations is welcomed and does, at least,represent an 
attempt to count~ract the authoritarian imposition of 
rationality by earlier systems analysts. 
Before we conclude this review, it is important to note, as 
did Burrell and Morgan (1979) that systems theory per se does 
not require an organismic or mechanistic analogy. As mentioned, 
the factional and catastrophic models, in fact, belie an 
attachment to matrices of analysis which are concerned with 
explaining change and conflict in human affairs. Systems theory 
is, therefore, not intrinsically linked to any specific view of 
social reality, except insofar as it implies a social world 
characterized by some form of order and regularity. Systems 
theory is about the principle of organization, of analyzing 
complex wholes. It represents perhaps the major way forward 
in studying human collectivities with close interdependencies. 
One of the central problems facing the systems analyst is 
that of choosing an analogy which reflects the basic nature of 
the phenomena to be investigated. The naive selection of a 
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'particular type of analogy to represent a system in advance of 
a detailed analysis of its structure and mode of operation is not 
systems analysis. Analysts must, therefore, avoid the uncritical 
use of analogies which may not explain and reflect the behaviour 
under study. 
2.9 Conclusion on Functionalist Approaches to O.E. 
Our review shows clearly that there has been much research 
within maintstream empirical theory on the issue of O.E. This is 
illustrated in the diagram below with the respective studies 
placed on the two dimensions discussed. 
The predominance of the functionalist emphasis is regrettable 
and this thesis argues that such a monopoly has stunted growth 
in the area of O.E. The next few chapters will outline in detail 
the derivations and limitations of each paradigm and argue that 
the way forward for social analysis is a dialectic that integrates 
insights from a variety of paradigms. 
Parochial Official goal model: 
evaluation research 
dominant coalition model. 
Classical neo-economics 
Shareholders' view of the firm 
Becker and Neuhauser's theory 
of property rights of owners 
Classical utilitarianism 
Social justice theory of O.E. 
Soft s'ystems 
Methodology 
Weick's 
Theory of 
Organizations 
Multiple 
Constituency Theory (e.g. COl1nclly et al. ) ___________________ _ 
Social Reponsibility 
Accounting 
Holistic 
Operative Goal Model 
Implicitly prescriptive "descriptive" 
Diagram 2.7: Functionalist Theories of O.E. Reviewed 
Systems Models 
(Mechanistic; organismic; 
participant satisfaction) 
Systems Resource Model 
Explicitly pre!:>Lnpnvc, "Normative" 
'-.I 
o 
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Chapter 3: Subject ~~trices, Subject Makers 
and Mode£, of Study 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter begins by arguing that accounting is a social science 
in the sense that it is a study of human behaviour. As such, the debates 
and critiques of a certain (positivistic, functionalist) mode of social 
inquiry are as relevant to accounting and organization theory as to 
sociology or politics. This chapter then briefly outlines the main 
strands of the critique on mainstream social theory (of which accounting 
is a constitutive constituent). It also explicates the various 
claSSifications of social knowledge which have been the source of much 
debate: that of Burrell and Morgan (1979) and Laughlin et al (1981). 
It will be argued that these different alternatives to main-
stream theory or different disciplinary matrices are in part explained 
by the predoroLnance of subject makers with particular psychological 
types. 
The purposes of this chapter. are to show (a) that mainstream 
social and accounting theory has proved increasingly inadequate for the 
task of studying human action, (b) that there are a variety of perspec-
tives which stress different aspects of social reality, and (c) that 
these different perspectives may be partially explained by the notion 
of different subject makers with various psychological types. 
3.1 Accounting as a Social Study of Man 
Accounting tends to be interpreted by other social scientists and 
by mainstream accountants themselves as a neutral, objective technology 
for computing numbers. \ Accounting, so it appears, has little to do 
with men and ethical choice; its main concern is the calculation of 
certain types of taken-for-granted numbers which seem 'commonsense' 
and 'necessary'. Tinker et al (1982) show that from the early years of 
the 20th century, accounting theorists have sought to be objective. 
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Such sentiments are echoed today by the AAAls (1971) suggestion that 
in developing non-financial measures of effectiveness, accountants could 
only hope to measure "events" or "effects" rather than "effectiveness." 
But as the emerging pockets of radical accounting show (discussed 
in detail in Chp. 13), accounting cannot be divorced from the questions 
of societal choice. Within organizations and society accounting systems 
perpetuate an economic rationality which emphasizes marginalist theories 
of value which place the subjective utility of consumers as being the 
most important determinant of value. In Chp. 13 we argue that this 
mode of calculus is rooted in an individualistic, machine-image of 
man and tends to benefit the possessors of capital while neglecting 
relatively the value of productive labour. It is this image of man 
as a disciplined, trained unit of production which underlies the theory 
of standard costing and work-study management. 
These kinds of assumptions clearly influence manls definition 
of what is value and what is not, what can be measured and what cannot 
and what may be defined as efficient, effective behaviour. They 
influence how we shall allocate scarce resources to what type of pro-
duction of which type of goods and services. Although the profession 
argues that accountants do not value, they merely record costs; this 
is an understatement of the effects of accounting numbers. For 
accountants value when they participate in the budgeting process and 
set standards for I reasonable , expenditure and production expectations. 
They value and assess the contribution of each individual worker, 
manager and department. They manage by exception and place certain 
forms of visi6ility on certain types of variances. Accounting thus 
mediates between social classes and helpS legitimate the claims of 
particular sectors of society to wealth accumulation and thereby 
helpS construct the social reality around us. 
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Given the importance of accounting to organizational and social 
life it may properly be regarded as part of that complex of human 
sciences which study man and his relation to other men. Indeed it 
seems strange to have to argue this point, when the writer stems from 
an accounting background developed at Sheffield; where it has long 
been argued and accepted that accounting essentially acts as a social 
mediator. 
3.2 A Statement of Mainstream Empirical Theory 
Criticisms of mainstream social theory have come from a variety 
of sources with a multitude of labels. Attacks have been directed at 
'functionalism', 'structural functionalism', 'positivism', 'logical 
pOSitivism', 'naturalism' and 'empiricism'. We do not intend to define 
each of these targets and the reader is referred to competent analyses 
by Wolin (1968), ~~ (1972), Bernstein (1976), Clegg and Dunkerley 
(1980), and Burrell and l~rgan (1979). We present only a brief summary 
of mainstream social theory and the main criticisms of it. 
At the core of this perception of social reality is the conviction 
that the aim of the social sciehces is the same as that of the natural 
sciences. Collecting and referring data, discovering correlations, and 
formulating testable empirical generalisations. There should also be 
the growth of testable and well-confirmed theories which explain 
phenomena by showing how they can be derived in non-trivial ways from 
our theoretical assumptions. At the heart of scientific explanations 
there must be discovery of and appeal to universal laws. 
This framework has fostered a distinctive attitude toward the 
\ 
history of the social sciences. Past theories , BO it is claimed are useful 
insofar as they provide clues for the future, they are not of substantive 
content. Correspondingly there is a suspicion of qualitative, soft data. 
Indeed, the boldest positivist, aware of pre-Enlightenment dangers 
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clai~that any knowledge which cannot be formulated into 
hypothetical-deductive systems of scientific explanation are 
meaningless and non-scientific. 
The empirical researcher, it is felt must also be able to 
cultivate an objective, disinterested attitude when investigating 
social and political phenomena. His job as a theorist is to 
interpret the world, not to change it; he interprets it by offering 
and testing theoretical explanations against observables. He 
believes that if one is seriously interested in changing the world, 
this can best be accomplished through scientific knowledge -
especially neutral, objective knowledge of the probable 
conseq'Jences of different courses of action. Therefore, he makes a 
distinction between 'theory' and 'practice'. Theory and 
experimentation are to be clearly separated from the forms of 
activity in which we consciously apply our theoretical knowledge to 
the solution of technical problems of society. 
Finally, as Bernstein (1976) observes: 
"a sophisticated defender of mainstream social 
science ...•.... can admit and even study, the 
ways in which values affect the selection of 
problems in social research ....... can even 
acknowledge that social science research cannot 
proceed very far without making use of 
"characterising" value judgements ..... (B)ut none of 
these admissions lessens or compromises the one 
basic sense in which there is a categorial 
distinction between fact and value". (p44-4S, 
Bernstein, 1976) 
Mainstream social scientists, therefore, seek to describe and explain 
phenomena as accurately-as he can. Knowing how easy it is to let 
one's biases distort the description of social phenomena, the 
theorist must always make a conscious effort to be value-free and 
to submit his hypothetical claims to public discussion and testing, 
and ought to abandon any claims which have been refuted according 
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to the canons of scientific research. The social theorist in a 
broad sense seeks to describe facts. His task is not to make 
prescriptive claims about what ought to be done. Empirical theory, 
e.g. positive economics must, therefore, be clearly distinguished 
from normative theory, e.g. welfare economics. 
In fact, mainstream social theorists often adopt an 
ambivalent attitude to normative theory. On the one hand, there is 
an insistence on a distinction, but on the other hand there is 
widespread sceptiCism about the very possibility and 'validity' of 
a normative theory. To them values, unlike facts are not amenable to 
rational argument and adjudication. Easton, for example, argues: 
" ••••• Although we can say that the aspect of a 
proposition referring to a fact can be true or 
false, it is meaningless to characterise the value 
aspect of a proposition in this way. II (p22l, Easton, 1967) 
This view of the epistemoLogical differences between normative 
theory and empirical theory has vi tal implications for the study 
of social reality and indeed provides the springboard for much 
of the current critique. 
But before we embark on a critique, we would like to point out 
positive contributions which this intellectual orientation towards 
the study of social phenomena has made; there are great virtues 
in these tFaditions which cannbt be lightly dismissed. At their 
best, they have insisted upon clarity and rigour. They have been 
committed to the ideal of public and interstibjective tests and 
'criticisms in which any knowledge claim is recognised as falliable 
and subject to further inqui'ry. There has been a healthy 
scepticism toward unbridled speculation and murky obscurantist 
thought. They have sought to achieve, if not succeeded in achieving the 
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Enlightenment ideal ·that the adv~ncement of science, and of 
scientific knowledge of social and human phenomena, 'tIIust bring 
progress toward ideals and social goals accepted by rational, 
reasonable human beings. 
3.3 
r. 
The Critique of Mainstream, Empirical Theory 
"The history of thought and culture is, as 
Hegel showed with great brilliance, a changing 
pattern of great liberating ideas which 
inevitably turn into suffocating straitjackets, 
and so stimulate their own destruction by new 
emancipating, and at the same time, enslaving 
conceptions. The first step to understanding 
of men is the bringing to consciousness of the 
model or 'tIIodels that dominate and penetrate 
their thought and action. Like all attempts to 
'tIIake men aware of the categories in which they 
think, it is a difficult and sometimes painful 
activity, likely to produce deeply disquieting 
results". (p 19 , Berlin, 1962) 
The above passage eloquently captures the essence of criticisms 
levelled at mainstream approaches to social inquiry. Contemporary 
positivist and empiricist modes of thought have tended to harden 
into extreme positions which instead of being great liberating 
ideas have become suffocating straitjackets. Our critique begins 
where our statement of mainstream theory ended - with the 
distinction between empirical and normative theory. 
To establish conclusively the claim about the paucity of well-
\ 
formulated, empirical theories which offer a functional explanation 
of social phenomena is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, 
Rudner (1966), who strongly defends a naturalistic interpretation 
of the social sciences has the following to say about functionalism: 
"Not a single one of "the myriad claims in 
anthropological literature (and Rudner would 
also include organizational literature) can be 
accepted without serious qualification - not because 
it is, in principle, impossible to achieve functional 
explanation (here we are in agreement with Rudner), 
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but rather because it is too difficult, 
much more difficult than the claimants appear 
to realise. All too frequently these claims 
may be counted at most containing some more 
or less accurate descriptions, rather than 
explanations, of specific phenomena, couched in 
or accompanied by rhetoric that may be mistaken 
for explanations by the unwary .•.•••. The results 
produced to date must be seen to amount only (so 
far as explanation is concerned) to the articulation 
of some prescientific hunches or pious hopes that a 
functional explanation for the item in question can 
ultimately be given". (pIOS-I09, Rudner, 1966) 
Similarly, Smelser (1969) honestly perceived that much of his 
earlier work lacked explanatory power - for unless we can 
indicate some of the causal connections among the several stages 
of a temporal sequence we have but a generalised description, not 
an explanation of a historical sequence. 
With the rise of linguistic philosophy, social scientists 
became increasingly aware of the ideological biases in 
"descriptive" theories. Ryan (1970) caustically notes that 
Merton's notion of function served no useful purpose except to 
indicate unlooked for goodness of the consequences of much social 
life in America. This led to articles like 'Some Social Functions 
of Ignorance' which turn out to be articles on 'Some Unthought 
of Good Effects that Ignorance produces for Almost Everyone'. 
Function became, therefore, a value-laden concept, being 
synonymous with good effects or good consequences. Many showed 
that it was logically impossible to arrive at completely value-
free theories of social phenomena. As Berlin (1962) stressed: 
"man's beliefs in the sphere of conduct are 
part of their conception of themselves and 
others as human beings; and this conception 
in its turn, whether conscious or not, it is 
intrinsic to their picture of the world". 
(p13, Berlin, 1962) 
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Human beings are self-interpretative beings. The beliefs which 
they have about themselves and others are not simply subjective 
states in their minds: they are constitutive of the actions, 
practices and institutions that make up soci'al and organizational 
life. Researchers, like all human beings, are dominated by one or 
more models of what the world is like. They socially construct 
the world they see and values influence their interpretation of 
data. Hence, the categorical distinction between tfact· t and 'value' 
actually misrepresents human action. Human action is such that 
what we take to be an action, and even its proper description, is 
internally related to the interpretations that are intrinsically 
constitutive of it. The description and identification of human 
action is "shot through with evaluation". In the last chapter 
we have shown how 'operative' goal models of O.E. which support to 
describe goal-seeking behaviour were in fact conservative supports 
for the status quo. To merely stop by saying: "Organization JC 
gains profit by paying low wages", is to imply that it is sensible 
for this organization to do so as long as protest is minimal. The 
ethics underlying such a strategy, it is implied are beyond question. 
Another consequence of the realisation that human action and 
perception is constituted by the interpretations of human agents is 
the blurring of the distinction between subjective and objective 
phenomena. There is no longer a realm of basic, uninterpreted hard 
facts that serves as the foundation for all empirical knowledge. 
"Facts II are 'historically condi t\oned, they reveal only one among the many 
different possibilities that human action can take. Further "facts" 
represent norms, rule-following behaviour that is embedded within a 
form"of life (Winch, 1964), wi thin structures of the life-world 
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(Schutz, 1967). In order to describe, explain and understand human 
action, we need to elucidate the variety of forms of life which 
characterise a particular collectivity. It is no longer tenable to 
maintain a categorical distinction between subjective and objective 
domains of experience. 
The role of the observer 'also changes. No longer is he 
interpreting objective 'hard' facts in an external reality. Instead, 
he needs to exp~cate the meanings and interpretations used by 
actors in particular social contexts with particular values and norms. 
Lastly, mainstream social theory has been attacked not only 
for being value-laden but for adopting the value premises of 
powerful classes in society. Krupp (1961), Wolin (196B) and 
Allen (1975) argue that contemporary organizational theory and 
by implication management accounting adopt a 'managerial' 
definition of social reality: organizations are conceived either 
as equilibrium-seeking systems or as essentially co-operative 
systems; action not geared towards organizational goals is labelled 
'dysfunctional' or 'irrational'. In accounting, this bias was 
, 
initially reflected in a shareholder theory of the firm whereby 
accounting reports are constructed solely for the 'benefit of 
shareholders. 'Today~ although there hawbee~ so~ concrete efforts 
made to produce corporate social responsibility reports and 
employee reports, the fundamental bias of external financial 
reports is towards the interests of capital-holders and investors. 
Similarly, much of, the work in budgetary control reflects the neo-
human relati~ns tendency to construct uncritical theories of 
motivation and budgeting that numanise organizational life without 
questioning the fundamental relations of wealth and authority. 
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The growing lack of confidence in mainstream social conceptual-
isations of reality culminated in the 1960's in a proliferation of 
alternative theories of social behaviour. We shall take a brief 
look at ~hese in the next section. 
3.4 Burrell and Morgan's Framework of Sociological '~aradigms" 
Thus far, we have sketched the main points of criticism of 
mainstream social, organizational and aOccounting theory. 
We turn now to attempts that have been made to classify and systematise 
the alternatives offered to mainstream theory. 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) have developed a framework of 2 
dimensions. These dimensions give rise to four paradigms (Kuhn, 1970) 
which are defined 8S ·'universally recognised scienti'fic achievements 
that for a time provide model problems and solUtions to a community of 
practitioners·'. Each of these ·'paradigms" is characterised by a 
common set of assumptions which underwrite the frame of reference, 
mode of theorising and modus operandi of the soci'al theorist located 
within it. The fou~ paradigms are entitled:functionalist, inter-
pretive, radical humanist and radical structuralist. 
Tneir work argues a comprehensive case for a notion that there 
are radically different perspectives for .theorising about social 
behaviour and action. The same argument is advanced by Bernstein 
(1976) who outlin'es in scrupulous detail the phenomenological 
alternative and critical theory. In general, Bernstein's analysis 
is superior to that of Burrell and Morgan in terms of depth and 
.... 
careful argument, though he diQ~ot attempt to analyse the causal 
differences between the alternatives he outlined. 
Our argument ~ere is that Burrell and Morgan's classification, 
though useful in highlighting alternatives, provides an inadequate 
explanation for the existence of these different perspectives. 
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To begin with a minor issue, their use of the term 'paradigm' 
is ill-justified. Kuhn's use of the term has been shown to reveal 
ambiguities and these have not been resolved or discussed in detail 
by Burrell and Morgan. The disciplinary matrices which Burrell and 
rob 1 the suc·cess~on of schools rather than Morgan describe rese e more ~ 
the d refutat~on found in the natural sciences. pattern of conjecture an ~ 
Burrell and Morgan also do not justify convincingly the choice 
of their two dimensions. How are these dimensions derived? Why are 
they important? Do they form a necessary and sufficient classification? 
Are they empirically contingent properties that somehow 'arise' 
from an examination of the literature? If so, what were the criteria 
for their choice of relevant literature? If these dimensions are not 
empirical properties, then are they transcendental a priori categories 
which apply universally to all theories of social behaviour? The authors 
do not clarify the ambiguous epistemological status of their 
classificatory dimensions. 
Further, it could be argued that their assumptions about society 
are essentially assumptions about human beings and their collective 
nature. But such assumptions also arise in the other dimension about 
science. It is also unclear why the ontological assumption about 
the existence of the social world is an assumption about the nature 
of science and not of society. Thus their ideas are useful but weak. 
3.5 Subject Makers: their Modes of Inquiry and their Relationship 
to Subject Matrices , \ 
We shall argue here that these different perspectives, subject 
matrices, alternative views of reality or different ways of knowing 
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are a partial function of the perceivers of this reality. That is, 
the shape and content of a subject is partly determined by the' 
psychological make-up of its subject makers. It must be emphasized 
that we acknowledge the following argument to be but a partial 
explanation insofar as historical, cultural, political and economic 
conditions influence and mould both subjects and subject makers. 
Indeed, in Chapters 11, 12 and 13 we seek to analyse the 
complex of individual and sociological forces which moulded the 
development of particular forms of accounting and nursing knowledge 
and the structure of the respective monopolies. Human behaviour does 
not take place in an individual vacuum, it has a societal context. 
Individual constructs or psychological preferences are changed and 
translated through social processes and via social interaction wit~ 
other men. An individual does not construct his reality on his own, 
he uses social concepts and ideas from other men. Why then have we 
developed a classification of subject makers and their relat.ion to 
subjects? Why have we spoken so much of holism but employed partial 
modes of analysis? Are we being inconsistent? 
The contradiction and inconsistency is resolved when we clarify that 
our classification of subject makers is an analytical tool that 
enables us to see the necessity of the integration of social 
knowledge and the importance of integrated theory. This thesis is based 
on the argument of holism and order in the social science of man 
and on holistic forms of analysis. Our image of man is that of a 
holistic being who relates, as a part-whole, to other men. Koestler 
\ 
(1967) uses the term "social holon" to refer to this Janus-effect of 
social wholes, which are simultaneously wholes at a particular 
resolution level but also parts at a different level. Psychoanalysis 
argues that man may display a variety of personas, a variety of 
responses which differ depending on psychological and social 
, 
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conditions. But man must also displaysan integrative mechanism, 
a holistic psyche which links and orders diverse sets of behaviour. 
There is a deep-seated, vague, intangible but extant sense of order 
in man's behaviour which undergirds and traverses his contradictions 
and his deviations. Man acts as a whole and reacts as 8 whole. 
Even certificated forms of 'madnes.s' or of 'irrationality' may have 
within their structure forms of unity which we are not aware of; 
irrationality and rationality may not be the separate concepts we 
think they are but a holistic notion which we do not perceive. And 
just as there is a sense of unity in the human psyche so the study 
r· 
of man must possess a similar sense of unity. Just as integration 
underlies the individual psychology, so an integrated form of 
social analysis is required in order that we may understand 
ourselves. It is because we believe in the part-wholeness of man that 
we argue for an integrated form of knowledge about man. Thus, far 
from being inconsistent, our classification of subject makers is 
an analytical tool which is developed to demonstrate the unity which 
ought to pervade the social science of man. It is not put forward 
\ 
as a ~omplete explanation of empirical events; nor are we down-playing 
the importance of social, historical forces. Rather we are attempting 
to make visib1e.the analogue between man .as a being and the social 
study of man. Just as he is an integrated being, so our modes of 
study' need to be integrated. 
Much of the argument is found in an unpublished paper by 
\ 
Laughlin et al. (19Bl) and I shall use that as a basis of argument. 
Our first~oint is that man's~rceptions of reality are restricted 
psychologically and technically. They are restricted psychologically 
because our thought processes - the initial starting point for a 
perception of reality -are limite(! by our psychological makeup. Such a 
-84-
psychological makeup is not only 'bounded' by our cognitive ability 
(Simon, 1976) but also by our self-created, cognitive or incognitive, 
filtering systems. They are restricted technically because as soon 
as we, as human beings, attempt to express ourselves through word or 
figures (public language) some of the intricate thought processes 
which such language attempts to capture is lost. However, this in its 
own way, given the 'publicness' of public language is also traceable 
to the perceptual qualities of the perceiver of this information, 
which are, in turn, a function of psychological makeup. Thus, if we 
can understand the psychological type of the perceiver we have the 
independent variable in an explanatory chain which will help us to put 
in context the ways in which subject makers perceive their social reality. 
Diagram 3.1 attempts to depict these various relationships. What 
Diagram 3.1 shows is given in theory a defined domain of reality, due 
to psychological and technical restrictions of the perceiver such a 
full appreciation of all facets will be limited to only the shaded area. 
What then are these psychological restrictions and how do they produce 
different perceptions of reality? 
Jung has some very valuable insights for answering these questions. 
He (1968, 1971) argues that the human psyche has four basic functions 
and these functions (thinking, intuition, feeling and sensation) are 
constitutionally present in every individual and are related in continua 
and cross continua as depicted in Diagram 3.2. As can be seen, thinking 
and feeling are the evaluatory functions ( ways to reach decisions) 
and are on one continuum. This is because both are used for evaluation 
, 
although each continuum end uses different machinery: true-false 
on the thinking and a pleasant-unpleasant on the feeling dimension. 
Likewise sensation and intuition are the perceptual functions 
(ways to take in information) and are on the same continuum but at 
either end becouse: 
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"Sensation perceives things as they are and not 
otherwise. It is the sense of reality, par 
excellence ••.•• Intuition also 'perceives' 
but less through the conscious apparatus of the 
senses than through its capacity for an 
unconscious inner perception of the inherent 
potentialities of things". (p12, Jacobi, 1968) 
Or in other words the sensation function perceives the details 
whereas the intuition function the context and global effects. 
Although all these functions are constitutionally present 
in each human psyche they will not be activated all at the same 
time. For instance, it is not always possible to perceive a 
situation by sensation and by intuition at one and the same time. 
Equally it is not always possible to evaluate a situation by 
thinking and feeling at the same time. One can certainly make an 
evaluation by thinking initially and then test it out with one's 
feelings but the two cannot work simultaneously on the same thing. 
Jung argues that most individuals cannot bring into 
conscious play all four functions simultaneously_ On the contrary 
most individuals emphasize one of the functions or more often as 
not a mixture of adjacent functions. Diagram 3.3 depicts these 
eight different types with the four fundamental functions in 
shading due to the fact that: 
" .... in actual life the function types almost 
never appear in pure form, but in a variety of 
mixed types". (p17, Jacobi, 1968) 
Mitroff and Kilmann (1978) building on the Jungian framework 
of the four mixed functions (NT, NF, ST and SF) from Diagram 3.3 
suggest these give rise to four different types of inquirers: 
the Conceptual Theorist (CT) (NT), the Conceptual Humanist (CH) 
(NF), the Analytical Scientist (AS) (ST) and the Particular 
Humanist (PH) (SF). Diagram 3.4 depicts these on an adaptation 
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of the diagram of ~he psychic functionS of an individual. Mitroff 
and Kitmann describe the four inquirers as follows: 
(a) On the Analytical Scientist (AS): 
ft •••• the AS's basic drive is towards certainty 
and the corresponding desire to eliminate or 
avoid uncertainty as much as possible in regard 
to knowledge and h\lJllan affairs in general". 
eb) On the Conceptual Theorist (CT): 
"Apparently the CT is a speculative theorist 
who deeply values broad-ranging novel ideas and 
who does not demand that these ideas be tied 
down to 'reality' in the sense of being verified 
by accepted theories and facts". 
ec) On the Conceptual Humanist (CH): 
"The over-riding concern of the CH is not how 
science, methodology and experimentation can 
serve some abst"ract theoretical concepts of truth 
per se but how they further humanity as a whole". 
(d) On the Particular Humanist (PH): 
" ••••• the PH's intense concern is with capturing 
and describing the uniqueness of particular 
individual human beings. The PH naturally treats 
every human being as though he or she were 
unique - not to be compared with anyone or 
anything else. Thus, the PH is not interested 
in formulating general theories of human 
behaviour at all - not so much because this is 
impossible (although the PH argues it is 
impossible) but because it is not desirable". 
(p94-95,Mitroff and Ki1mann, 1978) 
The Analytical Scientist possessing as he does a mixture of 
the thinking and sensation functions of the psyche will baSically 
see all problems and solutions from this perspective. He will 
view all problems and solutions as singular, empirical and 
requiring,~ogical thought processes. The Conceptual Theorist, 
"\ "\ 
on the other hand, possessing as he does the thinking and 
intuition functions of the psyche will basically see all problems 
and solutions only from this perspe~tive. He will see issues as 
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multiple, conceptual and as requiring oversight and overview. 
The Conceptual Humanist emulating the intuition and feeling aspects 
of the psyche will invariably see all problems and solutions 
from a humanitarian perspective. Finally, the Particular Humanist 
possessing as he does a concentration of the sensation and feeling 
functions of the psyche will see all problems and solutions as 
fundamentally empirical, detailed and as requiring evaluation 
from a 'feeling' perspective. 
Thus, each alternative type will perceive problems and 
reality in very different and distinctive ways. If we compare 
our typology with that of Burrell and Morgan, there are 
striking similarities. The AS corresponds well with the 
functionalist, mainstream empirical school; the PH with the 
phenomenological matrix; and the CH with the radical humanist 
matrix. The only difference is that the CT school does not 
correspond with the radical structuralist matrix, being ~ore'·akin 
to certain forms·of~ainstream beliefs. However, work discussed 
within the radical structuralist perspective partake of the 
characteristics of the CH inquirer and differ from the radical 
humanist matrix only in terms of content emphasis (structure as 
opposed to consciousness) and not in purpose. Contrary to Burrell 
and Morgan's interpretation of the literature we do not see a 
fundamentally different framework guiding what they label as 
research within a radical structuralist mode. We, therefore, 
advocate th~t both 'radical' matrices be seen as reflecting a CH 
inquirer. 
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These four types of inquirers are argued in the next chapLer 
to be all required for an integrated theory of O.E. Just as 
Habermas argues that technical and hermeneutral interests are 
insufficient for social science, so we argue that a single type of 
inquirer or inquiring system is inadequate. Social theory needs 
to be empirical, interpretative and critical; we require an 
integration of our four types of inquirers in order that we may 
understand the complex unity which underlies human action. In 
contradiction to the implication of Burrell and Morgan, we argue 
that social science, of which accounting is a part-whole, cannot 
encompass the essence of man, if all four types of inquirer work 
within their disciplinary matrices. Unless we halt our gradual 
fragmentation of social knowledge and realize, like the classical 
\ 
theorists, that~an is a holistic, social being, we can never 
understand the kinds of repression which prevent his . emancipation. 
Chapter 4: Alternatives to Mainstream Theory 
4.0 Introduction 
The last chapters have demonstrated that in spite of the inadequacies 
of mainstream theory and the existence of alternative models of social 
inquiry, theories of organizational assessment are limited to those in the 
mainstream framework. This chapter argues that we need to reformulate our 
theories of accountability so as to recognise not only the strengths and 
weaknesses of the AS but those of the other subject matrices. It argues 
that we need integrated theories of social phenomena and integrated methods 
of inquiry and sets out an epistemology that believes that there are 
rational crit0yia for evaluating competing constructions of reality. 
4.1 A Critique of Non-Choice 
Mainstream social and organizational theory have changed what were 
once its strengths into restrictive weaknesses. We must now turn to the 
alternatives offered in order to derive an integrated approach to the study 
of social behaviour in society and within organizations. 
These statements strike a contentious note - for they argue that 
different philosophical perspectives or alternative conceptions of reality 
which are based on dissimilar ontological and epistemological assumptions 
are capable of evaluation and adjudi cation. An evaluation which is based on 
intersubjective standards of rationality or norms of inquiry by which 
we attempt to distinguish personal bias, superstition, or false beliefs 
from what Hegel calls Wahrheit (truth). Such a concept of objective choice, 
it is argued, must inform all forms of human inquiry, whether it be inquiry 
about physical or social phenomena.* For through this process we may 
approximate an ideal of systematic, rigorous scientific knowledge that has 
been publicly discussed and "tested". This concept of objective choice is, 
however, distinct from the notion of objectivism. The latter is an uncritical 
* The distinction between each is increasingly difficult to draw (see Ravetz, 
1973) . '
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belief in an external world of uninterpreted, hard facts that serves as 
the foundation of all empirical knowledge and rules that the only form of 
legitimate knowledge is a form of empirical data that is measurable, observable 
and quantified. Theoretical judgments need to be made objectively (as defined) 
but not objectivistically. 
Such a view is not universally accepted by philosophers and practitioners. 
For example, Kuhn is often quoted as arguing that the action of matrix 
choice or "paradigm switch" is a matter of faith and conversion. The 
implication here being that such "switches" or choices about matrices are 
completely incapable of being explained rationally within the conventional 
bounds of formal logic and reason. Kuhn in fact has been severely criticized 
for proposing such a vision of science: a discipline that is irrational, 
subjectivistic, relativistic and wherein mob rule is the name of the game. 
However, Kuhn himself in 1969 claimed that he was shocked that such an 
interpretation was made of his work and he drew a distinction between rational 
and irrational forms of persuasion. That being said, Kuhn nevertheless 
believed that such norms of rationality functioned as values which may be 
differently applied individually and collectively by men who concur in 
honouring them. "There is no neutral algorithm for theory choice, no 
systematic decision procedure which, properly applied, must lead each individual in 
the grou_p to HIe SaITle declo 51' on." ( 200 l' hn 1970) H f It th t p. , "u, . e e a reasons dnC.rt 
there was still an unaccountable element of faith in the act of "paradigm 
Choice". Kuhn, therefore, did not feel that competing matrices led to a 
total breakdown of communication, only a partial one: in such disputes there 
was always a search for common ground on which the advocates of different 
"paradigms" could argue with each other. Burrell and Morgan (1979), on the 
other hand, feel that these competing "paradigms" are totally incompatible 
for they represent fundamentally different views of reality. Further, they 
imply that one cannotadjudi~between them - there is a total breakdown 
in communication. But surely such a view is a mistake for how then can 
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one account for "paradigmatic" shifts? Are such acts of conversion totally 
irrational, completely void of reason? How can we account for theorists 
who sit on the boundaries of competing matrices or Checkland's (1981) 
claim that his soft systems methodology encompasses three of Burrell and 
Morgan's four boxes? How indeed, can we account for Burrell and Morgan's 
own evaluative adjectives about "functionalist theory" and "interpretative 
sociology", adjectives which in fact belie their own preferred matrix choice? 
Clearly, it is not that we cannot, in principle -adjudicate between competing 
theoretical orientations but that our theories of rationality are inadequate 
and fail to explicate the complex rational processes which accompany such 
"paradigmatic" switches. (See Bernstein, 1976; Kuhn, 1970). 
Our view, therefore, is that though theory or matrix choice represents 
in part an act of faith, there are nevertheless intersubjective norms of 
rationality which distinguish "ill-founded" and "well-founded" statements. 
A judgment of what is "true" or "false", what is "strong" or "weak" of 
particular theories is possible within given norms or theories of rationality. 
Further, these norms of rationality are not sacrosanct but open to 
continual debate and criticism amongst the community of subject-makers. The 
dreaded Pandora's box then opens when one asks as did Weber, Kuhn and Popper, 
Quine, Feyerabem, Lakatos and others - what ought to be the norms of 
rationality for a particular domain of inquiry such as that about social 
phenomena? There is no simple or direct way of stating the norms of 
appropriate inquiry. Indeed the attempt to specify a single universal set 
of criteria as a basis for distinguishing what is genuinely objective from 
what is not, has been one of the most obsessive and futile preoccupations of 
modern thinkers since Descartes. But 'we are not, therefore, obliged - as 
it is often claimed when one retracks from mainstream empiricism - to retreat 
to scepticism, self-defeating relativism or irrational subjectivism. The 
difficulty of a task does not invalidate it in principle. The lesson to 
be learnt, rather, is how difficult and complex it is to articulate the 
standards of objectivity relevant to different domains of inquiry, and the 
.. 
ways in which these standards are themselves open to criticism. The debate 
so far does not deny the existence, in principle, of a systematic procedure 
or argumentation about the norms of rationality and about the rules of 
argumentation. They merely point cautiously to the difficulties of such a 
task. 
The possibility of debate and in particular dialectical debate about 
values and norms of rationality rescues us from a dangerous non-choice, 
relativistic position as regards different perspectives. For if we puruse 
this stance we would be led once again up the path of mainstream social 
theory to the abyss of absolute relativism where there can be no rational 
normative theory that debates the moral realm of values and that evaluates 
the quality of social and organizational life. It is also not s3tisfactory 
to stop midway up the path and argue a "social engineering" approach that 
assumes that our society is peopled with enlightened men who all share the 
same basic values. 
4.2 The Nature of Matrix Choice 
If we argue that matrix or theory evaluation is logically possible, 
how shall we choose? What is the nature of this choice? What are the 
criteria which underlie such theory evaluation? I shall not attempt to 
mount here the Herculean task of specifying what ought to be the universal 
criteria of evaluation (this is discussed in the next section) but shall 
set out criteria which underlie this analysis and which are accepted by 
scholars and subject-makers in a variety of disciplinary matrices. 
These criteria include the need for a theory to develop a logical, 
consistent argument that is simple, fruitful and has explanatory power. 
It must explain the phenomena under study for the purpose of scientific 
knowledge, a purpose which is espoused either explicitly or implicitly by all 
four subject-makers; whidhis to understand and mediate the relationship 
between man and his natural and social ~nvironment such that enlightened 
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action and thought ensues. The task of the scientist is to achieve "better" 
more progressive forms of knowledge and to re-form our ideas about our 
social and natural world. 
Having stated our position let us look at the nature of matrix choice 
that follows an evaluation of competing perspectives. Bernstein (1976) 
gives a highly relevant quote from Hegel's description of Wissenschaft, 
the complete systematic scientific comprehension of what is, and Das 
NatSrlich Bewusstsein, natural consciousness. Hegel argued that initially 
both forms of knowledge appear topsy-turvy to each other, inverted. But 
this is not a satisfactory moment of rest for as Hegel (1949) writes: 
"(S)cience cannot simply reject a form of knowledge which is not 
true, and treat this as a common view of things, and then assure us 
that itself is an entirely different kind of knowledge, and holds the 
other to be of no account at all; nor can it appeal to the fact that 
in this other there are presages of a better. By giving that assurance 
it would declare its force and value to lie in its bare exist.ence: but 
the untrue knowledge appeals likewise to the fact that it is, and assures 
us that to it science is nothing. One barren assurance, however, is of 
just as much value as another." (p. 134-135, Hegel, 1949.) 
While it is unclear whether one could approximate to the idea of Wissenschaft 
the passage above gives an important moral. A moral that contradicts 
Burrell and Morgan's (1979) belief that competing matrices are irreconcilable 
and their recomruendation for theorists to work solely in each matrix. For 
the choice of a matrix is not an either/or choice, which it is often 
mistakenly taken to be. Either one has to be a pure AS or he is a watered-
down, no-good renegade. Either theory must be explanatory and empirical or 
it is not a true theory. Either theory must be critical about the quality 
of social life or it is a piece of conservative ideology. Either be a CH 
or nothing at all. Either theory must be interpretative and be completely so, 
or it is meaningless, empirical claptrap. Either stand up and be counted 
as a PH or • • . 
Such polemical rhetoric that puts up competing matrices as either-or 
choices are fundamentally mistaken. Bernstein (1976), drawing upon Hegel, 
advises us that the history of culture develops by the assertion and pursuit 
- 98 
of what appear to be irreooncileable conflicts and oppositions. Opposing 
theoretical orientations may be conceived as "moments" in the flow of human 
history which may be analysed. Further, 
"(W)e can discern in these 'moments' a pattern that reveals how we 
grasp both their 'truth' and their 'falsity'. As we work through these 
moments we learn how what is true in each of them can be integrated 
into a more comprehensive understanding that enables us to reject 
what is false, partial, one-sided, and abstract. ••• In the final 
analysis we are not confronted with exclusive choices: either empirical 
theory or interpretative theory or critical theory." (p. 235, Bernstein, 197€ 
Indeed an adequate social, organization and most of all accounting theory 
needs to be empirical, interpretative and critical. It needs to integrate 
that which is useful in each theoretical perspective. 
Some justification for this proposition lies within the genesis of our 
framework of subject-makers and their psychological make-up. For it 
argues that in order to do justice to the richness of reality and to develop 
enlightened knowledge and moral action we need the insights of all four 
inquirers, all four matrices. We shall draw once again on the insights of 
Jung and Mitroff and Kilmann. 
Jung was, of course, concerned with the basic functions of the psyche, 
indicating how far completeness or seeing life "in the round" should be 
equally developed by each function. However, he went further than this to 
indicate both the relative value of each of, and the interconnections between, 
the four functions. Jacobi (1968) depicts these aspects in a highly symbolic 
diagram which we have reproduced with slight modification in Diagram 4.1. 
In Jung's view thinking (T) has the highest value and is the causal 
(Insert Diagram 4.1 here) 
starting point for a journey which flows into (NT), (N), (NF) , (ST), (S), 
(SF) and finally (F) in that directional ordering. Clearly Jung's picture 
is normative in that there is no guarantee whatsoever that anyone individual 
can follow such a pathway for all sorts of reasons. These reasons, although 
vitally important, cannot be discussed in this chapter since they require 
highly complex psychological understanding and would take us too far from 
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the purpose of this section of this chapter. 
Mitroff and Kilmann (1978), building on the Jungian, theory developed 
and applied his ideas to social science problem formulation and solution 
design. Diagram 4.2 presents this overview of their model with links to the 
inquirer who can best perform the task. The model starts from reality in 
terms of a sounding or "feeling of an existence of" the phenomena under 
study. This then moves into a vocal conceptualisation of the situation 
from a macro (general) perspective i.e. looking behind the seeming problem 
to its "real" global nature. The result of this process is a "humanised" 
conceptual model of the problematic with some understanding as to the nature 
of where a broad solution can be obtained. Such broad boundaries feed into 
the empirical modelling ~Id solution stage of the process where a, or a 
number of, detailed specific solution'model(s) are suggested. Finally having 
arrived at a (or a number of) technical solution(s) to highlighted problems 
comes the stage of implementing these in the problem situation (reality). 
As can be seen from Diagram ~.2 there are feedback loops between all 
stages so that there can be constant retracing of steps should this be 
required. For instance the implementation stage may indicate that the 
technical solutions suggested are totally unjmplementable. In such a 
(Insert Diagram 4.2 here) 
situation this may well require modifications in the solution and empirical 
model invariably, and also, on occasion, the conceptual model as well. 
However, as can be seen, the feedback relationships are not all in an anti-
clockwise orderly sequence. The empirical model of mainstream theory can 
and should feedback into reality to test out its understanding. In a 
similar way the solution once formulated needs to be checked with the 
conceptual model to test out congruence. 
For this overall model to actually work requires the insights of different 
types of inquirers working in a closely knit complementary way. As can be seen 
from Diagram 4.2 the conceptualisation phase needs to be conducted by the 
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Conceptual Theorist and Conceptual Humanist (in Jung's terms this is the 
path from (T) through (NT) and (N) to (F). The modelling and solution phase 
needs to be conducted by the Analytical Scientist (in Jung's terms this is the 
path from (NF) through to (5». The implementation phase needs to be 
conducted by the Particular Humanist (in Jung's terms this is the path from (5) 
through (SF) to (F). 
In this way all inquirers play their own unique and important part in 
the problem formulation and solution design, but without anyone of the 
stages the end result becomes the poorer. For a Conceptual Theorist or 
Conceptual Humanist looking at the problem situation would only see the 
conceptual issues missing all aspects of modelling detail and implementation 
issues. Likewise an Analytical Scientist would miss the conceptual and 
, 
implementation stages in the problem formulation and solution design in his 
blind desire to see the world in a technical way. Ina similar fashion a 
Particular Humanist would omit the conceptual and modelling stages in his 
great desire to smooth out the emotional difficulties obviously present in 
the problem situation. The important point of course is that all these 
insights are necessary but individually they are not sufficient to bring 
about truly rich solutions or to discover the complex problems which face 
socjal scientists. 
The astute reader would have noticed that Mitroff and Kilrnann formulated 
their ideas with the view to designing problem-solving models in a management 
science context. In Habermas's terms their ideas are in the realm of techne 
which in classical Greek referred to the skillfull production of artefacts 
and expert mastery of objectified tasks." In other words, their concern is 
guided by a technical interest: which attempts to attain "technical control 
over history by perfecting the administration of society." (T.P., page, 255.) 
Apart from this Jungian analogy of the integrated personality, Habermas's 
structure of knowledge constitutive interests also argues, albeit implicitly that 
- 103- -
theory must needs be empirical, hermeneutically grounded in the meanings of 
social actors and be critical. He argued that there are three forms of 
knowledge, each of which is guided by a specific interest: the empirical-
analytic sciences by a technical interest, the hermeneutical sciences by a 
practical interest and the critical sciences by memancipatory interest. Each 
type of knowledge, according to Habermas, is categorially distinct from the 
other and each has a specific purpose, relationship to practice and a particular 
epistemology. 
The empirical-analytic sciences are concerned with developing instrumental 
knowledge which expands man's technical control over nature and which continually 
refines the administration of human beings and their relationships to each 
other by means of social organization. This form of knowledge is essentially 
used for the control of the external conditions of existence and is the necessary 
outcome of disturbances or disruptions in routinized intercourse with nature. 
In Habermas's terms, this process of technical, instrumental inquiry: 
" • • • (1) isolates the learning process from the life process. 
Therefore the performance of operations is reduced to selective feedback 
controls. (2) It guarantees precision and intersubjective reliability. 
Therefore action assumes the abstract form of experiment mediated by 
measurement procedures. (3) It systematizes the progression of knowledge. 
Therefore, as many universal assumptions as possible are integrated into 
theoretical connections that are as simple as possible." (p. 124. 
Habermas, 1972.) 
The theoretical connections which are made within this type of knowledge 
have the form of hypothetico-deductive systems. Particular phenomena are 
conceived in terms which allow their subsumption under hypothetically proposed 
general concepts. Through the use of such concepts, knowledge is generated 
which makes possible the duplication of conditions and the reproducibility of 
results. Thus empirical-analytic knowledge is predictive knowledge. 
\ 
"Theories comprise. hypothetico-deductive connections of propositions, 
which permit the deduction of lawlike hypotheses with empirical content. 
The latter can be interpreted as statements about the covariance of 
observable events; given a set of initial conditions, they make predictions 
Possible." (p. 308, Habermas, 1972.) 
Theory is connected to action by means of certain operations and activities, 
in particular systematic observation, experimentation, and operations of 
, 
measurement. These actions and the language required to express them 
objectify reality under the conditions of a "restricted mode of experience." 
(page 191, K.H.l.). Objects constituted as observable are at one and the 
same time objects whose behaviour can be described in causal laws and objects 
which are instrumentally manipulable. Observations or basic statements are 
therefore "not simple representations of fact in themselves" but rather expressions 
of the "success or failure of operations". (Page 308, K.H.l.). Facts are 
constituted through particular structures of experience and action. In the 
empirical-analytic sciences they are generated through an "a priori organization 
of our experience in the behavioural system of instrumental action." (Page 309, 
K.H.I.). 
Natural science is clearly seen by Habermas to be knowledge with a technical 
interest: it is oriented toward the proJuction of technically useful information. 
Although Habermas does not reduce natural science to a simple or crude 
instrumentation, he claims that it can be understood as oriented toward the 
prodUction of knowledge which can be used for the manipulation and control of the 
environment. While not every study of inquiry in the natural (or behavioural) 
sciences need produce technically utilizable results, nor need have as a 
conscious interest the production of such knowledge, 
"nevertheless, with the structure of propositions (restricted progress 
concerning observable behaviour) and with the type of conditions of 
validation (initiation of the control of the results of action ••. ) 
a methodical decision has been taken in advance of the technical utility 
of information. Similarly the range of possible experience is 
prejudiced, precisely the range to which hypotheses refer and upon which 
they can founder." (p. 209, Habermas, 1976a.) 
Thus Habermas argues that to the extent that actions are causally produced 
as effects of social and natural forces beyond the knowledge and/or control 
of actors, it is possible to consider ~em in an objectified manner and to 
use positivistic methods of study. It is for this reason that Guess (1981) 
argues that empirical-analytic and critical theories differ in their logical 
or cognitive structure. The former are objectifying theories. This means 
that at least in typical cases one can distinguish clearly between the theory 
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and the "objects" to which the theory refers; the theory is not itself part 
of the object-domain it describes. Newton's theory is not itself a particle 
of motion. Critical theories, on the other hand, are claimed to be reflection 
or self-referential: a critical theory is always a part of the object-domain 
which it describes; critical theories are always in part about themselves. 
Similarly Fay (1975) argues that critical theories are somewhat at odds with 
positivist methods of social study. Not only do critical theories have a 
different aim but they have different epistemological standards, i.e. they 
admit of and require different kinds of confirmation. Empirical-analytic 
theories have as their purpose the successful manipulation and prediction of an 
external reality; they have instrumental use. If correct, they enable the agents 
who have mastered them to cope with the environment and thus pursue their 
chosen ends successfully. Critical theories, on the other hand, aim at 
emancipation and enlightenment, at making agents aware of hidden coercion 
thereby freeing them from that coercion and putting them in a position to 
determine their true interests. In addition, empirical-analytic theories 
require empirical confirmation through observation and experiment; critical 
theories are cognitively acceptable only if they survive a more complicated 
process of evaluation, an important part of which is a demonstration that they 
would be acceptable by actors who have been freed of their repression and 
suffering. 
Not only are empirical-analytic theories different in important aspects 
from critical theories, so are the hermeneutical sciences which differ yet 
again from the other two types of knowledge. While knowledge claims of the 
empirical-analytic sciences "grasp reality with regard to technical control 
that, under specified conditions, is possible everywhere and at all times", 
knowledge claims in the hermeneutical sciences, Habermas holds 
"grasp interpretations of reality with regard to possible intesubjectivity 
of action-orienting mutual understanding specific to a given hermeneutic 
starting-point." (p. 195, Habermas,·1972.) 
Habermas, influenced by Dilthey, Hegel and Gadamer, underscores the "fact" 
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that individUals and societies act within a matrix of intersubjective meanings. 
These require controlled analysis and appropriation if key aspects of behaviour 
- not least of which are motives, purposes and beliefs about action - are to 
be understood. Through his reading of Dilthey, Habermas affirms that social 
scientists must learn the language of their subject/object - they must learn 
to speak the language that they interpret. In addition they must appreciate 
the origins and tradition-bound nature of understanding; this means that, in 
contradict jon to Dilthey and in accordance with Gadamer, hermeneutics cannot 
be restricted to a purely descriptive role (if such should exist) but that 
texts, experiences, actions etc. have to be understood in their historical 
contexts. For on~the historical dimension of understanding is established 
it becomes possible to transcend the surface level of intended meaning. And 
to move on to a critical analysis of the deep-seated sources of ideology, 
(conceived as false consciousness) domination and distortion in communication. 
For language, according to Habermas, not only reveals the conditions of 
social life, it conceals and: 
"Language is also a medium for domination and social power; it serves 
to legitimate relations of organized force. In so far as the legitimations 
do not articulate the power relations whose institutionalizations they 
make possible, in so far as these relations manifest themselves in the 
legitimations, language is also ideological." (p. 360, Habermas, 1977.) 
Social actions, therefore,can onlybe fully understood, Habermas contends, in 
a framework "that is constituted conjointly by language, labour and domination." 
A purely interpretative science cannot grasp this. And an approach is required 
that, on the one hand, 
"does not suppress the symbolic mediation of social action in favour of 
a naturalistic view of behaviour that is merely controlled by signals 
and excited by stimuli." 
and on the other, does not 
"succumb to an idealism of linguisticality and sublimate social 
processes entirely to cultural traditions." (p. 361, Habermas, 1977.) 
Habermas thus views empirical-analytic knowledge as "useful" for 
understanding social reality but limited in its usefulness. He recognized 
that positiVist philosophy had an initially liberating intent; its concern 
to provide a criterion for a strict separation between science and 
metaphysics was motivated by a desire to dispel all dogmas - all modes of 
thought - that placed themselves beyond empirical test and relevant independent 
controls. The results of natural science were impressive and did enable the 
external control of the natural environment. The positivistic ideas also 
prevented people from accepting beliefs that were factually erroneous or 
from confUSing normative and descriptive statements. However, Habermas argued 
that the positivistic notions of rationality and of acceptable knowledge were 
too narrow and by themselves are incapable of understanding social reality. 
Nevertheless, it is important to point out that Habermas does not argue that 
it is never appropriate to study human subjects with the methods of a causal, 
nomological science. On the contrary, we would argue that Habermas indicated 
that whilst such knowledge was not a sufficient condition for human emancipation, 
it was a necessary one and that such knowledge are vital for understanding 
laW-like behaviour and regularities in social and physical phenomena. For 
these reasons we argue that nomological knowledge of the kind which is reflected 
in social, organizational and accounting knowledge is not totally and 
intrinsically ideological. By failing to recognize its limitations is to 
succumb to error but such knowledge does enable us to study the constancies 
of social phenomena which are not merely products of the positivist's 
methodology and imagination. As Bernstein (1976) points out, social and 
organizational life does exhibit regularities and it is necessary to understand 
these to understand social life. But the significance of these regularities 
and observable correlations cannot wholly be understood in terms of statistical 
tests of significance. Statistical explanations are partial and in certain 
instances may be illusory but they do help to point the way towards hermeneutical 
and critical analyses. 
Similarly, for the moment, we accept Habermas's argument that hermeneutics 
is vital in turning our attention to the study of social practices, forms of 
life, intersubjective meanings and to understand how social and organizational life -
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consist of "moral paradigms". Hermeneutics enables us to see what underlies 
and is presupposed by the study of regularities and correlations; to see 
how actors understand themselves and interpret what they are dOing. In this 
way, a hermeneutical understanding helps to enrich our interpretation of the 
correlations or non-correlations we observe. But as Habermas argues, we need 
to go even further. Not only do we need theories which provide a nomological 
explanation of regularities, not only do we need theories which display a 
hermeneutical understanding of the social phenomena under study and which locate 
this understanding in larger, historical macro-structures of society, we need 
integrated, critical theories which provide a critique of contemporary social forms. 
As Berlin (1962) points out the exposure of models that dominate 
and penetrate man's thought and action is but a first step in social inquiry. 
The analyst's second task is to analyse the model itself, and this commits 
the analyst to accepting or modifying or rejecting it, and in the last cases 
to provide a more adequate one in its stead. Wolin (1972) similarly argues 
that social theories need to be critical and to offer a critical analysis of the 
quality, direction, or fate of public life. They should not merely accept the 
present "authoritative allocation of values" in our society. 
Theory and knowledge, especially that concerning social phenomena, may 
be and often is value-laden but this does not in itself preclude a science of 
social studies. Indeed, the social scientist aims to provoke moral debate 
about values and ethical issues. In Horkheimer's (1972) words theory should 
not only have a technical intention but a practical, critical purpose in 
radically improving human existence so that "mankind will for the first time 
be a conscious subject and actively determine its own way of life." 
"There is a human activity which has society itself for its object. 
The aim of this activity is not simply to eliminate one or another abuse, 
for it regards such abuses as necessarily connected with the way in which 
the social structure is organized. Although it itself emerges from the 
social structure, its purpose is not, either in its conscious intention 
or in its objective Significance, the better functioning of any element 
in the structure. On the contrary, it is suspicious of the very categories 
of better, useful, appropriate, productive, and valuable, as these are 
understood in the present order, and refuses to take them as non-scientific 
presuppositions about which one can do nothing." (p. 206-7, Horkheimer, 
1972.) , 
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A little further on Horkheimer describes what criticism or critique 
means: 
"By criticism we mean that intellectual and eventually practical effort 
which is not satisfied to accept the prevailing ideas, actions and 
social conditions unthinkingly and from mere habit; effort which aims to 
co-ordinate the individual sides of social life with each other and with 
the general ideas and aims of the epoch, to deduce them, to distinguish 
the appearance from the essence, to examine the foundations of things, 
in short, really to know them." (p. 270, Horkheimer, 1972.) 
This belief about the critical and practical role of social science 
harks back to Aristotle's conception of politics. As Habermas(1974) 
pointed out, this conceived of politics as the doctrine of the good and just 
life; it was a continuation of ethics. Aristotle saw no 0Pjosition between 
the constitution formulated in the nomoi and the ethos of civil life, that 
is, the ethical character of action was not separable from custom and law. 
Only the politeia makes the citizen capable of the good life; and he is 
altogether a zoon politikon in the sense that he is dependent on the city, 
the polis, for the realization of human nature. 
This conception of the critical role of science may be contrasted with 
that of Hobbes whom Habermas claims to have argued that "the engineers of 
the correct order can disregard the categories of ethical social intercourse 
and confine themselves to the construction of the conditions under which 
human beings, just like objects within nature, will necessarily behave in a 
" calculable manner. (p. 43, Haberrnas, 1974.) However, this extreme position 
has not been adopted by most AS in mainstream theory who have tended to adopt 
the mid-way position and assumed that enlightened men already exist. Though 
mainstream social theory makes a categorical distinction between fact and value 
and confines discussion of the latter to a minimum it does not altogether dis-
regard the categories of social intercourse. Indeed even logical positivists 
like Popper argue that ends are capable of rational discussion though there are 
severe problems to his defense of this central claim. 
We have used Habermas's structure of knowledge-constitutive interests to 
argue that nomological, hermeneutical and critical insights are by themselves 
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partial, inadequate but necessary parts of social theory. All three 
forms of knowledge are required in order to construct an adequate theory 
of human behaviour. Below we argue in what sense a theory may be said 
to possess an empirical, hermeneutical and critical imperative. 
But first we intend to show that the rigid distinctions which 
Habermas makes between the three forms of knowledge, each of which is 
guided by a separate, independent interest are ill-justified and 
unsatisfactory. Such clear distinctions between different forms of 
knowledge cannot, in the main be maintained. For instance, hermeneu-
tical problems are central to all attempts to comprehend law-like 
regularities in natural phenomena while a knowledge of regularities 
and a capacity for prediction is an equally important element of 
most forms of interpretative knowledge. 
Thus the respective forms of knowledge of these sciences cannot 
be adequately grasped by reference to the hypothetico-deductive 
model of explanation and interpretative accounts. In addition, certain 
forms of empirical-analytic knowledge do not have any obviouS relation 
to technical control. As Hesse (1978) pointed out, many theories 
enlarge our pragmatic knowledge without necessarily forming the basis 
of technology. An interest in prediction is not necessarily an 
interest in technical control. The link between interest and form 
of knowledge thus appears to pe in question in certain sciences and 
theories. As such, Habermas's rigid distinctions between forms of 
knowledge and their guiding interests are difficult to maintain and 
we argue rather that they point the way for an integrated theory of 
SOcial phenomena. \ 
Nomological knowledge is as much a part of integration as Ideo-
logiekritik and hermeneutics. Despite the restrictive practices 
which positivists have grown to adopt, such forms of knowledge and the 
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testing of its knowledge claims via hypothetico-deductive methods is an 
essential facet of social theoretical construction. The difficulties arise 
when such partial explanations and forms of knowledge are seen to be the only 
legitimate forms of knowledge and when regularities are artificially 
constructed and reified into immutable social laws beyond the control of man 
when they may not be. 
In addition, Habermas's definition of the role and purpose of critical 
theory: the emancipation and enlighte~tafman's social conditions is 
essentially empirically-based. To be more exact, a critical theory has as its 
inherent empirical, practical aim the self-consciousness of a successful 
process of enlightenment and emancipation. In this sense the word empirical 
is synonymous with praxis, with relating to social and human reality. A 
critical, integrated theory is built on the cx~licit recognition 
that social theory is interconnected with social practice, such that what is to 
count as truth is partially determined by the specific ways in which knowledge 
and theory is supposed to relate to practical action. This empirical basis is 
also found in both empirical-analytic and hermeneutical sciences though Fay 
(1975) argues that this theory-practice relationship is more implicit and less 
well-acknowledged by practitioners in each of these fields. Indeed we would 
argue that this relationship of theory to practice would be the case in any 
nJodel of social scientific knowledge and in this sense any theory of social 
phenomena has an empirical imperative and must tie its knowledge claims to the 
satisfaction of human purposes and desires. Social theories will necessarily 
be composed of, among other things, an account of how such theories are translatabl~ 
into action or are to influence action. This means that the truth or falsity 
of any social theory will be partially determined by whether they are in fact 
translated into action. The primacy of the theory-practice relationship or 
the reqUirement for an empirical base in social theory is well argued by 
Res~ (1973) and by Habermas himself in Knowledge and Human Int~rests. It is 
reflected in the positivist's search for social regularities which explain, 
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predict and enable man to extend the narrow bandwidths of survival, in the 
phenomenologist's desire to explicate deep-seated subjective meanings and to 
facilitate communicative interaction and the critical theorist's demand 
that theory should emancipate man from repression and domination. It is also 
implicit in the epistemic principles used by each form of inter-related 
knowledge - all three are based on and can only be confirmed by experience. 
However, the experience on which a critical theory is based includes not only 
the sense data and observations of the positivist, the mutual meanings and 
understanding of the phenomenologist but the experience of self-reflection, 
of self-consciousness and a liberation from unnecessary coercion and frustration. 
Social theory also has a hermeneutical imperative because the object/subject 
of study is man itself, a sentient being who interacts via language games, who 
actively creates and is created by the construction of a subjective reality. 
Human experience does not reflect fundamental organic states; rather it is 
formed by publicly established symbolic structures - by language. In order 
to develop knowledge of a socio-cultural phenomenon, the subject must, at 
least, penetrate the language and social context of the object. Knowledge can 
only be enhanced through the establishment of intersubjective understanding. 
As experiences, speech acts have a significance even beyond their role as 
carriers of meaning within systems of grammatical structures. Since ordinary 
language is intertwined with practice, the meanings and experiences that an 
interpretation attempts to grasp can be seen as part of a "stream of life". 
Language mediates between the finite historical nature of humankind and the 
world; it is the mechanism through which people can come to understand themselves 
and their relation to others. Thus a social science must not only be empirically_ 
based but hermeneutically grounded in intersubjective meanings. 
Finally, as argued earlier, social theory demands a critical intent. It 
does not predict that agents in the society will adopt and use the theory to 
understand themselves and transform their society, rather it demands that 
they adopt the critique of theory, i.e. it- asserts that these agents "ought" 
" 
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to adopt and act on the critical aspects of theory where the "ought" is 
the "ought" of rationality. A theory which is informed by critique asserts 
of itself that it is not a matter of indifference to some group of agents. 
It does not merely give information about how it would be rational for agents 
to act if they had certain interests; it claims to inform them what interests 
it is rational for them to have. Habermas develops a complex theory of 
rationality which claims that the notion of critique, the critical imperative 
of theory is itself a quasi-transcendental concept which is unrelated to 
particular historical conditions. In the next section we elaborate his theory 
of universal pragmatics and his argument that critique is intrinsically 
antiCipated in the speech acts of human beings. 
4.3 Habermas's Theory of Communicative Competence and Universal Pragmatics 
We have noted previously that the question of appropriate norms or 
criteria of rationality for all forms of inquiry has vexed many philosophers 
of science. "Paradigm switches" clearly involve rational processes and is 
not totally a matter of whim, arbitrary fiat, or irrational decision but our 
standard theories of rationali ty are not rich enough to illuminate these 
processes. 
We present here Habermas's (1979) attempt to formulate a comprehensive 
theory of rationality that is concerned with what Habermas considers the 
primary problem of social theory today: 
"HOW, within a political situation, can we obtain clarification of what 
is practically necessary and at the same time objectively possible? 
This question can be translated back into our historical context: how 
can the promise of practical politics - namely, of providing practical 
orientation about what is right and just in a given situation - be 
redeemed without relinquishing, on the one hand, the rigour of scientific 
knowledge, which modern social philosophy demands in contrast to the 
practical philosophy of classicism? And on the other, how can the 
promise of social philosophy to finish an analysis of the interrelationships 
of social life, be redeemed without relinquishing the practical 
orientations of classical politics?" (p. 44, Habermas, 1974.) 
His theory of universal pragmatics argues that whilst pure theoria 
cannot exist, there is nevertheless a justified normative basis on which moral, 
practical, questions can be decided with reason just like technical-empirical 
questions. That is, a justified normative theory of rationality exists that 
at Once acknowledges the historicality of knowledge and yet is transcendental; 
a cognitive ethics is, according to Habermas, possible. 
For Habermas the only way to explain the particular qualities of inter-
subjectively recognized norms is by recourse to the notion of a consensus 
based on the primary of rational criticism. What is needed is recognition of 
the procedures by which rationally motivated agreement is and can be attained. 
While no procedures exist which can guarantee a lasting consensus, or which 
can supply the "truth" once and for all, there are procedures, Habermas thinks, 
which generate good reasons to accept or reject competing knowledge and 
normative claims. These are located in the notion of discourse. It is 
Habennas's contention that the presuppositiolls and procedures of discourse 
are the basis for establishing both the truth of statements and the correctness 
of norms. The rationality of discourse resides in the fact that the reciprocal 
behavioural expectation raised to normative status afford validity ofacommon 
interest ascertained without deception. (See Habermas, 1976b;Habermas, 1979). 
But how can we justify this norm of discourse which is used to justify 
all other nonns? How can this principle of discourse be established in a 
non-circular ~ay ill adjudicillE between competing theories of rationality? 
Haberrnas's solution is that discourse is embedded in the very nature of speech 
itself. As he argues in the theory of communicative competence, an analysis 
of "universal pragmatics" - "rules for using sentences in utterances" -
discloses the "transcendental" nature of all such acts and, in particular, 
demonstrates that "the expectation of discoursive redemption of normative-
validity claims is already contained in the structure of intersubjectivity 
and makes specially introducedmaxims of universalization superfluous." (L. C. , 
page 110). 
Drawing from the ideas developed by, among others, Chomsky in linquistics 
and Austin and Searle in the theory of speech acts, Habermas argues that 
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"communicative competence" can be rationally constructed. A rational 
reconstruction is defined by Haberrnas as a mode of reflection that explicates 
general rules of human competency in a given area or context, for example 
linguistics or cognitive developments. While reconstructions depend on 
reflection, this reflection is not limited to a particular subject. 
"Rational reconstructions . deal with anonymous rule systems, 
which any subject whatsoever can comply with in so far as they have 
acquired the corresponding competence with respect to these rules. 
Reconstructions thus do not encompass subjectivity, within the horizons 
of which alone the experience of reflection (in the sense of self-
criticism is possible)." (p. 22, Habermas, 1974.) 
The core ideas behind the theory of communicative competence include firstly, 
an eXamination of "the validity basis of speech"; for a successful communication 
is underpinned by a rational foundation of validity claims that have a cognitive 
character. Anyone acting communicatively "must raise univ~rsal validity 
" claims and suppose that they can be vindicated (einlosen )". There are four 
d u ifferent types of claims (Geltungsanspruche): comprehensibility, 
(Verstandlichkeit), truth (Wahrheit), rightness/correctness (Richtigkeit) 
and truthfulness/sincerity (Wahrhaftigkeit). In everyday interaction these 
claims are usually taken for granted but the assumption is made by interacting 
subjects that they could, if the background consensus is brought into disrepute, 
vindicate their beliefs. That is, in everyday interaction statements are 
generated about the objects of experience. These statements imply truth clainJs. 
Experiences support these claims; but the truth of norms can be redeemed 
only through argumentation in, respectively, a "theoretical-empirical" 
discourse and "practical discourse". The former leads to a critique of knowledge 
whilst the latter leads to the formation of rational critical will. 
The aim of such discourse is to distinguish an accepted consensus - one 
which is now challenged - from a rational consensus. It is argumentation 
itself that is the basis for determining whether a consensus is rational or 
not. This is not to deny that in any given instance we may be mistaken: we 
may jUdge a consensus to be rational where further reflection and argumentation 
indicate that it is not. 
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But what are the criteria for determining whether the consensus reached 
is a rational one? What are the criteria of argumentation itself? This 
question was posed earlier in section 3 but not answered. Habermas claims that 
there are no fixed decision procedures or explicit criteria which will definitely 
set off a rational consensus from one which is not; we can only recourse to 
argumentation itself. But argumentation requires a consensus: how else can 
we rationally agree about what are sound and unsound, or better and worse, 
~ arguments? 
Habermas locates not the criteria for determining a rational consensus but 
the process for such determination in the notion of an ideal speech act, which 
lays the a priori foundation for argumentative reasoning because it is both 
presupposed and anticipated in every speech act. 
"No matter how the intersubjectivity·of mutua1 understanding may be deformed, 
the design of an ideal speech act situation is necessarily implied in 
the structure of potential speech, since all speech, even intentional 
deception, is oriented toward the idea of truth. This idea can be 
analyzed with regard to a consensus achieved in unrestrained and universal 
discourse. Insofar as we master the means for the construction of the 
ideal speech situation, we can conceive the idea of truth, freedom and 
justice, which interpenetrate each other - although of course only as 
ideas. On the strength of communicative competence only, however, and 
independent of the empirical structures of the social system to which we 
belong, we are quite unable to realize the ideal speech situation, we can 
only anticipate it." (p. 372, Habermas, 1970a.) 
The goal of discourse is hence to approximate the ideal speech situation 
which serves as the critical standard for the assessment of rational genuine 
consensus. Ideal speech is that form of discourse that requires "the 
suspension of the constraints of action"; there is only one acceptable motive 
- "the co-operative search for truth". The conditions for such a grounded 
consensus that is free of systematic distortions ~a situation in which 
there is mutual understanding between participants, equal chances to select 
and employ speech acts, recognition of the legitimacy of each to participate 
in the dialogue as "an autonomous and equal partner" and where the resulting 
consensus is due Simply to the compulsion of the argumentation. 
As a variety of commentators have pointed out, such an ideal speech 
situation is concommitant with the good f~d true life. That is, it normatively 
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implies an ideal institutional context, an ideal form of life that would enable 
all participants to engage in discursive will - formation as free and equal 
actors (see Held (1980); McCarthy (1973». One where objective social 
institutions and practices exist that not only permits but motivate free, 
symmetrical, unconstrained discourse, and it is through speech and discourse 
that such a form of life is manifested. As Bernstein (1976) points out this 
idea of ideal speech comes remarkably close to Pierce's understanding of the 
ideal community of inquirers - a parallel that Habermas readily acknowledges. 
Like Pierce, Habermas thinks that such an ideal is presupposed and anticipated 
in all inquiry. 
The end result of Habermas's complex argument is that truth and virtue, 
facts and values, theory and practice are inseparable. The very structure of 
speech itself, according to Habermas, involves the anticipation of a form of 
life in which complete autonomy and responsibility are possible. Hence its 
normative foundation is, therefore, not arbitrary, but inherent in the very 
structure of social action which it analyses. 
We have presented Habermas's argument in some detail because it is one 
of the most ambitious and comprehensive theories of rationality. Indeed 
Habermas conceives of his project as an attempt to develop a comprehensive 
critical theory of society with a practical intention: the self-emancipation 
of people from domination. Earlier we argued that social and organizational 
theory needs to be integrated and Habermas's work, it is contended, helps to 
illuminate in what sense theory can be and is required to be critical. He 
also presents a highly suggestive and systematic argument about the rational ad-
judication of competing technical and practical claims. 
\ 
4.4 Some Criticisms of Habermas's Argument 
This is not to deny that Habermas's work does not still contain unresolved 
ambiguities, tensions and difficulties. One would hardly expect none of such 
an endeavour. However, our final assessment is that the heart of Habermas's 
arguments, despite all its flaws, enabl~ us to reformulate an integrated 
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perspective on social and organizational phenomena. 
Let us turn then to the criticisms of critical theory, in general, and 
Habermas's work in particular. Held (1980) has written a succinct reply to 
Marxist critics like Anderson (1976), Therborn (1977), Slater (1977), 
Woodiwi$ (1978) and Tar (1977). To the first charge that critical theory 
reproduces idealist positions and is but metaphysical humanism, Held points 
out such a charge rests on an unfounded assumption that the influence of 
idealism was completely negative. Clearly, this is not the case as Marx 
indicated in the Theses on Feuerback (1970) that idealism restores insight 
into the "active side" of materialism. Though the work of critical theorists 
like Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse and Habermas do vary significantly from 
one another they all attempt to conceive human societies as "natural" and 
"sensuous" beings whose needs have been unfulfillec by certain forms of 
"ideology". To reflect on such needs is not "nJetaphysical humanism". Rather 
it is to believe that "things might be otherwise than they are", that potentiali ties 
for radical change exist. Indeed, their concept of idealism enabled the 
critical theorists at various points in their career to restore to the centre 
of Marxism some of the most radical and subversive elements of Marx's work. 
The second and third areas of criticism are closely coupled and refer to 
the complaint that critical theory is too concerned with philosophical 
and theoretical problems whilst not paying sufficient attention to Marxist 
topics. For example, an excessive amount of time is spent on "super-structural 
phenomena". Again, such a charge is refuted. Firstly, critical theorists 
were not interested in philosophy and theory per se, but in how philosophy 
and theoretical formulation could illuminate practical problems. Secondly, 
Marxist critics tend to have a narrow view of what constitutes Marxist 
topics - namely, political economy and the theory and practice of Leninist 
(Trotskyist) politics. But the critical theorists have all acknowledged 
and discussed Marx's contributions to political economy. What they do contend, 
and this is especially true of Habermas, is that Marx's formulations were 
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too narrow: they failed to uncover the increasing vital role of the State, 
failed to explain the lack of revolutionary consciousness in advanced Western 
capitalism and ignored the ability of ideological culture and aesthetics to 
preserve the capitalist mode of production. What the critics have not done 
to date is to confront these arguments, instead they persist in misreading 
critical theory. Althusser, for instance, in his critique of critical theory 
presents the concept of "mode of production" as though the Frankfurt School 
and Habermas had not even heard of the term. Thirdly, the interest of 
critical theorists in history and culture is not downplaying structure. It represents 
a serious attempt to examine the interplay between structure and social practices 
and the manner in which this interplay explains the course of a constructed 
history. Indeed, Horkheimer's critique of ideology, Adorno's use of negative 
dialectics in cultural criticism, Habermas's criticisms of scientism and 
hermeneutics are amongst some of the n~st insightful, provocative and radical 
examples of social inquiry. Fourthly, critical theory is criticised for being 
generally remote from working-class politics. The critical theorists were 
isolated in academic settings. While this charge is true in a sense it must 
be emphasized that critical theory itself has significant political implications. 
"Far from reflecting a distance from practical-political problems, 
their interest in theory and critique was directly related to an ambition 
to analyse new forms of domination, undermine ideology, enhance awareness 
of the material conditions of life circumstance, and to aid the creation 
of radical political movements." (p. 361, Held, 1980.) 
Also the criticism has less force When one remembers that active participation 
in day to day working class politics is not the only legitimate form of 
political involvement. One of the most significant achievements of critical 
theory is, in our view, to have shown that politics has a different meaning, 
that there are many ways of contributing\to critique, self-reflection and 
the eventual emancipation of man from structural and super-structural forms 
of domination. 
These criticisms apart, Habermas's theory of communicative competence 
is seen to pose problems. Firstly, Habermas holds that it is possible for 
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individuals in discourse to "step outside" of their web of everyday beliefs 
and commitments. This implies as Held puts it a "complete transformation 
of psychic states and interests". Such an expectation, so Held claims, is 
completely unrealistic and irrelevant for discourse, say in mathematics, is 
compatible with a wide range of psychological make-ups. This is certainly 
the case but it is argued here that when Habermas set out this requirement 
of a complete freedom or "suspension of constraints" he is setting out the 
formal requirements of an ideal speech condition. The entire theory of 
communicative competence is based on an ideal which Habermas freely admits 
is counterfactual to everyday experience. But this does not of itself under-
mine its significance. For as he explains it 
"The ideal speech situation is neither an empirical phenomenon nor 
Simply a construct, but a reciprocal supposition unavoidable in 
discourse. This supposition can, but need not be, ~ounterfactuali 
but even When counterfactual it is a fiction which is operatively 
effective in communication. I would, therefore, prefer to speak of 
an anticipation of an ideal speech situation •••• This alone is the 
warrant which permits us to join to an actually attained consensus the 
claim of a rational consensus. At the same time it is a critical standard 
against which every actually realized consensus can be called into 
question and tested." (p. 258, Habermas, 1973.) 
In other words, this ideal serves as a standard for the critique of systematically 
distorted communication: where it is clearly absent doubt can be cast on the gen-
uineness of the consensus or compromise achieved and the legitimacy and 
authority that is derived from it. Whether or not the empirical conditions 
can be practically created, the self-motivation to enter into discourse 
(which Bernstein (1976) demands) can be instilled for the realization of this 
ideal of reason and life is a separate question. It is not one that in 
Habermas's opinion admits of an a priori answer. 
Similarly, critics who demand that Habermas's ideal should tell them 
"how to change the world" has, according to Hahermas confused the distinctions 
between theoretical and practical discourse and strategic, risky political action. 
Whilst a social theory that limits itself to a discussion of ideal conditions 
leaves us with a myopic vision of praxis and theory and practical action must 
complement one another, theory can never '.be used directly and automatically 
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to justify tactical action. 
"Theory cannot have the same function for the organization of action, 
of the political struggle, as it has for the organization of 
enlightenment. The practical consequences of self-reflection are 
changes in attitude which result from insight into causalities in 
the past, and indeed result of themselves. In contrast, strategic 
action oriented towards the future, which is prepared for in the 
internal discussion of groups . • • cannot be justified in the same 
manner by reflective knowledge." (p. 39, Habermas, 1974.) 
According to Habermas the intent of critique is insight into causalities 
in the past and present so as to provide us with an accurate depth understanding 
of our historical situation. Its aim is to initiate emancipation by first 
initiating knowledge of the constraints upon freedom and ideal discourse 
via a process of critical self-reflection. However, Habermas is clear that 
self-reflection is a necessary but not sufficient condition for real, material 
freedom. Here an ambiguity arises in Habermas for he does not specify in 
detail what are the necessary and sufficient conditions. One can but glean 
from his other work that these other contingencies would include the capability 
and motivation for a man, individually and collectively to achieve self-
reflection, the learning process within society as a whole and the strategic 
actions taken by man. 
Finally, critics complain that the idea of unconstrained discourse does 
not aid the resolutions of disputes between comPrting value positions or 
truth claims. It is merely a regulative ideal in discourse. As Lukes (1977) 
puts it 
"(How does it) help us in the face of the great ideological struggles 
of the age, involving religious and anti-religious creeds • . • and 
all varieties of socialism, liberalism and conservatism? How does it 
help even when trying to decide between the views of, say Herbert 
Marcuse and John Rawls? For it is precisely the claim of such 
contending doctrines that each advances views which are reasonable and 
rational." (p. 411, Lukes, 1977.) 
'> 
As Held (1980) shows this is not a criticism at a certain level for Habermas 
is less concerned with specific value positions as with a rational 
reconstruction of the possibility of discourse and the process whereby such ad-
judication may take place. But it is accepted that as presently conceived 
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Habermas's work does not specify in sufficient clarity the judgment of the 
effectiveness of discourse in the absence of an ideal form of life. Given 
'. 
that there is domination and asymmetry in wealth and by extension speech 
opportunities, how can we judge the force of a better argument? How can we 
be sure that even if consensus is reached in an unideal world, that it is a 
genuine, rational consensus, that there has been genuine self-reflection? 
Insofar as Habermas implicitly addresses the issue, the answer is that we 
are never in a position to know with absolute certainty. There is a 
fundamental ambiguity intrinsic to the human condition. As Bernstein (1976) 
so aptly puts it 
"The complexity, strength and deviousness of the forms of resistant:e; 
the inadequacy of mere 'intellectual understanding' to effect a radical 
transformation; the fact that any claim to enlightened understanding 
may itself be a deeper and subtler form of self-deception - these 
obstacles can never be completely discounted in our ~valuation of the 
success or failure of critique." (p. 218-219, Bernsteine, 1976.) 
In the meantime, Habermas urges for a clear-sighted critique of systematic 
distortions of communication, for argumentation, debate and yes, imperfect 
discourse amongst scholars about the limits of their models and the adequacy 
of alternatives. 
Despite these issues we think Habermas is right when he argues that there 
is a relentless drive in modern societies to transform all ~ractica1 questions 
into technical ones. And that the most practical problem of our time is to 
initiate a critique, a process of self-reflection about all those intellectual 
and material tendencies that undermine or suppress practical discourse. The 
role of the theorist is thus to work towards the achievement of these objective 
institUtions in which such ptactical discourse can be concretely realized. 
(Habermas, 1970bt-l.979; l.975) '. 
\ 
Effectiveness Issue 
5.0 Introduction 
The prevailing dissatisfaction with mainstream social and organizational 
theory has initiated emergent theoretical alternatives which have yet to 
influence in a substantial manner current research in organization theory, 
"behavioural" and management accounting. Most of the work on O.E. for 
example is within the mode of traditional theory. The last chapter has argued 
strongly for developing an integrated theory of social and organizational 
phenomena. This being a theory that is founded as far as possible on the 
strengths of all four scientific inquirers, that is created by working through 
these theoretical "moments" such that what is "true" in each of them can be 
integrated into a more comprehensive understanding of human action. This 
chapter develops the argument further by setting out the strategy for 
developing an integrated theory of O.E. We work through various theoretical 
perspectives and evaluate their implications for a study of O.E. We then end 
with a discussion of the process of integration in formulating a theory of O.E. 
5.1 An Integrated Theory of Organizational Effectiveness: The Process 
What then is the nature of an empirical, hermeneutical and critical theory 
of organizational accountability and what are the implications of such a theory 
for the development of a critical function in the discipline of accounting? In 
order that such an integrated theory might be developed it needs to be 
subjected to the insights of all four inquirers. To recapitulate,:Jung gave 
thinking (T) the highest value and argued that the causal starting point for 
an integrated individual went from (T) into (NT), (N), (NF), (ST), (S), (SF) 
'. 
and finally (F). Mitroff and Kilmann (1978) interpreted this as a theory of 
problem-solving which moved from a given reality domain to conceptualization, 
to empirical model construction (which was based on a genuine feel of the 
problem situation) and finally to the generation of numerous solutions to 
the identified problem. 
Our proposals for the development of an integrated theory of social 
phenomena is a theory that is first generated by the AS and is then shown 
by PH how it might be extended by the CH and CT via a process of critical 
self-reflection. In other words, our theory begins with a technical level 
of interest which is then enriched by a hermeneutical understanding of the 
social phenomena and leads finally to a critical self-reflection which exposes 
the degree of ideology and constrained consensus within a given institution 
and society in general. If we refer to Jung's diagram, then the process of 
integration goes through a figure of eight, moving from thinking (T), back 
to thinking or re-thinking to be more precise. (See Diagram 5.1) . 
Or in Habermasian terminology, this suggested model of theory re-
construction may be seen as below. (See Diagram 5.2) . 
As can be seen fran Diagram 5.1 the flow of integration is similar to the 
process outlined by Jung but with one vital addition - that of a feedback 
loop that initiates self-reflection. Indeed, it is the establishment of just 
such a critical facet that enables man to expose sources of domination and 
together with technical progress move to higher levels of knowledge. In 
addition, this argument begins with where most mainstream scientists are at, 
within the confines of traditional, mainstream theory. It then takes the 
SOcial scientist through the weaknesses and strengths of this "moment" of 
inquiry through to a mode of self-reflection, both about the phenomena under 
study and the theory constructed to explain the phenomena. In this way, an 
integrated theory is built first on the usefulness of traditional methods in 
interpreting, explaining and predicting quasi-causal behaviour. It then 
carefully expands this social theory in a critical mode and evaluates our 
present structural forms in terms of their contribution to the existence of 
an ideal speech condition. 
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Diagram 5.2: A Model of Social Theory Formulation 
This process of developing an integrated theory of D.E. is not claimed 
to be the only or the "best" methodology but is argued to be a way of 
building on and extending current methodologies in social science. The 
justification for such a process is two-fold: 
(a) we begin where mainstream theory is at and our process of integration 
recognizes the contribution of a technical interest to the 
understanding of social knowledge. As will be argued, a technical 
concern with efficient administration is important for emancipation 
because it enables man to control and predict the forces of 
production; and 
(b) We integrate in a manner which incorporates the major alternatives 
now emerging. The process of integration essentially follows 
Habermas's typology of the three levels of interest which are said 
to characterize the empirical, hermeneutic and critical sciences. 
" 
Although we do not agree with Habermas's rigid distinction between 
each of these levels of interest, the typology afforded a useful 
base from which integration could proceed. 
More discussion about this definition of integration is found in chapter 11. 
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5.2 The Old Wine in New Wineskins 
The assessment of organizational effectiveness has so far been 
conducted primarily in the positivistic tradition of mainstream theory. 
The 2 x 2 matrix used to classify contemporary theories of O.E. reveals 
that such theories in effect fall mainly within the parameters of 
positivism as outlined earlier and therefore reflect the weaknesses 
therein. Theories which purport to be descriptive rather than prescriptive, 
make strong distinctions between fact and value and between 'objectivity' 
and 'subjectivity' fall within this classification. 
Both these sets of criticisms are less true of the need-satisfaction 
theory of the F-set of Tinker (1975) and Lowe and Tinker (1977). 
This theory does attempt to uncover the prescriptive bias which 
undergirds so-called descriptive theories of O.E. and does seek a 
holistic analysis of the meaning of long-run satisfaction of participant 
needs and desires. The strengths of this theory have already been 
discussed in detail in chapter 2. These strengths partially explain 
why we have chosen to build an integrated theory of O.E. from the 
technical base of the notion of the F-set. However, as chapter 8 
discusses in more detail, the F-set as it stands is not without 
difficulties and criticisms may be levelled at the theory from within 
the parameters of a technical-interested methodology. That is, were 
we to keep within a technical level of interest we are still able to 
criticise the F-set and propose changes which retain a technical 
perspective. 
In brief, these criticisms are: the F-set as currently conceived 
does not analy~e the processes by ~hich macro- and micro-power rela-
tionships may influence the content of the F-set and the particular 
mix of inducements and contributions which prevail in a micro-organization; 
it does not analyse, although theoretically it could t the historical 
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as distinct from the social, economic and political factors which 
influence the content of the feasible set and the choice of a feasible 
strategy; and it does not explicitly incorporate notions of long-run 
survival as defined by a long-run satisfaction of participant needs. 
In addition, there were indications of methodological difficulties when 
the theory of the F-set was empirically tested. Tinker (1975) em-
ployed stepwise regression to analyse hypothetical linear relationships 
among his twenty-six variables, twenty-five of which were "independent" 
and the O.E. measure was the "dependent" variable. The use of step-
Wise regression in multivariate analysis is highly problematic and 
as Guttman (1977) points out stepwise regression as currently practised 
is neither inference wise nor theory wise. He writes: 
"Making further calculations conditional on lists of 
"significance" of previous calculations does not yield 
the implied probabilities for purposes of inference. 
A correct sequential test is not yet known. Alter-
natively to look at all possible regressions simul-
taneously creates another inference problem that no 
one has yet solved." 
(p. 7, Guttman, 1977) 
Also mathematical and empirical cross-validation evidence suggests that 
there is merit in seeking a minimal number of predictors for practical 
prediction. Too many predictors can give almost worthless predictions 
in the next sample; they spoil a regression by adding more sampling error 
than anything else. The use of 25 predictors is therefore of dubious 
statistical reliability. 
These methodological criticisms are, however, not an intrinsic 
criticism of ~e F-set but are more criticisms of the choice of 
statistical tools used by Tinker (1975). Such difficulties resulted 
primarily from the relative complexity of the theory generated and the 
rather undeveloped statistical means used and, indeed available for 
usage, in an empirical test of the theory. 
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For these reasons we attempt in chapter 8 to extend the theory 
of the F-set within a technical level of interest. Our purpose is to build 
an integrated theory of organizational effectiveness from a technical-
interested base of measuring and identifying social patterns and relationships. 
The current conceptualization of the F-set is modified to take account of the 
treoretical difficulties identified within a functionalist perspective and an 
attempt is made to overcome some of the statistical problems of analysis. In 
particular the use of stepwise regression is avoided. However, our own use 
of statistics itself generates new difficulties and these are discussed later 
in the thesis when we integrate technical knowledge with a critique of social 
phenomena and practices. Prior to this integrative effort, however, the 
empirical results deduced and generated by a technically-interested theory of 
O.E., which is based on Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety, are analysed in 
conventional, traditional modes of statistical explanation. That is, these 
results are analysed and presented from a technical perspective; they form, 
as it were, the base strata from which hermeneutical and critical insights 
are generated. To borrow an analogy oft-used, this technical-interested 
theory and the results it generates are the outer layers of an onion, which are 
part of the totality of social phenomena (as pictured by the onion) and which, 
when unpeeled, reveal other layers of complexity generated by phenomenology 
and critique. Just as the part does not have meaning but within the whole 
so the whole is meaningless without its parts. Hence the concern with 
developing nomological knowledge, with quantification in social science and 
with using natural science methodology is an essential facet of an integrated 
theory of O.E. 
This is not, however, to ignore the phenomenological challenge to the 
understanding of criteria of effectiveness in micro-organizations. There is 
much to recommend the phenomenological emphasis on the subjective and inter-
subjective meaning of action. For too long this creative, manifest facet of 
man has been completely submerged by the analytical scientist's image of man 
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as a complex, mechanical physical system. In particular, Schutz's analysis 
of the concept of Verstehen is invaluable: it is primarily the name of a 
complex process by which actors attach meaning to action and thereby interpret 
their own actions and those of others. It also defines the role of the 
theorist as a creator of second-level "ideal types" which explain the first-
level ideal types and typifications used by actors. The concept of Verstehen 
is here understood as a methodological tool whereby the actor's definition 
of the situation might help provide a filtered, causal explanation of observabl~ 
regular patterned actions. This interpretation of Verstehen is closer to 
Weber's original definition of the "ideal type" and to the work of symbolic 
interactionists. The argument of ethnomethodologists like Zimmerman and 
Wieder (1970) that they are concerned with the actor's point of view per se 
is, though vllid, of only limited use in providing explanations for the 
regularities of social life. 
But it is insufficient to.' recommend a descriptive analysis of the meanings 
of O.E.· and'of the processes by which various definitions of O.E. arise. 
For once the filtered observations have been made, then what? How does the 
analyst propose to further his study? How does the argument proceed? For 
what is lacking in this essen.tially phenomenological approach (though HopwoOd 
(1979) does not use the te~) is anything that could serve as a basis for 
critical evaluative judgments. What is worse, it turns this lack into a 
virtue - the presumed virtue of pure description which hides support for 
a conservative ideology. 
Consider an example of how such an evaluation of effectiveness would 
proceed. Suppose the analyst discovers that the administrators of Hospital ~ 
influence subs ,anti ally the de~inition of effectiveness and criteria such 
\ 
as efficiency and speed of throughput became.a·highly visible facet of 
I 
organizational life. By contrast, Hospital B with a different historical 
background is controlled by an elite of doctors whose self-interest 
coinc~des with achieving a high degree of prestigious research output that 
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incidentally induces a high standard of patient care. Presumably there are 
basic structures common 'to both these forms of reality and a transcendental 
phenomenology would elucidate them. Further, by using the techniques of 
phenomenology, we can also describe the differences between those two forms 
of life and point out the explanatory causes and resultant consequences. 
For example, Hospital A is indeed more efficient and Hospital B does in fact 
have a national research reputation. 
What is lacking in such a limited explanation, with its drive towards 
pure description, is any ground for evaluating these very different forms of 
social and political life, for saying that one form better apprOXimates what 
social life is or ought to be. The discrimination of what is genuinely 
universal and a priori from what is variable, even if achieved, is not 
sufficient to assess anyone historical form of social and accounting reality 
as dehumanising or alienating. Hopwood (1979), like other mainstream 
theorists, has essentially opted for an uneasy midway ethical position - he 
has assumed that by "describing" such events, reasonable rational and 
enlightened Man will act in an enlightened way to further "progress". But 
what is the basis of such an assumption - a belief in the inherent goodness 
of man? 
In order to achieve the desired hermeneutical insights we have sought 
to enrich our extended, teChnical theory of the F-set. Chapter 8 sets out 
not only the technical base, of an integrated theo:t;Y of O.E. but it also incorporat~~ 
a model within which historical meanings of O.E. may be located within the power 
relationships of past and present interest groups. Such power relationships 
are analysed at both the macro-structural as well as micro-political level. 
The creation of such a model in fact departs from the work of phenomenologists 
such as Schutz, Gari~nkel and Goffman w~o have tended to aimost pluck meanings 
from the air. In other words, one is unaware of the holistic_framework within 
"hieb their analysis of "descriptive" meanings takes place and is perceived. In 
COntradiction we have set out an arena within which subjective meanings may be 
said to "mean something", to be a charged item of analysis, to be of significance 
to the social scientist. 
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We have chosen to analyse meanings within a political framework of power 
relationships because of a variety of reasons. Firstly, our research 
organization was one with a long history of social struggle to establish social 
and political status. Nursing and its training have been radically 
redefined since the 19th century and these definitions have reflected changing 
relationships with and Expectations of oth~r interest groups such as doctors 
and patients. 7n addition, the micro-organization had recently seen a clear 
change of authority styles in its leadership and had implemented a state-
imposed hierarchical structure of legitimate authority. These historical 
contextual factors contributed to the choice of a political framework in 
analysing different meanings of organizational effectiveness. Finallyex·ante 
interviews with participants from various interest groups revealed that 
authority relationships were a primary influence and integral part of their 
quasi-militaristic world. 
Yet another departure from the argument of traditional phenomenologists 
was made When we analysed the historical social antecedents of meaning. Following 
Gadamer. we have sought an appreciation of the tradition-bound nature of 
understanding and to transcend surface meaning. Since tradi tim and history 
is the medium in which meaning is created and transmitted through time, the 
actions and expressions of a person and of a group of people can only be 
properly grasped within.this context. As traditiqn lends significance to 
phenomena it becomes possible to conceive of them as having a meaning beyond 
\, 
or in conflict with that subjectively created by their creators. Therefore, 
in an interpretative analysis it is necessary for the scientist-interpreter 
to examine whether or not there are discrepancies between manifest and 
intended meaning. .., 
\ 
Such an approach to uncovering the meanings and _social constructions 
of criteria of effectiVeness was thus intended to analyse the historical 
and social antecedents of these meanings. However, it also enabled the 
introduction of critique and an evaluation of tradition and of the 
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foremeanings within which contemporary meaning is situated. It paved 
the way for what Haber.mas calls Tiefenhermeneutik or depth hermeneutics. 
Habermas was particularly concerned with the assumptions which lay 
behind Gadamer's arguments. Essentially Gadamer believed that because 
interpretation always presupposed the supporting (onsensus of an ongoing 
tradition, there was no independent ground from which to criticize the tradition. 
Habermas summarizes the position as follows: 
"Any attempt to suggest that this (certainly contingent) consensus is 
false consciousness is meaningless since we cannot transcend the 
discussion in which we are engaged. From this Gadamer deduces the 
ontological priority of linguistic tradition before all possible 
cri tigue : at any given time we can thus carxy on critique only of 
indiVidual traditions, inasmuch as we ourselves belong to the 
comprehensive tradition-context of a langUAge. II (p. 125, Jiabermas, 1970C> 
In short, the consensus must be treated as an authentic and legitimate domain 
of agreement and authority, since in Gadamer's opinion there is no way to 
step outside it, no adequate trans-historical standard from which to consider 
it otherwise, no language avoidable that will allow us to step beyond its 
bounds in order to see how reality ultimately is or should be constituted. This 
implies that when a discrepanqy is uncovered between intended and manifest 
meaning, the intended meaning must be interpreted within the given conceptual 
system of the ongoing tradition. For Gadamer the author! ty of tra4J, tion and 
of a historical context is supreme and the traditions supporting consensus provide 
the only standards from which the experienced meaning .must be understood. 
Babexmas rightly takes issue with this position ~ challenging as dogmatic 
its uncritical acceptance of the underlying consensus of tradition. For him 
" ," ,. . 
evexy consensus in which the understanding of meaning terminatea, 
stands fundamentally under suspicion of being pseudo-communicatively 
indUCed ••• the prejudgmental structure of the understanding of 
meaning dces nbt guarantee identi~cation of an achieved consensus 
with a true one. n (p. 125, Habermas, 1970C) 
He is Critical of Gadamer for failing to come to terms with the possibility that 
the dialogue which is may be a dialogue of coercion and domination. Gadamer, 
in trying to escape Schutz's and Dilthey'. picture of the objective observer, 
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has fallen into a contextual-bound uncritical mode which is intrinsically 
conservative. According to Habermas, Gadamer fails to see the fundamental 
opposition between domination and rational. consensus, the latter being defined 
according to Habermas' s theory of universal pragmatics. A "depth hermeneutics" 
is therefore needed. A form of analysis which is founded on the notion of 
rational discourse and which seeks to grasp the history of tradition and 
language in such a way as to reveal sources of domination and distortion in 
communication. Habermas argues that human life unfolds in a framework of 
language, labour and domination and a transendental basis for rational 
discourse is itself antiCipated in the structure of speech itself. Hence, 
tradition itself is open to critique and analysis; tradition must be put into 
context by taking into account the boundaries and empirical conditions under 
which it develops and changes. By reduci~g social reality to the world of 
symbols and meanings, Gadamer fails to appreciate that this world, however 
symbolically mediated, is also shaped by the constfaint of material forces 
and relations ~f p~.duction. 
Gadamer's extensions to the work of traditional phenomenologists are 
thus useful but limited in their ability to uncover asymmetry in power 
relations because they are not anchored in a regulative ideal of uncon-
strained consensus. For these reasons, in chapter 11 we proceed to 
unite oUr observations-of regularities with our discussion of meanings 
in a manner which seeks to expose unequal power relations and forms of 
distorted communication. FOr in addition to empirical and hermeneutical 
inSights an adequately integrated theory of O.E. must possess a practical, 
critical, emancipatory function. Whilst not all forms of.inquiry are always 
prescriptive, the ieparation of prescrtption from description in the social 
sciences is extremely difficult. In the assessment of organizational 
effectiveness, it is not possible unless one settles unsatisfactorily for 
the substitution of the notion of organizational effectiveness by the concept 
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of group effectiveness. Since prescription is inherent in the accountability 
of subjective meaningful action it is essential that a rational procedure be 
instituted that b~ings into debate competing normative claims for assessment. 
It is here that the work of Habermas makes its contribution for his concept 
of an ideal discourse suggests such a process without specifying the ultimate 
normative ,position. The critical function is critical in order that 
integrated knowledge might bring about mor,e progressive, more integrated 
social collectivities who are informed as to the constrainedne~s of their 
structures of meanings and work to loosen these constraints. It is always 
with a view of that "what ought to be" or "could be" that radical change 
might be instituted to remove the non-restrictive "truths" that went before. 
Indeed, if one were to draw the similarities between the Jungian development 
of integrated individuals and the Babermasian model of societal evolution, 
then the development of practical' moral knowledge and learning which forms 
the practical facet of social and ~rgan1zational life is an indicator of 
the development of the human species. 
5.3 Towards an Integrated, Critical TheorY of O.E.: Babermas's Concept 
of Self- Reflection 
In order to grasp Babermas's concept of critique, it is necessary to 
understand his notions of self-reflection and self-understanding. Both 
these notions are deriv~d from Babermas I s reading ~f Freud. According to him, 
the theoretical structure of Freudian psychoanalysis exhibits three levels 
of analysis. The first is that of metapsychology which comprises: 
"the basic categories • • • of the discipline, the conceptual constructions, 
the assumptions about the functional structures of the psychic apparatus 
and about mechanisms for both the genesiS of symptoms and the dissolution of 
pathological compulsions." (p. 252, Babermas, 1972.) 
. '. 
On this level one finds, in Babermas's tiew, Freud's theory of neurosis, i.e. 
the connection between language deformation and behavioural pathology, the 
ego-id-superego model and the theory of instincts. Metapsychology thus 
explicates baSic knowledge categories which are derived from reflection on 
,. . 
the conditions of psychoanalytic knowle,cJge, on the very form of communication 
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in which analyst and patient participate. These categories cannot be assessed 
independently of this context, or directly by some form of empirical text; 
they can only be assessed indirectly through discourse and argument. 
The second level of psychoanalysis is comprised of "empirically substantive 
interpretations of self-formative processes" which are developed within the 
framework provided by metapsychology. These general interpretations are 
drawn from data collected from clinical experience and operate like theories 
in the empirical sciences. Thus a general interpretation is "fixed" and 
, 
like a general theory must prove itself through predictions deduced from it. 
In psychoanalysis a general interpretation provides, for example, a generalized 
narrative of the psychodynamic development of the child. This theory, by 
addressing itself to patterns of interaction between child and parent, 
development of motivation patterns and learning mechanisms etc., allows 
individual case histories to be understood in terms of a series of causal 
connections, although its application must be modified, in the light of initial 
conditions and the particularity of the case. 
The third level involves "reconstructions of individual life histories" 
with a therapeutic content. The actual events of the patient's life are 
pieced together using the general interpretative scheme, on the one hand, 
and the fragmentary information obtained in the analytic dialogue, on the 
other. Each reconstructed life history can be viewed as a hypothesis generated 
by the second-level general theory. Verification of this hypothesis, however, 
is dissimilar to that required in the empirical-analytic sciences (inter-
subjective agreement concerning the result of an observation in the light of 
a prediction) and the hermeneutic sciences (consensus about an interpretation). 
Rather in psychoanalysis, verification means acceptance by the analysand of 
the reconstruction of hiS/her life history. As Held (1980) points out, such 
acceptance and self-reflection must be on a level such that obstacles to 
memory etc., are apprehended and dissolved by the patient and hiS/her neurotic 
symptoms are overcome. Thus, in the end, the criterion of assessment of a 
-- --- --~----.. 
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reconstructed life-history is emancipatory reflection achieved in and through 
practice. 
This psychoanalytic model of social analysis is in effect mirrored in 
Habermas's own work. The first level of metapsychology is reflected in his 
theory of communicative competence in which he seeks to establish the basic 
claims about man's empirical competence in communication. The second level 
is found in his exposition about a general theory of social evolution which 
is based on his central claim that through work and interaction the human 
species evolves in two separate but inter-related dimensions, namely the 
development of the forces of production and the development of normative 
structures which govern interaction. The third and final level of psychoanalytic 
analysis is found in his attempt to reconstruct the life-history of a specific 
SOCiety in order to uncover and dissolve ideological formations. In particular, 
he focuses on the emergence of class societies organized around a state and 
on the possibilities of a "post-modern" society. On this third level, the 
aim is to identify potential crisis points in the social structure and thereby 
social groups amenable to the process of enlightenment. 
It should be pointed out that the first level of metapsychology which 
corresponds to Habermas's theory of communicative competence is itself argued 
by Habermas to be a special form of reflection. In the postscript to 
Knowledge and Human Interests Habermas. (1978), in an attempt to answer critics abou't. 
a conflation of reflection with practical activity, distinguishes between 
two kinds of reflection. The word defines two processes: (a) it denotes the 
reflection upon the conditions of potential abilities of a knowing, speaking and 
acting subject and (b) it denotes reflection upon unconsciously produced 
constraints to which a determinate subject (or a determinate group of subjects, 
or a determinate species subject) succumbs in its process of self-reflection. 
The first form of reflection is now called a rational reconstruction which 
explicates general rules of human competence in a given area of context, for 
example linguistics or co~iti~e development. According to Habermas: 
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"Rational reconstructions • • • deal with anonymous rule systems 
which any subjects whatsoever can comply with in so far as they have 
acquired the corresponding competence with respect to those rules. 
Reconstructions thus do not encompass subjectivity within the 
horizon of which alone the experience of reflection (in the second 
sense) is possible." (p. 22, Habermas, 1974.) 
As can be seen, Habermas's theory of communicative competence clearly sets 
out to rationally reconstruct man's ability to communicate with each other. 
Such a form of reflection corresponds to the first level of metapsychology 
in psychoanalysis because it seeks to locate the basic categories on which 
subsequent general theories and specific case-histories may be built. The 
theory of communicative competence sets out the means whereby forms of 
distorted communication may be identified and it also signposts the mechanisms 
whereby pathological compulsions may be banished. It performs a vital task 
in reflection: the setting up of a priori conditions for the possibility of 
knowledge and interaction. It highlights the conditions of interaction which 
are "anticipated" in every speech act and argues that every human agent must 
have an innate capacity to "construct" the ideal speech situation, i.e. 
given the proper conditions, and perhaps the proper guidance and prompting, any 
agent should be able to recognize what features an ideal speech situation 
would have. A rational reconstruction thus sets out to highlight reflectively 
what human agents are capable of achieving in a particular area of competence. 
Habermas argues that this form of reflection is only feasible within the 
, 
context of a theoretical discourse; that is, it is only when we bracket or 
Suspend the imperatives of everyday action and reflect on "the conditions 
normally assumed in ordinary interaction" that we can engage in this type of 
activity.. A rational reconstruct is empirical only in so far as it explains 
the development and acquisition of empirical competences by empirical subjects. 
" It is not empirical in the sense of being tied directly to practice and to 
influencing specific groups iri society. 
This is the role left to the second form of reflection - which Habermas 
calls self-reflection or self-criticism. This is a mode of reflection which 
"brings to consciousness thOse determinants of a self-formative 
process (Bildung) which ideologically determine a contemporary praxis 
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and conception of the world." (p. 22, Babermas,1~74) 
Thus self-criticism is the mode of reflection which the analysand 
is encouraged to engage in during psychoanalysis. Unlike rational reconstruction 
self-criticismis tied directly to practice in so far as it is: 
"(a) brought to bear on objects of experience whose pseudo-objectivity 
is to be revealed . . . 
(b) brought to bear on something particular - on the particular se1f-
formative process of an ego, or group, identity. . . 
(c) characterized by its ability to make unconscious elements conscious 
in a way which has practical consequences." (p. 183, Postscript 
to Knowledge and Human Interests, 1978.) 
Self-criticism or self-reflection is thus equated with a critique of ideology 
in the sense of false consciousness. Based on a theory of undistorted 
communication, this second mode of reflection seeks to locate sources of 
distorted communication. In general terms,' Kortian (1980) points out that 
this means giving systematic meaning and importance to what is missing, to 
what fails to appear in ordinary interaction. Unlike traditional hermeneutics 
psychoanalysis is not content to understand interaction and language which 
is dominated by the assumptions of ordin~language. Instead, this form of 
depth hermeneutics is aimed at analysing distorted speech; to discover a 
meaning at an entirely different level from that of ordinary language, to 
extend beyond the manifest content of understanding to a deep-seated latent 
meaning. ~uch an aSSignment for the reflective role of a depth hermeneutics, 
as already pointed out, differs from the historicist tradition of philological 
hermeneutics and the contemporary philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer. In 
the case of both these latter forms of hermeneutics the interpreter-scientist 
is generally concerned to establish communication between social actors 
speaking different languages or sub-languages or belonging to different eras. 
He seeks to institute an intersubjective understanding by eliminating difficulties 
due to differences in cultural context and socio-historical determinations. 
But he always proceeds within the limits of ordinary language games and their 
grammatical norms. Although he may be able to identify social, historical 
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influences on the content and shape of the language games used, he is unable 
to identify pathological forms of communication. Moreover, in his everyday 
life, that is, in the customary conditions of social repression, the neurotic 
endeavours to maintain intersubjective understanding, employing the mechanics 
of ordinary language games and following' the directives of social sanctions. 
But, 
"the price he pays for undistorted communication under these circumstances 
of frustration is distortion of communication within himself. If the 
illusion of intersubjective constraint-free communication is not to be 
diminished, then the restrictions on publiC communication necessary 
under the institutional relations of control must be set up within the 
subjects themselves. Thus the privatised section of excommunicated language 
is reduced to silence in the person of the neurotic, along with the 
undesirable motives of action, and made inaccessible to him." (p. 227-8, 
Habermas, 1972.) 
This distortion of communication requires the scientist-interpreter to teach 
one and the same subject to understand his own language and contradictions, 
repressed needs and desires therein. 
"The analyst instructs the analysand to read his own texts which he 
himself has corrupted and displaced, and to translate the symbols 
from a mode of expression which has been deformed in a private language 
into the mode of expression of public communication. This translation 
opens up the genetically important phases of his life history to 
recollection that was previously blacked, and makes him conscious of the 
processes of his own formation. To this extent, psychoanalytic 
interpretation, unlike the hermeneutics of the human sciences, is not 
concerned with understanding symbolic configurations as such. The art 
of understanding to which psychoanalysis leads is self-reflection." (pp. 228, Habermas, 1972.) 
This mode of self-reflection, of self-understanding is unmistakably connected 
with Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. In both Hegel and Freud a truth is to 
be uncovered from the experience of the false in a kind of self-enlightenment. 
Thus a distinguishing feature of such a radicalized form of critique is that 
it heightens internal contradictions within a system of beliefs, values and 
action. Ideologiekritik is not just a form of moralizing criticism, i.e. an 
ideological form of consciousness is not criticised for being nasty, immoral, 
unpleasant, etc., but for being false, for being a form of delusion. A belief 
is ideologically false when it is "reflectively unacceptable", when it is accept~c:l. 
by agents only because they were suffering £rom repression and domination. 
Once such sources'of domination are r~ved these same beliefs are no longer 
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acceptable - hence the objective "reflectively unacceptable" is used to 
describe forms of false consciousness. This function of self-reflection, 
self-criticism or Ideologiekritik is cogently described by Guess (1981) who 
writes that a critical theory criticizes a set of beliefs or world-picture as 
ideological by showing: 
"(a) that the agents in the society have a set of epistemic principles 
which contain a provision to the effect that beliefs which are to 
be sources of legitimation in the society are acceptable only if 
they could have been acquired by the agents under conditions of free 
and uncoerced discussion; 
(b) that the only reason the agents accept a particular repressive 
social institution is that they think this institution is legitimized 
by a set of beliefs embedded in their world-picture; 
(c) that these beliefs could have been acquired by these agents only 
under conditions of coercion. (p. 68, Geuss, 1981.) 
From this it follows immediately that the beliefs in question are reflectively 
,. 
unacceptable to the agent and that the repressive social institutions these 
beliefs legitimize is not legitimate. He also points out that for Habermas 
ideOlogy is fundamentally false consciousness and what Guess calls the 
epistemic and genetic dimensions of ideology are paramount. By the epistemic 
dimenSion, Guess means that actors who are ideologically bound have made a 
factual error which contradicts their own, assumed epistemic principle of only 
rationally accepting beliefs only if they could have been acquired by agents 
under conditions of free and uncoerced discussion. By the genetic dimension 
Guess refers to the "fact" that an ideological form of consciousness "requires" 
ignorance of or a false belief about its own origin or genesis, in the sense 
that given their epistemic principles, agents would not continue to cling to 
that form of consciousness, if they knew something about its genesis - namely 
if they know that it could not have arisen in conditions of free discussion. 
" What Guess terms the functional dimension of ideology is secondary to these two 
dimensions. A functional approach to ideology is one which places emphasis on 
the argument that a form of consciousness is false ~ virtue of the fact that 
what it stabilizes or legitimizes are relations of Herrschaft, which is defined 
relative to the ability to frustrateag~t's wants and preferences. Herrschaft 
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is often used by Habermas to mean hegemeny or domination; it is the domination 
of one interest group over another, the ability of one group to frustrate the 
desires and wishes of the other. To Habermas this functional aspect of ideology/ 
false consciousness is secondary. To be sure, a form of consciousness cannot be 
ideological unless it thwarts some human desires, wants or preferences. It is 
also true that if a form of conscious is ideological it means that it will 
legitimate and stabilize Herrschaft, surplus repression etc. but what makes 
the form of consciousness an ideology is that it provides false legitimation in 
that it makes the agent accept as legitimate that which if they were perfectly 
free and completely knowledgeable they would not accept as legitimate. So that 
an ideological form of consciousness will legitimate Herrschaft seems derivative 
from the fact that a form of consciousness formed in the ideal speech situation 
would ~ be one which would legitimate Herrschaft~ still Habermas·obviously 
thinks that it is not just an accidental or contingent fact about human beings 
that they will not freely and knowingly accept surplus repression, unnecessary 
inequality etc. He obviously thinks it is a mandate of reason itself that 
rational agents do not gratuitiously destroy the necessary conditions for the 
development and exercise of their own rationality, but to accept surplus 
repression or unnecessary inequality is to accept gratuitous obstacles to 
therealization of the ideal speech situation. The ideal speech situation, 
however, is just the ideal condition for the devel9pment and exercise of human 
rationality; we can predict a priori then that rational human agents will not 
freely and knowingly set up their society so as to prevent themselves from 
being as rational as possible. 
Self-re,flection and indeed rational reconstructions are thus tied to the 
emancipatory interest of knowledge, intended to produce enlightenment and 
emancipation. We are now in a position to see more clearly how this happens 
for self-reflection. Enlightenment 
(a) dissolves pseudo-objectivity and what Habermas calls "objective 
illusion"; 
" 
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(b) makes the subject aware of its own origin, its possibilities and 
the origin of its beliefs; and 
(c) brings to awareness unconscious determinants of consciousness and 
behaviour. 
By inducing self-reflection agents are brought to realize that the 
coercion from which they suffer is self-imposed, thereby dissolving the 
"power" or "objectivity" of that coercion and bringing them to a state of 
greater freedom and knowledge of their true unconstrained interests. Critique 
brings to the agent's awareness unconscious determinants of their consciousness 
and behaviour and it points out to them that their own coercive social 
institutions are "determining" them (by distorting the communication structure 
in the society) to cling to their ideological world-picture. Initially, the 
i 
agents falsely think that they are acting freely and without constraints in 
accepting the world-picture and acting on it; the critical theory shows them 
that this is not the case by pointing out social determinants of their 
consciousness and action of which they are not aware. In this way, critique 
makes the agents aware of their own origin. For to enlighten the agents about 
their own genesis or orgin is just to explain to them how they became the 
subjects they are with the beliefs, attitudes, norms, etc. they have. An 
essential part of critique is thus the hermeneutical project of showing them 
under what conditions, in what context, they acquired these beliefs, attitudes 
and norms and how they came to hold their basic world-picture, that is, how 
they came into being as social subjects. 
That still leaves the claim that critique by inducing self-reflection 
dissolves pseudo-objectivities and "objective illusion". Guess (1981) points 
out that the words "objective illusion" emphatically do not refer to "objective 
mistakes", that is taking particular arrangements of capitalist society 
which result from a particular kind and form of human activity to be invariant, 
unchangeable natural facts, or results of the subjective laws of nature. 
Guess argues that the whole point of an ideological delusion is that it 
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legitimises a social practice or institution. Now a social arrangement which 
is mistaken for a natural phenomenon, or a purely "objective fact" does not 
require or indeed even admit of legitimation. Legitimation is not required 
for hurricanes, or floods, or other natural occurrences; legitimation is 
only required for such things as are in an agent's power to change. So 
critique cannot have the limited intention of informing agents that the repressiv~ 
social institutions from which they suffer are not just objective facts, but are 
in their power to change. The fact that they demand legitimating arguments 
for these institutions indicates that they know that already. Instead, an 
ideological world-picture is an objective illusion when it falsely claims and 
appears to have a "rational, unconstrained" status. That is, it falsely claims 
that it is the world-picture fully rational agents would find themselves 
compelled to adopt (by the force of the "better argument") if they were to 
engage in unrestricted discussion under ideal conditions. Further, this 
appearance or illusion is "objective" because an "objective" validity is 
claimed for it. The self-generated pseudo-objectivities which self-reflection 
is to dissolve are such "things" as natural right, natural law, the 
"essence of man", the basis of human nature, etc., that is, they are the 
. "things" about which the world-picture purports to make objectivistic valid 
statements. 
Thus self-reflection or reflection more generally are aimed at 
emanCipation which is now more clearly analysed as a process and a social 
transition from an initial state to a final state which, according to GuesS 
(19Bl), has the following properties: 
(a) the initial state is one both of false consciousness and error 
and \ 
(b) in the initial state false consciousness and unfree existence are 
inherently connected so that agents can be liberated from one only 
if they are also at the same time freed from the other; 
(c) the unfree existence from which agents in the initial state suffer 
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is a form of self-imposed coercion; their false consciousness 
is a kind of self-delusion; 
(d) the coercion from which the agents suffer in the initial state 
is one whose own power or "subjectivity" derives only from the 
fact that agents do not realize that it is self-imposed; 
and 
(e) the final state is one in which the agents are free of false 
consciousness - they have been enlightened - and free of self-
imposed coercion - they have been emancipated. 
Conditions (a) and (b) are satisfied when agents hold a set of 
beliefs which are ideologically false, that is, beliefs which would not 
be held in an unconstrained world and which are held only through 
", 
coercion and domination. There is an inherent connection between false 
consciousness and unfree eXistence/domination. Agents cannot be freed 
from one without also being freed from the other; they cannot be freed 
from their coercive social institutions as long as they retain the 
ideological world-picture which legitimizes them, nor can they get rid 
of their ideological world-picture as long as their basic coercive social 
institutions render it immune to free discussion and criticism. The 
process of legitimation thus plays a vital role in the process of 
, 
emancipation and domination. To say that members of.a society or institu-
tion take a basic social practice as legitimate is to say that they take 
it to -follow from a basic social system of norms which they all accept 
and identify with. So a social practice is considered legitimate if it 
can be shown to stand in the "right" relationship to the basic world-picture 
of the group. \ A practice may, therefore, be extremely repressive - it may 
thwart and frustrate the agents in the pursuit of many o~ their strongest 
desires - and still be accepted by the members of the society because they 
take it to be legitimate, to accord with certain normative believes which are 
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deeply embedded in their world picture. Were these normative beliefs to 
be ideologically false, they would invariably make acceptable repressive 
institution of domination. 
It is also not hard to now understand in what sense the unfree existence 
from which the agents suffer is a form of self-imposed coercion. Social 
institutions are not natural phenomena; they do not just exist of and by 
themselves. The agents in a society impose coercive institutions, create 
"objective illusions" by participating in them, accepting them without 
protest, giving them face-validity etc. Simply by acting in an apparently 
"free" way according to the dictates of their world-picture, the agents 
reproduce relations of coercion. In holding their false form of consciousness 
the agents in SOCiety are deluding themselves. Ideological error is not a 
mistake the agents make for some accidental reason nor does someone else 
consciously deceive the agents in a great conspiracy. In acting the agents 
produce their basic social institutions and it is the normal operation of 
these social institutions which maintains the world-picture. The illusions 
embodied in this world picture are the result of the agent's own acti vi ty 
reacting on them. 
The process of emancipation and enlightenment thus entails both 
freedom from a false set of normative beliefs and a variety of repressive 
social institutions and practices. 
We can now see how the concept of reflection is tied to an emancipatory 
interest and to the concepts of enlightenment and emancipation. We have 
also argued, following Habermas, that reflection goes beyond the traditional 
hermeneutical concept of Verstehen and is akin to a depth hermeneutics 
(Tiefenhermeneutik). It is clear that the definitions which Habermas 
ascribes to the concepts of ideology, delusion, repression, objective 
illusion on the one hand, and emancipation and enlightenment, on the other 
follow directly and explicitly.. from his theory of universal pragmatics. 
It is this normative cri terio'l of a rational consensus based on an ideal 
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speech condition which undergirds the entire project of critique and self-
reflection. 
We have already discussed one instance where critique and depth 
hermeneutics differs from the traditional concept of Verstehen. There is a 
second difference of some import and cOhtroversy. Held (1980) argues that 
understanding in psychoanalysis entails both an understanding of a subject's 
intersubjective meanings and an understanding of neurosis as the consequence 
of lawlike developments, which act, prior to therapy, as a form of "second 
nature". While understanding cannot be accomplished without explanation, 
the role of explanation is to mediate between distorted self-understanding and 
a posited state of self-consciousness. Explanation, in the form of a 
reconstructed life history, is used both to understand and overcome the 
pressures of second nature; to reinstitute an unconstrained existence. The 
complementary utilization of explanation and understanding is necessary, 
therefore, only while there is a gap between the patient's distorted self-
understanding and his or her behaviour (as manifest, for instance, in neurotic 
symptoms). Once the therapy has been successfully concluded and the patient 
is well, explanation of actions will coincide with the patient's own understanding 
and the process of explanation will itself become superfluous to the recovery 
of meaning. Held then quotes from Apel in describing the role of explanation 
and understanding: 
"I think that this methodological pattern of dialectically mediating 
communicative understanding by causal explanation is, in fact, the model 
for a philosophical understanding of all those types of critical social 
science which have their relation to the practice of life, not in the 
realm of social engineering, but in providing public self-reflection and 
in emancipation of men as subjects. (p. 34, Apel, 1972, Quoted on 
p. 343, Held, 1980~) 
Held interprets Habermas and Apel as saying that a critical theory of social 
phenomena is in effect what we would term an integrated theory of social 
phenomena - one which unites linguistic analysis with the psychological 
investigation of causal connections in emancipating men from false 
conSCiOusness and repressive practices. In short, according to Held, Habermas 
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puts forward critical sciences as bodies of knowledge which unite an interest 
in nomological and interpretative knowledge within a framework aimed at 
facilitating the process of reflection. Thus while empirical-analytic sciences 
are structured to generate knowledge in the form of laws and theories which can 
account for regularities in "observable" phenomena and the hermeneutic 
sciences are structured to allow the recovery of a particular meaning of an 
action or expression, critical theories are integrated theories which are 
empirical, hermeneutical and critical. This interpretation of Habermas's 
work, as we argued earlier, is not always made explicit by Habermas himself and 
there is some ambiguity in his work. His theory of knowledge-constitutive 
interests, When first propounded, made rigid distinctions between different 
kinds of knowledge and he appeared to define a restricted role for the 
empirical-analytic sciences and their distinctive form of knowledge. However, 
when he speaks of psychoanalysis and the explanation of neurosis, he does 
speak of the necessity of obtaining "causal explanations" which Held has 
interpreted as lawlike developments which act as a second nature. Such 
ambiguity produces a contrary interpretation from Kortian (1980). He argues 
that the causality which Habermas and Freud speak of cannot be the Humean 
Causality of the natural sciences which equates causality with the concommitant 
occurrence of certain phenomena in lawlike frequency. He argues that causality 
in a psychoanalytic context: 
" .•. could only be causality in second nature, in the Hegelian 
sense of the term. The young Hegel explicated this as the causality 
of fate, having in mind a context of loss and restitution in a 
domain of life." (p. 116, Kortian, 1980.) 
Kortian did not equate the term "causal connections" with the causality of 
nomological knowledge, and indeed he clearly rejected the latter connection. 
\ 
This ambiguity in Habermas's work was one of the reasons for our long 
argument for an integrated theory of phenomena which utilized nomological 
and interpretative knowledge in a critical reflective mode. In view of our 
argument, Held's interpretation is more consistent with an integrated theory 
of SOcial phenomena; where nomological knowledge is accepted by the theorist 
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as an essential, necessary facet of knowledge which is ultimately grounded 
in an emancipatory interest. An integrated theory actively seeks to raise 
both the levels of empirical-nomological knowledge and practical knowledge in 
a given society in order to advance the evolution of society such that a 
higher level of true need-satisfaction may be contemplated with an expansion of 
both th~ choice and the range of possible problem solutions. This depiction 
of the role of an integrated theoria within Habermas's general theory of 
social evolution, it is argued, is more consistent with his comments on 
Freud's theory of ideology. 
Freud distinguished, Habermas claims, the forces and relations of production 
in a way similar to Marx. He understood that the level of "necessary" social 
repression was a function of the level of development of productive forces; 
as the technical power of a society to control the forces of outer nature 
increases, the constraints of scarcity are progressively overcome, thus 
decreasing the degree of socially necessary repression. As the level of 
repression diminishes, the institutional framework of a society can be changed 
to accommodate a higher level of needs gratification. The level of necessary 
repression is vaguely defined by Habermas as that which results from the 
conflict between surplus impulses and conditions of collective 
self-preservation. That is, faced with conditions of scarcity, 
human beings - in order to survive - are forcedto adapt to their environment 
in ways which prevent "complete gratification of instinctual desires". Thus 
societies and social institutions, in order to ensure collective survival, 
repress wants and needs. The satisfaction of these needs is enhanced when 
the required degree of repression is lessened by greater technical control 
over nature and by the extension of objective possibilities by the productive 
forces. Thus technical control over the development of productive forces was 
seen as a necessary precondition of emancipation. However, as Habermas goes 
on to argue, neither greater technical progress nor the dissolution of 
systems of distorted communication necessarily brings about emancipation. and 
" 
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enlightenment. Resistance could be encountered and one of the ways in which 
a critical theory is confirmed is the extent to which resistance is overcome 
and is accepted by agents who possess a perfectly free, fully informed, and 
thoroughly considered judgement. 
This interpretation of Freud is more consistent with an integrated theory 
of social analysis and argues as we do that nomological knowledge not only 
has a separate, independent scientific role but is a precondition, a pre-
requisite for the process of emancipation and enlightenment. Thus we would 
agree with Held's distinction between the concepts of understanding and causal 
explanation as used in the psychoanalytic or depth hermeneutic context and 
the concept of Verstehen as used in the context of traditional hermeneutics. 
Finally, in this analysis of the relationship between reflection, ideal 
speech situations, emancipation and enlightenment, we wish to highlight the 
difference between self-reflection (Id~ologiekritik) and psychoanalysis. In 
the case of individual neurosis, there is often no other agent who benefits 
from the mystification and repression and who thus has an interest in its 
continuance. Neurotic repression is self-imposed literally; the struggle to 
overcome it is a struggle with oneself, not with external physical or social 
reality. Self-knowledge, therefore, leads generally to freedom from self-
imposed coercion and freedom from self-imposed coercion is synonymous with a 
reduction in the level of frustration. This may not necessarily be so in 
cases of ideological coercion. Such forms of coercion are self-imposed -
by acting and accepting them in the way they do, agents constitute coercion 
- but the "objective power" it has over them is not just a power which will 
automatically be dissolved by critical reflection. In acting in their self-
delUding, illusionary world, agents haye produced a complex of social 
institutions which cannot now be easily abolished merely by changes in the 
agent's beliefs - by the dawning recognition of where their true interests 
lie. Further, an ideology is not a form of consciousness which merely 
legitimizes repression but one which legitimizes unequal distribution of 
normative power and flerrschaft. Indeed,'" ideologies only arise in conditions 
in which an unequal distribution of surplus must be legitimized. That the 
distribution is unequal means that more is distributed to some group, say A, 
than another group, B. Therefore, to abolish an established social 
institution which is deeply rooted in the interests of A will in general 
require more than a change in the form of consciousness of B, the oppressed. 
It will require a long cause of political or as Habermas calls it strategic 
action. Until that course of action has been brought to a successful 
completion and dominating groups, such as A, freely assent to such political 
action, then the institution will continue to exist and continue to frustrate 
A's and B's freedom and desires. A's desires are "frustrated" although they 
benefit from such frustration because they too are suffering from a distorted 
form of consciousness. They too live in a society in which the communication 
structure is distorted for everyo~e. To say that the ideological delusion works 
to the benefit and advantage of the members of the dominant group means only 
that in the given social syste~ as then distorted and constituted, it is 
"better" to be a member of the dominant than of the oppressed group. This in 
no way implies that the dominant group are not themselves also massively 
frustrated and also implies nothing about what social system they would 
prefer if they had unconstrained choice. Until such time that strategic 
action does couple emancipation to enlightenment, both the dominant and 
the oppressed will not experience a decrease of suffering and frustration. 
If any thUg enlightenment is likely to make awareness of frustration rise. 
And the process of enlightenment itself may be incomplete until agents are 
emancipated not only from the complicity in their own oppression, but from the 
unfree social existence they now lead. 
\ 
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S. 4 More Cri ti ci sms of Habermas' s Fr aJI',E-work 
Habermas's concept of reflection has been discussed in detail 
because it is central to the process of emancipation and enlightenment. 
However, as it stands, the theory of self-reflection does not provide a 
wholly satisfactory integrated theory of social and organisational phenomena 
and there are several difficulties with Habermas's ideas in particular 
and with that of the Frankfurt School more generally. 
Firstly, as Held (1980) points out, Habermas and the Frankfurt School 
more generally, through being excessively influenced by their experience 
of Fascism and Nazism maintain an exaggerated notion of the coherence of 
capitalism. A conception of society, and in particular of capitalist 
society is presented which tends to overestimate its internal homogeneity 
and critical: theory as currently presented does not adequately grasp the 
pattern of conflicts .and the endemic tensions in society. Society appears 
in their analysis to be completely steered and dominated by a ubiquitous 
capitalist conspiracy; managed from above and not the outcome of a continuous, 
historically-situated process of struggle over rules, resources and 
meanings. 'This overemphasis on the cohesion of·the interlocking relations 
between the economy and the state raises several issues: 
(a) It ,leads to an unsatisfactory notion of domination; a notion is 
propounded which-suggests a rigid, taken for·granted relation between 
various public and private bureaucracies and a conception of administrative/ 
bureaucratic/class domination which is deterministic and inescapable. 
(b) It denies the possibility of struggle over state and economic activities 
and the possibility of refor.ms being instituted which work to 
\ 
circumscribe and perhaps undermint~ (in the long run) the capitalistic 
accumulation process. Haber.mas, himself, does not clarify an agent 
of revolutionary transformation; and this despite the fact that 
he .Yec9gnisesthe need for a theory such as his to be able to 
identlfy the subject of emancipation. 
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(c) It fails to explain policies which are not obviously linked to the 
pursuit of profit and wealth maximization. Policies may be effected 
by the state which are a result of negotiation in a variety of realms 
and with a number of groups in society. In addition, unintended 
consequences may result from state intervention which are not adequately 
explained wholly by an over-rationalistic theory of the relationship 
between the state and various bureaucracies. 
(d) It overestimates the significance of instrumental reason, technique 
and technology in shaping political attitudes and demands within the 
individual, the group and the institution. As such, it does not 
. ,. 
account for the diversity of levels of social consciousness which may 
prevail in collectivities. Giddens (1977), among others, has argued 
that a peculiar brand of "dual consciousness" is often expressed, this 
combines a dissatisfaction with dominant interpretative systems in 
everyday work worlds with a relatively conservative interest in wider 
political parties and processes. 
New issues arise with Habermas's controversial concept of 
an "autonomous ego" - the ideal unitary posture of human nature which is 
hinted to be consistent with the ideas of an emancipated collectivity. 
Habermas has attempted to avoid an ahistorical conception of the 
autonomous ego by arguing, following Piaget and Kohlberg, that there 
is a developmental logic in the development of the individual ego. 
His theory of ego development is used to create a parallel theory of 
social development. In both instances, Habermas argues that his 
notions of a developmental logic tells us only something about the 
range of variations within which social and individual organization 
can be organized but the actual dynamics of development are left 
to the influence of history. Despite this, problems remain for it 
now appears that the aim of emancipation is not only to be equated 
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with the achievement of an unconstrained consensus as to the ends and means 
of action but is only possible with the attainment of an autonomous ego 
within individuals. Such an ego-identity can only be sustained if the 
structures which support the authoritarian state are undermdned. But 
this notion of an autonomous ego remains ambiguous and Habermas does not 
actually explicate the relationship between the ideal speech criterion and 
the achievement of an autonomous ego - the only relation vaguely hinted 
at is that one state of the individual cannot be procured without the 
other state of the collectivity. Presumably it is in this sense that "an 
autonomous ego" is said to "reciprocally require" an emancipated society. 
How exactly would Habermas define an autonomous ego and in what sense does 
an unfree ego relate to an unfree existence? Is a coerced ego identical to 
an individual who suffers from false consciousness? In what sense can an 
ego be coerced? How does it relate to the concept of an ego which is bounded 
by "objective illusions"? Is the process by which an ego becomes free and 
uncoerced similar to the process by which objective illusions are removed? 
These and other questions have not yet been answered by Habermas and we can 
but hazard a guess at the relationship between the development of an 
autonomous ego-identity and the achievement of unconstrained consensuS. 
Thirdly, Habermas may be criticised for not giving an adequate 
emphasis to the integration of studies of the individual and social 
consciousness with political economy and institutional analysis. This 
criticism is different from that of Marxist critics whose concerns have 
already been discussed in chapter 4 and found to be ill-justified. Our 
complaint is not that "traditional Marxist concepts of political economy" 
.. 
are ignored but that there is a lack 6f integration of macro-level analyses 
with micro-l 1 
eve studies of consciousness. Because so many of the import-
ant features of contemporary capitalist society are seen as the result of 
initiatives from public and private bureaucracies (Marcuse) or the 
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outcome of illusion (reification) (Adorno and Habermas, to a lesser extent) I 
the importance of analysing particular patterns of social relations, the 
labour process (the experiences people have of it as well as its structure) 
and political organizations, is downgraded. 
In short, this third criticism argues that Habermas and the Frankfurt 
School have failed to adequately characterise and detail the complex 
meshing of relations at the individual, group and societal level. This 
criticism is connected with an insufficient use of the techniques of 
historical investigation. Despite the School's continual emphasis on history 
and the importance of historical inquiry, their work lacks sufficient 
historical and empirical detail on the ways in which social forms are created, 
sustained and changed. Despite the intention to bring together theoretical 
considerations and empirical research, many of their boldest claims are 
under-researched. Precisely that which they sought to grasp - the "fluid 
reality" of sociological and psychological life; of empirical, hermeneutical 
and critical knowledge of the past and the present eludes them. Beld (1980) 
believes that such an unsatisfactory position could be.due to two "causes", 
(a) models of societal development were too readily drawn from the 
experiences of a rigid, all-powerful form of fascism, Nazism and StalinismJ 
(b) the revolutionary ag~ncy was invested more and more in the individual. 
As the confidence in fundamental social change was gradually lost 
(particularly by Borkheimer and Adorno) hopes were increasingly vested 
in the individual as the point of freedom - despite all the arguments they 
made against such a position. Even Habermas, with his emphasis on systems 
analYSis and the identification of systems problems fails to draw the 
.. 
integrating links between the individu~l and the system. As a consequence, 
there is a tendency to neglect the Janus-faced nature of social phenomena 
- to integrate the whole and the parts in an analysis which does justice to 
both. 
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In a sense, our third criticism is closely connected with the first, 
in that it is the emphasis on the cohesion of the whole which precipitates 
a neglect of the conflict among the parts. Because the Frankfurt School 
takes the domination of the elites to be self-evident and well-nigh complete, 
there is scant attention paid to how such domination is created, sustained, 
and resisted. Resistance is simply not of~en "seen". Baharmas does 
recognize that this dominance may be undermined but he errs on the other 
extreme. To him the legitimacy of capitalistic values and forms of 
consciousness is so totally undermined that a motivation crisis is imminent 
and capitalist SOCiety is ready to move to alternative modes of thought which 
reflect a communicative ethics. Not only is there little evidence to suggest 
such an imminent move, Bahermas does not provide an argument why the 
altexnative should be his ideal of an ideal speech situation. On the one 
hand, he argues that his theory of social evolution does not mean that 
empirically and historically societies 'Will move in line with his developmental 
logic. On the other, he appears to succumb to crude forms of orthodox 
Marxist determinism in postulating that the next move is to a "better" society 
as he defines it. Be tries to walk the narrow line bet~een the stronC]er 
claims of Hegelian teleol.ogy and historical.relativism.bu"t.he i. not always 
'. successful in maintaining a consistent balance. 
Our fourth and final criticism about Habermas in particular relates to 
his Obscure notion of "necessary repression". Because of the way in which 
Babermas interpreted Freud and developed ~is argument of societal evolution, 
he has to rely on the notions of "necessary repression" and .. surplus 
repreSSion", which surfaces at the individual and societal level. According 
, . 
to Habermas, Freud had implied that fot collective self-presentation a 
certain degree of repression of instinctual drives was necessary. Faced with 
conditions of scaricity, .human beings - in order to survive - are forced to 
and indeed required to create institutions which prevent a complete gratifica-
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tion of instinctual desires. 
Whilst differing from Marcuse in this context, Habermas too believed 
that a basic degree of repression was necessary at each level of survival. 
His theory of a developmental logic in social evolution is grounded on the 
assumption that at each level of survival, there is an optimal level of 
technical and practical learning and capacity. The basic level of technical 
competence sufficient to ensure survival represents the basic degree of 
historically required repression. Repression which is in excess of this 
level is defined as surplus repression. In order for a society to move to 
a higher level of survival and to move towards an ideal speech condition, 
advances must be made both at the technical and practical learning levels. 
The preCise movement to a new level of development would depend on (a) the 
type of new learning acquired; (b) the unresolved system problems which had 
overloaded the society's steering capacity ~t its present level of knowledge; 
and (c) the specific strategic action taken by members of that society in 
overcoming their identified problems. 
This concept of a basic repression leve~which is synonymous with a 
"basic" survival level, is remarkably similar to Tinker's ideas of the F-set. 
However, 'unlike Tinker, Habermas does not posit the basic level as the 
criterion of satisfaction and instead argues a s~ronger normative ideal. 
Also, unlike Tinker, Habermas conceives of this basic level of the human 
condition not as the minimal level of need-satisfaction but the historically 
required level of repression. Despite these creative differences in emphasis, 
however, Babermas's concept of survival, like Tinker's, is beset with 
theoretical diffi~lties. 
\ 
Let us remain with Baberrnas's definition of surplus repression or surplus 
Berrschaft: the ability to frustrate the preferences o~ social .agents in a 
society to a greater extent than is .necessary .for it to maintain . and 
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reproduce itself. This concept of Herrschaft and surplus Herrschaft is 
also synonymous with an unequal distribution of normative power, with the 
" domination of one group over the other. It is important to stress that 
Herrschaft is the exercise of power within an unequal political order and is 
linked to some kind of legitimacy. If a group of invaders simply ransacked 
a country, doing and taking what they wanted by sheer force, they would 
clearly be frustrating the preferences of the agents on whom they act, but 
they are not exercising Herrschaft. Normative power/repression is the 
frustration of agent's preferences which makes a claim to legitimacy that is 
accepted by those agents because of certain normative beliefs that they 
themselves hold. Thus any form of Herrschaft is a legitimate unequal or 
asymmetrical distribution of normative power. Surplus Herrschaft exceeds 
that required to ensure survjval. 
But to say that "(HerrschaFt) is required by the economy" or " .. is 
requ1.' red 1.' f the ' ' t' to economy is to function' is at est an approx1.ma lon; 
say that "the economy" "functions"is to say that it functions at some level 
of efficiency (i.e. at some level of expenditure of resources) to provide 
some level of satisfaction of a qualitatively specific set of human wants 
and needs of a quite particular kind. It presumably also means that the 
industrial plant does not produce a mass of goodies and then promptly 
collapse, so the economy must function in such a way that it not only 
satisfies certain human wants, but also reproduces itself. One cannot even 
begin to determine whether society imposes surplus repression on its members 
unless one specifies what level of satisfaction of what particular human 
desires and needs the economy is to provide. As Guess (1981) puts it 
picturesquely: 
"Did the ancient economy 'require' the use of slave labour in order 
to function at a level which would provide each Mikrokles with an 
onion, a barley cake, and half a cabbage for each of his two meals 
a day? Or did it require the use of slave labour if it was to 
function so as to allow Alkibiades to race in a four-horse chariot 
i(n the morning and spend the afternoons playing cottabos in the baths?" 
p. 35, Guess, 1981.') 
Associated with every human collect1vity, whether it be an organization 
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or a society, there will be a set of accepted wants, needs and desires. 
But one cannot define surplus repression as any repression more than that 
required for survival of the socially accepted and defined needs. After all 
the set of acceptable needs and the traditional level of consumption may 
themselves be part of an ideology which we wish to criticize. An appeal to 
surplus repression was supposed to give an external evaluative standpoint 
which was outside the given social interpretation of the agent's needs, from 
which to criticize it. The Frankfurt School clearly wishes to argue that 
"real" needs and desires include more than minimal biological survival 
needs and that interaction and work have a complementary developmental 
logic. Hence any repression which is more than that needed to ensure the 
physical survival of the agents is surplus. Agents in society have 
acquired sophisticated cultural needs and it is as legitimate and important 
that they be satisfied as it is that the agents get enough food and shelter. 
But surplus repression provides but a bed of sand on which to establish an 
"objective" standard of evaluating societies and their associated forms of 
consciousness. To measure the amount of surplus repression we first have to 
determine what needs and desires are deemed to be at the basic level of 
survival. 
Thus we, like Guess, would argue that the notion of surplus repression 
cannot form the starting point of a critique of social phenomena. Rather 
we must start with Habermas's theory of communicative competence, abstract 
though it is at present, in order that we are able to define a prianwhich 
needs and wants are legitimate and which are ideologically false; the amount of 
surplus repression, then, is the amount of repression exacted beyond that 
required to satisfy the agent's legitimate needs and desires. The phrase -
"this 
. repression is surplus" - is a conclusion which sums up a critical 
argument; the real work of Ideoloqiekritik would already have been done in 
distinguishing legitimate from "false" needs and wants. 
These four difficulties are, in our opinion, primary weaknesses in 
-. 
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Habermas's argument and they indicate challenges to be met in devising an 
integrated theory of social phenomena. There are other criticisms of his 
" 
work which are minor and have not been discussed in chapter 4 or this 
chapter. The reader is referred to them in Held (1980) and McCarthy (19}g), 
Keat (1981) and Guess (1981). Despite these difficulties with the 
conceptualizations of critical theory to date, it is felt that critique 
remains a vital facet of social analysis. And Habermas's framework, with all 
its attendant baggage does provide a basis for an empirically informed 
critical theory. But one last doubt should be discussed before we move to 
examine the basis on which Habermas's critical theory needs to be accepted 
- the subject and instigation of emancipation. 
It is necessary for a theory such as Habermas's to identify the subject 
of emancipation. The questions arise: to whom is critical theory addressed? 
Who is to be the instigator or promoter of enlightenment? Held (1990) 
appears to chastise Habermas for not declaring a specific subject of 
emancipation and a particular transforming agent or catalyst. We argue that 
such a declaration has been made by Habermas in a general but sufficient way. 
Thus from his writing and that of Marcuse, it is possible to distinguish four 
groups of agents who could form the subject of emancipation. These are: 
(a) agents who are suffering and know what social institutions or 
arrangement is the cause; 
(b) agents who know they are suffering, but either do not know what 
the cause is or have a false theory about the cause; 
(c) agents who are apparently content, but an analysis of their 
behaviour shows them to be suffering from hidden frustration of 
which they may not be awarej \ 
(d) agents who are actually content, but only because they have been 
prevented from developing certain desires which in the unconstrained 
course of things they would have developed, and which cannot be 
satisfied within the framework of the present social order. 
" 
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Cases (1) and (2) indicate that the subject of emancipation is usually 
identified by the felt, conscious experience of frustration and suffering 
of particular groups of people. There are, in these instances, clear, 
observable, explicit signs of frustration and suffering. However, case (3) 
suggests that in certain societies there could be such extensive repression 
that members may be prevented from becoming fully aware of the fact that 
they are miserable and frustrated. In other words, the frustration is hidden 
from superficial analysis and agents in such societies are deprived of a 
full and immediate experience of their own unhappiness. The frustration of 
these desires is not something which is ever allowed to come to full 
consciousness: a clear recognition of the frustration might lead to 
recognition of the inadmissible unconscious desire. However, Habermas 
argued that even in such situ~tions there would be observable, meaningful 
clues to a state of latent, unconscious frustration; clues which an indepth 
hermeneutics would be able to unveil. Although a situation of unrecognized 
frustration and unhappiness may be the case, there would be various, 
perhaps isolated, signs of a vague malaise, a free-floating sense of dis-
satisfaction and "irrational" patterns of behaviour, that is, behaviour 
which is not threatening to prevailing normative structures but which 
nevertlleless does not coincide happily with them. 
Case (4), however, is the nightmare of the Frankfurt School. Here 
agents in a SOCiety are really fully satisfied with their lives and show 
no behavioural signs of hidden frustration. It is the spectre of a society 
where social control is so total and so effective that members can be 
prevented from even forming desires which cannot be easily satisfied, a 
society of happy slaves, genuinely contented with their chains. However, 
it is argued that such a state is a nightmare, not a view of a state of 
SOCiety which is at present possible or which has been recorded as experienced. 
Even if such total control could exist, it is argued that we can extract from 
the "cultural tradition and history" standards of what the "good" or "better" 
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life is. These views may be found expressed in certain works of art, in 
religious or metaphysical doctrines, or may be derived from aesthetic or 
religious experiences. If agents genuinely believed all which utopia could 
offer has already been realized, then the role of the critical theorist is 
to enlighten the social agents about how much more of the utopian content 
of their tradition they could realize. 
Now the admission of cases (3) and (4) as subjects of emancipation 
suggest that the critical project could be somewhat of an elitist, expert-
governed enterprise. Society appears to be criticized not because of the 
experienced suffering it imposes on some oppressed group but because it 
fails to satisfy the aesthetic sensibilities of a cultural, "civilized" 
elite. It raises images of the Expert in society and in academic research 
- denouncing particular societal forms purely because they do not accord 
with higher opinions of a New Jerusalem. If this were the case, then the very 
notion of critique, of critical evaluation of institutions and societies, 
would be potentially repressive. However, as Guess (1981' points out, 
there is no intrinsic reason why this approach need be elitist. The agent 
in the society may be perfectly content, but, if they were released from 
some unperceived coercion, they might come to realize that their mode of 
existence is lacking in dignity or self-directedness etc.; any agent might 
be quite capable of realizing this and of initiating new desires. In other 
words, there is no imperative for enlightenment and emancipation to be 
along expert-defined lines. Indeed, the very ideal of emancipation is to 
enable unconstrained discourse in the formation of needs and desires. In 
addition, discursive will formation is intended at all times to be a 
democratic process and a critical theory can only be definitively 
confirmed to the extent that it is freely accepted or rejected by agents in 
the ideal speech situation. We are not and are unlikely ever to be in 
the ideal speech situation but we still may be able to tell in a relative 
sense Which concrete situations are closer and which weaker approximations 
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of the ideal speech situation; the closer a given situation approximates 
to the ideal, the greater weight the agent's expressed assent or dissent 
should be. This assent or dissent cannot be obtained but in a situation 
of a free flow of uncoerced interaction between and among the actors and 
between the actor and the theorist. Thus the "expert" must continually 
consult with the actors throughout the entire operation of attempting to 
free agents from domination. The democratic implications of this model of 
a theorist-society relationship should not be ignored for it implies that 
an ideal speech situation can be institutionalized only in the democratic 
form of public discussion among the citizenry. The theorist may perform 
an educative role, even an "expert" one, but the manner in which his 
expertise is channelled is radically different from that of the objectivistic 
positivist scientist. Thus we argue'that the concept of critique, of 
evaluation is not intrinsically ideological, it depends on how we evaluate, 
who we evaluate and the purpose of our evaluation. 
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5.5 A Statement of H~bermas's Assumptions which are Accepted 
-------
In this thesis we shall set up an integrated theory of D.E. which utilizes 
the information provided at the technical, hermeneutical and critical 
levels to take account of the four difficulties we have discussed. Here 
we wish to provide a statement of the assumptions behind Habermas's argument 
and which also underlie our proposals for an integrated theory of social 
phenomena to the extent that we have accepted his propositions. The first of 
these assumptions is an assumption which is brought from conflict theory, 
namely that conflict concerning action orientated to institutionalized norms 
arises only when the consensus governing the distribution of opportunities for 
satisfying needs breaks down. That is, the conflict can come to consciousness 
only within the hermeneutical categories of the interpretative system obtaining 
at that historical time. When conflict arises action oriented to norms gives 
way to risky strategic action which criticizes and seeks to change these norms. 
This assumption in turn requires an empirical assumption that the interests 
that actually emerge in conflict situations coincide sufficiently with the 
interests that the same parties would express if they were able to enter 
discourse at that time. A methodological assumption is also made, viz, hidden 
interests can be reconstructed even in cases where there is no manifested 
conflict and these interests can be brought to the conscious mind in such a 
way that it would lead to conflict (dissatisfaction), a desire for change and 
strategic action. These assumptions undergird the "advocacy model" of critique 
which we have discussed. The critique would involve a comparison of the 
eXisting, historical normative structures of a society with those which 
hypothetically would be the case if norms were arrived at discursively. 
USing such indicators of potential conflict as levels of felt frustration, 
politically permitted levels of satisfaction, or the differences between legal 
and social norms and legal/social reality, or codified rules of exclusion whiCh 
distinguish one social collectivity from another, a result could be obtained 
which would indicate the nature and level of ideological repression. 
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The second assumption which is accepted is that confirmation of critique 
can only be st,(,ured via the agent's assent in a situation of rational 
consensus. This for Habermas is the ultimate criterion of truth and of the 
correctness and rationality of norms. But what does acceptance and assent 
mean in practice? 
Suppose that the agents have adopted the criticisms of the theory and act 
to put its recommended course of action into effect. In order for the critique 
to be confirmed then the proposed "final state" must eventuate; if it does 
not, or if the final state turns out to be inherently unstable, the critical 
theory is disconfirmed. If the proposed final state ~reached (and is stable) 
the agents in this state must freely agree that they have been enlightened 
and emancipated, and that the critical theory gives a correct account of the 
process of emancipation and enlightenmrnt. They must agree that their former 
state was one of bondage, frustration, and delusion, as described by the 
critical theory and that their present state is one of increased freedom and 
satisfaction, and one in which they have a more correct view of their interests. 
Finally they must freely acknowledge that awareness of the critical theory and 
the process of reflection it initiated was the mechanism of their emancipation. 
If the agents refuse any part of this complex free assent, i.e. when they are 
in an ideal speech situation, the critical theory is disconfirmed. For exrunple, 
this would result if, for instance, having experienced the "final state" they 
decide that they were better off back in the original state. 
Our third assumption, which represents an extension of Habermas's argument, 
is that emancipation is synonymous with the removal of material institutions and 
practices which legitimate repression. It is also synonymous with individuals 
freeing themselves from pathological s~ates of anxiety and distorted 
communication - a theme which will be explicated later. That is, it is not enOugh 
that the oppressed agents no longer voluntarily co-operate in their own 
frustration, there must be a change in the basic social institutions which does 
away with the experienced suffering and the restriction of human, individual 
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possibilities which motivated the agents to adopt the critical theory. Thus 
there needs to be an integration of emancipation at the individual, group, 
institutional and societal level. Such a requirement also means that the 
dominant class should also accept the critical theory. The theory is addressed 
to both the disadvantaged and oppressed group and the dominant class. And it 
is the clear intention of critical theory that if the agents in a particular 
society have been emancipated from ideological delusion and coercion, they must 
all, including the former dominant class, agree that they prefer their present 
emancipated state to the former "initial" state of false consciousness and 
unfree existence. As pointed out earlier, members of the dominant class are only 
in an advantageous position within the given social system. This in no way 
implies that the members of the dominant group are not themselves also massively 
frustrated and so implies nothing about the social system they would prefer, if 
they had free choice. Unlike Rawls, Habermas does not postulate a veil of 
ignorance whereby in a risky situation all members of a society would argue 
for a "minimization of regret" principle. So if the process of emancipation 
and enlightenment is a true one the members of the dominant class should at 
the end of the process recognize and agree that their privileges were opiates, 
modes of gratification which served to mask the much more serious and pervasive 
forms of frustration from which they suffered. This third requirement highlights 
in what sense self-reflection per se is a necessary but insufficient condition 
for emancipation. Self-reflection needs to be supplemented by strategiC action 
geared towards the removal of existing structures of repression. 
This requirement also explains why resistance to a critical theory could 
result. As discussed, Herrschaft represents an unequal distribution of normative 
repression and ideological false consciousness differs from neurosis in that 
dominant groups will seek to maintain it~ and powerful groups may seek to keep 
a practice or institution in existence despite the fact that increasing numbers 
of agents realize that it is repressive. In addition, social inertia could 
also playa role in resisting emancipation. Hence, enlightenment does not 
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automatically lead to emancipation. What it does lead to is a break in the 
compulsion to believe in the legitimacy of repressive soc~al situations. By 
" ' 
accepting the legitimacy of such institutions, the agents themselves have 
been reproducing and co-oporating in their own frustration. Reflection, at 
least, frees agents from an unconscious complicity in thwarting their own 
real and legitimate desire~. Emancipation will usually require a long course 
of political action. Until that course of action has been completed, 
repressive institutions will continue to exist for even enlightened agents and 
the critical theory will remain as yet an unconfirmed theory. 
Our fourth and final assumption is that we accept the emphasis which 
Habermas places on the process of achieving truth. That is, the ultimate 
criterion of truth and of an integrated theory is the extent to which discursive 
will-formation is promoted and realized. Following'Habermas we agree that 
the purpose of theory is to elucidate and advance the process whereby needs 
and desires may be the subject of an unconstrained, democratic discourse, a 
discourse which is free from domination and repression, a discourse which is 
based on the rule of the "better argument". Like Babermas, we do not attempt 
to posit a specific welfare norm to be the ultimate value position, the emphasis 
is on the process whereby such a norm may be evolved. We recognize that such 
a Position is weak in the sense that it does not instruct agents to adopt a 
particula~ value position. But on the other hand, why is there an ontological 
imperative that such an instruction be given? Admittedly the concept of 
communicative competence does not at present solve competing value disputes, 
say between Marcuse and Rawls but there is little explanation of why such a 
reqUirement should be made and met. Held (1980) perSistently argues that 
disputes between competing value positions should be resolved and criticises 
critical theory for not providing this answer. But he does not give a coherent 
argument why philosophically such an imperative is prior to any analysis of the 
process whereby discourse may be achieved. Surely we ~annot arrive at a rationat 
consensus of what society and, ~r9anizations should.be do~n9 if the opportunities 
... 
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for unconstrained participation amongst social actors are not present. 
5. 6 A General Framework for an Integrated, Critical Theory of O.E. 
From the discussions to date it is clear that an integrated theory is a 
very complicated conceptual object; it is aimed at a particular oppressed 
group in a particular society and aims at being their self-consciousness in 
a process of successful enlightenment and emancipation. A process of enlightenment 
• 
and emancipation is a transition from an initial state of bondage, delusion and 
frustration to a final state of freedom, knowledge and satisfaction. An 
integrated theory, by being built on Habermas's theory of communicative 
competence, is not a utopian fantasy, a dream of an ideal state which we 
could say neither whether it was theoretically possible nor how it might be 
realized. For Habermas's rational reconstruction of man's competence argues 
that a transition from a constrained state of society (the initial state of 
• 
the process of emancipation) to some proposed final state of emanCipation and 
enlightenment is intrinsically possible. It has already been anticipated 
t ••• 
in the structure of speech itself. Thus an integrated theory argues that the 
final state is theoretically possible given the capacity of the human species 
and the developmental logic of the forces and relations of production (which 
are Conceptualized into technical - analytic and practical learning). That 
is, given the developmental logic of the evolutio~ of the individual and society 
in general, it is possible for society to function and reproduce itself in 
the proposed state. It is also possible to transform the present state into 
the proposed final state by means of specified institutional or other changes. 
An integrated theory therefore avoids the charge of utopianism, and it 
also escapes the c~arge of orthodox 't' ddt i i II sc~en 1sm an e erm n sm. The Frankfurt 
School takes as an important distinguishing feature of their critical version 
of MarXism (and a sign of its superiority over more orthodox versions) that 
they do not categorically predict the "inevitable" coming of the unrepressed, 
classless society. They argue that their theory of society claims only to 
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give knowledge of the "practical necessity" of a transformation of the present 
social order. That is, the Marxist knows that the agents in the society have 
an overwhelming real interest in bringing about a classless society but this 
does not mean that the transformation is inevitable. Whether or not it will 
occur depends on all kinds of other factors which the theory may not allow us 
to predict; in particular it depends on whether large numbers of agents find 
the critique plausible, adopt it, and act on it effectively. 
agents about how they ought rationally to act to realize their own real 
interests. It seeks to point out the process whereby agents are able freely 
It· • 
to determine their interests, needs and preferences. 
An integrated theory thus begins with an object or group for investigation 
whose fundamental nature and meaning is being called into question. It employs 
traditional forms of empirical and hermeneutical knowledge as an essential 
means of gaining data and exploring possible interpretations. It seeks to 
measure and tap both the forms and the extent of the agent's frustration, 
experience and suffering as they themselves describe it. It is essential 
that at the first instance, access to and an understanding of the agents' 
language and mode of expression is obtained. This is because a critical theory 
Which is integrated 1s only confirmed at the practical level when agents 
freely assent and act upon it. Clearly, for this to happen, a critical theory 
must be expressed in a form which is comprehensible to the agents addressed 
and Which allows them to recognize it as a description of their own situation 
and use it as a guide for action. Secondly, if the "dual consciousness" which 
Giddens (1977) speaks of is present, then it is likely that agents are able 
to speak of their everyday frustration and suffering in a radicalized manner 
.. 
Which clearly pinpoints the sources of constraints upon their thought and 
action. These agents may not be able to link macro-societal relationships and 
political institUtions to their micro-level problems (hence the postulated 
dual conscio~ness) but their radicalized interpretation would help in the 
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critique and identification of contemporary social practices and institutions 
which prevented a rational, free consensus. For both these reasons it is 
important that a deep understanding is obtained of the agents' language and way 
of communicating with each other. \ 
Nomological knowledge is also required in order that we may study the 
interaction, coupling and interactions between certain processes or "variables". 
At a first instance, it is important to know that agents experience "job 
dissatisfaCtion" or that they experience "s lot of anxiety at work". It is 
alsoinfarmative that statistically there is a significant correlation between 
agents who experience high levels of dissatisfaction and high levels of 
t.· • 
anxiety. For the identification of such patterns of responses, although 
gathered on a questionnaire basis, is nevertheless a facet of the agents' 
construction of their world. And such measures of frustration, limited though 
they may be, do help to identify the complex, mUlti-interactive processes 
which operate at the individual, group, organizational and societal level and 
which constitute or reproduce the forces and relations of domination and 
ideology. 
But obtaining empirical relationships and hermeneutical meanings is 
insufficient by itself in order to achieve the goals of enlightenment and 
emancipation. We need to move beyond traditional interpretative techniques 
because the subjects' accounts of their behaviour would include meanings 
which remain opaque due to distortion and repression. In 
the example of a quasi-causal relationship between job satisfaction and 
psychological anxiety, the positive correlation which is significant can 
support tWo inferences: (a) a technically-interested one which argues that 
.. 
in order for the worker to be satisfie~ and to produce more, sources of 
anxiety must be controlled; or (b) an emancipatory-interested argument which 
shows that one of the barriers to an unconstrained discourse. between nurses 
and patients and between various grades of .nursi:ng staff is the inability to 
. '. 
- 171 -
cope with psychological anxiety; which is projected and introjected into 
collective organizational defence mechanisms and which, when interlocked into 
a bureaucratic division of labour and patient powerlessness become objectified 
into macro-level institutions of repression. When the components and sources 
of job satisfaction are teased out and its links to psychological anxiety 
discerned, the critical theorist may be better to integrate the psychological 
and sociological facets of a "fluid reality". Thus, the identification of 
patterns of relationships and of relatively stable associations between 
observations of behaviour is essential in clarifying the issues for critique. 
So is a depth hermeneutics which seeks to integrate a study of meanings with 
a study of relations of domination. 
This discussion shows that the bulk of the empirical work of a critical, 
integrated theory is to shbw that a transition from the present state to the 
proposed final state is "practically necessary". That is, empirical relationships 
and hermeneutical measuring systems should reveal that the present state of 
the agents is one of reflectively unacceptable frustration, bondage and illusion. 
This means that the present social arrangements cause both conscious and 
unconscious forms of pain, suffering and frustration and the agents in the 
society only accept the present arrangements and the suffering because they hold 
a particular world-picture. This world-picture is in fact ideologically false, 
i.e. it is one which the agents acquired only because they were in conditions 
of coercion. Such are the demands of an empirical, critical social theory. 
In addition to specifying empirically the present state of illusion, an 
integrated theory also asserts that the proposed final state will be one which 
will lack the illusions and unnecessary coercion and frustration of the 
present state; the proposed final state will be one in which it will be easier 
for the agents to realize their true interests. It further argues that the 
transition from the present state to the proposed final state can come about 
if the agents adopt the critical theory as their "self-consciousness" and 
act on it. The theory is then confirmed if the final state eventuates, is 
-, 
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stable and the agents freely agree that their former state was one of frustration, 
as described by the critical theory and their present state is one of 
increased self-autonomy and satisfaction, and one in which they are able to 
participate in the definition of their needs and interests. Guess (1981) 
argues that a critical theory need not be the sole and only means of 
emancipation and the adoption of a critique is not strictly necessary and 
sufficient for real emancipation. That is, emancipation could hypothetically 
have come about in some other way and be activated by some other catalyst. 
Also, it is not strictly necessary for confirmation of a theory that it be the 
only means of enlightenl'lent and material emancipa'tion. Nonetheless, it is 
probable that the Frankfurt School implied that a condition of the acceptability/ 
confirmation of a critique was that it be the kind of thing agents could adopt 
as their self-consciousness. The assessment of whether a critical, integrated 
explanation of processes could be accepted by agents if not for the existence 
of resistance from the dominant classes is a question for empirical investigation. 
h ' 'tique As a first requirement the critical theorist should make sure that ~s cr~ 
captures the language of the agents in all its complexity, and expresses itself 
in a language which is comprehensible to the agents addressed. The Frankfurt 
School terms this requirement of a critical explanation: the hermeneutical 
requirement for the acceptability of a theory. A critical explanation of 
ideology must be understandable to the agents to whom it is addressed. 
Finally, a critical explanation should set forth the means whereby a free 
existence might be achieved. A critical theory does not advocate the acceptance 
of a particular value position. It advocates a process of free discourse and 
the means whereby such a rational discourse may be achieved. That is, a 
critical theory should show how,given the present development of the forces 
of production, it is feasible to achieve the proposed state and how it is 
feaSible for society to function and reproduce itself in the final state. 
Without this requirement, an integrated, critical theory would come up against 
the charge of utopianism yet ,again. Further, impliCit within such a specification 
" 
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of the means whereby distorted communication be dissolved and emancipation 
instituted, would be an assessment of the feasibility of such a transition 
from the initial to the final proposed state. Clearly a critical explanation 
should assess whether it is practically possible, meaning possible in practice, 
to transform the present into the final state by means of specified institutional, 
social or political changes. Indeed, Guess (1981) argues that an essential 
part of a critical theory would be one that argued convincingly that a transition 
to the final state is "objectively" possible - Le. given the forces of 
prodUction currently available in the predictable future, it is possible for 
society to function in its proposed state and a radical transformation is 
feasible. Guess's requirement is stronger than ours in that he interprets 
Habermas as requiring a critical theory which is based on an established argument 
that transformation is definit~ly possible given the resources available to man. 
We, however, argue that critique may be initiated prior to the establishment of 
such evidence but that as part of the critique an assessment of the feasibility 
of the theory's recommendations for change be made in the knowledge of available 
resources. The difference, though slight, is significant for instead of 
critique following an assessment of the feasibility of transformation, critique 
and this assessment is conducted interactively and simultaneously. For how is 
it Possible to assess the feasibility of transformation if we have not even 
identified in detail the sources and structures of false consciousness? 
Guess's model of a critical theory (page 76) ignores the vitality of feedback 
loops and appears to see the process of enlightenment and emancipation in over-
rigid chronological terms. He appears to insist that a feasibility study be 
carried out prior to the self-reflective identification of false consciousness. 
To us this rigid setting of A first, then B militates against the dynamic nature 
of critique which is illustrated in the following summing-up diagram of the 
cognitive structure and confirmation of a critical, integrated theory of 
social analysis. 
Cognitive 
Structure 
Criterion of 
Acceptabili ty 
by Agents 
Cri terion of 
Confirmation 
of Theory 
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Object under review; obtain empirical knowledge 
of relationships and a hermeneutical understand-
ing of their mode of communicative interaction. 
Interpret both these forms of knowledge with a 
critical interest of identifying domination and 
ideology. 
Employ both Habermas's concepts of depth 
hermeneutics and quasi-causal explanations. 
Assess the feasibility in practical terms of the 
proposed state and of the transition from the 
present to the future. 
Specify detailed changes which if adopted will 
bring about a final state of a "free existence". 
Do the agents accept these criticisms and 
recommendations for radical change? Is the 
critical theorist writing in a language which is 
understandable by the agents to whom it is 
addressed? 
If the agents accept the theory and act on it, 
does the final state eventuate in a stable form and 
do the agents freely assent that their previous 
state was one of the bondage and the present one, 
one of greater freedom and happiness; both states 
being as described by the theory? 
, 
I 
, 
I 
I 
r.J , 
I 
... 
I 
I 
I , 
I , 
I 
J 
, I L ___________________________ , 
\ 
Diagram 5.3: An Integrated Form of Social Analysis 
Feedback Loops 
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As the diagram seeks to display, each "step" in the fOZlllulation, 
acceptance and confirmation of the theory is interlinked such that each 
"step" is not a true step at all. There is no suggestion that each element 
in the total process is independent and continual feedback loops occur 
between the elements. 
Bearing this dynamic model of an empirical, hermeneutical and critical 
mode of social analysis in mind we set out in this thesis an integrated theory of , , 
O.E. which has as, its ultimate purpose the enlightenment and emancipation of 
organizations and individuals. The .theory is built on a model for identifying 
micro-level and macro-level constraints to an ideal speech situation, thereby 
gaining both Psychological and sociological insights into domination and ' 
repression. It also seeks to use nomological and hermeneutical knowledge in 
the manner outlined above in ord'er to achieve its ultimate emancipatory 
interest. In this manner, our model for an integrated theory of O.E. avoids 
two of the criticisms we have levelled at Habermas's work. In order to avoid 
the other charge of painting society as an homogeneous whole, we have deliberately 
set a model of hermeneutics which is tightly coupled to issues of power and 
of maintaining control. These hermeneutical meanings, when used critically, 
show that meaning systems are themselves repressive systems, geared towards 
maintaining the control of dominanT interest groups in an organization. 
Finally, our model of an integrated theory of O.E~ does not utilize in any 
way Habermas's or Marcuse's concept of survival and of survival-related 
necessary and unnecessary repression. Following Guess's suggestions 
Ideologiekritik begins from the benchmark of an ideal speech situation; these 
needs Which are formed discursively are by definition legitimate needs and 
those which ,are not are ideologlcally'false. 
Chapter 6: The Process and Methods of Research 
Stereotype Qualitati~e Researcher: 
Stereotype Quantitative Researcher: 
"Many people these days are bored 
wi th their work and are.~·. ~ .•.•. " 
"~l1at people, how many, when do 
they feel this way, where do they 
work, what do they do, Why are 
they bored, how long have they felt 
this way, what are their needs, when 
do they feel excited, where did they 
come from, What parts of their work 
bother them most, which •.••••. ?" 
Stereotype Qualitative Researcher: "Never mind." 
(P. 519, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 24, 1979) 
"People who write about methodology often forget that it is a matter 
of strategy, not of morals. There are neither good nor bad methods but 
only methods that are more or less effective under particular 
circumstances in reaching objectives on the way to a distant goal." 
(p. 330, Homans, 1949) 
"Every data-gathering class-interview, questionnaire, observation, 
performance record, physical evidence - is potentially biased and has 
specific to it certain validity threats. Ideally, we should like to 
converge data from several different data classes, as well as converge 
with multiple variants from within a single class." (p. 35, Webb, 1966) 
6.1 A General Case 
The purpose of this chapter is to set out in detail our process of research 
and the methods of research employed. In so doing we wish to explain our 
rationale for choosing particular methods and to argue that research methods 
cannot be evaluated or chosen in isolation. They must be seen in the context 
of our whole research philosophy and theoretical' argument. As the above quote 
COlllJDents, there are no "good" or "bad" methods, there are only more or less 
efficient ones. 
The specific use of methods in this research have been guided by two 
basic rationales: (a) the desire to obtain multiple observations and measures 
.. 
of a single event or process in order~to increase the level of empirical 
validity of our findings and conclusions; and (b) to integrate methods from 
a variety of diSCiplinary matrices in order to obtain an integrated 
understanding of the phenomena being studied. In particular, efforts were 
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made to integrate and use both "quantitative" and "qualitative" modes of 
data col·lection and analysis. "Sard" and "soft" data are felt to be of 
equal importance in offering insights and are complements rather than 
substitutes for one another. Further both real-time and historical data 
is used in a longitudinal study of our research organisation. 
The process of using multiple methods to obtain observations of a 
single event/process is not new. In a now celebrated paper Campbell and 
FiSke (1959) discuss the validation process in terms of the multi trait, 
multimethod matrix. ~~bb et a1 (1966) too argued for the necessity of 
chOOSing a collection of methods in order to avoid the concentration of 
similar weaknesses. Recently, this so-called use of various methods of 
data-collection has been termed "triangulation" (see Denzin, 1978; Jick, 1979), 
a metaphor borrowed from navigation and military strategy that use 
multiple reference points to locate an object's exact position. Given 
basic prinCiples of geometry multiple viewpoints allow for greater 
accuracy. Similar organizational and accounting researchers can improve the 
accuracy of their judgements by collecting different kinds of data 
bearing on the same phenomenon. When the phenomenon under study is the 
complex concept of organisational effectiveness, such triangulation is 
argUably vi tal. 
6.2 The ChOice of a Case-study Approach 
The majority of our empirical work was conducted within a large 
school of nursing in the north of England. This was an Area School of Nursing, 
administered by the Area Health Authority and run by a Director of Rurse 
Education. The School was responsible for nurse training in some thirteen 
"-
basic and· post-basic programmes and supplied experience in two large health 
districts. The Sourthern District encompassed ten hospitals and specialist 
clinics, Whilst the Northern District technically encompassed five hospitals 
and four annexes and adult training centres. I 
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The methodological problems of studying a single micro-organizaUofl 
have often been raised in the literature. For instance, a case-study 
methodology that involves only one sirtgle focal F-set is often accused of 
being non-generalizable and statistically invalid. That is, though it is 
recognized by researchers that case studies often provide rich thick 
descriptions of the phenomena under study it is ~oncluded'that a sample of 
one does not provide any basis for scientific generalization. Inferential 
I 
statistical procedures apparently "demand" that the number of cases studied 
be equal to or greater than the number of variables being tested. Even' 
'0 • 
qualitative researchers appear to give in to the greater knowledge of 
statisticians and Bateson (1979) himself points out that single examples 
do not illustrate patterns. It would appear that where there is a single 
data source with an N of 1, the effects of measurement and of the features 
of the case are confounded. 
In addition to this issue of non-generalizability, there is the related 
argument that case studies are appropriate only for generating hypotheses 
but not for testing them because of their statistical limitations. Further, 
it is pointed out that the methods of generating information in a case study, 
the treatment of data extracted from it, the mode of presentation of information, 
the procedures for reasoning about the data, the rules for judging the 
validity and reliability of the observations, th~ ways of relating the 
information in the case to other information, etc., are all less well-defined 
than in traditional sample surveys. 
We contend that case study analysis, by which we mean a methodology 
that eXamines a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context, has much 
to offer the accouhting researcher. ~ case study is, if you like, a 
"little system" study while a multi-case study is but a "bigger system" 
study. Both t f ypes 0 study face precisely the same problems of generalization 
\ 
and the former is different only in the case of being concerned with a 
smaller system. Further, as~ill be demonstrated in chapters 11 and 12, 
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even the study of a single micro-organization, ("little system") cannot be 
divorced from a simultan~ous analysis of the societal environment within 
which it is situated. In other words, even our use of the words "little" 
\ 
and "bigger" systems analysis does not quite capture the richness and 
"bigness" of the case study method. For an analysis of a case is never 
just that, a single micro-organization cannot be understood prior to an 
analysis of the historical, macro-societal context withi~ which it nestles; 
its relations to other institutions, other agencies, other cases must be 
• 
analysed at the same time. So, to what extent is a case study ~ case, 
a study of ~ organization', wnen by focussing on one, we similarl¥. ~ocus 
on a multitude of others? Moreover, what counts as one case? One bed, 
one patient, one ward, one hospital, one district, one Regional Health 
Authority, one society, one earth? When is a system too small and when is 
it adequate? Even Adorno's study of the Authoritarian Personality, which 
was conducted via large-scale questionnairing was considered inadequate to 
establish that a society possessed this characteristic. How big should 
our samples be? Perhaps we would be better served as a social science 
community if we take note of Ashby's (1956) arguments that there is only a 
certain amount of control (of information) within a complex system. And 
no matter how sophisticated are our measuring instruments, our difficult 
calculations, our large samples, there is only ~o much information to be 
obtained and not more. Further the criticism that case studies cannot be 
repeated, is equally true of multi-organizational studies. To begin with 
few replication studies are conducted even when large-scale sampling was 
used in the first instance and no replication study can replicate the 
SOCial, historical context within wh~ch research is conducted. The point is, 
all researchers are looking at a series of case studies and this applies 
in the absence or presence of pieces of paper called questionnaires or 
standardized scales of pers,onali ty. 
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Also, are large samples always to'be desired? Perhaps one or two 
exceptions to the rule may have greater social impact but these are precisely 
the kind of exceptions which large-scale ~ampling regards ·as non-significant 
statistically. The concept of s~ling was originally ,conceived in order 
that we did not succumb to obscure myths but the virtue of large-scale 
sampling ,is so extolle.d that we are in d~ger of ignoring vital, perhaps 
i I 
infrequent, occurrences .and events. 
Further, the generality of case studies can be maintained by the use 
of multiple cases, multiple data sources, methods of observations of the 
same phenomena and multiple techniques within a given method. Convergence 
or agreement amongst these different methods of data collection would indicate 
that the results are valid and not a methodological artefact. For instance, 
"across method" triangulation of a particular phenomena helps to establish 
the external validity of the theory and concepts whilst "within-method" 
triangulation helps to establish the internal validity and consistence of 
concepts (Jick, 1979). 
This last point in fact answers critics who may feel that case study 
results do not test hypotheses. H8gg and Hedlund (1979) point out that there 
is always knowledge in the form of theories formulated by the case researchers 
themselves or by others on to which individual cases can be mapped so that 
valid conclusions can ~ drawn from the assembled body of knowledge. Further, 
if the observation of th~ phenomenon under study·required in-depth 
investigation, hypothesis testing could be most appropriately conducted 
using case studies. 
Finally, there is much evidence to show that case study analysis 
provides rich insiihts into the functioning of organizations. The work of 
.. 
Tinker (1975), Pettigrew (1973), Baldr~dge (1971), and'~ahapiet (1981) reveal 
that case studies provide a wealth of information. 
In particular, they afford a holistic analysis of data and appeared the 
most logical manner of investigating the processes by which specific criteria 
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of O.E. rose in importance and the way in which they were interlocked with 
micro- and macro-power relationships. Like Pettigrew (1973) we had little 
prior empirical knowledge of these process issues of the theory of O.E., of 
the precise manner in which a fe~sible strategy was implemented, changed and 
evolved. The F-set and its contents has remained, till now, a black box 
and it was considered prudent to open it in detail within one organization. 
Besides, as Mintzberg (1979) testily complains: 
" . 
"What, for example, is wrong with samples of one? Why should 
researchers have to apologize for them? Should Piaget apologize for 
studying his own children, a physicist for splitting only one atom? 
• • • given that we have one hundred people each prepared to do a 
year of research, we should ask ourselves whether we are better off 
to have ea~h study one hundred organizations giving us superficial 
data on ten thousand, or each study one, giving us in-depth data on one 
hundred. The choice obviously depends on what is to be studied. But 
it should not preclude the small sample, which has often proved 
superior." (p. 583, Mintzberg, 1979). 
In conclusion, we would add that it was through the richness and 
intensity offered by a holistic, deep immersion in the life of the 
research organization that led to a development of an integrated theory of 
O.E. via a hermeneutical analysis of the deep structures of organizational 
language and discourse. It was because I spent so much time within the 
r J 
organization, talking to the participants, working alongside them, that I 
~as better able to understand the parameters within which their world was 
constructed. And to locate ideological sources of repression in the way 
in which particular levels of the organizational hierarchy mobilized 
Visibility and bias to specific directions. Had I not been provided such a 
form of inquiry, the insights gained and reported in this thesis would have 
been totally different. 
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6.3 The Choice of Participant Observation and Ethnography 
"Many people feel that a newspaper reporter is a far cry from a 
social scientist. Yet many of the data of social science toda¥ ~re 
gathered by ~nterviewing and observation techniques that resemble 
those of a skilled newspaper man at work on the stu~ of, say, a 
union strike or a political convention. It makes little sense 
for us to belittle these less rigorous methods as "unscientific". 
We will do better to study them and the techniques they involve so 
that we can make better use of them in producing scientific information". 
(p274, Dean et a1, 1967) 
Participant observation was employed in a limited way at the beginning 
of the study and was used to a significant extent during the later stages of 
the study when the researcher worked full-time on the wards of the two large 
general hospitals in the Northern and Southern Districts of the Health 
Authority for a period of 2 months. The term "participant observation" is 
however somewhat imprecise for it implies the use of a single method of data 
collection(~ that of direct observation. In reality, this was not so. OUr 
Use of the term "participant obsevation" thus refers to a blend of methods 
and techniques that were employed when the researcher spent a considerable 
amount of time ac~ively interacting in the field with the subjects of study, 
and took on a formal role as a member of the focal F-set. The work involved 
a good deal of direct observation of participant behaViour, note-taking, some 
COllection of documents and an inherent unstructured-ness and unstandardization 
Of methods and procedures. 
Because our aim was .to study processes of a political and hence delicate 
nature and to determine within limits of inherent ambiguity what "actually" 
Went on, it was felt that the best possible way was to live with certain 
Participant groups. As is often observed, few people will openly acknow-
their political interest and involvement in legitimation activity. 
Those who act politically usually clai~ that they are acting in the public 
interest or in our case, the interest of the wider profession. In addition, 
the researcher would have the time to build up a trusting relationship 
which enabled the collection of sensitive information and the access to 
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f 
managerial meetings. Our official project was to study nurse selection 
and turnover and it would have been very difficult to gain access to 
managerial meetings on that basis alone. ·Without some level of trust 
nurse managers and educational staff would not have been persuaded that 
attendence at such meetings would throw light on the issue of nurse 
turnover. Also, participant observation ~llows the researcher time to 
ease himself into the field at an appropriate pace and thereby avoid 
rebuff by blundering into sensitive situations or subject matter. Further, 
the researfher is more able to pick up "charged cues" which result from 
being more attuned to the nuances of organizational life and he is thus 
more able to make use of the knowledge of selected informants and surrogate 
observers who are able to provide the results of indirect observation. 
Such informants are vital because the investigator cannot be at all places 
simultaneously. Also, he may not be aware of the historical factors 
relevant to a particular situation. The use of well-placed informants 
can add valuable information to the research. However, the researcher 
needs to have gained the confidence and trust of these informants. Only 
then is .he able to carefully and subtly· .question .knowle.dgeable informants who 
.. .' . 
were present as eye-witnesses· to events from which'the researcher was 
, 
absent. Such advantages of participant observation are clearly i~rtant 
When the research problem is def~n~d as a study of sensitive processes as 
well as content. 
Also, there was a new sub-language of jargon to be learnt. This 
applied particularly to the use of technical words. In addition, a quick 
ear in a strange social context soon realized that language itself was a 
.. 
research subject for it was a primary'~ans by which a link is forged 
between the world and perceptions of it. The closeness of intense parti-
cipant observation enabled the realization that it is through language 
that the encodation, decodation and emplotment of social drama takes place. 
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And the "organization" is then a label with a set of domain assumptions 
about the semantic space in which it operates, and a set of 
meanings that are tacitly assigned to behaviours. For example, there is a 
special significance attached to the wearing of a par~icular hospital badge 
in a large, new general hospital formed by the amalgamation of several 
established hospitals. 
.In addition 0' the statement "What do you expect 
of a Nursing Officer from the Royal!" bears at least three second-order 
implications: (1) the role relationships amongst nursing superiors and sub-
ordinates; (2) the competitive loyalties of different hospitals and schools 
of training; and (3) the history of £11 conceived amalgamations and struc-
tural changes in the nurs~ profession as a whole. Such background, taken-
for-granted assumptions are perhaps one of the ~ost difficult phenomena to 
elicit. They represent creative leaps that result from an in-depth exam i-
nation of the linguistic categories used by informants in the setting. 
However, the use of participant observation has also generated and 
given rise to more criticism and controversy than any other method of re-
search. Riley (1963) suggests that participant observation studies are 
Subject to "control effect" and "biased - viewpoint effect". '!be former 
is present when the measurement process itself or/and the measuring instru-
ment (observer) becomes an agent working for change: "the difficulty with 
control effect in participant observation, and in many othe~ research designs, 
is that it is unsystematic •••• >. (p. 71, Riley, 19'3.) The biased viewpoint 
effect includes the selective exposure, perception and reporting of "exotic datCl' 
and the possible shift over time of the calibration of observational measures. 
h' • 
It also includes the fears of Vidich (195,) and Miller (19S~ of over-, 
\ 
support and of the researcher "going native" such that he is no longer able 
to objectify his own experiences for research purposes. In committing his 
loyalties, the researcher so develops hl.·s o~ d /. 
"u veste interests and or emotl.ons 
in the subject under study th t th 
a e advantage of intimate observation and 
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participation then becomes a threat. It is also pointed out that there are 
obvious limitations on the observers' ability to witness all relevant aspects 
of the phenomena in question and that the use of key informants may be suspect 
as the investigatc:>r may not know whether the "truth" is being reported. 
Finally, as the participant's experiences, always operates in the borderland 
r 
of his/participant's experiences, he has to impute meaning to their actions, 
how can an external person assess the validity, reliability, precision and 
relevance of the data collected? If measurement and sampling procedures, 
for example, are as unstandardized as methods of participant observation, 
can we have any significant confidence in the resulting data? Would any 
two investigators come up with equivalent results and observations? Are 
data obtained early in such a study comparable with those obtained later, or 
has the researcher altered his framework over time such that early and late 
data are\quite different entities? Are the data valid indicators of the 
underlying phenomena? 
Such questions are clearly important and deserve the most serious con-
sideration but our answers are relatively difficult to establish, for the 
standard statistical means of ascertaining the validity and reliability of 
data-collecting operations are largel~ inapplicable. There is no doubt 
that from time to time and in significant ways, the researchers' presence in 
the wards and the school of nursing influenced peoples' attitudes and 
behaviour. For example, ward staff were anxious to assure me that slack 
periods of ward activity were "one of these days" and "it wasn't normal". 
Informant bias is always possible; positional bias is yet another important 
" . 
aspect of the data. Nevertheless, safeguards have been built into our use 
of participant ob~ervation. 
Firstly, the key tactic lay in the use of multiple indicants of any 
particular phenomena and an insistence on a very high degree of consonance 
'.' . 
among these indicants, tracking down and accounting for any contrary indi-
cants. This meant the corroborqtion of a single observation with other 
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observations, documentary evidence, questionnaire responses and interview 
data. For example, it was observed that role ambiguity on one ward signi-
ficantly affected the level of job dissatisfaction, this was counter-checked 
by observing behaviour on other wards, and interpretating statistical 
measures obtained by survey methods. 
Secondly, in order to counter any control effect observations of 
behaviour were delay¥d for two days on each ward and one class period in the 
school to ensure that some degree of familiarity had been engendered. 
This familiarity was important in order that the researcher was not regarded 
as a management spy and was gained·by the researcher displaying a genuine 
\, . 
ignorance of nursing work and therefore classified as a low-grade nursing 
auxiliary. The researcher in fact performed tasks normally performed by 
nursing auxiliaries on the ward. 
Thirdly, the risk of "going native" was in fact ex~rienced, identified 
and countered. The experience of "going native" was not that the observer 
became over-identified with the v.iewsof a participant group or with the 
viewpoint of a particular faction of these participants. This was, success-
fully avoided by the extensive discussion of problem issues with ~enior 1nformant~ 
in each of the primary participant groups in the F-set. student or learner 
nurse responses were recorded, so were those of the nursing service in 
hospitals and that of nursing staff in nurse education. In a'ddition, 
interpretations, first and second-order concepts were checked with knowledgeable 
outsiders, like other researchers. The experience of "going native" in fact 
arose when the observer had been in the field for a long period of time and 
had become so familiar with the organizational world, or so it appeared, that 
nothing new or sigRificant seemed to be happening. 
" 
She had in fact become 
immersed in the language and symbols of this social context that like the 
actors, these objects were becoming a background expectancy, a taken-for-
granted part of her construction of nursing reality. Such a danger was 
clearly recognised by early ~thropologists and ethnographers and ·George 
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Spindler,. a key figure in educational anthropology has said that "no anthro-
pologist-of-education-to-be should start his or her first significant piece 
of empirical research in a school in our own society". (quoted in Wolcott, 
1975) • That is, a participant observ~r needs to immerse himself and yet 
remain dry and distant, to have a porous skin but a skin nevertheless. In 
order to counter this effect more time was ,spent discussing interpretations with 
colleagues at the University, thus spending less time on site; multiple parti-
cipant g~oup interviewing was also initiated around similar topics, .. say, the 
, 
defining criteria of effective nursing, such that diversity of views was 
introduced more formally in the data collection process. This in effect 
' ... 
amounted to increased physical and psychological distancing from the over-
whelming effect of being constantly in the social context of the researched. 
In addition, care was taken to hear the views of different participant groups, 
say night staff at hospitals as well as day staff and the opinions of similar 
participants within a group but who were differentiated by rank or number of 
This years within the organization, say third-year and first-year learners. 
helped to counter the perception of familiarity as different interest groups 
often had different and conflicting views which contributed an element of 
unpredictability in the analysis of the system. The feeling of strangeness 
returned. 
Fourthly and finally the researcher realized 'that her role changed with 
increased interaction with participants over an extended period of time. 
Ini tially we presented ourselves as researchers doing a study on "what good 
nurse training and nursing is all about,especially with regard to the learner 
who leaves" and this identification was maintained throughout the research. 
The qualities encompassed, altered howe~er, with familiarity. In particular, when 
we approached participants during early stages of the research a high degree 
of genuine naivete produced invaluable insights ~nto'the nuring world. We 
played and were learners ours~lves, inducing participants to instruct us in 
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the ways of nursing. This role could not be maintained indefinitely. Also, 
as propositions developed and we began to pin down hypotheses , other kinds 
of interactional tactics became more valuable: argumentation, for example. 
This tactic helped to clarify the oft-hidden interests and biases of part-
cipant groups and led to detailed explications of what effective nurse 
training and nursing meant to different interest groups. 
As our conclusion, we present a brief summary of the length of time 
spent in participant observation, the roles undertaken and the centres observed: 
1. As a part-time learner nurse. Observations were randomly taken on 
2. 
3. 
4. 
one 6-week SRN and two 4-week SEN introductory courses. 
As a full-time supernumerate nursing auxiliary for 4 weeks in the 
5GH and NGH. At the SGB, 2 weeks were on a mixed-sex medical ward 
and 2 weeks on a mixed-sex surgical ward. At the NGH, a week each was 
spent on the following wards: (1) male medical (2) male surgical 
(3) female medical, and (4) female surgical. 
As a non-participant observer at monthly senior staff meetings at the 
nursing school. These meetings were observed for 14 months. 
Attendance on one single occasion as an observer was also negotiated 
at the following meetings: 
(a) The monthly meeting of the senior service (hospital-based) nursing 
staff of the S. District. This meeting is chaired by the District 
Nursing Officer and attended by Divisional Nursing Officers and 
Senior Nursing Officers from all the hospitals within the S.Districti 
(b) The weekly meeting of the Assistant Director of Nurse Education and 
the educational staff of the S. District; 
.. 
(c) The weekly meeting of the As~lstant Director of Nurse Education and 
the educational staff of the N. District. 
" .. 
"." 
./" " " j 
." " 
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6.4 The Choice of Formal and Informal Interviewing 
Formal interviewing is used to refer to situations where verbal 
information is obtained from selected respondents in a formal setting, that 
is, when both interviewer and interviewee are aware that an interview is 
being conducted. An appointment was always made prior to the interview as 
to the interviewee's preferred time and place of interview. In addition, 
these interviews were structured and a list of formally prepared questions 
was always used during the course of the interview. Informal interviewing 
as the name suggests indicates interview information collected on a less 
structured basis. The interviewee may not even be aware that an interview 
is being conducted and an appointment was not always made. The most 
distinguishing facet was that a formally prepared list of questions was seldom 
in evidence. 
Informal interviewing on a group basis was used early in the research 
as the researcher collected information from groups of learner nurses at 
different stages of their training as to reasons why learners took days off 
absent and left training before the full completion date. Such interviewing 
was deemed more appropriate and was intended to promote greater freedom of 
expression from respondents. 
In addition, it enabled the researcher to hC'ar and understand the dem(j;los 
of learners as an interest group expressed in their language and social 
context. It is well-known that any social group which has an identity has a 
culture differing from that of other groups, a somewhat different set of common 
understandings and background expectancies referred to earlier (see also 
Becker and Greer, 1957). It was, therefore, essential that our first few 
months of fieldwork was spent conducttng these informal interviews and 
thereby learning this "native language". Interviews were thus recorded, 
as far as possible, in the language used which was subsequently analysed to 
de . r~ve conSistent, explanatory second-order concepts. This same tactic of 
informal group interviewing was used for similar reasons in the study of 
- 190 -
schoolchildren's expectations about nursing as a form of training and employment. 
In this event, the informality of the interviewing technique helped in 
" . 
encouraging shy and hesitant school children to speak with a complete stranger, 
set the scene for a discussion of the topic and the subsequent filling in of 
an open-ended questionnaire with incomplete sentences. This last instance was 
in fact the only time when a questionnaire accompanied the use of informal 
questioning. The use of informal settings in obtaining both verbal and written 
responses particularly provided flexiblity and served as a brainstorming tool 
in the early stages of the research prior to the detailed development of data 
measures and questionnaires. It was also advantageous in "breaking the ice" 
and helped allay respondent fears about researchers who merely wanted quick 
answers on questionnaires. 
" As was discussed in the last section informal interviewing was used to a 
great extent whilst performing participant observation on the wards as an 
observer-nursing auxiliary and as an observer-student in the School of Nursing. 
Such interviews often took the form of extended conversation, discussions and 
hospital/School "chit-chat" about events and happenings - both routine and 
nonroutine. Such conversations are termed interviews because they were pursued 
with a purpose in mind - that of illuminating concepts and processes which 
had been a priori theorized. The study of events, processes and language 
mOVed from an initial semantic emphasis to a behaviouristic one which was 
interested primarily in the confirmation of our hypotheses, however vaguely 
formed. Though no formal list of questions was ever in evidence, repertorial 
questions were often asked with the empirical, theoretical constructs in mind. 
POSing questions like - "what do you mean by good nursing?" or "so, you 
think nur9:!X is a good nurse?" on an aeil hoc, informal basis were clearly 
intended to facilitate our understanding of the construction of facets of 
effectiveness. As were questions like - "do you see a quick change of teachers 
as good." , 
or 'why do you not like Ward Y?". The first served to provide a 
measure of intra-systemic variability and the second a measure of systems 
sUpportiveness. 
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The issue of the validity of information obtained from structured interviews 
raises the more general issue of the validity of interview data per se. There 
" . 
are three main areas of concern: (a) to what extent can we infer from the 
verbal expressions to a person's "true" position on a dimension that gives 
his attitude? (b) to what extent can we infer from what a person says to 
what he thinks? and (c) to what extent can we infer from verbal expressions 
to a person's behaviour? 
In order to reply to (a) and to counter its effects we repeat the principle 
of triangulation. Instead of relying on interview data alone we supplement 
with the use of questionnaire information, observations and archival records. 
Questionnaire information is particularly useful in the confirmation of 
interview data on a person's attitude for multiple data measures can be 
combined to give indices or scale measures ~f an underlying attitude. Further, 
standard statistical tests of reliability are available on this form of 
corroboration. 
To counter (b) is a much more difficult affair. Do people speak the 
truth when they are approached by interviewing and anonymity is lost? If 
"truth" is defined as what they have in mind, obviously no absolute answers 
can be given. The degree of correspondence between a person's private thoughts 
and his public expressions are subject to cultural and individual constraints. 
We have not seen any good data on this, but all experience seems to indicate 
that "v '". . eraC1ty 1n the sense of thought - speech correspondence 1S to a 
Considerable extent a product of culture and socialization. No social scientist 
working in or originating from former colonial nations (whether they are 
POlitical, economic, or cultural colonies) will have failed to get this "advice" 
from residing colons: "Do not trust what people say in interviews. They only 
say What they think you want to hear, not what they think themselves." It is 
difficult to evaluate the degree of truth in a statement of this kind. It 
probably derives from a master-servant relationship and a sense of servility 
which gave a clear incentive for very scarce positions with access to the 
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ruling class to please the master. This does not mean that the same phenomenon 
automatically obta~ in research interviews - although it is likely to be true 
I, •• 
the more similar the interview situatio~ is to a master-servant situation. 
In addition if the organizational rule is not to criticize the organization to 
"visitors" and this rule is adopted by the respondent or the individual has 
difficulty in the language of communication, then it is likely that a 
divergence will exist between private thoughts and public expressions. In 
order to avoid such a divergence, whereby only official answers were given, 
the researcher attempted to gain as much trust with the respondent prior to 
the interview or the asking of a particular sensitive question. Formal 
interviews with managerial groups were conducted in the later stages of the 
research after a period of twelve months had elapsed from the date of initial 
entry. This meant that respondents were very familiar with the presence of 
the researcher. Secondly, care was taken to keep up the pace and momentum of 
questions during actual interviews so that it became too complicated for the 
interviewee to work out (on the spot) a system ar:systematic distortions; by 
having a number of references to events, past and present actions or pure 
technical knowledge, so as to induce in the respondent a pattern of speaking 
in a thought-speedhcorrespondence manner, in the hope that there may be a 
carry-over effect from the relatively "safe" part of the interview to the 
more valu~-based, sensitive part. By such techniques the discrepancy between 
thought and speech was in all probability reduced but there can be no claim that 
the problem was eliminated. complete confirmation of thought-speech correspondence 
can only be effected if we have indicators of thoughts and indicators of speech 
- since our ability to read thoughts is at best somewhat undeveloped. Such 
indicators of thought may be obtained ~rom a subsequent interview which brings 
us back to the same problem. Again, the use of observations, archival data 
and questionnaire data may help to increase confidence but it is recognized that 
the problem, if it is a problem, ·remains. 
,. '.' 
. ' 
.-
!I j,< 
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.We turn now to consider (C) as an objection to the use of interviews as 
a means of data collection. Brief mention has already ,been made of this 
issue which ~gain ~~ b~s~d'Dn 'a naive a~~umption that t:he~e 'needs to be a tight 
consistency between',Mords and deeds. Again the degree of consistency will 
depend on sOCio-cultural'~nd individual norms; these will be cultures 
.... 
inculcating norms about consistency and others more lenient in this respect, 
just as individuals differ. This is not simply a question of speaking the 
truth or not, but conceiVing the two spheres - of words and action - as 
tightly coupled or not. Whereas to some people it seems obvious that if one 
expresses democratic values then one should also behave democratically in 
some specified way, to others this is less obvious. Words may be defined as 
epiphenomenal, as belonging to a sphere of the ideal, whereas deeds are 
solidities; and the two may belong to different worlds and time dimensions. 
Hence, action does not always serve as a basis for validating words. In earlier 
chapters it has been pointed out words may be constructed post-event in order 
to legitimize action. Further phenomenologists like Schutz and organization 
theorists like Weick have been known to argue that on a more general, 
ontological level, meaning is retrospectively conferred to an ,act; thought 
and words are, therefore, not necessarily father to the deed. March and Olsen's 
model (1976) of organizational decision-making pictures organizations as 
garbage cans with solutions 'looking for problems.,. Whilst this is not the place 
to reopen our debate on rational human action, it is useful to bear these issues 
in mind and ,to suggest that available evidence indicates but a loose coupling 
~:weeen ~ords and actions, with no sweeping assumption as to what should be 
Used as a criterion of truthfulness and what should be validated against 
that criterion. '-~nere tends to be ~asymmetric conception of non-verbal 
information as being prior to verbal data. We argue that this should yield 
to a symmetric conception of the two as manifest data in social research _ 
to be USed relatively safely for inferences within their own sphere, and with 
care for cross-sphere inferences. 
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Finally, we discuss the problem of interviewer effects. It is old ne ... ·s Ulat 
the characteristics of the interviewer can contribute a significant amount of 
variance to a set of findings. Respondents respond differentially to visible 
clues provided by the interviewer. and within a single study this variance can 
produce a spurious difference. The work of Katz (1942) demonstrated the 
differential effect at that time of the race of the interviewer. Age has also 
been shown to be a factor (Riesman and Ehrlich, 1961) with the number of 
"unacceptable" (to the researcher) answers higher when questions were posed 
by younger interviewers. B~et al (1956) reported that age and sex together 
produced biases as well, they report: 
"Male interviewers obtain fewer responses than female, and fewest of them 
from males, while fema1einterviewers obtain their highest responses 
from men, except for young women talking to young men." ip. 143, Benney, 1956.) 
The evidence is, therfore, overwhelming that a sUbstantial number ~f biases 
are introduced by the interviewer (see Kahn and Cannell, 1957). We have 
tried to minimize such effects of interviewer biases by keeping the same 
I ••• 
interviewer throughout all formal and 95' of all informal interviews. That 1s, 
the effect of the interviewer is kept constant in a certain sense; this, 
however, only alleviates the issue and does not fully account for the possibility 
... -.. 
that the same interviewer could have radical different influences on different 
respondents. However, it is believed that such radical differences in responses 
did not materialize to a significant degree as the interviewer became well-known 
to respondents and a careful monitor and look-out "for such effects did not 
prodUce any observable conclusions. In addition, the interviewer took care to 
dress in a manner which was observed to be the rule within the organization such 
as !o ensure that this factor at least did not prejudice responses. 
,," 
TO. conclude we present a summary of the participants interviewed and their 
., 
position in the system's hierarchy: 
1. (a) Learners - both students and pupils on a, general nursi,ng course at 
different stages of their training_ Students are learners who 
sit for a State Registered Nurs~ngcertificate (S.R.N.) and pupils 
. , 
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are learners who sit for a State Enrolled Nursing certificate (S.E.N.) 
Six group interviews were carried out. (See Appendix 6.1 for a summary) 
(b) Leavers - learners who leave training before completion. 
2. Educational personnel - nurse teachers or educators whose responsibility 
is to teach learners, at educational centres and on the wards. Interviews 
were carried out at all five levels of responsibility: Director of 
Nurse Education, Assistant Director, Senior Nurse Tutor, Nurse Tutor 
and Clinical Instructor. 
3. Service personnel - ward-based nurses and nurse managers who are directly 
or indirectly involved with the day-to-day "care of the sick and dying" 
in hospitals. Their hierarchy is as follows: District Nursing Officer~ 
Divisional Nursing Officer, Senior Nursing Officer, Ward Sister, Staff 
Nurse, (Learners) and Nursing Auxiliary/Nursing Assistant. 
Learners are technically not service personnel as they are unqualified 
but at ward-level have an ambivalent status which is usually seen as 
being superior to the nursing auxiliary in ter.ms of skill. 
Formal interviews were conducted only from the District Nursing Officer 
level to the ward sister. Informal interviews spanned all levels and 
covered both night and day staff. 
6.5 The Choice of the Questionnaire 
In addition to the interview as a means of eliciting verbal response, 
'" . the questionnaire was also widely used in our research; nine different sets 
of questions or questionnaires were designed to tap the information required 
for a verification of the model of O.E. designed within the technical and 
hermeneutical lev~of interest and the subsequent theory of D.E. framed 
within a holistic epistemology that incorporated additional insights from 
the critical level of interest. The questionnaire was seen as a vital means 
of complementing information gathered from Observation, interviewing and 
the analysis of archival records. Its success as a means of data collection 
is well-known and two advantages were particularly noted: (1) that theo~etically 
relevant data can be obtained in a standardized form at relative)y less cost 
in time and effort than mass interviewing, and (2) questionnaire information 
is amenable to statistical treatment which means the use of (a) statistical 
tools of correlatiQn analysis and limited multivariate analysis to test 
substantive "hypothese i.e. propositions about variables on 'the sample, and 
(b) the tools of statistical tests of hypothe~about generalizabi11ty from 
samples to universes and populations. (see Moser .. ~d !<alton, 1971; OppenbeiJn, 
1966)' 
However, the ease with which statistical manipulation (via computerized 
packages)of social science data may be made makes the questionnaire and 
I 
statistical tools of analysis a double-edged sword. On the one hand it is 
clear that statistics is a powerful, rigorous analytical tool that aids the 
researcher in establishing same kind of tenability in his hypotheses 
Whether they be substantive or generalization hypotheses. The tradition of 
hypothetical dedu~ve social science rests on the tenet that the raison 
" d'etre of the hypo~esis is not to remain a hypothesis but to confront it 
with data and the confrontation leads to an evaluation of the confirmation 
or disconfirmation of the hypothesis. As Galtung (19'7) incisively concludes: 
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"There is no doubt that statistical tests should be used to test the 
generalization hypotheses when they are appropriate, which means (1) 
the data form a probability sample with known probabilities from a 
specified universe ••• , the universe may be empirical or hypothetical 
(2) the findings to be tested are (a)· isolated, (b) generated from the 
data by random or at least not too systematic procedures." (p. 387, 
Gatlung, 19E1i.) 
On the other hand, it is equally true that 
"Most social scientists working in the field of empirical study with 
data amenable to statistical treatment beyond mere description will 
know both the almost insurmountable difficulties they encounter when 
they try to make data meet the statistical requirements, and the not-
too-appreciative comments of their statistical colleagues. (p~~359, 
Gatlung, 19"1.) 
. . . 
That is, statistical analysis is intended to solve certain problems in a specific 
way under specific conditions. The difficulties that arise from the use of 
\ 
statistical analysis or questionnaire data is the misuse or misunderstanding 
of the problems it solves, the implications of its analysis and the conditions 
which have to be met before tests can be used. In addition, statistical 
analysis is predicated on a variety of assumptions which can easily be 
forgotten 1n an eagerness to "dredge the data". For instance, there is a 
\ 
wide range of technical conditions concerning the universe of interest and 
the types of SamplLng required for certain problems. If samples are not 
probabilistic, then statistical tests have no importance or use whatsoever; 
if the testing of a generalization hypothesis is required, then a probability 
sample is required. Any"stat1stical tex~ook would set out these requirements 
and the statistical methods required to counter the violation of requirements. 
However, social scientists and accountants have not always paid heed to the 
I" • 
warnings issued for a careful use of statistical tools. They have tended to 
create pragmatic difficulties for themselves, that is difficulties which arise 
from misuse and m~sunderstanding. Th~re is often a confusion of statistical 
Significance with theoretical Significance of particular variables and 
relationships leading to the danger of either restricting theoretical analysis 
to what is a priori deemed statistically significant or possible, or substantial 
remodification of theoretical analysis to suit the data. In either case, the 
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social scientist becomes a slave to his means of analysis and the data analysed 
and a prime target for attack by interpretative social scientistis who raise 
the staff of verstehen. There may also be confusion of the level of statistical 
significance with the observed si~e of association, ignoring the fact that 
since the former is dependent on sampling procedure and sample siZe, it cannot 
in general be used as a measure of associ~tion. And finally, there could be 
an ignorance or a selective misperception of the obvious limitations and 
assumptions of statistical analysis - (a) statistical tests focus on isolated 
findings and propositions which stand as sub-units within an intereste'd holistic 
theory. Because of the technical difficulty in arriving at an evaluation of 
the Significance level for jOint findings and propositions when there is 
dependenc~ both on the unit and the variable side, statistical hypotheses are 
always evaluated singly; (b) statistical tests focus on differences, not 
on similarities. They work by excluding the null hypothesis which is usually 
about some kind of similarity (in means, in percentages, in correlations, in 
entire distributions). As "significance" means the exclusion of these 
hYPOtheses, "statistical significance", in most cases means some kind of 
difference. The result, as has often been pointed out, is to regard 
similarities as uninteresting and focus on differences; it is forgotten that 
similarities may be equally problematic and worthy of theoretical exploration; 
(c) statistical testing' implies a strict dichotomy between qenerality and 
l 
non-general,ity whereas levels of generality may may be more appropriate. 
Such an implication is par~iy due to the sole dependence of 'theory confirmation 
' .. . 
on the analysis of statistical results which leads to the equating of 
confirmation with statistical significance; and most importantly Cd) statistical 
tests and reasoning alone are not sufficient to test a causal hypothesis or 
a theory. Theoretical analysis is needed to see a relationship or a mechanism 
working between the variables, to analyse the time-relation and the impact of 
historical events. Further th re d 
e nee s to be an intersubjective feeling or 
faith or agreement that the theor h b Y as een tested for a sufficient number of 
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relevant variables in a sufficient number of combinations, and non-statistical 
reasoning and interpretation is required'in arriving at a conclusion as to 
whether the test of isolated propositions whose weight in relation to others 
is obscure, amounts to the testing of a whole theory. 
Given these difficulties and the limited problems which statistics can 
solve, we recognize that the use of questionnaires as a means of data-collection 
is but one of many other means of data-collection, and the use of statistical 
analysis. one of a variety of· methods of analysis. Hence we have used the 
questionnaire in conjunction with other means of data collection. Nevertheless, 
given these limitations and put to its proper use the use of Ftatistics and the 
questionnaire do furnish us with statistically reliable data. The interviewer may b~ 
better trained to record the respondent but the respondent knows himself what 
he wants to answer and will get immediate reinforcement and check when he 
Circles or underlines an alternative. Thus one extra human fallible link 
is cut out, ~ut even more important, we think is the visual check provided 
by the manual operation with the questionnaire. There is nothing quite 
corresponding to this in interviewing. The interviewer may read aloud or 
paraphrase what the respondent has answered but ,the point remains that the 
respondent did not possess the an~wer alternatives in advance, as he does 
for the questionnaire •.. 
But is the data obtained from the questionnaire valid? Can we legitimately 
infer from manifest data to the content level of our theoretical constructs or 
from our sample to the universe of interest? The first pa~t of the question 
asks the extent to which public expressions and verbal behaviour, written-
do~, can be used to infer to thl underlying cognitions, attitudes or behaviour 
of respondents - the ~eoretical variables of our interest. The second part 
\, 
,of the question asks a much wider statistical question as to the validity of 
sampling as a means of approximation to the universe. 
The earlier part of the question has already been dealt with in detail 
when discussing the validity of verbal data and the correspondence between 
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words and "true attitudes", thoughts and behaviour. With regard to increasing 
the validity of questionnaire data in closing any probable gap between words 
and "true attitude" we once again used the principle of triangulation. Instead 
'. 
of taking one observation variable as a data measure of a theoretical construct 
we take several indicators and ensure that these indicators are sampled 
from a reasonably well-defined set of possible indicators and combine these 
indicators into a summary measure by some kind of index formation or using 
all of them separately but never relying on only one, except when there is 
long experience supporting the belief in exactly that indicator. And as 
reported above, these indices were then statistically tested for inter-item 
correlation and item-whole correlation or consistency. In addition, respondents 
were always ensured of anonymity when filling in questionnaires. Though names 
were act~lly recorded they were often psuedonyms; questionnaires were always 
filled in with only the researcher present and no possible threatening 
authority figure, such as a superior was allowed into the situation. 
The third possible gap - that between written responses and behaviour 
proved the most difficult to bridge. There is a wealth of literature to show 
that what people say is not what people do. Parry and Crossby (19JO), 
for example, discussed an experiment carried out in Denver which showed that 
23% of the respondents said they had voted in the 1944 election when in 
fact they had not voted at all. Bearing such evidence in mind, we decided 
that crucial variables, on which respondents could feel a social pressure 
to misrepresent their answers, were collected and cross-checked by more 
subtle methods. For instance, the absence frequency of a particular learner 
Was not obtained via a self-report on a questionnaire but collected from 
archival records k~t of learners. In ~ddition, questionnaire responses on 
the frequency of ward teaching by clinical instructors and ward sisters was 
checked against observational counts made whilst the researcher adopted the 
.... 
participant Observer role. Reports on the learner's propensity to search 
for employment 11 d was co ecte by asking the learner to tabulate the actual 
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number of jobs applied for and so forth. Essentially the use of multiple 
checks and indicators was again in the fore. Nevertheless it cannot be 
arrogantly claimed that we were always successful in our effort to minimize 
the degree of questionnaire invalidity measured in terms of a lack of words-
theory correspondence. In the later chapters we discuss the reasons why a 
lack of correspondence in certain instances may be accounted for. 
~e second part of the question of validity refers to the adequacy of 
sampling per se and our particular approach to sampling. This was carrtefr 
out with clear objectives in mind and with due consideration of the validity 
of samples taken for the testing of generalization hypotheses and the nature 
of our universe. In addition to these precautions, the major questionnaires 
for learners were pretested at a pilot run of ten second-year nurses in 
order to assess whether the variables developed theoretically in the construction 
of the questionnaires really corresponded to something in the minds of respondents. 
These answers were analysed for response sets to see if there were concentrations 
of particular answers in particular questions. Where the respondents complained 
that questions were ambiguous, these were changed to meaningful terminology and 
standardized scales had to be adapted to the language of the research site. 
One problem, however, did arise from the pilot study and that was the 
so-called ~guinea-pig effect". Because respondents knew they were being 
tested as a first group, they were very enthusiastic and hence took a much 
shorter time with the questionnaire. In subsequent applications the length 
of completion time was increased from one hour to two one-hour per,iods 
separated by several days' interval in order to minimize boredom. There 
were no indications, however, that the knowledge of being tested,affected 
the actual response~ given on the pilot test; although there is no independe~t 
eVidence to substantiate this claim. 
A total of eight questionnaires were designed and used. These ranged 
from standard personality t t t f 
es s 0 speci ically designed questionnaires. 
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These eight questionnaires were: 
I, • 
1. Schoolchildren questionnaire - designed to provide information on 
environmental illiberality via the attitudes of potential recruits 
to nursing as a career. 
2. Expectations questionnaire - to elicit information on the expectations 
possessed by new learners and "old" learners as to definitions of 
ideal nursing. 
3. Biographical questionnaire - this information was obtained from new 
learners only. 
4. Eysenck Personality Inventory - designed to measure the levels of 
extraversion and neuroticism in learner nurses. 
5. Taylor's Sc~of Manifest Anxiety - designed to assess the level of 
manifest anxiety exhibited by learner nurses at various stages of 
training. 
6. Primary questionnaire to learners - designed to provide information 
on all other theoretical variables identified in the empirical model, 
with the exception of variability E and complexity E. 
7. Leaver questionnaire - this was part of a structured interview 
administered to all learners who intended to leave the training 
system. 
8. Management questionnare - designed to elicit the definitions 
of effective nursing and nurse training possessed by hospital-based 
nurses~ nurse managers, school-based nurse educators and teachers • 
.. 
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6.6 The Choice of Archival Research 
"The palest ink is better than the best memory." 
Chinese proverb 
The above quotation captures the essence of our use of archival records 
in research for the analysis of continuous records and episodic accounts 
represents one of the most effective means of gaining nonreactive information 
(Webb et aI, 1966). Access was given to the following documents which were 
continuous records of learner performance: 
1. Learner files, which housed information on 
(a) personal and biographical details; 
(b) learner performance to date on theoretical and practical assessment; 
(c) learner performance on specific wards and areas of experience; 
(d) learner perfurmance at his/her initial interview for a place of 
training; and 
(e) any formal interview held between the learner and educational 
personnel, for example, "counselling sessions", verbal warnings 
so forth. 
2. Learner kardexes which are records of learner allocation to specific 
areas of ward experience and his/her periods of absence on each 
allocation. These records are automatically transferred to a learner's 
file when he/she completes training or terminates training before 
completion. 
Access was also given to another form of continuous record. These were 
the official minutes taken down at senior staff meetings at the School of 
Nursing. As already reported the researcher personally attended these meetings 
over a period of fourteen months. However, minutes of these meetings were 
sent for a further period of twelve months in order to enable the researcher to 
keep in touch with affairs within the research site. In addition to these 
continuous records, access was gained to two vital episodic records: 
1. an organization and methods report on the administration and allocation 
functions within the entire Area nurse training system. This was a 
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controversial document which will be discussed in later sections of 
the thesis; 
(2) a written history of the formation of the present sehool of nursing. 
This was written by a former director of nurse education before she 
left her job. 
, I 
Finally, apart from these documents which related specifically to the 
,. 
research site, unemployment information was also gathered from statistics 
published regularly by the Department of Employment of th~ United Kingdom. 
These statistics were collected in order to establish a link between 
environmental states and participant behaviour. 
As can be seen a variety of documents, both continuous and episodic were 
used to gather information on vital aspects of our research, both at the 
technical and critical lev~of interest. But as Webb et al" (1966) note, 
there are two major problems associated with documentary evidence - that of 
selective deposit and selective survival. This is particularly relevant 
When one eXamdnes information contained in learner files, official minutes of 
senior staff meetings and the written historical account of the formation of 
the school of nursing. At times these documents were obviously .. spotty" and we 
do not know if the missing sections of an account can be adequately estimated 
bya study of the rest of the series of.accounts. Secondly, there is arways 
the issue that such written evidence is always written by somebody with a 
filtered point of view and specific int~rest to protect. ,That is, even if 
~ 
these records are complete serially, the collection of secondary sources of 
inform~tion impeccable and the analysis inspired, the validity of our 
conclusions is ~ecessarily constrained by the filteredness of our original 
material. Systematic bias could enter into what was actually deposl ted as 
a·record and much ~f it could be unconscious bias as opposed to purposive 
distortion. 
, 
However, the contamina~ts mentioned above were felt to be less likely 
to influence certain of our archival information. For instance, although 
un~loyment statistics on an aggregate basis often understate the,number o~ 
, to 
unemployed, neverthe1ess they have been repeatedly shown to produce stable 
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statistical relationships in macro-economical research (Pettman, 1975). In 
addition they are less subject to selective perception and distortion on the 
part of pa~icipants within the F-set. The same argument applies to our use 
of the Organization and Methods report which was produced by statisticians from 
a Regional section of the Health Authority and thus several steps removed from 
the micro-politics of the organization. F9r such data, which is collected by 
a third party, the risk of awareness, role or interviewer contaminants is 
present but very low. The main problem. here was to keep constant the basis 
on which certain statistics were calculated. Data was in fact omitted when 
they were calculated on a different basis in order to avoid invalid comparisons 
across different time periods. This applied particularly to unemployment 
statistics. 
For ~he other forms of documentary evidence we took careful steps to 
counter POssible contamination due to systematic bias or distortion~ TQ 
Overcome the inadequacy of absence records we followed Thorndike's (1939) 
seminal work on U.S. cities and constructed various indices of absence; a 
... 
gross absence ratio, a separation of absence into long-term Or short-term 
spells, a measure of the frequency of inception of a spell of absence, a 
spell of long term absence and a spell of short-term absence. It was felt 
that using archival absence records would, on balance, produce less biased 
data than a self-report of the number of days taken off work. In addition 
strenuous efforts were made to make comparable a variety of different methods 
of record-keeping to ensure data comparability; such as adjusting for five-
day weeks, seven-day weeks, the exclusion of bank holidays, the record of 
absence in a forty-hour week, a 37~ hour week etc. Secondly, care was taken 
to distinguish and compare information gathered from archival sources and 
that from other sources of data-collection, for example, the interview. Our 
litany of triangulation was again enforced and sources of distortion were 
monitored by comparing accounts of learner behaviour reported by the leaver 
himself aD as recorded on the written file of the leaver. 
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Thirdly, further steps were taken in 'relation to the construction of 
the history of the institution under study and its relationship to macro-
societal movements. A historical analysis was soon found necessary in order 
to pursue our analysis of process and critical evaluation of the effectiveness 
of the training system. As E.G. Boring (1963) states: 
"The best fact is one that is set in a context, that is known in 
relation to other f~cts, that is, perceived QS part of the context of 
its past, that comes into understanding as an event which acquires 
significance because it belongs in a continuous dynamic sequence • 
(p. 5, Boring, 1963.) 
This emphasis was particula~ly emphasized by senior personnel 
" 
in the nursing school who were e~eriencing a difficult process of change and 
adaptation that resulted from the radically different managerial styles of two 
successive directors of nurse education. The former director had been 
autocratic and formal, the present director preferred to delegate executive 
responsibility and adopted a more informal superior-subordinate relationship. 
A signific~t event had occurred and its impact on the definition of effective 
organizational performance . could only be understood in terms of the history of 
the organization. TO a lesser extent, specific, local historical events also 
played a part in explaining the process by which particular definitions of 
effective behaviour emerged within the hospital system. 
But history is 'not "objective" by any definition of the term and historians 
have traditionally been conscious that the reality they study can "only be an 
image or hypothetical conception of the actual fact." (Berkhofer, 1969) 
This is particularly so When the subject of their interest is in the distant 
past and documents are the only available data source. In order to reduce 
biases we constructed our historical record carefully. Firstly, data 
Was collected from eye witnesses only. 
, 
The presence of a general adndnis-
trative assistant who had worked within the nursing school for 28 years 
was especially helpful and she provided much historical data. other 
informants who were interviewed had also spent a considerable number of years 
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at the institution (two years and above). No informant who had left the 
institution for more than twelve months was interviewed. Hence a historical 
record of the formation of the Area School of Nursing in April 1975 was 
constructed by interview data from six info%1Dal1ts 'who were currently employed: 
' .. 
l. the Director of Nurse Education (2 years in office) 
2. the General Administrator (29 years within the health district) 
'" . 
3. the Senior Allocations Officer (5 years within the health district) 
4. Senior Tutor MH . (10 years within the health district) 
5. Senior 'I'utor SR (10 years within. the 'health district) 
6. Divisional Nursing Officer AB (12 years within the health district) • 
These same informants were also used to report on events particular to the 
school prior to 1975, form 1966-1975. This period was vital for it saw many 
changes in the hierarchical structure of the nursing profession and it provided 
a wealth of information on events prior to the formation of an Area School. 
It is in the light of these verbal records that the later. written historical 
account of the school of nursing is interpreted. This written history briefly 
r. 
lists events happening in' the Southern District from the years 1938-1966 and 
its existence partially explains the events from 1966-1975. Though written 
by a former director of nurse education (or its equivalent) and hence subject 
to selective bias, it nevertheless gives useful clues as to subsequent events 
and indeed helps explain in part the verbal accounts of 1966-1975. Part of 
its validity was corroborated by interview information from the general 
administrator. 
Finally historical events and our interpretation of them were corroborated 
by reference to detailed histories of nursing compiled by a variety of other 
.. 
'\ 
researchers. The work of Abel-Smith (1'960), Rosemary White (1978)' Dingwall and 
MCIntoSh(1978) were thoroughly reviewed and any corroborating or nullifying 
information noted in order to increase the internal validity of our argument. 
i 
I j 
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Olapter Seven: The Setting: An Overview of Events 
The Mayfield Area Scho~l of Nursing which is situated in Mayfield, a 
'0 0 
city in the industrial north of England was officially founded in April 1974 and 
an Area Director of Nurse Education appointed in August 1974. Two events 
contributed to its formation (a) the re-organization of local governmental 
spheres of responsibility in the United Kipgdom in 1974, and (b) the "successful" 
setting up within the city of a former group-based School of Nursing. This 
group-based School, called the United School of Nursing is largely represented 
today by the Southern Health District. This now defunct School had in fact 
played a significant role in the development of the Area School and a brief 
outline of its history precedes a discussion of.events after 1974. 
7.1 A History of the Formation of the United Group of Hospitals and the 
United School of Nursin~ 
Prior to the formation of the United School of Nursing which was based 
on the United Group of Hospitals, there were four main hospitals in the 
southern side of Mayfield - each~ith a long history and its independent 
school of nursing. These four hospitals were. 
-(a) The Royal Infirmary, 
(b) The Royal Hospital, 
(c) The Children's Hospital, and 
(d) The Women's Hospital. " 
By 1946, when the National Health Services Act was passed in Parliament, 
all these four hospitals were united into a single group which was called 
the United Group of Hospitals. This group provided medical training for 
medical students on a shared, integrated basis. The process of formation 
... 
,'-
of the United Group of Hospitals also spurred the formation of a United 
School of Nursing • 
.. 
From its inception in 1946/47 to August 1974 the United School of Nur-
sing gradually dominated nurse training in the city. Its prestige derived from 
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the fact that it was the first group-based school of nursing to be set up in 
the Uriited Kingdom and the pilot project had been a "success". Nurse training 
had received a "successful" radical re-interpretation; instead of being 
identifi~with a particular hospital, training was now provided by a number 
of different hospitals, each of which offered a specialist knowledge. The 
United School of Nursing showed that such a division of labour could be used 
to maximum advantage and the diversity of experience integrated to provide 
a well-rounded form of nurse training. 
The successful integra~ion of the United School of Nursing and its growing 
influence was also linked'-direCtly ·to the long historical tradition of the 
It· • 
United Group of Hospitals. These hosp.itals, being situated in the south side 
of the city had had a long history of close contact with the Mayfield Medical 
School that had been founded in 1828 and which eventually gave rise to the 
University which was officially opened in 1905. The United Group of Hospitals 
had also traditionally served that part of the city which had a higher average 
income and had always maintained good relationships with weal ~" "highly-
respected" (i.e. societally legitimated) interest groups in the wider communal 
enVironment. Each of these four traditional hosp{ta~s owed their very origins 
to the donations (financial support) and moral support of the upper and 
middle class tiers of e'ighteenth century society. The Royal Infirmary was 
started from voluntary gifts from \Jealthy ladies,. physicians and prominent 
clergymen (including the Vicar) of the city. Both the Royal Hospital and 
the Women's Hospital were launched by an appeal from the industrialist, 
T •• ~essop. The Children's Hospital used to possess a Ladies Committee which 
Consisted of respectable, well-meaning ladies of the middle-class who assist~d 
with the purchase df linen and other ~usehold requirements. The United 
Nursing SchOol could also claim an association with Florence Nightingale 
herself, a figure venerated even by nurses in the United Kingdom today as 
the found~r of modern nursing. 
By December 1974 the United School of Nursing had so increased in size 
.. {.' 
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that it alone accounted for fifty per cent of all learner nurses undertaking 
a variety of nurse training courses throughout the city. In addition, the 
School was run successively by two prominent, autocratic leaders who coped 
with initial opposition to the School'a formation and the management of its 
required subsequent integration. The earlier of these two leaders was P 
Who retired in 1965 and who was succeeded.by Vane who directed the School from 
January 1966 to October 1978. Both these leaders brought a sum total of 
approximately two decades of authoritarian leadership. which were to 
I. 
significantly influence the formation of "the Area' S~h~l'~f N1Jrsing in 1974 • 
Before we move to compare the development of nurse train~ng in the 
'-~ 
northern side of the city, a report must be made of the building of a 
large general hospital in the southern side of Mayfield: the Southern 
General Hospital. The building of this new hospital further enhanced the 
image of health organizations in the southern side of the city. It 
was to be a 75o-bedded hospital with the most up-to-date medical and 
research facilities. Wards were designed on a revolutionary racetrack 
principle as opposed to traditional open-plan wards and these would betwen-
ty- eight bedded . wards that were divided into individual bays and rooms 
for maximum patient privacy. In short the SGB was heralded as a hospital 
that "has been planned and designed to provide very much improved faci-
lities for the care of patients, for the teachin~ of medical, nurSing and 
other staff and for research than those afforded by existing hospitals." 
Further under the Mayfield Area Health Authority's Strategic Plan for 
Hospitals, the SGB would be one of the two teaching hospitals in the city • 
.. 
7.2 A History of .the Formation of the Northern General Hospital and the 
'\ 
Northern General School of Nursing. 
The Northern General Hospital had a radically different historical 
background from hospitals in the south. It had its origins in a work-
house and the concept of poor relief. The F.V. workhouse was formally 
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opened in 1881 bQt its formation had been heralded by constant bickering 
among the Guardians of the Mayfield Union (who were responsible for 
operating the workhouse),the local Government Board (who controlled the 
adudnistration of Poor Law Relief) and the ratepayers (who funded the 
workhouse). Such in-fighting had caused delays 'and when the workhouse 
was Opened, it already housed numbers which stretched it to its capacity -
1188 palpers and 365 sick poor. 
Although there is little comparative material on the conditions within 
the workhouse hospital and hospitals in the south of,the city it is certain 
that they were highly inadequate. In 1896 Mr. R.J. Smith (Emeritus Professor 
of Surgery at the University and consultant at the Royal Hospital) conducted 
an investigation into workhouse conditions and reported: 
"I w7nt home wondering that we citizens of Mayfield should be so 
ap~thetic to the final lot of many who have helped to build our 
city's reputation, and to create the wealth that abounds in its 
suburbs, that those who ~ndertake the work of dealing with the 
destitute seen so blind to the ends inseparable from pauper palaces, 
and that practical Christianity at the end of the nineteenth 
century has found no better way than this for meeting the needs of 
the poori and I felt, with Wordsworth -
Have I not reason to lament? 
What man has made of man?" \ 
Mayfield Daily Telegraph, August 24th, 1896. 
Specific unsatisfactory conditions mentioned were the number of inmates, 
impersonal treatment,' the ,locking-in of inmates'; the wearing of uniform, poor 
diet, restrictiVe hoU!'~..: of 'absence and visiting and sunary evils of, "pauper 
'. superintendence". 
.However, events were soon to occur that would change 
the image of the workhouse. 
~ the earlY,l900s the Guardians decided that the hospital should be 
.. " 
separated from the Workhouse proper and its attendent social stigma and in 
1906 the Local Government Board issued an order separating the hospital from 
the other bUildings and it was renamed the Mayfield Union Hospital with 
aCcommodation for 643 patients. Over the years it came to be known as the 
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F.V. Hospital. Eventually this was amalgamated with the Children's Hospital 
that had been built on the grounds of the F.V. Workhouse. The Mayfield 
Union Hospital then carried on its activities like any other municipal general 
hospital but the aged and infirm were cared for separately within the old 
F.V. Infirmary. Although workhouse status was no longer attached to the new 
hospital, the old vagrant wards were used until 1960 by the Local Authority 
to °d proV1 e accommodation andfarl for some sixty to ninety inmates per night. 
It is interesting to note that all initial medical staff at the new F.V. 
Hospital were provided by visiting staff who held permanent posts at the 
Royal ~ospital in the south. It was not until 1909 that the F.V. Hospital 
procured a resident Medical Officer but it still had to depend on a visiting 
surgeon from the Royal. 
In 1929 the Local Government Act was passed. This Bill was essentially 
a compromise effected by the then Minster of Health, Neville Chamberlain. 
It placed some responsibility for health care on local government authorities 
which, however, left the Voluntary hospitals and private medical practice 
untouched. It was in this way that the Mayfield Union Hospital came under 
the control of the new Mayfield City Council in 1930j its Board of Governors was 
abolished and it was renamed Ci'ty General Hospital. The City Council 
then took steps to build up the status of City General. One of its first 
tasks was a symbolic one - to create a separate entrance into the new City 
General Hospital which had hitherto shared the same entrance as the Workhouse. 
It was felt that a new entrance could reflect the new orientation of care 
offered. No longer was the City Council content to allow the social 
differentiation between municipal and voluntary hospitals. Ironically, it 
.. 
took what it saw as reasonable step~ to raise the respectability of the 
Hospital - by disassociating it psychologically from the sick poor for whom 
the hospital had originally been intended. However, new gates and new names 
do not make a new hospital and it is recorded in 1978 in the official history 
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of the hospital that: 
"The distinction between municipal and voluntary hospitals, in tenns 
of standards of accommodation and the range of care offered , was to 
continue for many years in spite of developments at the City General 
Hospi tal. to (Documented source unrevea1ed.) 
It can be seen that up till 1948 it was the state run City Counci~ that had 
enabled the transition of the hospital from one which served the needs of only 
the sick poor of the F.V. Workhouse to a large, modern municipal general hospital. 
The National Health Service Act represented yet another act of the State that 
aided the City General Hospital in its efforts to move to a position similar in 
, 
status and role to that of the voluntary hospitals in the south. Post-l948, the 
City General saw several years of low capital investment spending but a major 
expansion in the numbers of nursing staff and learners. Though capital expansion 
was not as great as that desired, increased specialization in medical care did 
result and new Physiotherapy and Cardiology Departments were set up. 
\ 
In 1962 a third State intervention occurred - the publication of the 
"Hospital Plan for England and Wales" by the then Minister of Health, 
E. powell. This established the government's policy of providing District 
General Hospitals for centres of populations •. The City General was already on 
the way to providing the range of facilities required of a District General 
Hospital. Plans were, th~refore, put for its redevelopment along the lines 
" . 
laid down for a large District General Hospital that would eventually have 
1650 beds. However, in the early 1970s the State and the hospital faltered 
in their plans. Severe macro-economic problems and financial difficulties 
Curtailed the announcement of a multi-phased project that was intended to 
completely replace the acute hospital facilities of the hospital. Only 
.. 
.. \ 
in 1977 was a start made on certain redevelopment plans and only in 1981 was 
the building completed of a new Mental Illness Unit and a new Accident and 
Emergency Department. 
We conclude this comparison of the growth of hospitals in the north 
and south of Mayfield with the. SWllDary shown in Table 7.1. 
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Southern Group of Hospitals 
1. Voluntary Hospitals ~hich 
received considerable financial 
and political support from the 
middle and upper classes of 
18th-century Mayfield, for 
example, wealth ladies, 
merchants, clergymen, 
industrialists, physicians. 
2. Close connections maintained 
with F. Nightingale 
3. Close links with the University 
that was sited nearby. Teaching 
status accorded to all four 
hospitals by 1948; the Royal 
was designated a teaching 
hospital' in 1875. Professorial 
medical staff were teaching at 
the Royal as early as 1896. 
4. The Southern General Hospital 
was opened in 1978 with its 
developments completed. It 
is officially designated a 
District General Hospital. 
The Hospital was and is 
regarded by citizens as one 
of the most modern hospitals in 
the country, despite staff 
complaints of inadequate 
planning. 
5. The United School of Nursing 
was regarded as a highly 
successful pilot project in 
nurse training. 
6. The United School accounted the 
for largest number of learners 
training in Mayfield at a 
particular school of nursing. 
7. The United School was run by 
a succession of powerful, 
autocratic leaders. P 
directed the School till 1965 
and Vane took over the 
Principalship from 1966-1978. \ 
Northern Hospitals 
1. Began as a Workhouse Institution 
that was funded unhappily by 
ratepayer money. Catered 
basically for paupers, vagrants, 
the sick poor and the infirm. 
Constant disputes with ratepayers 
and Local Government Board. 
2. None recorded. 
3. University teaching status conferred 
in 1971. The first medical chair 
at the Hospital was created in 1972. 
4. Redevelopment plans to convert 
the Northern General into a District 
General Hospital have been 
considerably slowed down due to a 
lack of funds. Only the Mental 
Illness Unit and the Accident and 
Emergency Unit had been completed 
by 1981. Staff suffered stress and 
this was highlighted on a national 
television programme. 
5. None was initiated. 
6. The number of learners training at 
the Northern General, irrespective 
of speciality were smaller than 
that at the United School. 
7. No such record of charismatic 
leaders was reported at the 
Northern School. 
Table 7.1 A Comparison of the North 
and South in Mayfield 
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7.3 The Formation of the Mayfield Area School of Nursing: 1974-1978 
By the time Vane came to undertake the principalship of the United 
" . 
School of Nursing in January 1966 plans were already afoot for the concept 
of an Area School of Nursing. This officially came into being in August 1974. 
No written documentation of this formation was available to the researcher. 
However, interview information revealed that this formation of an Area School 
was significantly influenced by the successful integration of the southern 
hospitals and the working of the United School of Nursing. 
Reports gathered from three current senior tutors at the School of Nursing 
revealed that the birth of the Area School was marked by controversy and 
conflict. The formation of an Area School was a complex process of merging 
three dominant schools of nursing: (a) the United School of Nursing based in 
the south, (b) the northern school of nur~ing and (c) three other small nurse 
training schools based at a small general hospital, an orthopaedic-based 
hospital and a mental illness hospital. However, there was apparently little 
consultation and discussion of the merger with teaching staff of the northern 
and smaller nursing schools; one senior nurse tutor informed the researcher 
that "r woke up one morning and suddenly found myself part of an Area School". 
This perception of a lack of thorough consultation and discussion was further 
aggravated by the fact that the then principal (Vane) and assistant principal 
of the Un~ted School of Nursing became the first Area Director and Assistant 
Director in the Southern District of Nurse Education. (The person then in 
charge of the Northern School became the Assistant Director of the Northern 
District and also had administrative responsibility over the smaller schools 
at L.M. and the mental illness hospital in the north of the city.) The 
members of staff of the Northern and smaller schools of nursing felt that 
there had been a virtual take-over of nurse training in the city by the 
United School. This developed into a them-us attitude which was partially a 
hangover from traditional feelings of competition between the prestigious 
United School of NurSing and the Northern School and other less well-known 
schools. As the previous history indicates, there are long historical roots 
for the origins of a sense of rivalry and competition. 
I, ' 
In addition to these changes on the educational side of the Health 
District, the service component or sUb-system also saw changes. Previously 
Mayfield had been divided into three health districts, northern, southern and 
central. But in the 1970'sthe city was redivided into a two-health district 
area: Northern and Southern. The Northern District now had the Northern 
General Hospital as its main district general hospital and the small 
hospital called L.M. also come within its service boundaries. The Southern 
District was largely grouped around the four main hospitals that had serviced 
the United School of Nursing. This North-South division of the Area added to a 
sense of change within the city's health environment and also developed into 
a North-South split of loyalties amongst service and educational staff. As 
the division closely paralleled traditional divisions of the city's health 
arena, it was not difficult for participants to mentally reorganize a United 
School versus the Northern School (or L.M. School) attitude into a Northern 
District versus the Southern District feeling. 
Interview information from North and South service and educational staff 
reveals that the new Area Director of Nurse Education (Vane) did little to 
loosen these jealousies and indeed she has been accused of positively 
Contributing to a sense of division. The question of blame aside, cross-
checked reports indicate that her style of leadership did not contribute 
to an Area concept: teaching and administrative staff from the Northern 
training centres based at L.M. Hospital and the Northern General Hospital 
(N.G.H.) had but few opportunities to ,meet teaching staff from the old 
United School of Nursing. Although an\Area School was nominally in operation 
each training centre was left to arrange the detailed mechanics of its 
training in its own way. That is, although each centre was now supposed to 
belong to a common Area School each still operated like an independent school 
of nursing. For example, the Northern and Southern centres, the former based 
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at N.G.H. and the latter at Clarke House, each had its own recruitment 
programme. Learners were recruited not to an Area School but to the Northern 
t, • 
centre or Southern centre. In addition o~recruited to a specific centre, 
they only worked in the hospitals of that defined district; Northern based 
learners would do their training entirely in the Northern District and vice 
versa for Southern based learners. The notification of resignation, absence, 
the design of specific courses and their content and the allocation of learners 
were also left to the discretknofindividual centres. When the researcher 
first began her research she found a bewildering array of different forms and 
procedures which were peculiar to the individual mode of operation of each 
training centre. However, although day-to-day operational control was left 
to the choice of individual centres, Vane kept a tight rein on her executive 
and managerial control. From all accou',)ts, she was an autocratic leader who 
did not delegate much of her responsibility and senior tutors were more often 
that not told of her decisions rather than being involved in discussion to 
any significant degree. For instance the overall design of intakes/cohorts, 
their nUmbers and overall course content was decided by the Director herself 
and her Assistants. Complaints from learners were referred directly up to 
the Director and senior tutors had little contact with the entire disciplinary 
procedure. Any implementation of new changes and rulings from the General 
Nursing C~uncil of England and Wales were also decided by the Director. Senior 
tutors were also not concerned with introducing any educational innovation, 
their job was very clearly defined in both teaching and administrative terms. 
Finally they Were compartmentalized into specific unchanged areas of teaching 
at Specific centres. For instance, a senior tutor who was in charge of pupil 
training at L.M. would be in charge of"that course for several years. 
Similarly a senior tutor who was responsible for teaching graduate nurses would 
only teach this type of learner. The following are excerpts from particular 
actors within the training system and they serve to illustrate the source of the 
above arguments. 
General Administrative 
Assistant, 12 June 1981: 
The Senior Allocations 
Officer, 11 January 1980: 
The new Senior 
Allocations Officer 
12 June 1981: 
Senior Tutor in Southern 
District, 28 May 1981: 
Senior Tutor in Northern 
District, 3 June 1981: 
Director of Nurse 
Education, 7 May 1980: 
Director of Nurse 
Education, 10 July 1980: 
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"Before Davies came we had no Area School. 
Each centre worked separately and nurses 
were recruited to specific education centres. 
There was no central recruitment centTe like 
now. Also administration, allocation and 
community care experience was organized on a 
centre-by-centre basis." 
"The change of leadership in 1978 brought a 
completely different philosophy and style of 
management. Davies is very different from 
Vane, he delegates more." 
"The old style of management, like that of 
Vane's and service colleagues like her_ is not 
appropriate today. It was too strict and 
perhaps undemocratic but she had authority and 
responsibility. The problem we have today is 
too much delegation. Delegation is but one form 
of management, a part of it. We need authority 
from above not like the old days and in the old 
way but authority nonetheless. We need firm 
leadership, the trolwle with this school today 
is too much delegation. Men are always talking 
of delegation but that is not management." 
"My role as a senior tutor has changed a lot. 
When Vane was here I was only in charge of a 
pupil school in L.M. Hospital. Now I have 
various responsibilities and I teach both oupils, 
students and graduates. At the moment I am also 
in charge of a special project • The change 
initially caused me a great deal of stress and 
anxiety but I am settling now." 
"The level of decision-making has been pushed 
much lower down than in the past. We are now 
supposed to deal with as many decisions as 
possible at our level, for example learner 
disciplinary procedures. We are also given the 
freedom to design our own course content but in 
a way that is consistent throughout the Area 
School." 
"There is a legacy of authoritarian leadership 
in this School. Teaching talent was being 
squandered, teachers were mentally locked up. 
They were not encouraged to talk, to discuss, 
to think. They did not know the workings of 
different centres. Teachers in the various 
centres ~ere keot apart. There was no Area 
School, each centre kept its own identity, its 
own method of work. There were and are many diff-
erences. boyalties particular to a centre were 
encouraged and rivalry between centres was common." 
"I have tried to encourage senior tutors to make 
their own decisions as far as possible, to encoura9~ 
the movement of staff across the four different 
centres and to encourage more social mixing of 
staff amongst the centres. The old loyalties are 
slowly disappearing but the changes here, of 
course, caused stress to staff at all levels." 
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As can be seen each actor agrees that there was a significant change 
in leadership style when Davies replaced Vane as the Director in 1978. 
7.4 The School 1978 -
When Davies came to the Directorship in November, 1978 he found a 
School which was ostensibly an Area School but which functioned as a hybrid 
set of semi-separate centres with strong education centre/hospital-based 
loyalties. All major policy decisions had been made by Vane and her assis-
tant directors while a variety of routine administrative tasks were left 
to the discretion of centres. Both senior tutors and Davies reported that 
there was little communication between centres as to the details of 
teaching content; each teacher apparently belonged to an Area School but knew 
little of what a teacher in the other district was teaching. Thus there was 
little indication that a learner would receive a similar form and quality 
of education in the North and South, the only yardstick of performance 
was the ability of the learner to pass her State Finals at the end of 
her training. Further, .there was little evidence that senior tutors 
were particularly dissatisfied with their job content. Interviews with 
.all thre~ long-serving senior tutors and Davies revealed that none "complained" 
of their work in the past. On the contrary there were frequent discussions 
of the stress caused by a change of directors, e~ch of which possessed his/ 
... 
her definition of "what ought to be". Finally, not only was there relatively 
little communication between Education centres, there was little contact 
and an uneasy relationship between service and educational personnel in 
both the North and South Districts. 
Davies propos,d to change all t~ and the detailed account of changing 
definitions of effective organizational~-haviour and h uc: t eir consequences· 
fbrthe organization will be set out in chapter 10. 
We conclude this description of the setting with a series of organizational 
charts which _anpertain to the period 1980/81. i d t ff t ~ Changes have cont nue 0 a ec 
" 
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the entire field of nurse training and hence these charts should serve as 
accurate illustrations of the principal participants and their role defini-
tions rather than precise statements of exact relationships. 
The Area Health Authority which is of interest is called the Mayfield 
Area Authority and it primarily caters for the health demands of the city 
of Mayfield and its surrounding towns and,villages. As pointed out earlier, 
this Area Health Authority was divided into two health districts and to 
this day (1982) remains'~ two-health district Area. The Northern District 
.. . 
serves a population of approximately 216,000 people in the northern side of 
the city. There are some seven main hospitals and clinics which provide 
training for general nurse qualifications of which the principal ones are 
S.E.N. and S.R.N.; and mental illness and mental handicap qualifications. 
The Southern District serves an estimated population of 206,'000 in the southern 
side of the city and has eight main hospitals and annexes which again provide 
both general and specialist nurse training. (The number of hospitals and 
clinics cited only include major centres; in addition to these there are a 
considerable number of hostels, special schools, adult training centres and 
community care centres.) The major hospitals for general training .,in the 
Northern District are the Northern C~neral Hospital (N.G.B.) and a 
smaller L.M. Hospital. The main hospital for nurse training in the 
Southern District is a new hospital called the Southern General Hospital 
(B.G.H.) • 
Appendix 7.2 shows the hierarchical structure of the service subsystem of the 
Mayfield Area Health Authority. The A.B.A. is a body of men and women who 
.. . 
are drawn not onlX from persons with a nursing or medical responsibility but 
, ' , 
also from prominent members of the surrounding community. As can be seen, 
it is executively advised by the. Area Management Team on which sits the 
Area Nursing Officer (A.N.O.). The other members of'the Area Management Team 
are the Area Medical Officer (A.M.O.), the Area Personnel Officer (A.P.O.), 
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the Area Treasurer and the Area Administrator. The Director of the School of 
Nursing is directly responsible to the Area Nursing Officer. 
Below the level of the Area comes the District Management Team. This 
comprises five members: the D.N.O. (District Nursing Officer), the D.M.O. 
(District Medical Officer), the D.P.O. (District Personnel Officer), the 
District Treasurer and the District Administrator. As the Mayfield Area 
Health Authority is divided into two Distri~ts, there are two District teams 
of management. Some of these members represent or is the chairman of a 
larger body or committee, these committees are placed in brackets directly 
below the names of the relevant persons. For instance, the D.N.O. is responsible 
for and to a larger decision-making body of nurses called the Nursing Executive 
Committee. Both.Divisional Nursing Officers and Senior Nursing Officers from 
across the health district sit on this committee. The A.N.O. only has a monitor 
function Over the activities of the D.N.O.; that is, in principle the District 
Nursing Officer, as part of the district management team is executively responsible 
to the Area Health Authority not to the A.N.O. It is important to note that the 
D.N.O. is not directly accountable to the Area Nursing Officer and consequently 
tends to have less of a direct line of communication with him/her than the Directo~ 
of Nurse Education. This arises because our micro-organisation is an Area 
School of Nursing. If it were a district-based school of nursing then it would 
be under the authority of the D.N.O. 
Below the level of D.N.O. we encounter a descending hierarchy of management: 
DivisionaLNursing Officer (D.N.O.), Senior Nursing Officer (S.N.O.), Nursing 
Officer. The Nursing Officer position is a boundary role between nursing 
administrative and clini~~l responsibility. In principle, the N.O. role is a 
" .. 
clinical appointment'but in practice th,re is little evidence of that 
(lierrison Report, 197'). After that role the ward sister forms the most 
senidr appointment at ward level and she has responsibility for most of the 
actiVities of her ward. A ward sister. is always a qualified S.R.N. who has 
had about two to three. years of post-qualifying experience. Staff under her 
• 
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legitimated authority include qualified nursing staff with S.R.N. (State 
Registered Nurse) or S.E.N. (State Enrolled Nurse) qualifications, unqualified 
learners - both students (learner S.R.N. nurses) and pupils (learner S.E.N. 
nurses) and nursing auxiliaries or assistants. This last group of personnel 
is a semi-skilled group which undergoes a four or five week period of training 
prior to actual ward work. Bel~w the level of the ward sister qualified 
nursing staff with S.R.N. qualifications are invariably appointed to staff 
nurse positions from where they can climb the clinical and administrative 
promotion ladder. Qualified S.E.N.s, however, do not have a structured career 
~ttern and do not progress beyond the rank of a senior S.E.N. who is ward-
based. S.E.N.s cannot become staff nurses or ward sisters and are barred 
from progressing up the administrative career structure; in order to do so, 
S.E.N.s must gain the S.R.N. qualification. 
Appendix 7.2 is turther expanded in Appendices 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5 to show 
the detailed 1980/81 organizational set-qp within the entire Hayfield Area 
Training System. The term "training system" is used because a nurse's 
training is made up of two vital ingred~ents: t~oretical Jcnowledge and 
practical skills. The former is usually intensively taught ~n study blocks of 
one-week (for general pupil nurses) or two-week (for general student nurses) 
... 
duration, during which time a cohort or intake of learners is grouped 
collectively in the training centres of the School of Nursing and taught on 
a full-time basis by teaching staff whose main responsibility for teaching 
. 
is executed in the classroom. With the exception of clinical instructors most 
of the teaching staff of the educational sub-system at the Mayfield Area 
Training System spend eighty per cent of their time within the boundaries of 
the School's training centres which ar~physically separated from" hospital 
wards. This educational fUnction is referred to as the educational sub-system 
or simply as the Area School of Nursing because it has its own distinctive 
hierarchy and modus operandi. The detailed organization of the School's 
set-up is shown in ~pPen~i~ 7.3. 
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As can be seen the Director (Davies) is the head of the School itself 
and he is directly accountable to the A.N.O. Below him are two Assistant 
~ . 
Directors, each with a specific responsibility for management within a 
Health District. Both the Director and Assistant Directmsare based at the 
School's headquarters in Clarke House which is near the S.G.H. on the 
southern side of the city. (Clarke House was formerly the headquarters of the 
United School of Nursing.) However, the Assistant Directors also have 
subsidiary offices at the S.G.H. and N.G.H. educational centres. The role 
of the Assistant Director as documented in a role outline dated January 1977 
is largely managerial and administrative. During the period of research 
November (1979-June 1981) the activities of both Assistant Directors were 
largely similar to those outlined in the 1977 job specification. At a policy 
level the Assistants aid the Director in the vital interpretation and 
implementation of statutory and regional policies. He/she also acts as a 
communication link between educational staff and nursing service staff since 
the Assistant Director is always a member of the relevant District Nursing 
Executive Committee. Further, the Assistants and the Director play an important 
role in the control of staff inputs - they sit on the selection boards for 
all learners, teaching staff as well as nursing service staff. The Assistants 
select staff up to and including the rank of Senior Nursing Officer (S.N.O.) 
Whilst the Director sits on selection committees up to and including the rank 
of District Nursing Officer. Essentially the recruitment system across the 
entire Area Nurse Training System ensures that both educational and service 
personnel help select staff in each of these sub-systems up to and including 
their corresponding ranks in their respective highly structured hierarchies. 
Finally the role specification for the0ssistant Director states specifically that 
he/she shouid aid in the promotion of research. Below the rank of the 
administrative tier comes the role of Senior Tutor who not only oversees and 
monitors teaching programmes but, of ten undertakes some teaching herself. 
Senior Tutors are allocated specific specialities; since the largest number 
of learners within the Mayfield Area Training Systan undercp general training for 
the Roll and the Register, there are more more general senior tutors than 
I, 
senior tutors in charge of specialities like Mental Handicap or Mental Illness. 
Again the responsibilities of maintaining a good service/education link are 
mentioned and so is the promotion of research. In addition the Senior Tutor 
has to liaise closely with the Allocation function, be familiar with the 
Disciplinary Procedure for learners and participate in the selection of 
learners. Next comes the rank of the nurse tutor who participates actively 
in the teaching of learners and whose main administrative responsibility 
relates directly to learner affairs and management. Lastly there are the 
clinical instructors/teachers. The role of the clinical teacher was created 
by the Salmon Plan of 1966. The function of the clinical teacher is to teach 
practical skills in the classroo~ and to go actively to ward areas and assist 
in the teaching of learners on the wards. Whilst tutors and senior tutors 
do go onto the wards to some extent their usual purpose is to conduct ward-
based assessments and not to teach in the ordinary sense of the word; the 
latter fUnction is, however, the primary responsibility of the clinical 
teacher. 
Apart from the teaching function the School has also a specialized Allocatjun 
function or department. This function is essentially a boundary spanning role 
for the Allocation Officer has to ensure that each learner has a programme of 
ward-based experience that not only enables the learner to meet all statutory 
training requirements but also services the wards of the hospitals in such a 
way to aVoid a glut or scarcity of "pa:iJ:'S of hands". In most U.K. hospitals and 
in the Mayfietd area unqualified learners provide some 50% - 80% of the labour 
force on the ward. This percentage is,obtained via interview information and 
partiCipant observation on the wards. Invariably a day-time ward shift 
consists of two to four qualified nursing staff, some six to eight unqualified 
learners with one or two nursing auxiliaries. This dual role of the learner 
as a learner and as a worker lies at the heart of the allocation function and 
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is often a source of conflict within the Training System. Within the Mayfield 
Training System there is a Senior Allocations Officer (Richards) who is 
... 
based at the S.G.H. educational centre. Below her are two Allocation Officers, 
one of which is based at the N.G.H. educational centre and the other at a 
smaller orthopaedic hospital. The Allocation Officer at the N.G.H., Eagles, 
is aided by a Higher Clerical Officer called Rose. 
In addition to these three main divisions the Director of the School has 
reporting to him liaison personnel from the Community Care Service, a Senior 
Tutor in charge of Orthopaedic courses and an administrative staff. The 
Senior Administrative Assistant post has only been created in early 1981, prior 
to that the General Administrative Assistant, Massey, was in charge of the 
administrative function. Massey had been employed at Mayfield since 1953 and 
only retired on 30th June, 1981. 
Appendix 7.4 below shows the service sub-system of the Northern District 
of the r~ayfield Area Nurse Training System. Essentially, this hierarchy is 
similar to the broader pictureof Appendix 7.2 except that it shows only the 
administrative tiers - beginning from District N.O. to N.O. The D.N.O., 
Botts, has five Divisional N.O.s under her authority. One of these is Binney 
Who is in charge of general nursing and has control over the nursing staff 
of the surgjcal and medical areas at the N.G.H. and all qualified nursing 
staff at ~.M. Hospital. Like the educational sub-system, responsibilities 
within the service sub-system are divided by nursing specialities and there 
are only two staff as opposed to line departments. This is the Personnel and 
In-SerVice Training Department and the Research Development and Service Planning 
Department. These two are fairly small departments the latter consists of the 
S.N.O., James, and her secretary. It was through James that entree was 
negotiated onto the general wards of the Northern General Hospital. 
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Appendix 7.5 shows the service subsystem of the Southern District of 
the Mayfield Area Nurse Training System. The D.N.O., Potts, has three 
~ . 
Divisional Nursing Officers. Acton is the person in charge of general or 
acute services and she has reporting to her S.N.O.s who carry different 
responsibilities within the Southern General Hospital. Abel is the S.N.O. 
in charge of general wards within the complex. Below the level of the S.N.O. 
are N.O.s. These are generally omitted from the diagram except where N.O.s 
are in charge of smaller hospitals, like Hospital El or the Women's Hospital. 
The role of a N.O. in charge of the Royal Infirmary is now defunct because the 
Infirmary was officially closed as a hospital in thelSpring of 1981. As 
in the Northern District there are two staff S.N.O.s. One of these is Williams 
whose nondescript title covers a range of sundry administrative duties, among 
which was the co-ordinatio;l of research within the entire District. It was 
Williams who arranged the researcher's entree onto the general wards of the 
Southern General Hospital. 
With these organizational charts explained we have come to the end of 
the description of the setting of our empirical research. Appendix 7.1 
~ . 
gives a brief description of the training courses available at Mayfield. 
In the next chapter we begin a description of our technically-interested 
model of O.E. A considerable amount of effort has been spent in tracing 
the historical origins of the micro-system because it was found that 
these events substantially inflaenced the social constructions of the 
participants within the system. Names have, however, been altered to 
prevent identification of the persons and places involved and sources of 
material have not been revealed. 
, 
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Chapter 8: A Theory of Organizational Effectiveness within a 
Technical and Hermeneutical Level of Interest 
I, 
8.1 The CF-Set Summarily Criticised 
Tinker's (1975) theory of the F-set (henceforth denoted as the CF-set) 
was discussed in detail in chapter 2. Its strengths were noted but it 
also has weaknesses. h T ese will now be discussed before we proceed in the 
next section to develop an extended F-set. 
O.E. within a CF-set is essentially a satisficing notion. Whilst 
accepting that macro-societal and environmental structures and relationships 
can influence the CF-set, little attention is in fact paid to the analysis 
of such influences. Neither the statics nor dynamics of such "variables·' is 
incorporated in Tinker's (1975) analysis. Macro-societal relationships, 
for example, whether defined structurally or processua11y are not evoked 
.. 
as an explanation of the state and change of the CF-set. Instead, the act 
of survival is defined at a general level - as the extent to which an 
organizational coalition maintains and induces a point in a jumpy (changing) 
CF-set within any societal environment. This emphasis on the generality of 
the CF-set unfortunately obscures the consequences of specific societal and 
institutional arrangements. For instance, a society geared towards barter 
trade Qod a. socialist ideology will differ significantly from a market 
economy in a state of advanced capitalism in te~s of its effects on the 
definition of "What people need". The very content of the CF-set alters and 
so does the level and kind of need-satisfaction activity required from the 
coalition as a whole~ By neglecting to explain the historical and macro-
societal factors which "cause" certain needs to gain importance, Tinker's 
.. 
\ (1975) thesis does not fully allow an in-depth analysis into the antecedents 
of organizational purpose and measures of effectiveness. (Tinker (1982) does 
give an indication, however, that he is aware of the influence of social 
historical forces on theories of value.) 
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In addition, the CF-set does not enquire into the mechanics by which a 
particular mix of inducements and contributions is chosen by the coalition; 
it doe~ not elucidate the interaction between intraorganizational interest 
groups nor the linkages between micro-political and macro-societal networks 
that ensure the choice of a particular viable strategy. Its primary emphasis 
is on the maintenance of coalitional order and the achievement of a 
minimally acceptable level of consensus. Though conflict was ostensibly 
used as the basis for Tinker's (1975) empirical model only the static 
picture of conflict was presented. In any event, the relationship between 
conflict and power was not clearly drawn. 
This neglect of macro-societal forces and micro-organizational politics 
is due directly to the failure of Ashby's cybernetics to enquire into the 
processes of power and influence. For Ashby (1956), the nature of outcomes 
is classified into a dichotomy of "good" and "bad" outcomes, "good" being 
.. 
defined as "those states in which certain essential variables are kept 
Within aSSigned limits". Because he speaks of biological systems in 
isolation, Ashby fails to relate to notions of power in the construction of 
criteria of O.E. (If he had enquired at the level of the tribe or species 
in biological analysis, he could have been more explicit about power). 
Essentially, Ashby's definition of survival is static and he takes goal-
states and ends as non-problematic; he belongs to the "official goal" model 
of O.E. Whilst this concept of static equilibrium is not a part of Tinker's 
CF-set, he nevertheless omitted an analysis of macro-power relationships. 
Lastly, Tinker's CF-set did not distinguish well between long-term and 
Short-term forms of O.E., that is, the concept of survival within a CF-set 
• 
was not differentiated clearly intd short-term or long-term concepts. This 
is important, for clearly, achieving a feasible set of strategies in the 
short-run is no predictor of such achievement in the long-run, no assurance 
~'lat in the future the coalition will continue to exist as a "need-satisficer II 
upon which the satisfaction of individual needs is said to depend. It 
". -
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could be argued that the notion of managing "jumpy" F-sets implies a long-run 
concept of survival but this is by no means clear. Such management is 
obviously ,vital even for short-run survival in conditions of high environmental 
uncertainty. We therefore begin our next section with an extension of the 
CF-set to explicitly incorporate the concept of long-run survival. 
B.2 The CF-set Reformulated 
The CF- set, on a first approximation, is extended such that long-run 
, 
survival is the standard of effective organizational performance. That is, 
an effective organization is one which achieves a point in the F-set in the 
long-run, which continually maintains at least the minimal level of "acceptable 
need satisfaction". The system's effectiveness is thus defined by the current 
S~of surviVcUand the expectation of continued survival in the long-run. 
It is important to clarify that survival is not equated with the usual, 
I, . 
physical concept of survival. An ad hoc, temporary organization, like a 
committee set up for a specific task is deemed to have survived in the 
long-run when and if it achieves this task to the minimally acceptable 
standard set by all coalitional participants; although the organization may 
then be disbanded and in fact no longer exists in a physical sense. By 
extending the concept of survival to survival in the long-run the feasible 
solution obtained may be defined more strongly as an optimal solution in 
that each and every factor or participant is willing to carry on as it now 
is (within the focal organization) in the long-run. 
It is important to distinguish clearly between this concept of long-
run maintenance of {he F-set from Ashby's biological notion of survival. 
As briefly noted earlier, Ashby took goals to be non-problematic. The 
problem of adaptae10n and control was perceived purely in terms of an 
\ 
organization's need to develop strategies to counter environmental disturbances 
in order to maintain an equilibrium. Ashby's examples speak of physiological 
limits (the survival of particular gene patterrs) and mechanical constraints (th~ 
desired temperature range being between 360C and 370C). Though he did 
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accept that a finer classif.:i cation of Q(·sired states might be possi hIe, hE: 
nevertheless believed that his formulations could be applied universally in 
as "rigorous, objective and unambiguous .(manner) as one pleases". Our 
definition of the F-set sees desired and feasible states as highly contingent 
on the states of the environment, the values thereof and the construction of 
partiCipants. The F-set is not the seemingly invariant set of Ashby's 
essential variables. Indeed, change i~ inherent in its structure for in 
order that an organization might remain viable in the long-run and stay 
within a changing and changeable F-set, the organization must both adapt to 
changes which Occur internally and externally, a~d initiate changes in order 
to create an environment suitable as a habitat. Changes in the values and 
beliefs of the society in which the organization is embedded, in technology 
or in the life-chances of the participants will influence the costs of 
10 • 
continued participation and hence what is deemed acceptable and feasible 
will change. Changes in the F-set are also influenced by past and present 
strategies and policies which reflect a particular set of inducements and 
contributions. A particular choice of inducements and contributions may 
not wholly satisfy the needs of certain participant groups and these will 
then seek to right the balance. The achievement of past targets will 
lead to changes in the feasible set of alternatives as participants set new 
targets. Thus, because the F-set changes, the act of continued survival 
means an act of appropriate change and response to change. (Tinker and 
Lowe, 1977). This is illustrated in Diagram B.l. 
The inputs to an organization are seen as participant needs which 
require satisfaction the output is the satisfaction of these needs. At 
.. ' 
" any given time, there is a difference between what is and what is aspired 
to. This gives an indication of the current level of effectiveness of the 
organzation and also produces an impetus for change in the system. 
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Change may be an act of response on the part of the organizational 
coalition to disturbances from the environment. It may also be an act of 
proactive change which stems from the forward action of the organization 
in an attempt to control its environment. As Child (l972a) points out 
organizations often do possess strategic choice and the more powerful 
coalitions are able to manipulate their environments such that they become 
more favourable to the activities of the organization. Indeed, Ashby (1956) 
points out that a system that is controlled by feedback is not an efficient 
or in our terms effective machine. Without a regulator that produces feed-
forward information and action, it is probable that disturbances from the 
system's environment will be able to affect the workings of the system. 
8.3 The Measurement of O.E.: the Development of Indicators of the Propensity 
to Survive 
By defining O.E. as the attainment in the long-run of a minimally 
satisfactory level of negotiated welfare, this theory has close affinities 
with the Barnard-Simon theory of "organizational equilibrium". (Barnard, 
1938; Simon, 1947). The concept of equilibrium reflected the conditions of 
survival of an organization: these being the organization's success and 
ability in arranging payments to its participants such that they were 
adequate enough to motivate continued participation. Simon et al (1950) 
wrote, for example that 
"an organization is 'solvent' - and will continue in existence - only 
so long as the conditions are sufficient to provide the inducements 
in large enough measures to draw forth these contributions." (p. 382, 
Simon et aI, 1950). 
They argued that each participant will continue his ~rticipation in an 
organization only so long as the inducements offered him are great or 
greater (measured in terms of his value and in terms of the alternatives 
Open to him) than the contribution he is asked to make. The emphasis on 
"the deCiSion to participate" underlies, as can be seen, both the Barnard-
Simon theory and Tinker's argument of the CF-set • 
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March and Simon (1958) wrote a useful discussion on how such a theory 
of "organizational equilibrium" might be verified. Specifically, to test 
" 
the theory they argued that we would need to obtain independent empirical 
estimates of 
"(a) the behaviour of participants in joining, remaining in, or 
withdrawing from organizations; and 
(b) the balance of inducements and contributions for each 
participant, measured in terms of his 'utilities'." (p. 84, 
March and Simon, 1958.) 
They then pointed out that direct observation of the inducement-contribution 
utilities could be approximated by a measure of expressed satisfaction used 
in conjunction with an estimate of perceived alternatives available. This 
is because the act of moving to or from a coalition is dependent on both 
the desire to move and the perceived ease of movement. Diagram 8.2 below 
shows March and Simon's (1958) argument about the detenninants of the act 
of partiCipation. 
An alternative method of verifying their theory was to infer the utility 
balance directly from observations of changes in the inducements or 
contributions measured in nonutility terms. However, their tnethod required 
that certain assumptions be made about the utility functjons of participants. l 
The initial method seems preferable as it regujres fewer assumptions to be 
made about participants' utility functions. 
It should be noted that March and Simon's use of the term "participation" 
is somewhat ambiguous for they appear to include within this concept the act 
of production or the decision to produce. Here we wish to draw a 
distinction between these two sets of decisions and actions. Tbey are by no 
means synonymous; the greater the degree of "organizational slack", the 
greater would be the divergence between the act of production and that of 
partiCipation. We, therefore, put forward two propositions instead of one. 
In addition to March and Simon's proposition about the act of participation 
1 These were (a) that each utility function changed only slowly, 
(b) each utility function is monotonic with respect to its 
corresponding inducement or contribution, and 
(c) the utility function of fairly broad classes of people were 
nearly the same. 
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we propose a symmetrical hypothesis about the act of production. This is 
shown in Diagram 8.3. 
Participant Expressed Satisfaction 
Perceived Employment Opportunities 
(Time Usage) 
.J 
=-y------
Inducement-Contribution 
Balance of Participants 
I. 
I •. 
Participants' Behaviour in 
Joining, Remaining and 
Leaving the Coalition 
Diagram a .2: The Act of Participation 
Participant Expressed Satisfaction 
Perceived Employment Opportunities 
(Time Usage) 
Participants' Behaviour in 
Remaining Within the Coalition 
and Contributing Positively to 
the Coalition's Need-
Satisfying Activity. 
Diagram 8.3: The Act of Production 
.. 
, 
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The foregoing analysis has argued that long-run survival is based on 
two factors: 
;, 
(a) the extent to which the organization as a whole satisfies the 
needs of all its participantsin such a fashion as to induce 
continued participation and production (contribution) and, 
(b) the extent to which the coalition adapts to change and initiates 
change which creates a more favourable environment. 
March and Simon's work gives an indication of how we could measure (a). 
Put differently, their work implies that the level of need satisfaction, or 
the level of acceptability of organizational strategies is expressed via 
participant behaviour in participation and production. It is through an 
examination of past and current behaviour that one infers and predicts the 
Subjective probabili'cies of the coalition's propensity to survive in the 
long-run; the accuracy of such predictions depending variously on the rate 
of environmental and systemic change. Measures of O.E. (as defined) must, 
therefore, be measures of participants' behaviour in the area of participation 
and production. Verbal expressions of satisfaction and perceived alternative 
opportunities only reflect a participant's felt inducement-contribution 
balance. This perceived level of need satisfaction is more concretely 
expressed in behaviour. Theoretically, if the inducement-contribution theory 
holds, there should be a correspondence between this balance and behaviour 
(assuming human consistency in action). 
Measures of this aspect of O.E. may be conveniently separated into 
measures of the act of production and the act of participation. As regards 
the act of production, we could measure sales performance, profitability, 
"professional" behaviour, level of competence, level of ethical support 
etc. Indicators of the act of participation would include, inter alia, 
measures of turnover, absenteeism, lateness, tardiness. Obviously the 
choice of particular measures of participation and production would depend 
on the system under study. Variances in systems technology and primary 
task-activity would lead to different measures becoming more or less 
appropriate. 
4, • 
To assess whether an organization is effective at a point in time, 
measures of viability as expressed in participant productive and participative 
behaViour would suffice. However, how does· one measure the propensity to 
survive in the long-run? The answer lies in the necessity of coping with 
change. As outlined earlier, the act of long-run survival within the F-set 
means appropriate response to change through time. Ashby has called this 
reqUirement of the system the Law of Requisite Variety (this will be discussed 
in detail later). However, according to Ashby's formulation, it would appear 
that an observer can only decide with increasing statistical confidence 
whether a system possesses requisite variety by tracking a system's response 
through time. At a point in time, we argue that an observer can but measure 
a system's adaptive capacity which is a surrogate indicator of the system's 
degree of requisite variety and hence a surrogate indicator of the organization's 
propensity to remain viable in the long-run. Adaptive or coping capacity is 
defined as the ability of a system to change regularly and innovatively. It 
measures an ability to change at a point in time and makes an assumption 
that change is in the appropriate direction. As such, it is a distinct concept 
from that of Ashby's Requisite Variety which it is argued can only be measured 
through time. Adaptive capacity and requisite variety are related and the 
former is arguably a surrogate for the latter to the extent that past 
adaptive capacities within a system reflects future capacities. This is 
because the assessment of a system's adaptive capacity at a point in time is 
based on past responses to change and the observer then extrapolates to 
derive a surrogate measure of long-run appropriate change. Strictly speaking 
the concept of adaptive capacity is more a means to the end state of long-
run maintenance of the F-set than an adequate end in itself but as argued 
abOVe, in cross-sectional studies it becomes a useful predictor. In addition, 
to the extent that coping/adaptive capacity indicates the ability of a 
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system to move as an integrated whole in response to or to counter change, 
it may be said to measure O.E. per se by measuring the degree to which a 
;, 
viable balance amongst conflicting participants' inducements and contributions 
has been achieved. As Friedlander and Pickle (1968) showed empirically, 
different participant groups often make diverse demands on each other which 
are incompatible (negatively correlated). Therefore, it is a feasible 
balance in the long-run that characterizes the effective whole. The higher 
the adaptive abilities of a system at a point in time, the greater confidence 
an observer has that a viable, integrated balance is being achieved within 
the coalition for a lack of balance would show in a system not being able to 
adapt easily as an integrated whole. 
In essence, this second measure of adaptive capacity when contrasted 
with the first set of participant behaviour reflects the part-whole controversy 
of the measurement of organizational effectiveness. On the one hand, we have 
measures of effectiveness which are descriptions of participants' behaviour 
and which indicate the level of participant need satisfaction. We see the 
parts (the coalition) and then as in gestalt psychology we see the whole. 
But both are parts of the same reality. Therefore, it is essential that 
measures of O.E. should capture these two aspects. As Von Bertalanffy (1968) 
points out the whole is not a simple sum of its parts; there are intricat<_' 
and complex interactions between parts which give the whole an identity that 
is independent of its parts. Therefore, in measuring the effectiveness of a 
system in maintaining a point in the F-set in the long-run it is insufficient 
purely to monitor the levels of satisfaction (as expressed in behaviour) of 
each partiCipant group. A simple total of these various levels will not 
indicate the state of the whole of the F-set. Holistic measures of the 
viability of the system are also required. 
Oui- concept of adaptive capacity as a surrogate measure of an end state 
of effectiveness is often called "adaptability". As Steers (1977) points 
out, this concept is one of the most widely used measures of O.E. However, 
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it tends to be interpreted in a variety of ways and measured differently 
(c£ Mott, 1977; Caplow, 1964; Tinker, 1975). In order to avoid this kind 
of confusion three forms of adaptive ability are defined. First, the 
concept of flexibility - which assesses the organization's ability to react 
swiftly to novel, unprogrammed, unexpected change. Examples of such responses 
to action would include reactions to accidents, emergencies, breakdowns, 
SUdden stoppages. Second, the concept of adaptability which refers to the 
ability of an organization to respond to programmed, regular and predictable 
changes. A system's adaptability may, for instance, be measured via its 
response to predictable demographic changes or changes in the client 
population. Third, the concept of innovation, which measures the ability of 
an organization to change proactively by inventing and creating structures 
and/or processes which counter both forms of programmed and unprogrammed 
change. This concept is intended to assess not the response potential of a 
system to change but its active potential. Flexibility and adaptability 
measure the past and current capacity of the system to change itself in 
response to environmental demands whilst innovativeness measures the system's 
ability to change and control its environment. 
Thes(? three concepts are hypothesized to be distinct though related 
facets of the concept of adaptive capacity. Therefore, it is expected that 
empirically these three measures would show a moderate positive statistical 
correlation. High correlations are not expected as this would throw doubts 
on the validity of these three measures being distinct and separate 
dimenSions. Our first hypothesis may, therefore, be stated as below: 
HI = Flexibility, adaptability and innovativeness are positively 
correlated with each other. 
It is also hypothesized that there will be a statistically significant 
relationship between measures of partiCipant behaviour, our first set of O.E. 
measures and adaptive capacity. This is because both are argued to be 
measures of an underlying construct _ O.E. OUr second and third hypotheses are: 
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H2 = High levels of Adaptive Capacity are positively related to high 
levels of production and participation. 
I, 
H3 = The higher the level of adaptive capacity, the higher the level 
of production and participation. 
We have now concluded our discussion of the measures of O.E. and the 
relationship between them. These measur,es are sununarized in Table 8.1 below. 
In the next section we shall look at the complex issue of the determination 
of levels of O.E. given these measures of O.E. 
PART WHOLE 
- .. ' 
Measures of the Level of Measures of the Level of 
Participant Need Satisfaction System's Adaptive Capacity 
(a) Act of Production Flexibility 
Sales Adaptability 
Profi t abi li ty Innovativeness 
Productivity 
Financial Support 
Community Support 
Growth 
"Professional" Competence 
(b) Act of Participation 
Turnover 
Absenteeism 
Lateness 
, 
StrikeS/Stoppages \ 
Number of Complaints 
Table 8.1: l~easures of O.E. defined as the Propensity 
to Survive in the Long...;,Run 
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8.4.1 The Determinants of O.E. 
The extensive review in chapter 2 has demonstrated that most research 
I •• 
in O.E. has been within the functionalist paradigm. Despite this essential 
commonality of epistemological and ontological assumptions which undergirds 
such research, there is, nevertheless, immense variety in the specification 
of determinant variables. This large numQer of probable influences has 
been classified into: 
(a) Organization Structure (e) Employee Characteristics 
(b) Technology (rt) Organizational Climate 
(c) External Environment 
(d) Managerial Policies and Practices (Steers, 1977) 
In Steer's discussion of each of these factors, a plethora of variables 
present themselves as influencing the level of O.E. A similar but less 
specific classification of contingent variables is made by Otley (1980) who 
argues that a minimally satisfactory contingency framework of management 
accounting should analyze: 
(a) variables that cannot be influenced by the organization e.g. certain 
environmental relationships; 
(b) organizational objectives; 
(c) organizational control packages e.g. accounting information systems, 
management information systems, organizational design, etc.; 
(d) intervening variables that are thought to "pre-dispose an 
organization towards effective rather than ineffective operation". 
(e) Other factors(!) 
Like Steers, Otley argues that a contingency framework suggests complex 
and multi-layered relationships which ~ossess feedback loops. Indeed, he 
believes that it is sheer folly to attempt to construct a contingency theory 
of accounting systems deSign without a consideration of the overall organizational 
perspective that takes into account other control strategies such as personnel 
selection, promotion rules, investment plans etc. - a potentially infinite 
number of variables. 
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It is interesting to note that both Steers (1977), Otley (1980) and 
other reviewers of the O.E. literature (Pennings and Goodman, 1977; Spray, 
1976) specify more complexity in organizational or systemic variables such 
as information systems, organizational design, managerial policies, employee 
characteristics etc. That is, there is a more abundant specification of 
organizational variables which are thought to influence the level of O.E. 
That this is so, is not surprising since social scientists within a 
functionalist paradigm are guided by a technical interest in the notion of 
O.E. They are concerned with discovering means by which a micro-organization 
might achieve O.E. (defined "technically"). There is, therefore, a 
natural tendency to attempt to discover ways by which an organization might 
cope with environmental variety by manipulating variables under its control. 
Factors which are relatively less controllable, for eXillnple, certain 
environmental variables are correspondingly less well-defined and organizdtion 
theorists and accountants have tended to characterize the environment with 
only a small number of dimensions (see Child, 1972b; Aldrich, 1979). By 
contrast, the number of "relevant" organizational or controllable systemic 
variables is extremely large and appears to become even larger with each 
Subsequent review of the literature. 
In the face of such a variety of possible contingent influences on O.E. 
Otley (1980) rightly suggests a control-based apprOach to the study of such 
complex relationships. He argues that greater attention should be focussed 
on the "unpredictability of variables crucial to organizational success". 
But how does one gauge which variables are crucial? Unfortunately, Otley 
gives few guidelines and his contingency framework offers but the most 
vague suggestions in a myriad of dire0tions. It is argued that a selection 
of "appropriate" variables must emerge from a priori theoretical reasoning 
and a survey of current literature. In the next section, we look at Ashby's 
Law of Requisite Variety and the empirical support thereof in order to 
devise an empirical model of the determinants of O.E. to yield fresh insights 
on a confUSing area. 
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Such a method of progress has a long history in traditional accounting 
and organizational theory; being rooted in the realm of hypo-deductive 
research of the so-called natural scientific method. Though its dominance 
has rightly been called into question this section of the thesis seeks to 
show its usefulness and the benefits of the kind of scientific rigour it 
demands. Simultaneously, we seek to expose its limits and the folly of 
depending on positivist and statistical insights alone. 
The reasons for choosing a cybernetic theoretical framework have 
already been discussed when we explained a preference for the ideas of the 
CF-set of Tinker (1975). This set of ideas analyses complex relationships 
holistically and draws attention to the relationship between a system and its 
environment. Further, it makes explicit the prescriptive basis on which it 
is based (albeit in the last section of this thesis we argue that this 
prescriptive norm has a conservative bias). Though we have found it necessary 
to refomulate its structure and extend the F-set in defining the concept of 
viability, the theory of cybernetics does provide a starting point for 
looking at the determinants of O.E. 
8.4.2 Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety 
Ashby (1956) defines variety as the number of distinguishable elements 
in a set. Thus, for example, if the order of occurrence is ignored, the 
following set 
c, b, c, a, c, c, a, b, c, b, b, a 
has three distinguishable elements and is said to have a variety of three 
elements. Ashby, however, cautions that a set's variety is not an intrinsic 
property of a set but depends on the observer and his powers of discrimination. 
Thus the two-armed semaphore can place each arm, independently, of the other, 
in any of eight positions; so the two arms provide sixty-four combinations. 
At a distance, however, the arms have no individuality - "arm A up and arm 
B down" cannot be distinguished from "arm A down and arm B up" - so to the 
distant observer only thirty-six positio,ns can be distinguished, and the 
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variety of this set is then thirty-six, not sixty-four. Therefore, the 
variety of a set or system is the number of distinguishable elements/states 
which are perceived by an observer. 
Since the number of states or different elements present in a set may 
be very large, variety is more conveniently measured in logarithms. 
Specifically, it may be measured as "bits" by taking logarithms to the base 
of 2. Thus, the variety of the sexes is 10922 which is 1 bit, whilst the 
variety of fifty-two cards is 1092 52, which equals 3.322 10910 52 = 
3.322 x 1.7160 = 5.7 bits. The word "bits" is a shortened form for the 
words "binary digit". 
Relating the idea of effective systemic control to the flow of variety, 
Ashby has formulated the Law of Requisite Variety. In order to illustrate 
this law, we use Ashby's example of two players playing a game. Diagram 8.5. 
shows a payoff matrix of the outcomes of different strategies followed by 
the players Sand E. 
1 b 
E 2 a 
3 c 
S 
{3 
a 
c 
b 
c 
b 
a 
The rules are as follows: (1) S must score on a in order to win, and (2) E 
must play first, by selecting a number, and thus a particular row. S, 
knowing his number, then selects his strategy denoted by Greek letters, and 
thus a particular column. The letters a, b, c represent the outcomes of 
different combinations of strategies. As we can see, in this particular 
game, S always wins. Whatever value E selects first, S can always select a 
strategy that will give a desired outcome. In fact, if S acts according to 
the transformation 
123 
a a "'( 
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he can always force the outcome to be a. 
Ashby goes on to show that if the same rules are followed and E has 
more moves than S, then S may not always be able to effect a desired 
outcome. In effect, if VE be the variety of E, Vs that of S, and Vo that 
of the outcome (all measured logarithmically) then Vo cannot be less 
numerically than the value of VE - VS. Thus VO's minimum is VE - VS. 
If VE is given and fixed, Vo can only be lessened by a corresponding 
increase in VS. Thus if the variety in the outcomes is desired to be 
minimal, then there needs to be a corresponding increase in that of S. 
Ashby calls this theorem, the Law of Requisite Variety and says picturesquely 
that only variety in S can force down the variety due to Ei only variety can 
destroy variety. 
We may extend this analysis to an analysis of the F-set. Diagram 8.5 
shows a similar payoff matrix. The players are now S (systems regulator) 
and E (Environmental Disturbances). The set of outcomes, 0, is represented 
by the score possibilities 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9. Score possibilities 
which are asterisked represent outcomes of coalitional interaction which are 
within the F-set. To illustrate, when the state of the environment is E, 
the system may choose to respond with anyone of the strategies within the 
El column. However, only strategy S2 produces an outcome that is minimally 
aCceptable to all participants. Similarly, if the system decides to choose 
an environmental state,E~ then it has chosen non-survival, for 
for nOffiof the strategies Sl to S5 in column E3 produces a viable outcome. 
As Tinker (1975) shows in his illustration of Ashby's Law, a reduction in 
the number of alternative strategic responses means that the variety of the 
outcomes is likely to be a function of the variety of the environment. That is, 
if the system is capable of using only strategy S2' whatever the state of 
the environment, E, then a feasible outcome will only be established when El 
holds. With the strategy fixed in the face of a changing environment, it is 
the environment that exerts primary control over the variety in outcomes. 
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Disturbances 
States of E 
E 
.~esponses 
States of S El E2 E3 E4 ES 
S1 1 3* 6 4 2* 
S2 4* 4 2 2 3 
S 53 6 1 3 3* 1 
54 9 3* 6 9* 2* 
55 2 5 1 8 5 
Diagram 8.5: Requisite Variety in the F-Set 
* Feasible Strategies 
If the restriction on the strategist's behaviour is relaxed from one to two 
choices, in general the variety of final outcomes ,is likely to reduce. If 
.. . 
all restrictions are removed, the position is equivalent to Diagram 8.5 where 
the system has been able to limit the outcomes in a majority of cases to 
outcomes that are feasible. The system is then said to prossess requisite 
variety. In other words, in order that the system always remains within its 
F-set, it must produce sufficient variety to match and "kill" environmental 
variety. 
The determinants of long-run survival may now be stated initially as 
\ 
O.E. = f (5, E) 
or diagrammatically as 
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E--~ 
O.E. 
S 
Diagram 8~6: Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety for O.E. 
<. 
O.E., organizational effectiveness, is defined as the achievement of a 
point in the extended F-set in the long-run. Performance is shown to be a 
I •• 
function of the match through time between E (environmental state) and S 
(strategic or systemic state). That is, long-run survival is ensured if the 
system possesses variety. The necessity of a match is shown by the sing1e-
headed arrow proceeding from the interactive effects of Sand E. This 
interpretation of Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety is in fact a stronger 
statement of conventional contingency theories of organization. For not 
only does it imply that both E and S influence O.E., but that there needs to 
be an appropriate "match" or "fit" between these two states!f the performance 
of the system is to be maximized. 
We term this the strong form of contingency theory. As Schoonhoven 
(1981) rightly complains, there is a lack of clear specification amongst 
different contingency applications. In order to overcome this, we differentiate 
between strong and weak forms of theory. The above strong form may be expressed 
mathematically as: '. 
O.E. (1) IE - SI 
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That is, given the value of E, there is a matched state of S that produces 
the highest value of O.E Deviations from this relationship in either direction 
reduce the value of O.E. Even stronger statements of Ashby's Law can be madt 
which specify, for example, that high levels of environmental complexity must 
be matched by high levels of strategic flexibility whilst low levels of 
environmental complexity must be matched by low levels of strategic flexibility. 
The weak form of contingency theory and of Ashby's Law, however, only 
specify that E and S are determining influences. This relationship may be 
represented diagr.u:mati.cally as ,.below i 
s 
Diagram 8 •. 7: Weak Statement of Ashby's Law 
For O.E. 
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This shows that there is a two-way interaction between E and S which allows 
for direct and indirect effects of the states of E and S on the level of D.E. 
L, 
No detailed specification, however, is made of the required fit between E and 
s. Mathematically, this weaker statement of Ashby's Law is often written as 
That is D.E. is a linear additive function of E and S through time. Multiplicativ~ 
relationships between Sand E are not hypothesized, these belong to more complex 
and stronger statements of Ashby's Law. 
It should also be noted that E and S are measured states of a system at 
a point in time, their precise nature depending on the manner of characteriza-
tion of the environment and the system. If S matches E as in the strong form 
of Ashby's Law, we speak of a match of states at a point in time. If Sand E 
influences D.E. in the manner argued by the weak form, we speak of the 
influence of particular states of the system and the environment on the level 
of organizational effectiveness. As argued previously, we can only measure 
the requisite variety of a system if we conduct a historical and/or longitudinal 
study of a system and map its response to its environment. 
There is considerable theoretical support for the strong form of Ashby's 
Law. Von Bertalanffy (1968) for instance describes several (high variety) 
organismic systems and (low variety) mechanistic systems in sociology, 
history and psychology. His concept of equifinality is a high variety 
characteristic that is illustrated by, inter alia, the adaptive mechanics of 
an embryo. During the early stages of development, an embryo has few direct 
experiences and, therefore, little basis for structuring feedback patterns 
in order to ' govern 1tS responses. Instead, in these early stages, it relies 
on its innate qualities to respond to the "surpriSes" of its development 
(Bertalanffy, 1962). 
As in general systems and open systems theory, so in cybernetics management, 
we find S. Beer (l97S) arguing that regulatory institutions at the societal 
level and management control mechanismS at the enterprise level (Beer, 1966; 
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1972) have insufficient variety to cope with the environmental demands 
placed on them. He argues that for requisite variety in systems we require 
(a) requisite ~qual balance between application of regulatory variety 
and attenuation of environmental variety (b) requisite channel capacity for 
variety transmission and (c) requisite transduction capabilities for variety 
preservation. 
Though theoretical support for both the strong and weak forms of Ashby's 
Law is strong, the extent of empirical support especially for the strong form 
of the theory still rests on the early pioneering work of Chandler (1962), 
Burns and Stalker (1961) Lawrence and Lersch (1967) and Aiken and Hage (1971). , 
A brief summary of their results is presented below. 
Chandler (1962) conducted a historical analysis of nearly one hundred 
major u.s. bUSiness concerns. Based on these case studies, he concluded that 
each major change in the design or structure of these organizations resulted 
from enVironmental shifts that necessitated such changes. More specifically, 
changes in the external environment (e.g. in customers, markets, etc.) were seen 
as creating demands on an organization to modify its strategies in dealing 
with the environment. These strategic changes in turn necessitated changes 
in organizational structure. Chandler further argued that growth or change 
(in the external environment and in corporate strategy) "without structural 
adjustments can lead only to economic inefficiency". Chandler's concept of 
appropriate structural change is clearly clo~y allied with Ashby's concept 
of appropriate strategic response to environmental disturbances. However, 
his work tended to demonstrate an environmental determinsm which is but part 
of Ashby's theory. There is little mention of the other part, of the 
proacti ve nature of strategic response'~ Such a failure may be due to 
Chandler's methodology of historical analysis and his time period of analysis. 
Other support for Ashby's Law stated in its strong form appears to be 
found in the work of Burns and Stalker (1961) and Aiken and Hage (1971). 
Burns and Stalker found from a study of firmSin the Scottish and English 
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electronics industry that the firm's management structure ranged over an 
organic-mechanistic continuum. In addition it appeared that "successful" 
" 
(profitable) firms were those with management structures that "matched" 
the environmental conditions. Specifically, they found that an organic style 
of management was associated with success in uncertain conditions and a 
mechanistic style was more profitable in more stable environments. Aiken 
and Hage (1971) replicated Burns and Stalker's work and substantiated these 
conclUsions. When we reinterpret Burns and Stalker's propositions in the 
language of cybernetics, it may be argued that their management style represents 
a form of strategic response and that organizational performance was maximized 
when there was a "match" between environmental states and strategic response. 
When there was high levels of uncertainty and change there was a concomitant 
requirement for the system to be flexible and organic in management ~;1:y] e. 
Here E has been characterized in terms of uncertainty whilst S has bt'en 
described in terms of management style. 
Empirical support in the same vein of thought is found in the work of 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) who found in a single industry that greater 
changeability was required by firms to deal with high sub-environmental 
uncertainty (i.e. in market, scientific and technical sub-environments). 
They concluded that the higher the instability in the environment, the more 
Psychological differentiation was needed between departments in order to be 
effective. This result will be discussed later in the thesis. In addition, 
different levels of environmental uncertainty required different forms of 
integration, the higher the amount of uncertainty, the more complex the 
integrative mechanism required. Lastly, they argued that given the level of 
external enVironmental uncertainty, the more effective organization had higher 
levels of differentiation and integration. Again, one could infer from these 
findings that differentiation and integration represented facets of strategic 
action and that an optimal fit between E and S led to greater effectiveness, 
measured in profit terms. 
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We come now to evaluate the strength of these empirical studies in 
confirming the strong form of Ashby's Law. Mention has already been made of 
" the methodology of Burns and Stalker and Lawrence and Lorsch for they used 
only measures of association to advance their arguments; a consequence, in fact 
of the emergent nature of their contingent propositions. Like Woodward 
(1965), they did not explicitly use a contingency framework but 
contingent results were perceived to have "emerged" either within the study 
itself or when its results have been interpreted in conjunction with those 
of other comparative work. Rather more rigorous methodology such as that 
applied by Schoonhoven (1981) in her study of the relationship between 
structural characteristics and technological uncertainty was not applied. 
Further, some criticisms have been made of the manner in which these 
researchers conceptualized anr measured certain variables. Tosi ct al (1973) 
throw considerable doubt on Lawrence and Lorsch's measure of environmE'ntal 
uncertainty and the adequacy of their findings. 
Secondly, these studies only looked at a specific facet of strategic 
action - Chandler at changes in structure, Burns and Stalker at management 
style and Lawrence and Larsch at levels of differentiation and integration. 
One is, therefore, unable to gain a holistic picture of the dimensions of S, 
of the stable characteristics of a system that vary with environmental states 
in order to influence the level of organizational effectiveness. Indeed as 
mentioned earlier, characterizations of systemic response and proactivity to 
environmental states have been splintered into a kaleidoscope of research on 
structure, technology, job design, climate, managerial leadership, 
organizational control packages etc. Much of this research is not well 
integrated and indeed has tended to s~,lidi fy into two lines of inquiry, 
neither of which can be used to confirm either the strong or weak form of 
Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety. One of these lines of inquiry concentrates 
on the detailed relationships amongst different facets of strategic response, 
for example, on the relationships amongst different structural characteristics 
Such as formalization, standardization and centralization (Pugh and Payne, 1976); 
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on the relationship between structure and technology (Woodward, 1965), structure 
and job deSign (Oldham and Hackman, 1981), structure and organizational 
I, 
climate (Payne and Pheysey, 1971) and the degree of employee participation in 
decision-making and 'climate (Dieterly and Schneider, 1974). The other area 
of research concentrates on the direct relationship between different 
characterizations of systemic variety and the level of O.E. For instance, 
the WoodWard study looks at the relationship between structure, technology 
and O.E.; the work of Litwin and Stringer (1968) looks at the relationship 
between management style, climate and individual measures of satisfaction and 
prodUction and the work of Brass (1981) attempts to trace the influence of 
structure and job design on organizational performance. Clearly, these two 
lines of research do not tap the richness of Ashby's Law, they do not measure 
all three variables - S, E and O.E., and therefore cannot be used to confirm 
either the strong or weak forms of Ashby's Law. 
To digress for the moment, this same criticism may be applied to most 
research that has concentrated on the E side of the equation. The work of 
Dill (1958), Thompson (1967), Emery and Trist (1965) and Duncan (1972) have all 
concentrated on explicating the relationships between different dimensions 
of E. Attention has been focussed on notions such as complexity in the 
enVironment, stability, homogeneity etc. Similarly the work of Osborn and 
Hunt (1974) has looked only at the direct relationship between characteristics 
of the environment and measures of O.E. They carried out a study that 
focussed specifically on three dimensions of environmental complexity: the 
amount of risk in organization environment relationships, environmental 
dependency and the favourableness of inter-organizational relationship~ and 
tried to show the links between these ~imensions and measures of effectiveness 
in a sample of social service agencies. They did not intend to and, therefore, 
did not measure dimensions of S. 
In conclusion then, we may validly decide that empirical support for a 
strong statement of Ashby's Law is weak. Much research carried out today 
does not specify measures of all three parts of the theory - S, E and O.E. 
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What little research that does suffers from methodological problems and 
characterizations, particularly of S, are fragmented and poor. 
What thffiof the weak operationalizations of Ashby's main propositions? 
Two clear examples of these lie in the work of Hayes (1977) and Tinker (1975). 
Hayes looked at one set of environmental factors, two sets of organizational 
factors (organizational subunit interdependence, factors internal to the 
subunit of interest) and the relationship of each of these on subunit 
effectiveness. He argued in his theoretical discussion that it was the type 
of subunit interdependency, the type of environment and the type or nature of 
internal factors which would affect the efficacy of managerial processes and 
consequently organizational assessment methods and O.E. His theoretical 
discussion would seem to imply a strong form of Ashby's Law but as Tiessen 
" 
and Waterhouse (1978) point out his empirical testing reveals only a weak 
statement of Ashby's Law. For Hayes does not distinguish amongst different 
forms of systemic interdependence or levels of environmental variety. Though 
discussions of these are given, interdependence is analysed as stable pooled, 
sequential and reciprocal and environmental variety is characterized as 
stability and homogeneity, Hayes does not show the interaction between distinct 
forms of Sand E and the consequential effects on O.E. What he does demonstrate 
is the independent contributions of contingency variables per se to the 
explanation of performance in a particular department type. He therefore 
argues that it is the differential presence of contingency dimensions, rather 
than their specific form which directly imparts the importance of particular 
performance explanators. To this end, his use of path analysis demonstrates 
well the direct and indirect contributions of each of these factors on the level 
of O.E. Though Hayes is rightly criticised for his inconsistent mode of 
empirical testing and his measure of subunit effectiveness, nevertheless his 
research lends considerable support to the principles behind a weak 
statement of Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety. 
The work of Tinker (1975) is again a weak operationalization of Ashby's 
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Law. He looked at the differential presence of measures of E and measures 
of "adaptability" and th~ir effect on O.E. within a single organization. 
:. 
Like Hayes, he did not specify the influence of different levels of 
environmental variety or "adaptability", neither did he test the necessity of a 
fit between these two variables. Instead, using multiple stepwise regression 
he demonstrated the independent effects of E and "adaptability" on O.E. 
Though the R2 of his regression equations were high, meaning that the 
proportions of explained variance were high, his empirical results were 
Subject to much intercorrelation amongst his predictor variables and he was 
not able to delineate the specific contributions of E and "adaptability". 
In addition, it is felt that his characterization of S is highly suspect as 
"adaptability" should more properly be conceived as a surrogate measure of O.E. 
The work of Moorhead (19Bl) in organization theory is yet another 
tentative statement of a weak form of Ashby's theory. Moorhead argued for 
combining "macro" and "micro" approaches to organizational analysis and drew 
an integrated model which looked at the influence of the environment and 
technology on organizational structure and worker job and role variables and 
the consequent effect on individual processes of performance and satisfaction. 
Moorhead's suggestions are helpful in that he begins to integrate various 
facets of strategic response (technology, structure and job design) and links 
these to environmental variables (simplicity, stability) and measures of O.E. 
(performance, satisfaction). However, his analysis did not proceed beyond 
an examination of correlation coefficients amongst his variables and, therefore, 
one is unable to assess the strength of causal mechanisms. Nevertheless, 
fifteen out of his forty-five correlation coefficients were statistically 
significant and indicate that valid relationships exist between characteristics 
of the environment, structure and O.E. 
The degree of empirical support for a weak statement of Ashby's Law 
seems, therefore, slightly stronger than that for a strong interpretation 
of his theory. This is not surprising since the "matching" or "congruence" 
imperative of the latter presents sever~ statistical problems when one 
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attempts to analyze a larger number of contingent variables. Schoonhoven 
(l9Ql) presents some illustration of this difficulty which is even more 
I, 
compounded when all three measures of O.E., Sand E are vectors rather 
than single measures. It is important to remember that both Burns and Stalker 
and Lawrence and Lersch analysed only two contingency variables via a series 
of contingency tables; this tool is, however, crude and its application 
extremely cumbersome when more variables are involved. Not only is support 
for a weak statement stronger and "easier" to obtain in view of operationaliza-
tion problems, it is also the more expedient method in trying to derive 
and integrate a number of facets of systemic response. In the next section, 
we shall discuss in detail the characterizations to date of the concepts' of 
E and S. It will be shown that whilst dimensions of E are fairly well-defined, 
characterizations' of systemic response are diverse. Whilst we are convinced 
that a weak statement of Ashby's Law seems theoretically valid, the next 
section amply illustrates the difficulties of empirical operationalizations of 
his concepts of E, S and our -technical'- definition of O.E. 
8.4.3 Operationalizations of E and S 
With the rise of open systems theory, general systems theory and to a 
lesser extent cybernetics in the 1960s, the "environment" as a concept in 
determining organizational performance began to gain importance. A 
distinction is usually drawn between external environments and internal 
envirorunents, the latter also being called "organizational climate". Measures 
of external environments include "objective" measures such as rates of 
technological change, unemployment, government regulations and so on as well 
as perceptual measures such as the degree of complexity, instability and 
.. 
illiberality. ,\' By contrast, measures of internal environments tend to be 
largely perceptual in origin though "objective" measures could theoretically 
be employed e.g. the number of times a superior was approached for advice. 
As Klir (1969), Beer (1972) and Starbuck (1976) have pointed out, the 
definition of a systems boundary is a self-referential process and depends 
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largely on the analyst's definition of a system. Closure of a system 
signifies that all the necessary and sufficient conditions for a system's 
"independent existence" at a given level of resolution are present." To 
the extent that different systems could be drawn from the same physical or 
legal entity depending on the level of resolution, boundary definition is 
of necessity a fuzzy business. The system often intrudes into the environment 
and vice versa; both parts form a bigger social totality and systemic bebaviour 
can only be explained as a complex, dialectical result of forces which are 
but temporarily drawn as "internal" and "external". Bearing this condition 
in mind, it is argued that the concept of E in Ashby's formulation closer 
approximates the construct of "external" environment and that the "internal" 
environment is a property perceived to belong to the system. This is because 
there is an implict bias in Ashby's work to conceptualize E (or disturbances) 
as representing factors less well controlled by the systemic regulator; 
although it is not denied that in some instances a system may be able to 
control and choose its environemnt. 
As such, we turn to the conceptualization of external environments to 
help specify dimensions of E. The e~ternal environment is often differentiated 
into an organization's task or suhstantial environment (which contain factors 
more pertinent to the focal organization's goals and task) and its general 
environment (Brown, 1969; Dill, 1958; Thompson, 1967; Lowe and McInnes, 1971). 
It is then usually characterized "objectively" by a series of abstract 
dimenSions (Emery and Trist, 1965; Terreberry, 1968; Thompson, 1967; Duncan, 
1972; Osborn and Hunt, 1974). In a review of these dimensions, Aldrich (1979) 
quotes six: environmental capacity (degree of resource scarcity), homogeneity 
(degree of differentiation), stability (degree of turnover), concentration-
dispersion (pattern of resource distribution), domain consensus-dissensus 
(degree of territorial dispute) and turbulence (degree of coupling). Similarly, 
Child (1972~ quotes three: variability, complexity and illiberality. These 
dimensions have also been adopted by other researchers in the accounting 
context, for example, Hayes (1977), Waterhouse and Tiessen (1978) and 
Gordon and Miller (1976) and Lowe and Oliga (1981). The dimensions used 
., 
were - dynamism, heterogeneity, hostility (Gordon and Miller),predictability 
(Tiessen and Waterhouse) and complexity, variability, illiberality (Lowe and 
Oliga) . 
As can be seen there "is considerable consensus amongst researchers as 
to the validity and robustness of characteristics of the environment. To 
some extent, this agreement is a product of accounting theorists borrowing 
from organization theory concepts of environmental variety. However 
empirical evidence does support the robustness of these characterizations 
which will be discussed in detail later. Whilst the concept of E may be fairly 
confidently described with the use of a small number of dimensions, the 
concept of S is harder to characterize. Indeed, "relevant" literature spans 
work on the stUdy of organizational structure (Pugh and Pa~1ne, 1976), 
the study of technology (Woodward, 1965), job design (Oldham" and Hackman, 
(1981), management style (Burns and Stalker, 1961), decision-m',~ing (Simon, 
1959), organizational control (Ashby, 1956; Beer, 1972; Bonini et al, 1964), 
organizational climate (Payne and Mansfield, 1973; Payne and Pugh, 1976), to 
the study of individual psychological needs and personalities (Porters and 
Steers, 1973; Holland, 1976). 
Unfortunately, most of this research on strategiC response and systemic 
action to achieve O.E. has been carried out in little niches with few attempts 
made to link them. Miles (1980) distinguished between "macro" and "micro" 
variables and levels of analysis in organization theory. As Moorhead (1981) 
explains "macro" approaches tend to take the organization as the unit of 
analYSis and analyses variables such as organizational structure, design and 
climate. "Micro" approaches, on the other hand, tend to take the individual 
as the level of analysis and concentrates on variables such as role conflict, 
ambiguity and job design. Such terms, for example "structure, "technology", 
then become conceptual blocks in our intellectual map and each of these has 
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spawned a host of independent lines of inquiry. Effort has been expended 
on looking at relationships amongst "macro" variables such as structure and 
tecImology, amongst "micro" variables such as job design and role conflict 
and not at integrating "macro" and "micro" variables in order to characterize 
the system. Indeed, the very terms themselves serve to denote distinct areas 
of research. 
In order to characterize the system, we repunctuate the problem of 
systemic characteristics differently. Instead of bracketing the intellectual 
map with measures of "structure" and "technology", we use the dimensions of 
differentiation, integration, supportiveness and uncertainty. These dimensions 
will be discussed in detail in the next section and their derivation justified. 
It will be shown that they encompass concepts traditionally separated into 
conceptual blocks of "macro" and "micro" variables. 
Because of the more diverse nature of forms of strategic response, we 
begin OUr next section with an explication of each of the four characteristics 
of systemic action. We then proceed to delineate dimensions of environmental 
states. 
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8.4.4 Characterizations of Systemic (Strategic) Action and Environmental 
States 
In developing a characterization of strategic or systemic action we 
" 
draw on the work of diverse organization theorists which include, among 
others, the work of Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), Child (1972a), Galbraith (1973) 
and Aldrich (1979). We hypothesize that a system may be characterized with 
four p , d' ff .. Sit' S r1mary 1mensions. These are di erent1at10n, ntegra 10n , 
uncertaintyS, and supportivenessS . s (The subscript denotes that these 
dimensions are characteristics of the system). 
We define differentiationS as the difference within the system of 
cognitive and affective orientations among participants. Cognitive differences 
include differences in task skills, perceptual abilities, language, values, 
purpose and goals. Affective differences are differences in the psychological 
make-up of coalitional participants, for example, differences in personalities, 
needs and drives. Following Lawrence and Lersch (1967) our concept of 
differentiationS refers not only to the specialization or "professionalization" 
of labour but also to what may be termed "psychological" departmentalization. 
Too often organization theorists ignore this vital aspect of differentiation, 
concentrating instead on the ostensible benefits of professionalization and 
the diviSion of labour. Yet as Dearborn and Simon (1958) show, these 
perceptual differences lead to different conceptualizations of the "same" 
problem. In the same vein, though on a different philosophical basis, 
theorists in the interpretative matrix emphsize that different individuals 
and interest groups construct their "reality" in a unique fashion; such diff-
rE!TlCes being rooted in the different life-worlds of individuals and groups. 
Defined thus, our concept of differentiationS is wide - referring to 
different value systems, different personal and group interests, different 
conceptualizations of the "same" problem situation, different needs and 
personalities. In effect, the concept measures the extent to which individuals 
and groups are differentiated and their members "cluster" in terms of 
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cognitive and affective structures. Burns and Stalker (1961) provide some 
elaboration as to how these forces of differentiation work: 
"In pursuing these private purposes which are irrelevant to the 
working organization, individuals affiliate themselves to groups, 
and seek to bind others in association. They acquire commitments. 
These commitments may persist in the face of an express need for the 
working organization to adapt itself to new circumstances. Further 
commitment involves some surrender of personal autonomy, not, this 
time in a bargain with employers and in return for money and other 
benefits, but in the hope of further material, or non-material rewards 
or in order to avoid discomfort, embarrassment or loss (perhaps of 
self-esteem). Commitment to others involves loss of autonomy in 
that the right to spontaneous, divergent action outside the group is 
surrendered in respect of the objectives the private combination has 
been constituted to attain. Voluntarily, or under such indirect 
restraints and controls as fear of ostracism, ridicule, or damaging 
criticism through gossip exchanges, individuals submit to their use 
as resources in pursuit of private ends tacitly or explicitly formulated 
by groups". (p. 98 - 100, Burns and Stalker, 1961) 
Such sub-group formation, identification and conformity has been re-
named "groupthink" by Janis (1975) who illustrates from graphic empirical 
examples such as the U.S. analysis of the Vietnan War and the Cuban Crisis 
that severe group conformity reduces variety by destroying "deviant" 
information. Thus where sensitive, responsive highly adaptive monitors are 
required, conservative stereotypes of an acceptable "code-of-conduct" may 
operate; low in quick strategic action but displaying conforming behaviour. 
However, Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) argued that greater specialization, 
and " 1.n our terms greater differentiation was necl'ssary for producing adaptivt: 
behaviour in organizations that faced high environmental uncertainty, 
provided that there was a corresponding level of organizational integration. 
They therefore posited a positive correlation between differentiation and 
quick response systems with systems integration as a mediating variable. 
This conclusion is partly at variance with our and other arguments and 
evidence. The reason why their differentiated firms performed well"may 
reside in their measure of environmental uncertainty (see Tosi et aI, 1973). 
They appear to have omitted the more problematic environmental changes by 
relYing heavily on measures of environmental uncertainty derived from the 
perceptions of functional management. Similar doubt may be cast on the work 
of Carroll (1967) who found a positive c~rrelation between specialization 
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and innovation in sixteen social welfare organizations. The technology of 
such organizations means 'that they are characterized by hard-to-measure inputs 
I, 
and outputs and this neglected variable could have played a vital mediating 
role. Indeed, Schoonhoven (1981) found that technological uncertainty did 
influence the effect of specialization on the level of organizational effect-
iveness. In her study of hospital operating room sub-units, she found a 
nonmonotonic relationship between technological uncertainty, professionalisa-
tion and severe morbidity. When levels of technological uncertainty wQrehigh 
or moderate, increases in professionalization did lead to increased effect-
iveness but in conditions of low technological uncertainty, increases in 
professionalization led to ineffective performance. Secondly, it is unclear 
exactly how differentiated were the tasks of the different functions studied 
for particip'"mts who perform different specialist tasks but in the know] edge 
of other specialist tasks may indeed not be highly differentiated in their tasks. 
Finally, these researchers only analysed programme innovation and not programme 
implementation, the latter task could have foundered on a high level of systems 
differentiation. 
Our main contention, therefore, remains that differentiation S has a 
negative relationship with systemic response to environmental demands and hence 
with measures of O.E. 
Integration S is the second vital dimension of the system. It 
refers to the quality of the state of collaboration and co-ordination that 
exists among different individuals and groups within the system which are 
required to achieve commonality of effort and purpose. That is, integration 
refers to the nature and quality of inter-group and interpersonal relations 
as well as the process by which such relations are achieved. Such integration 
between diverse functions or groups or sets of decisions could be brought 
about by the creation of joint decision-making bodies, a special integrative 
function that played a liaison role or the creation of rules and operating 
procedures that governed behaviour, plans and objectives. 
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This definition of integration S is wider than that of Lawrence and 
Lorsch in that they looked only at the level of integration between different 
I, ' 
functional groups whereas the word "group" in this context may refer to 
functional groups, or interest groups (as drawn in the F-set) or purely ad 
hoc transient groups which form for a short period of time in order to achieve 
a limited purpose. The concept of integration S also includes a consideration 
of interpersonal linkages, an aspect ignored in the Lawrence and Lorsch 
formulation. 
Finally, the concept of integration S varies directly with the degree of 
conflict present in interpersonal and intergroup relationships. As March and 
Simon pointed out back in 1958, conflict is a term of many uses and meanings. 
Here the term intraorganizational conflict is used to refer to a special case 
of interpersonal and intergroup relationships, that is, when disequilibr:um 
exists such that persons or groups experience difficulty in choosing an agreed 
action alternative. Following March and Simon (1958), it applies to a break-
down in the standard mechanisms of joint decision-making. Intraorganizational 
conflict, like integration S are properties of intergroup linkages and the 
level of conflict in such linkages is related directly to the amount of 
systemic integration. The higher the level of interpersonal and intergroup 
conflict, the lower is the level of integration S and the lower the effect-
iveness of the system as a whole. The system is less able to cope with 
demands from the environment or from competing interest groups. It cannot 
rally its diverse parts, forces or groups to develop coherent strategies. 
In conceptualizing integration in this manner we can draw the links 
between research in social psychology on personal and intergroup conflict and 
work in general organization theory on,the necessity of work co-ordination 
and integration in complex bureaucracies. In addition, support for this 
hypothesis may be drawn from both these areas of research. The work of 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), for instance, found that one hallmark of less 
effective organizations was the inability to devise sufficient means to 
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integrate and co-ordinate diverse departments. Given the level of environmental 
uncertainty, the more effective (nefined in their terms) organization was 
I, • 
one which possessed high levels of integration. Further they argued that 
different environments called for different structural approaches to integration. 
In the dynamic plastics industry, the more effective organization employed 
a formal integrating department whose function it was to ensure that the 
various functional areas worked toward common goals. In the moderately 
dynamic food packaging industry, the more effective organization used individual 
integrators. Finally, in the more stable containers industry, integration was 
facilitated in the more effective organization by direct managerial contact 
through the chain of command. Thus when we consider the effective organiza-
tion or high performers in this study each is characterized by an ability to 
establish a vehicle for integration that is commensurate with its respective 
environment. The more complex the environment, the more elaborate the 
integrative mechanisms required. 
The importance of systemic integration is also argued deductively by 
Caplow (1964), Mahoney and Weitzel (1969) and Duncan (1973). Mahoney and 
Weitzel (1969) found that in research and development organizations there was 
a POsitive correlation between perceived levels of co-operation and an overall 
measure of effectiveness. The latter measure was obtained by self-report from 
managers. Similarly Duncan found in a study of twenty-two decision units 
that the level of integration contributed positively to a measure of organiza-
tional effectiveness. 
In social psychology, the dysfunctional effec~of intergroup and inter-
personal conflict are well documented. The seminal work of Sherif and Sherif 
in 1956 has led to chapters on group conflict in all standard textbooks 
(see Gibson et al, 1979; Handy, 1976; Cohen et aI, 1980) and "recipes" given 
as to the means by which such conflict can be minimized, managed and channelled 
creatively into positive competition. The tactics of conflict have also 
been insightfully studied by Pettigrew (1973), Strau5~ et a:1 (1963) and Crozier 
(1964). The control of information, the' distortion of communication, the 
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use of rules and regulations to protect one's territory, the control of 
rewards and the denigrati~n of one's "adversaries" are common tactics used 
I, 
to undermine the power and status of rival sub-groups. The persistence of 
such conflict can only lead to a lowering of systemic variety as the parts 
of a system concentrate on fighting themselves. A hardening of conflict 
ensues as each tactic is met with other tactics, barriers of communication 
promote hostility and suspicion and collaboration degenerates into wasteful 
bargaining. A system ridden with conflict also has significant influences 
on O.E. via individual critical psychological states. For example, 
Friedlander and Marguiles (1969) found that systems high in "hindrance" 
led to lower satisfaction with interpersonal relationships, task involvement 
and advancement. In addition, Porter and Steers (1973) and Yolles et al 
(1975) found that absenteeism was inversely related to overall job sati3faction, 
opportunities for participation in decision making and increased job autonomy. 
That is, that intergroup and interpersonal hostility influences O.E. (as 
measured by absenteeism) via participants' felt satisfaction. Their psychological 
states thus form a critical intervening variable between the effects of systemic 
states and environmental characteristics on the performance of the system as 
a whole. We shall build on this insight in our specification of our empirical 
model. 
The third vital dimension or characteristic of the system is the concept 
of system supportiveness S. This characteristic is culled from literature 
on the influences of "organizational climate" and "work design" on 
partiCipants' critical psychological states and measures of O.E. The climate 
construct is well-studied but controversial as there is much debate about its 
dimenSions of measurement. Campbell and Beaty (1971), for example, 
identified ten dimensions which ranged from perceptions of reward-punishment 
relationship, to the level of openness, warmth and helpfulness to the amount 
of decision centralization. Payne and Pheysey (1971) have also devised some 
twenty-four scales which measure substantially different areas from the 
Campbell and Beaty dimensions. In addition, some of these climate scales 
measure facets of work design, an area which has an almost separate research 
territorial domain. For example, one of Campbell and Beaty's scales measures 
the amount of job feedback, another of Payne and Pheysey's measures the 
amount of rule orientation. These measures are similar to some of the five 
core job dimensions identified by Oldham and Hackman (1981) which are skill 
variety, task identity, task significance, autonomy and feedback. However, the 
research on climate and job design has developed into two distinct lines of 
research, each demonstrating independently its empirical usefulness. On the 
one hand, studies using the "climate" construct have shown that "climate" 
affects not only perceptions of individual worth but also job satisfaction 
and performance. (Litwin and Stringer, 1968; Friedlander and Marguiles, 
1969; St,eers, 1976). Such findings have emerged from a wide range of samples 
in a variety of institutions. In particular, the magnitude of the 
relationship between climate and satisfaction, though not overly large (in-
dicating that other factors are also at work) is consistently in the 
predicted direction. The relationship between climate and job performance, 
though more complex, is also highly significant. On the other hand, studies 
looking at the relationship between job characteristics and individual work 
attitudes have similarly demonstrated highly statistically significant positive 
relationships between Oldham and Hackman's five job dimensions and measures 
of general satisfaction, work motivation, growth satisfaction, mental health 
and job performance (Oldham and Hackman, 1981; Brass, 1981; Wall et aI, 1978 ). 
In the light of these findings and of the overlap between these two lines 
of t t f . S b d research, we propose that a cons ruc 0 support1veness e use to 
describe this "elusive" something within an organization's cultural and work 
milieu that creates conditions that are conducive to certain attitudes and 
patterns of behaviour. However weak our present measures may be, there is 
substantial evidence that the suPportiveness of the internal work environment 
of a system influences O.E. SupportivenessSis, therefore, defined as the 
cultural meaning of the system and is measured by both tradlitional "Climate" 
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and "job design" characteristics. Supportiveness S has two dimensions -
affiliation and production-centredness - both these dimensions must be present 
I, ' 
before systemic supportiveness may be said to be high. A warm, friendly, 
cosy atmosphere within an organization cannot be said to be supportive for 
though it correlates highly with levels of job satisfaction it may not lead 
to high productivity. Litwin and Stringer (1968) find, for example, that 
authoritarian climates in which decision making was centralized and employee 
behaviour heavily rule-governed lead to low productivity, satisfaction, 
creativity and negative work group attitudes. However, an affiliation-centred 
climate which stressed good interpersonal employee relations though leading 
to high job satisfaction, positive work group attitudes and moderate creative 
behaviour did not lead to high job performance. Only in an achievement-
" 
oriented climate where emphasis was also on goal attainment were both creative 
behaviour, satisfaction, work group attitudes and productivity positive. 
This emphasis on "employee-centredness" and "production-centredness" is 
further emphasized by work on effective managerial or leadership styles (see 
Blake and Mouton, 1964). They derived the concept of a 9,9 style of management 
in which the effective manager was said to be one who showed high concern for 
both employee well-being and productivity. Available research elsewhere also 
supports the essential supportiveness of such dualistic managerial styles 
and organizational climates; the outcomes of which have been empirically 
Shown to include increased employee performance, reduced turnover, lower 
manufacturing costs and reduced training time (see Friedlander and Greenberg, 
1971; Hand et al, 1973). , S ' It is, therefore argued that support1veness 1S 
high when both work production and job satisfaction amongst participants are 
faCilitated. In effect, work production is but another form of need-
satisficer and the propositianabove merely restates the original argument of 
the F-set - that effective performance in the long-run means satisfying a 
feaSible and diverse set of participant needs and demands. 
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A supportive "press" is also measured by perceived levels of skill 
variety, task identity, task significance, autonomy and feedback. When 
t, 
employees perceive high levels on these five core dimensions, then the 
system is also said to possess a supportive "press". As pointed out earlier 
there is ample empirical evidence to support this claim as numerous usage 
of Oldham and Hackman's five core dimensions have yielded stable results. 
Our final characterisation of the system is termed systemic uncertainty 
or uncertaintyS The justification for this characteristic is derived largely 
from the work of Galbraith (1973) and organizational literature on the 
contingent influence of "technology". Galbraith's work presents a mainstream 
analytic framework to the structural design of organizations and unlike most 
other contingency theorists, he was quite clear in specifying to what the 
system was adapting. In general, he argued that systemic structure and 
behaviour depended on the amount of information processed among decision 
makers during task execution and, secondarily, on the relative costs of 
various designs. Specifically, one of his basic assumptions was that the 
greater the uncertainty of the task, the greater the information that must 
be processed during task execution in order to achieve a given level of 
performance. He further assumed that alternative systemic structural 
arrangements vary in their capacities for processing information. Some are 
more effective than others for a given level of uncertainty. As a consequence, 
the specific structures adopted should depend on the amount of uncertainty 
present in the tasks and workflow. Thus, the degree of task uncertainty is a 
cont' t' fl f d'ff "S ~ngen ~n uence on which turn alternative levels 0 ~ erent~at1on,
, ,S S ~ntegrat10n and supportiveness Although we shall not be analysing in 
detail the interactions amongst these f~ur characteristics of systems activity 
we do hypothesize statistical correlations amongst them. However, 
the main point here is to establish the argument and hypothesis that 
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the predictability of a system's task is a basic conditioning variable in 
the choice of strategic respo~to environmental demands. 
A similar emphasis on intrasystemic uncertainty is reflected in the 
so-called "technology" literature which seeks to identify either mechanical 
or intellectual processes by which an organization transforms inputs or raw 
materials into desirable outputs. For instance, Lawrence and Lersch's 
(1967) measure of technology included a measure of information uncertainty, 
Hage and Aiken's (1969) study of sixteen social welfare agencies measured 
technology as the routineness of task and both Hickson et al (1969) and 
Hrebiniak (1974) measured technology via the rigidity of workflow sequences 
and task and materiaffipredictability. Further, their empirical results 
confirmed their initial hypotheses that "technological variation" or differences 
,. 
in levels of uncertainty S significantly influenced the dependent vaLiables 
studied. Lawrence and Lersch argued that their measure of technology showed 
a strong positive relationship with the level of differentiation, in our 
language, there is a positive interaction between differentiation Sand 
uncertainty S. Hage and Aiken found a significant negative correlation between 
routine technology and participation in decision making, a positive relation 
between routineness and formalization and no relation between routineness and 
other structural variables. Hickson et al (1969) found a weak relationship 
between technology and structure and effectiveness, and their data seemed to 
Suggest that size could be a mediating variable. However, this suggestion 
has not been brtcked up by subsequent research. Finally, Hrebiniak's (1974) 
results, though showing no clear relationship between technology and 
effectiveness, found that certain technological variables were related to 
some "structural" variables when the measure of supervisory behaviour was 
held constant. 
One of the most recent pieces of work on technological uncertainty is 
that of Schoonhoven (1981) who studied seventeen operating suites and 
measured uncertainty as the unpredictability of operations actually carried 
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out. She found a significant negative relationship between the level of 
uncertainty and her measure of effectiveness, measured as the rate of severe 
t, • 
morbidity. (In addition, she argued that uncertainty interacted with measures 
of destandardization, decentralization and professionalization in affecting 
the level of effectiveness). 
In the light of such evidence, we therefore hypothesize that the level 
of systemic uncertainty will have a negative effect on the level of organiza-
tional performance. Uncertainty is presumed to undermine organizational 
effectiveness unless it is met by structural features designed to absorb the 
information uncertainty. It should be emphasized that uncertainty S is defined 
as the level of unpredictability within the system as it transforms "raw" 
inputs ~nto desirable outcomes, contributions into inducements. It is 
, 
distinct as a concept, from measures'of environmental uncertainty. Though 
there could be an empirical and conceptual relationship between these two 
measures, depending on the "porousness" of the system's boundary, analytically 
they describe different concepts. 
We have now concluded our characterization of systemic activity states. 
The diagram below summarizes the exact causal relationships specified and 
the relationship between S and measures of O.E.; notations on the paths 
between variables represent the positive or negative relationships expected. 
The double-headed arrows represent unanalysed correlations and relationships 
amongst systemic characteristics. Our main justification for not analysing 
these interactions in detail is that we are more concerned with assessing 
their independent, direct effects on O.E., the main topic of this 8ecti~n. 
Secondly, as we also wish to measure environmental characteristics in a test 
of Ashby's arguments in its entirety, there is a constraint on time and 
effort. Thirdly, it is intended to use several measures of each of these 
characeristics, a technique not often used in the past and to assess the 
direct and indirect effects of each of these measures on O.E. Finally, as 
ar~ued before, the weak statements of Ashby's Law appears to offer more 
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Opportunity for conclusive elucidation of complex relationships. Hence, 
though it is recognized and known (via previous empirical research) that 
I, • 
there are interaction effects amongst systemic characteristics these will 
take a minor role in the present study in order to focus on the effects on 
organizational performance. 
Systemic Characterization 
Differentiation S 
O.E. 
Uncertainty S 
Diagram 8.8: Causal l~odel of O.E. 
Predicted from Systemic States 
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In conclusion, we emphasize that these four dimensions are put forward 
as the most promising and critical facets of strategic response after a 
I, 
comprehensive review of a wide variety of literature. However, we do not 
claim at this early stage that these dimensions are all-encompassing and 
that they capture the essence of a system in a fundamental methodological 
sense. The status of these dimensions is tentative, subject to empirical 
confirmation or refutation. In short, t~ are not transcendental characteristics 
of a system. 
We shall now explicate our characterization of environmental states. 
As pointed out earlier, the concept of E in Ashby's formulations refers to 
the external environment of a system, to wholes and coalitions which are less 
well controlled by the system. Descriptions of external environments have 
been consistently derived from several abstract dimensions. Emp~rically, 
these dimensions are often obtained via participant perceptions of the 
environment, thereby raising the interesting issue of whether "objective", 
"real" environments exist or whether as Weick (1979; 1974) contends they are 
essentially "subjective", "enacted" states. In Weick's view the environments, 
of themselves, represent "mythical entities". In the enactment process 
people "act out and realize" their ideas and thereby create their own 
realities (i.e. environments) which they subsequently deal with. Weick thus 
argues that the environment is a social phenomenon tied to processes of 
attention and sensemaking, which alone endow it with existence: "unless something 
is attended to, it does not exist" (Weick, 1976). Therefore, if men define 
Situations as real they are real in their consequences. Weick further 
develops his ideas into a formal model of organizing: organizing is a process 
"directed toward reducing the equivocality that exists in informational 
inputs judged to be relevant" (Weick, 1969). This model, which is based on 
the socia-cultural evolution model of Donald T. Campbell (1965) and the 
work of phenomenologists such as Mead (1934) and Schutz (1967), in fact lies 
on the boundary of Burrell and Morgan's interpretative paradigm. It proposes 
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that there are three organizing processes: enactment of an informational 
enVironment; selection of inputs to be processed from this environment and 
" 
the retention of information as a feedback function for future enactment 
and selection. These three processes in turn constitute a series of what 
Weick (1969) calls "assembly rules" and "interlocked behaviour cycles". 
Though Weick's emphasis on thesubjective enactment of environmental states 
is useful, his assumption that this theory of bounded human rationality is 
total is mistaken. For it obscures the material reality of a system's 
environment which consists of laws, institutions, norms and coalitions that 
partially determine systemic behaviour. Whilst Child's (l972b) critique of 
environmental determinism is taken to heart, Weick appears to have plunged 
to the other extreme,whe~ the environment loses all determination and nothing 
m~re than the ideational environment exists. For Weick at least, the notion 
of macro-structures is reduced to a myth, entirely dependent on the subjective 
interpretations of participants. If coalitional participants perceive such 
structures to exist, they do, if not they do not. Surely such an ontological 
commitment to the rule of participant perception is dangerous and invalid. 
As Bacharach and Lawler (1980) argue, without an independent object or source 
of information, it would be impossible to discriminate between that 
information that is sought but not recpived, that which is received but not 
sought and that which is possible rather than impossible to obtain. In 
addition, Weick's reasoning appears circular. The number of assembly rules 
activated is a function of the amount of equivocality in the informational 
inputs. These are enacted so that equivocality is a function of their 
enactment, which is a function of the assembly rules used to do enactment. 
However, we have already defined the number of assembly rules in terms of 
the amount of equivocality! Nor are the formulae "number of assembly rules" 
or "assessment of equivocality" particularly clear. Are any ten assembly 
rules equivalent to any other ten? Could not ten simple assembly rules be 
condensed into five in another organization? 
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The questions multiply - and Weick's originally promising model of 
organizing seems to lead only to empty formalism or to a content which cannot 
" . 
be meaningfully compared. We argue that the environment is more usefully 
conceived as an objective influence on systemic actions. Though subjective 
enactment is a vital and fascinating problematic area of study, nevertheless, 
a materialist ontology appears to be more satisfactory at a conceptual level. 
At this level, there are two distinct but related materialistic perspectives 
on the nature of a system's environment. As Lowe and Oliga (1981) point out, 
there is the resource flows perspective which view environments as a stock 
of resources for which organizations co-operate or compete and the information 
flow perspective which treats environments as a pool of information which is 
filtered through actors' perceptions for the purpose of, or in the course of 
Coping with, uncertainty in the decision situation. 
In the resource flow conceptualization of environmentS, resources have 
been defined as generalized means, or facilities, that are potentially 
controllable by social organizations and that are potentially usable - however 
indirectly - in relationships between the organization and its environment. 
(Yuchtman and Seashore, 1967). Thus resources include, at a general level, 
"human activity, ••. power, influence, reputation, money and knowledge". 
(Aldrich, 1979). But we would add that hurr.an values form an important 
component of the resource pool since issues of legitimacy and conflict 
significantly influence one's capacity for resource acquisition or disposal. 
There are two major variants of the resource perspective. The first treats 
reSOurces as evenly dispersed within the environment. In this category are 
inclUded the ecological models such as the "natural selection models" 
(Campbell, 1969) of which the "population ecology model" is a special 
application of the selective propagation of organizational populations 
(Aldrich, 1979; Hannan and Freeman, 1977). The population ecology model 
focuses not on an individual organization but on organizational populations; 
the environment is now defined as a niche which consists of a distinct 
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combination of resources and other constraints capable of supporting the population. 
The condition for continuep systems viability is relative superiority in the 
degree of fitness of the population to its environment. But the regulatory process 
is framed in terms of environmental variation, selection and retention; it is the 
environment that "selects" optimal organizational forms and which determines the 
survival of the "fittest". Indeed, the population ecology model is a gross state-
ment of environmental determinism and in Ashby's terms represents a case where the 
system has effectively "fallen asleep" and the environment is both the main source 
of disturbance and the regulator. As _Soo, Oliga and Puxty (1980) have shown, such 
a model begs more questions than it answers, failing as it does to adequately 
explain differential physical survival rates of organizations and missing out 
entirely on the richness of subjective enactment processes. 
A second variant of the resource perspective of environments is represented by 
resource dependence models which are based on the assumption that resources are 
Concentrated in the hands of a few elements or actors such that the resulting 
asymmetry in power leads to dependence-avoidance or dominance-seeking strategies in 
a situation of inter-organizational dependence. (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 
1962). The distribution of resources among competing demands then takes on 
a political nature (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Whereas in the population 
ecology model the resource view of environments was that of differentiated 
niches, in the resource dependence model, the environment is depicted as a 
differential power distribution. 
In the information flow perspective, environmental variety is conceived 
in terms of uncertainty and its impact on actors' decision-making ability. 
However, the same environment is the source of information that becomes the 
raw materials acted upon by sentient actors in their attempt to cope with 
'. 
uncertainty in the decision situation. The process of regulation thus 
becomes acquiring requisite information to absorb proliferating uncertainty. 
(Ashby, 1956; Beer, 1972). Uncertainty is seen to arise from two main causes: 
the low degree of constraint in the relationships between environmental 
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elements (i.e. complexity and unpredictability in the environment) and the 
equivocality of the information flowing to the decision-makers (i.e. 
I, 
ambiguity and unreliability of information sources). Indeed, the most 
common dimensions used to describe environments e.g. instability and hetero-
geneity stem from this perspective of environmental uncertainty. Within this 
perspective of environments, the condition for system viability is a matching 
of the information capacity of the system with the degree of environmental 
uncertainty. As can be seen, Ashby's original Law of Requisite Variety falls 
within this information flow perspective, its emphasis being on the quantitative 
rather than the qualitative aspects of information and uncertainty. As such, 
it suffers from a neglect of the resource flow perspective of environments. 
Just as the resource flow perspective takes information flow as non-problematic, 
so the information flow perspective takes the resource flow ~s non-problematic. 
The partial view of social reality inherent in each approach is obvious. 
We therefore intend to extend Ashby's conceptualization of the system's 
environment in such a way as to synthesize both the resource-flow and 
information-flow perspective in a materialist ontological theory about 
systemic environments which simultaneously accommodates the possibility of 
participant enactment of a system's environment. Much of the work that 
follows is in fact part of an ongoing research project at Sheffield which 
will be reported in greater detail in the future. Here, we describe only 
those facets of the research relevant to a characterization of environmental 
states. 
It is argued that, in the light of present findings, the system's 
environment be characterized via the use of these succinct dimensions which 
encompass insights from the resource and information-flow perspective~. These 
three dimensions are complexity E, illiberality E and variability E The 
subscript E indicates that these characteristics are descriptions of the 
environment. Following Lowe and Oliga (1981), complexity E is defined as 
the causal and relational meaning of the environment; illiberality as the 
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value meaning and variability as the changes in complexity and illiberality 
through time. We conceive complexity and illiberality as the static 
I, • 
perspectives of environmental variety but that the dialectical relationship 
between them (caused by the inherent contradiction between the human need to 
counter illiberality and the movement towards greater complexity that is 
entailed) generates relentless pressures ,for change. Diagram 8.9 illustrates 
these dialectics, showing that the interaction between complexity and 
illiberality generates through time a continuous movement or variability, 
which in turn feeds back to "restructure" the relationship between complexity 
and illiberality. It is variability that provides the dynamic perspective 
of environmental change. 
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Diagram B.9: Environmental Characteristics: The Dialectics of 
Complexity, Illiberality and Variability (adapted from Lowe and Oliga, 1981) 
• 
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Based on previous research in this area, cs well as on-going research, 
we posit the following relations; 
(a) Complexity E is a function of and measured by: 
(i) the number of distinct elements in the environment; 
(ii) the degree of heterogeneity among the elements, and 
(iii) the degree of linkage (or interdependency) among the elements 
or environmental "turbulence" in Aldrich's classification. 
(b) Illiberality E is a function-of and measured by: 
(i) the degree of resource scarcity or environment "capacity"; 
(ii) the pattern of resource distribution or "concentration-
dispersion", and 
(iii) the value system or domain consensus-dissensus. 
(c) Variability E is a function of and measured by: 
(i) the nature (i.e. qualitative aspects) of change, in terms of 
the degree of permanence (e.g., reversible or irreversible 
change), and 
(ii) the pattern (i.e. the quantitative aspects) of change, which 
in turn depends on the size, the direction (i.e. increase! 
decrease), the trend (i.e. linear, curvilinear or cyclical), 
the frequency and the rate of change. 
The links between a resource-flow perspective and an information-flow 
perspective roE achieved by conceptualizing information and values as resources 
which a system requires in order to achieve a feasible point in the F-set in 
the ~ong-run. The incorporation of information as a resource also serves to 
synthesize the objective nature of a system's environment and the problematic 
interpretation and perception of it via participants. It is vital that these 
two perspectives are synthesiaedbecause each on its own fails to encompass 
social reality. One presupposes that "objectivistic" knowledge is possible 
(i.e. that the problems of human perception and values can be assumed away 
in dealing with reality). The other assumes that the nature and the 
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distribution of resources is non-problematic, so long as requisite information 
can be obtained. It is important to note the distinction between the 
proposition that the environment is an independent, objective influence 
on organizational performance and the argument that objectivistic knowledge 
of an environment may not be possible. The former assumes an ontological 
position that states that a system's environment is independent of 
participant's perceptions. Nonetheless, it is acknowledged that unfiltered 
and lminterpreted knowledge of this environment is impossible and that systemic 
action is determined by the type of "perceived environmental state", Tl1at 
is, though a system's environment has an objective, material existence, 
knowledge of it is necessarily filtered and reconstructed. 
It is further hypothesized that complexity E, illiberality E and 
variability E are negatively related to the achievement 0':. a viable F-set. 
Unless the system adopts an appropriate response, then it is hypothesized that 
higher levels of complexity E, illiberality E and variability E will reduce the 
level of effective performance. The strength of this hypothesis is again 
derived from cybernectics. As Ashby's pay-off matrix shows, environmental 
variety if left unchecked will dominate the variety of the outcomes such that 
the probability of an undesirable outcome occurring (or a non-feasible 
strategy being chosen) will increase. Since environmental variety is defined 
as the number of distinguishable states perceived by an observer, it is 
entirely reasonable to argue that higher levels of complexity E, illiberality E 
and variability E are in fact identical to higher levels of environmental 
variety because the number of states which an environment may adapt increases. 
The environment in essence becomes more hostile and unpredictable and this 
places a demand on the system to increase its variety in order to be viable. 
However, it should be emphasized that these environmental dimensions in 
no way prejudge the system-environment determinism debate. They do not infer 
that the environment is all-powerful or that the system is all-important. 
Instead, the system-environment relationship is a dialectical whole, the 
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environment has no meaning or existence without the notion of a system and 
vice versa. Indeed, this argument about relative dominance in system-environment 
relationships is in part a false controversy for it implies a forced separation 
of the system from its environment. As argued earlier, the closure of a 
system is arbitrary and certainly does not mean the isolation of a system 
within an "adiabatic shell". The environment, is in an important sense, in 
the system and vice versa. Each reflects the dimensions of the other, each 
supports the other. Hence, theories of organization which focus on the 
relative dominance of one part-whole over the other are often irrelevant and 
often degenerate into interminable debates about the wrong questions. 
Diagram 8.10 summarizes the argument to date about the influence of 
environmental dimensions on the level of O.E. The notations on the paths 
signifiy the negative relatonshipsexpected. The double-headed arrows again 
show that there are interaction effects amongst these dimensions. As before, 
these interaction effects will be noted but emphasis will be concentrated 
instead on the direct and indirect effects of complexity E, illiberality E 
and variability E on O.E. 
When diagrams 8.9 and 8.10 are put together we have a clear empi"rical model 
that restates Ashby's Law in a weak form. This model is shown in Diagram 
8.11. 
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E~ --------------~) O.E. 
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Diagram 8.10: Causal Model of O.E. 
Predicted from Environmental States 
Environmental Characterization 
O.E. defined as 
Systemic Characterization achieving a point 
Differentiation 
..--"'f' ~---- in the F-set in the 
long-run 
Integration S 
Supportiveness S 
Uncertainty S 
Diagram 8.11: Causal Model of the Determinants of O.E. 
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8.4.5 !ntervening Variables in the Determination of O.E. 
Diagram 8.11, however, is not a full explication of critical determinants 
of O.E. As the literature discussion of systemic characterization revealed, 
there are vital intervening variables which mediate and compound the effects 
of the system and its environment on O.E. Two of these sets of intervening 
variables will be discussed and incorporated in the empirical model. These 
two sets of intervening variables are individual characteristics and what 
Hackman and Oldham (1975) have termed "critical psychological states." 
The "micro" organizational literature has long ago (see March and Simon, 
1958) recognised that participant characteristics often influence perceptions 
of systemic and environmental states and effective organizational behaviour. 
The review of "organizational climate" by Payne and Pugh (1976) showed clearly 
that the individual's own needs, goats and interests influence the perception 
of supportiveness S and that the level of supportiveness S in turn 
affects these same goals and behaviours. In an early study, George and 
Bishop (1971) used Cattell's sixteen PF to measure personality, Halpin and 
Croft's (1963) OCDG to measure organizational climate and Hall's bureaucracy 
scales to measure perceived organizational structure. They hypothesized 
that, "the type of organizational climate perceived is directly related to 
the degree of compatibility found between the organizational structural 
characteristics and the individual personality traits of its members." The 
authors demonstrated the expected relationships between the three sets of 
variables; schools with particular kinds of structures and climates were 
associated with teachers with particular personality traits. However, since 
all the measures used were perceptual, it is equally likely that their 
results showed that an individual's personality would affect his perception 
of both "climate" and "structure" and thus, the relationship between them. 
Schneider and Hall (1973) have demonstrated some clearer results. They con-
ducted a study among parish priests and studied a self-perceived work climate 
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which focused on the job itself and its immediate environment. This was 
then correlated with a sema~tic differ~ntial scale of self-image; the 
I, ' 
scale produced three factors - supportive, intellectual and involved. 
The correlations, though weak were significant and demonstrated that 
priests who perceived themselves as supportive, intellectual and involved 
reported that they had meaningful work and felt accepted by others. 
Not only do these traits and personality types influence perceptions 
of systemic states, they also influence directly measures of O.E. For 
example, research has shown that managerial success is closely related to 
the level of one's intellectual capabilities (for example, verbal com-
prehenSion, inductive reasoning, memory). A series of studies over the 
past twenty-five years has also focused on the "need for achievement" as it 
relates to job performance. This need has been conSistently found to be 
highly related to individual job performance among a variety of employees 
(McClelland et aI, 1953; Steers, 1975). Moreover, in a review of research 
on employee withdrawal from organizations discussed in Porters & Steers 
(1973), it was found that individuals manifesting certain personality traits 
in extremely high or low quantities tended to leave organizations far more 
often than did employees with more moderate trait levels. 
\ 
This has been 
empirically supported in the U.K. in Birch's (1975, 1978) study of voluntary 
leaving amongst learner nurses. He found that nurses who scored high levels 
of anxiety and conflict on Rotter's Incomplete Sentences Test and Cattell's 
16 PF tended to withdraw from training within the first eighteen months. 
In a less well-designed study Lewis and Cooper (1975) have also demonstrated 
that nurses who have remained in service for long periods have significantly 
different personality profiles from learners and leavers, the implication 
being that personality is an intervening variable in participant leaving 
behaViour. Lastly, it was also found that employees whose vocational 
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interests were not congruent with the realities of the job left more fre-
quently - and were poorer performers while they remained - than those 
., 
whose vocational interests were congruent with the job (Holland, 1976). 
This concept of congruency or a match between participant needs, abilities 
and personalities with job and organizational requirements has long formed 
the baSis of recruitment and selection tests. Andrews' (1967) work is 
often quoted as a clear example of this principle. He reported a field 
study of two Mexican firms which had very different value orientations, 
organizational cuI tures or what O,uchi (1980) called clan control. One was 
highly "achievement-oriented", economically effective, ready to change, 
and progressive; and the other was power-oriented and generally less suc-
cessful economically. Andrews gave the Thermatic Apperception Test (TAT) 
to top level managers in the two firms to measure their need for achieve-
ment (N Ach) and need for power (N Pow.). He also used the number of 
promotions and salary increases during the preceding four-year period to 
measure performance. There were no differences in motivational measures 
between the two organisations; however, the managers who had progressed most 
in each firm were those whose personal needs were most congruent with the 
values of the organization. 
Intuitively valid though this thesis is, studies which have calculated 
"discrepancy scores" between self and internal environment (see Pervin, 
1967; Stern, 1970) have produced disappointing results. Though supporting 
in general, the hypothesis that individual-internal environment (support-
, s 
1veness ) compatibility enhances behaviour and attitude, the percentage of 
variance explained in dependent variables has not been large, and has not 
been significantly greater than that explained by zero-order correlations 
between personality or ability measures and performance. 
this is mainly due to the use of discrepancy scores. 
It is felt that 
Relatingj such scores 
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to other variables has created the problem of linking variance to the 
variance of the personality variable, the environmental variable, or some 
interaction of the two. Accordingly, Wall and Payne (1973) emphasized 
that discrepancy scores can be misleading and suggested the use of raw 
scores and part or partial correlations to explore relationships and inter-
actions. This suggestion is in fact taken up later in our empirical model. 
In addition, to these characteristics of needs, traits, interests and 
abilities other characteristics have also played a part in influencing 
participant leaving and staying behaviour. Tenure, for example, has long 
been used as a predictor of withdrawal. As Schmittlein & Morrison (1981) 
explain, the longer a person has been on a particular job or within a 
specific role, he or she is less likely to leave. The problem of occu-
pational inertia is partially explained by revised job and role expectations, 
the costs of leaving (the ease of movement and the desirability of movement) 
and the consequences of learning on the job. In addition to personal 
characteristics such as age, tenure and qualifications, the concepts of "met 
expectations" and "perceived alternative opportunities" are often considered 
important explanations for participant attachment and withdrawal from a 
coalition. (see Porter & Steers 1973; Pfeffer, 1978; March & Simon, 1958) 
Central to the model is the notion that each participant brings his or 
her own unique set of expectation to a job and organization. For some 
individuals, it is likely that a high value would be placed on attaining 
their expectations in the areas of salary, promotional opportunities and 
so forth. Further, emergent expectations could develop due to a social 
comparison or referencing process whereby expectations are created or changed 
depending on the experience of others\(a clear example of what economists 
call interdependent utility functions). This set of expectations or demands 
then needs to be met by coalitional inducements. As March & Simon so 
clearly argued, if the inducement-contribution balance is unsatisfactory, 
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and there are alternative employment opportunities employees will leave 
the coalition. 
The second set of intervening variables has already been partly 
discussed within the discussion of March and Simon's work. It refers to 
critical Psychological states felt by participants, often called individual 
work attitudes and even individual outcomes. Though these psychological 
states do give some indication of participant staying and leaving behaviour, 
they are nevertheless not measures of O.E. As argued previously, expressed 
levels of participant satisfaction or well-being are not identical to 
actual participant behaviour. In addition, expressions of satisfaction 
by one participant group, say employees, may not equate the level of 
satisfaction of other participant groups and certainly do not describe 
the "health" of the whole. Further, even if an observer were to 
tabulate the satisfaction level of each critical participant group, the 
sum of parts may not necessarily be identical to holistic measures of 
O.E. such as measures of systems adaptive capacity. 
These statements expose our beliefs in the essential complex process 
of "rational" behaviour and in the synergistic effects of holistic part-
whole interactions. Empirical research has always had to cope with 
Observed "inconsistencies" between what "people say and what they do", 
with so-called "irrational" forms of human behaviour. As pointed out in 
our earlier discussions, our theories of rationality and of rational human 
behaviour are very inadequate; as yet, they do not satisfactorily explain 
the difference between verbal expressions of beliefs and observed behaviour. 
Simon's (1976) concept of bounded rationality, March and Olsen's (1976) 
description of "organizations running backwards" and the phenomenological 
alternative of a retrospective imputation of meaning to events are some 
of the issues now being raised within our discussion of rational behaviour. 
In addition, Puxty and Chua (1981) have argued , within the context of 
control, that questions about "irrational behaviour" are really questions about 
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different knowledge interests and epistemological focus. Given our state 
of knowledge about notions of rationality, we have decided to concentrate 
on participant behaviour as measures of O.E. and to use expressions of well-
being as intervening variables. Finally, this position is more tenable 
given the basic tenet of holism in general systems theory, viz, a summation 
of parts can never capture the essence and identity of the whole. That is, 
expressions of satisfaction by participant groups are not identical to 
measures of viability of the whole. 
The work of organization theorists again len&some support to these 
epistemological conclusions. In a comprehensive review Cummings and Schwab 
(1973) pointed out that the relationship between expressed job satisfaction 
and job performance is highly problematic and not necessarily symmetrical. 
The research quoted earlier by Litwin and Stringer (1968) also showed that 
in an affiliative climate employees expressed high job satisfaction and had 
Positive attitudes towards their work group but performance remained low. 
Only when an emphasis was placed on job performance was there high productivity 
and high levels of job satisfaction. In other words, satisfaction of the 
needs of one participant group did not produce satisfactory inducements (in 
the form of output) to other participant groups. 
Having established the argument for treating participants' psychological 
states as intervening variables, what then are some of these critical 
Psychological states? The most commonly studied are measures of satisfaction, 
organizational and professional commitment/identification and measures of 
individual conflict such as role ambiguity and role conflict. The notion 
of expressed participant satisfaction measures an individual's affective 
response to his coalitional participation. It is usually measured in terms of 
job satisfaction and/or satisfaction with the organization as a whole. 
Conceptually this concept of satisfaction is different from our measure of 
supportiveness S - the former is an affective feeling about coalitional 
participation whilst the latter is, conceptually, a description of a systemic 
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state. Though it is obvious that one's feelings influence one's perceptions 
and we can never achieve a "pure" description, nevertheless our separation 
., . 
of the two concepts is defensible at the theoretical level. At the empirical 
level, we can tackle the problem by asking two separate questions: 
(1) how do you perceive the system and how much supportiveness S do you 
think it shows?; and 
(2) are you satisfied with this state of affairs? 
It is expected that participant satisfaction is related to systemic and 
environmental characteristics and O.E. in the manner shown in Diagram 8.12. 
Increases in complexity E, illiberality E and variability E are hypothesized 
to lead to lower levels of participant satisfaction if the system does not 
counter these increases with appropriate strategies. This is because the 
system as a whole is unable to cope with environmental demands and this is 
reflected in dissatisfaction with the inducement contribution balance. A 
scarcity of resources in particular means that the system is unable to satisfy 
the demands of partiCipants. March and Simon (1958), for example, state that 
"When resources are relatively unlimited, organizations need not 
resolve the relative merits of subgroup claims. Thus these claims 
and the rationalizations for them tend not to be challenged; 
substantial differentiation of goals occur within the organization. 
When resources are restricted and this slack is taken up, the 
relations among individual members and subgroups in the organization 
become more nearly a strictly competitive game." (p. 12~ 11arch and Simon, 
Such competition, if conducted as a zero-sum game can lead easily to low 
morale and dissatisfaction with participation. The work of Baumol (1959) 
Williamson (1964) and Cyert and March (1963) all emphasize the generation of 
revenue and slack to reduce internal tension. Cyert and March (1963) argue 
that in a benign environment organizations tolerate and support a multiplicity 
of partially conflicting goals. Scarcity of resources, arising from a 
diminuition in environmental liberality results in search directed at a 
reduction in organizational slack (e.g. cost cutting exercises) : 
"Organizational slack absorbs a substantial proportion of potential 
variability in the firm's environment. As a result it plays both 
a stability and an adaptive role." (p. 38, Cyert and March, 1963.) 
.. 
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Similar arguments appertain to the effects of increased levels of 
differentiation S and uncertaint~ S A~ Increased polarization of subgroup 
" 
interests and sub-goal differentiation and increased uncertainty in the 
transformation process of contributions and inducements will lead to less 
satisfaction with organizational membership. Dn the other hand increased 
levels of integration Sand supportiveness S are hypothesized to lead to 
higher levels of participant satisfaction as the system is "better organized" 
to act as a transformer of inducements and contribution. The reader is 
referred to the earlier literature discussion on characteristics of Sand E 
for further evidence. The exact effect of personal characteristics is left 
unspecified in this general model of D.E., these will be specified in a 
la~chapter when a detailed empirical model is set out. Finally, participant 
satisfaction is expected to have a posi ti ve re'lationship with measures of 
D.E. at both the individual and holistic levels of analysis. This is because 
the higher the level of expressed satisfaction with participation and 
production, the less the perceived desirability of movement and the greater 
the probability that the organization is remaining and will remain in the 
F-set in the long-run. (See March and Simon, 1958). 
Diagram 8.U is also hypothesized to be relevant when we analyse the 
relationship of organizational cOIT@itment to S, E and D.E. The concept of 
commitment has recently received wide attention as an explanatory linkage 
between D.E. and systemic responses. (See Staw, 1977; Steers, 1977; 
Stevens et al, 1978). However, because of its wide usage it has been 
defined in a variety of ways. The term "commitment" has been used, for 
example, to describe such diverse phenomena as the willingness of social 
actors to give their energy and loyalty to social systems, the·bending"of 
an individual to particular acts or to an affective attachment to an organization 
apart from a purely instrumental relationship. In our formulation we define 
participant commitment as reflecting (a) a strong belief in and acceptance 
of the values and purpose of the micro-organization, (b) a willingness to 
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exert considerable effort on behalf of the organization and (c) a definite 
desire to maintain organizational membership. (See Porter et al, 1974). 
It is expected that increased environmental variety (across the three 
dimensions~ systemic differentiation S and uncertainty S will lead to lower 
mora~and commitment. Again, it is argued that this result is due to the system 
being unable to cope with environmental states and changes in those states in 
such a way as to transform contributions into satisfactory inducements. 
Dissatisfaction then leads to lower participant attachment and commitment, 
he/she is no longer willing to expend time and energy within the system. By 
contrast, higher levels of supportiveness S and integration S will lead to 
higher levels of commitment as participants become more exposed to common 
value orientations and have less room for "deviations from the mean". Finally, 
it is predicted that higher levels of commitment will lead to higher levels 
of effectiveness. Highly committed members will be willing to exert 
conSiderable effort on behalf of the organization in both acts of production 
and participation. In addition, in keeping with the view that committed 
employees will engage in spontaneous, innovative behaviour on behalf of the 
organization, it is anticipated that, within limits, organizational commitment 
among members would facilitate the ability of an organization to adapt to 
contingencies. As Angle and Perry (1981) point out, the adaptive capacity-
commitment relationship would not actually be expected to be monotonic over 
all Possible levels of corr~itment. Extreme commitment would probably lead to 
fanatical behaviour, suspension of individual judgement and the like. However, 
the relationship here is presumed to be positive and monotonic over the 
range of values actually encountered. 
Essentially similar arguments are· advanced as to the effects of perceived 
role conflict. Role conflict exists when an individual is confronted with 
two aspects of incompatible work demands or role demands. For example, a 
learner nurse is both a "nurse" with consequent behavioural role sets and 
a "learner" within a School of nursing. These two roles often conflict as 
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one denotes an ability to carry out responsible tasks on ill persons whilst 
the other denotes a lack of knowledge and experience. Role ambiguity, on 
;, 
the other hand, is brought about when individua~ are not provided with 
sufficient information concerning the nature of required tasks. For example, 
a learner nurse who finds herself being allowed to perform certain tasks on 
one ward but not allowed to perform these same tasks on another ward will 
experience role ambiguity as he/she is no longer certain of the province of 
her role or job. 
It is hypothesized that such conflict and ambiguity will increase when 
there is an increase in complexity E as the individual and the system has 
to cope with more environmental elements; an increase in illiberality E as 
one individual may be required to take on a number of different incompatible 
roles, an increase in variability E due to combined increases in complexity E 
and illiberality E; an increase in differentiation S as divided loyalties 
between subgroup and organization results (as, for example, in controversy 
Over professional versus organizational demands) and an increase in uncertainty S 
as increases in role ambiguity feed into increases in role conflict. As noted 
by Kahn et al (1964) role ambiguity is brought about by three factors: 
(1) rapid organizational (and we would add environmental cr.ange or variability E 
(2) increased organizational (differentiation Sand uncertuinty S) complexity 
and (3) managerial policies that lead to poor communications. Such breakdowns 
in communication are due directly to increasing complex and illiberal 
environments which lead to sub-groups entrenching themselves in intra-organiza 
tional niches and competing fiercely for scarce resources. Increases in 
integration Sand supportiveness S are, however, hypothesized to decrease role 
conflict and ambiguity as an individual's work is better co-ordinated with that 
of others and he becomes less prone to conflicting roles. Further, an 
increased supportiveness S of work design and cultural press also means that 
there is increased job feedback and hence less ambiguity. Finally, both 
role conflict and ambiguity are hypothesized to lead to lower levels of 
effective performance. Support for this proposition is widespread, as can 
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be evidenced by almost any issue of the Administrative Science Quarterly. 
Toffler (1981), for example, found that absolute measures of role conflict 
and ambiguity correlated negatively with measures of job satisfaction; the 
relationship held when the sample was questionnaired at a different time 
period. Moorhead (1981) also found that these two intervening variables 
correlated negatively at the 99% significance level and 99.9% significance 
level with feelings about job performance (used as a surrogate for a measure 
of individual performance). Early studies by Kahn et al (1964) further found 
that prolonged periods of role ambiguity led to feelings of futility, poor 
job performance, increased anxiety and general job dissatisfaction; such 
feelings often leading ultimately to withdrawal from organizational activities, 
Psychologically if not physically. 
We have almost come to a conclusion of our empirical model. In order 
to summarize expected relationships, diagram 8.13 is drawn below. The 
reader will no doubt have noticed in our discussion of participant satisfaction, 
commitment, role ambiguity and conflict that these variables are intimately 
related to one another. Increases in ambiguity and conflict often lead to lower 
levels of satisfaction and commitment and higher levels of satisfaction are 
also empirically associated with high levels of commitment. We have explicitly 
incorporated these interaction effects and these are shown by the series of 
double-headed arrows amongst these variables. We have also specified the 
direct effects of environmental and systemic states on levels of O.E. by 
specifying a series of numeric signs in strict order on the paths between S 
and D.E. and E and D.E. These should be read according to the order of the 
characteristics of Sand E. 
Environmental 
Characteristics 
(~r Complexity E r Il~iberali ty E 
Var iabili ty E 
Systemic 
Characteristics 
(-) 
[Differentiation S 
[Integration S 
rsupportiveness S 
Uncertainty S 
(- ) 
(+) 
(+) 
\ 
(-) 
(- ) (-) 
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Diagram 8.13: Causal Model of the Determinants of O.E. 
with Intervening Variables. 
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8.4.6 Power as a Determinant and Outcome of the structure and processes of O.E. 
Diagram 8.13 is only described as a near-complete model of the determinants 
of O.E. because it is drawn within a background of and is constrained by a 
given set of micro-political and macro-societal power relationships. We have 
now come full circle with the topic that first orchestrated our criticisms of 
Tinker's CF-set and with cybernetic theory in general. The concept of power. 
As was pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, the CF-set did not analyse 
the decision processes and mechanics by which a particular mix of feasible 
inducements and contributions was chosen. Neither did the ideas elucidate 
the influence which macro-societal forces have on the content of the F-set nor 
on the relationships between macro- and micro-power relationships and its 
consequent effect on the definition of "needs" and effective organizational 
performance. These omissions were due partly ~o Ashby's neat examples of 
biological systems and his rather simplistic notions of survival with 
essentially unchanging critical variables. 
In this section we intend to supplement and enrich the work of Tinker 
and Ashby by setting our empirical model within a model of intricate micro-
and macro-power relationships and to show how the concept of O.E. and its 
exact specification is greatly influenced by those continually changing 
structures and processes. 
To begin, let us explain our separation of "macro" and "micro" power 
relationships. This differentiation is identical to our separation of the 
system and its environment. As pointed out earlier, this division should 
be seen as a theoretical, conceptual exercise and the boundary of a system 
viewed as a fluid, porous penumbra through which there is a continuous 
exchange of energy and resources. Thus' at times it may be difficult to 
differentiate a firm boundary. Given this caveat, we define micro-power 
relationships as appertaining to power relationships between and amongst 
participant groups within the focal F-set and macro-societal relationships 
as referring to power structures amongst interest groups in the larger 
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substantial environment of the F-set; th'e latter including inter-organizational 
linkages of the type desc~ibed by Perrow (1979) and Evan (1976). For a 
I, 
detailed discussion of the meaning of "substantial environment" and its 
difference from "general environment" the reader is referred to Lowe and 
McInnes (1971). Essentially the substantial environment of a system contains 
elements and coalitions which are less controllable by the system but which 
nevertheless significantly influence its activities. The general environment 
contains elements which have less influence on the structure and behaviour of 
the focal F-set. 
Next, we look at the concept of power per se. As Pettigrew (1973) notes, 
"there are as many different definitions of the concepts of authority and power 
as there are of the concept of role." Indeed, it is precisely this controversy 
over its conceptual elaboration and operational definition that has prevented 
few empirical studies of the antecedents and consequences of power. This 
thesis is not the place to effect yet another survey of these definitions, 
for a comprehensive discussion, the reader is referred to Wrong (1968; 1979) 
and Lehman (1969). However, a number of ~mportant theoretical distinctions 
must be made in order that we proceed on a sound footing. 
Most conceptions of power are based on Weber's (1947) classic definition 
that power is the probability that a person can carry out his or her own wi~l 
despite resistance. Nearly all the theorists who have written about power 
would express agreement with this broad definition; yet there are vital 
differences to be drawn amongst these different perspectives. For Talcott 
Parsons, for example, authority refers to the legitimate position of an 
individual or group: "Authority is essentially the institutional code within 
which the use of power as medium is organized and legitimized." Cry. 319, Parsons 1967.) 
Authority is then, for Parsons, a basis of power, in fact the only basis of 
POwer, rather than a kind of power. The use of power is restricted entirely 
to the aChievement of collective goals: 
"Power rests On the consensual solidarity ef a system • • • in this 
sense it is the capacity of a unit i~ the social system, collective 
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or individual, to establish or activate commitments to performance 
that contributes to, or is in the interest of, attainment of the 
goals of the collectivity." (p. 504, Parsons, 1967) 
., ' 
Giddens (1968) rightly questions this collectivistic orientation to power for 
"b Y treating power as reasonably (by definition) legitimate, and thus 
starting from the assumption of consensus of some kind between power-
holders and those subordinate to them, Parsons virtually ignores . . . 
the necessarily hierarchical character of power, and the divisions of 
interest which are frequently consequent upon it." (p. 264, Giddens, 1968.) 
Clearly, pOSitions of power offer to their encumbents definite privileges 
and rewards which thereby stimulate conflicts between those who want power 
and those who have it. This brings into playa multiplicity of possible 
strategies of coercion, decei4 manipulation and non-action which can be used 
either to acquire or to hold on to power. As Giddens (1968) states 
"(a)ny SOCiological (or social) theory which treats such phenomenon as 
'incidential', or as 'secondary and derived', and not as structurally 
intrinsic to power differentials, is blatantly inadequate." (p. 264, 
Giddens, 1968.) 
The extent of consensus between those with legitimated power (authority) 
and those Subordinate to them is a major variable in our empirical model. 
The formal structure of power and authority is regarded as problematic. This 
issue has been expressed in the literature in a number of ways. Barnard (1938) 
talks of the authority of position and the authority of leadership whilst 
Peabody (1964) distinguishes between formal and functional authority. Both 
these authors imply that authority requires to be fortified in interaction. A 
POsition may give a' leader authority, but the exercise of authority requires 
interaction - a relationship. A supervisor's ability to exercise authority 
depends on the willingness of his subordinates to obey him. Thus, the 
sUperior not only controls but is in turn controlled to some extent. Though 
overstating the case, Crozier (1964) compares subordinates to "free agents 
who can discuss their own problems and'bargain about them, who not only submit 
to a power but also participate in that structure." An important accounting 
example of such subordinate control is revealed in the work of Lowe and Shaw 
(1968) who revealed the ability of subordinate managers to bias budget 
forecasts. Though superior managers suspecteo those sales budget forecasts to 
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be inaccurate and tried to counterbias them, they were not often successful 
and these forecasts were usually accepted in a decision making situation. 
I, • 
Such acceptance can occur for several reasons. First, the collection of 
information about alternatives takes time. Second, even if there were time 
and interest such alternative data collection raises problems of trust, 
co-operation and morale. To duplicate the work of an appointed individual 
or committee implies, naturally, a lack of trust in the work of the other 
party. Thus, subordinates may be able to considerably influence the ability 
of managers to control them. 
This problematic of consensus between superiors and subordinates may 
be generalized to an analysis of micro- and macro-power differentials between 
and amongst interest groups which are within and without the focal F-set. 
The work of Pettigrew (1973) nicely illustrates this point where a power 
struggle took place between Kenny and his systems manager, Reilly, and between 
Reilly and his programming manager, Turner, conerning the purchase of a 
computer system. Eventually, Kenny was able to exert biases in favour of his 
own demands because he possessed a major strategic advantage in the power 
conflict by virtue of his placement as a gatekeeper along vital communication 
channels. In general then, as was pointed out by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), 
demonstrated by Friedlander and Pickle and depicted in the F-set, different 
interest 'groups often make different and incompatible demands on the coalition, 
which gives rise to different criteria of effectiveness. As argued earlier, 
criteria of O.E. are measured by monitoring participant behaviour in 
participation and production. In addition a universalistic surrogate measure 
of organizational balance was proposed in terms of the system's adaptive 
capacity. But what was left undiscusssed was whose acts of production and 
participation are desired more critical and vital for viability? Whose 
criteria of effectiveness must be balanced or traded-off against whose? 
Although it is a near truism to state that criteria of effectiveness are 
SOcial constructions reflective of underlying and particular interests (see 
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Hopwood, 1979) it is nonetheless true that we lack empirical knowledge as 
to how power prOblema tics and differentials of the kind described above 
I, 
influence the establishment and overthrow of specific "regimes of effectiveness". 
How, for example, do the mutual processes of conflicts of control between 
superiors and subordinates, between those who have power and those who have 
not as much effect the choice of a particular mix of inducements and 
contributions which benefit interest groups differently and which give viability 
to particular facets of effective performance? A choice and visibility which 
by ~ome accounts significantly influence corporate action and response to 
environmental demands. For example, in a study of insurance companies, Becker 
and Neuhauser (1975) found that different patterns of visibility for the 
finanCial consequences of corporate action themselves explained the major 
portion of the observed variance in the {atio of profits to assets. In a 
later study of American hospitals (Shortell, Becker and Neuhauser, 1977) 
illustrated how emphasis on the measurement and reporting of either the 
economic or the medical components of organizational performance could result 
in very different outcome consequences if they were disseminated through 
the relevant organizational communication and decision processes. With such 
dissemination, hospitals who measured economic consequences were indeed 
cheaper whilst those emphasizing medical consequences tended to be more 
innovative in the use of both medical technology and pharmaceuticals. How 
and why do these criteria of effectiveness become such influential "things 
in the world"? What micro-political and macro-societal interactions amongst 
interest groups gave rise and enabled the importance or "criticalness" of 
attending to particular criteria of performance in order to remain in the 
F-set in the long-run? As Hopwood (1979) points out: 
"Criteria of any variety have little more than the potential to 
influence corporate action. The realization of that potential is 
dependent, however, on the way in which articulated criteria interlink 
with the complex social and organizational processes through which they are 
endowed with a particular meaning and-relevance." (pp. 9~-94, Hopwood, 1979 
We shall elucidate several such processes which form our central focus. 
Our diSCUSSion so far may be depicted diagrammatically as below: 
Powerful Groups 
Within and Without 
the Focal F-Set 
\ 
'-
- 299-
Interaction 
f \ . Criteria of Ef ect1veness 
that need to be met in 
order to achieve long-run 
survival 
Less Powerful Groups 
Within and Without 
the Focal F-Set 
I 
Diagram 8.14 Power Processes and D.E. 
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That is, the interaction and possibly conflict between groups with 
power and those with relatively less influence the definition of and the 
kind of participant needs that require satisfaction in order that the F-set 
is maintained in the long-run. It also shows that it is most likely that 
powerful groups will be able to impose their definition of effective 
performance but equally that less powerful subordinates may have considerable 
influence in enforcing their interests and criteria. The work of Crozier 
(1964), Mechanic (1962) and Pettigrew (1973) illustrate how the concept of 
dependency brings about these phenomena. For these three pieces of research 
essentially show that within organizations, dependency and hence power may 
be generated by controlling access to the resources of information, persons 
and instrumentalities. 
The dependent aspect of power has' been treated most fully in the power-
dependence theory of Emerson (1962) and Blau (1964). Emerson (1962) wrote: 
"Thus, it would appear that the power to control or influence the other 
resides in control over the things he values, which may range all the 
way from oil resources to ego support. In short, power resides 
impliCitly in other's dependence." (p. 32, Emerson, 1962.) 
Emerson went on to define dependence as: 
"Dependence (Dab). The dependence of actor A upon actor B is 
(1) directly proportional to A's motivational investment in goals 
mediated by B, and (2) inversely proportionate to the availability 
of those goals outside of the A-B relationship." (p. 32, Emerson, 1962.) 
Subsequently, Emerson formally defined the power of A over B as equal to the 
dependence of B upon A. Thus, power is defined in terms of dependence, and 
dependence in turn is seen to be a function of the importance of what one 
actor or group of actors gets from the other and an inverse function of the 
availability of this outcome or performance in other places or from other 
sources. 
Power, according to this formulation is quite simply understood. It 
derives from having something that someone else wants or needs and being in 
control of the performance or resources so that there are few alternative 
sources, or no alternative sources, for obtaining what is desired. The 
resource-dependence perspective on organizational environments mentioned 
earlier is essentially based on this definition of power. So is the work of 
~I ' 
Hickson et al (1971) who argued that the power of organizational sub-units 
is a function of (1) the degree to which a subunit copes with uncertainty 
for other subunits, (2) the extent to which a subunit's coping activities 
are substitutable, and (3) the degree to which the activities are centrally 
linked to those of other subunits. Essentially, both the resource-dependence 
theory of power and the uncertainty coping or strategic contingencies 
perspectiVe on power are variants of each other and both emphasize the notion 
that dependency is the converse of power. This source of power could then 
enable actors and groups like Crozier's maintenance men and Pettigrew's head 
of management services to make their demands "vital" and prerequisites for 
organizational viability. That is, power based on such power interactions and 
relationships of dependency crucially establish certain criteria of effect-
iveness in the consciousness of organizational life. 
However, this process by which visibility is given to certain facets of 
effectiveness is but half the story. The strategic contingencies theory of 
HiCkson et al was tested by Hinings et al (1974). They studied some twenty-eight 
SubUnits in seven organizations (five breweries and two divisions of a container 
company) and found statistically significant correlations between the various 
indicators of power and virtually all the variables from the strategic 
Contingencies theory. However, Hinings reported that the two power scores 
were only significant . when the subunit had the top scores on all the 
strategic contingency variables. This would indicate that coping with 
unCertainty alone does not provide domination and power but that it must 
be accompanied by work flow pervasiveness and centrality and low substitutability 
for the coping capacity. 
A more penetrating statement of the partiality and inadequacy of 
dependence definitions of power comes from Clegg and Dunkerley (1980) , who 
~einterpreted Crozier's (1964) original formulation of the "control of 
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uncertainty confers power" hypothesis and his supporting empirical evidence. 
They pointed out that the plant described by Crozier is a part of a state 
I, ' 
monopoly organization that mass-produces cigarettes. The monopoly controls 
the sales of the factory's output. Almost every activity of the system seems 
to be encapsulated by constraints of a technical or organizational nature. 
For instance, the organization's output goals and mechanization processes are 
fixed, and the majority of petty decisions have been centralized or are 
rigidly standardized. The task of the factory was thus to combine 350 employees 
and forty-five machines in four limited functions: (1) preparation of raw 
material; (2) maintenance and setting of machines and buildings; (3) utilization 
of non-machine combinations for output in several parallel production segments; 
and (4) allocating of jobs among employees. It could not determine its own 
mode and pace of mechanization, ev~tl its basic technology such as the allocation 
of job and new capital reinvestment. At a national level, the monopoly faced 
union pressure which prevented the plant engaging in any autonomous personnel 
POlicy measures. Output norms, workload and pay rates were all fixed at a 
national level. In short, for people working in the organization, "the 
daily problems of running the plant are completely boring" (Crozier, 1964). 
The plant is an almost completely routini~ and dc-skilled production unit 
and paralleled by an almost completely routinized task st.ructure for moni loring 
and controlling the situation. 
However, within this formal bureaucratic, rigid system, there was room 
for individual, local power. The maintenance engineers were able to gain 
power and use it in their own interests as opposed to those of supervisors 
and production workers but only because of the de-skilled, fragmented nature 
of production worker's jobs which, in 'addition, were paid on a piece rate 
payment system as compared to skilled maintenance work which was paid on a 
fixed salary. Only the maintenance men had the necessary skill for repairing 
the machines; this gave them a situational skill which then became the basis of 
a local plant dependence upon them by both management and workers. That is, 
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though these men were able to gain power, they nevertheless remained 
Subordinates, remained ~ithin an existing set of organizational and societal 
" . 
rules. Crozier did not claim that they were the most powerful members of 
the industrial bureaucracy because of their undoubted success in controlling, 
in an almost monopolistic manner, discretionary tasks of their work. What he 
does suggest, so Clegg and Dunkerley (1980) argue, is that given the formal-
ized power structure of a task-discontinuous organization there exist areas 
of uncertainty which groups or individuals are capable of controlling. So 
these areas become key resources by means of which individual and groups 
procure less dependence and more power but in a manner which does not disturb 
essential "ground rules". Essential values, norms and power bases on a 
macro-societal basis, which ensured that the organization's dominant power 
structures and criteria of effectiveness were consonant with these values. 
What Clegg and Dunkerley (1980) rightly criticize is the tendency of dependence-
POwer theorists to locate sources of dependence and power only within the 
micro-organization and hence ignore macro-societal influences. In addition, 
such behaviourist-oriented, one-dimensional views of power (derived essentially 
from the work of Dahl, 1957) tend to concentrate on observable behaviour in 
key decision-making areas with subjective interests seen as policy preferences 
revealed by political participation. There is a neglect of what Lukes (1974) 
calls the two-dimensional view of power which emphasizes decision-making as 
well as nondecision-making, issues and potential issues and interests revealed 
through policy preferences and grievances. As Mechanic (1962) argued what is 
interesting is not that subordinates or other similar less powerful groups 
accept the instructions of managers or other more powerful groups because of 
the greater power possessed by management. Rather, it is interesting that in 
Spite of the considerable power potentially exercisable and exercised by lOW8~ 
level employees, these employees still accept the power of managers to direct 
and define effective work performance. 
This then raises a second process which facilitates the establishment of 
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effectiveness: legitimation based on norms, values and beliefs. Legitimation 
is used here in two senses. On the one hand legitimation refers to an 
acceptability of wealth, power, status and resource distributions, in general 
systemic strategies, based on a social, collective consensus about rightful 
privileges and distributions. The point here is that although it is true 
that the manager may have the power to fire employees and to withold rewards 
such power is only a partial explanation for employee behaviour. Employees 
do not consciously and consistently compare their power (to withold labour 
services, to leave, to withold information, to do the work poorly) with the 
power that the manager has (to use rewards and sanctions), and then decide 
whether or not to comply depending on the relative power balance. Rather, 
most of the time in most work settings the authority and effectiveness mandate 
of the manager is so legitimated by societal and organizational values and 
taken for granted, that issues of relative power seldom become consciously 
considered. Subordinates obey not because the supervisor has the power to 
compel them to; rather, they follow "reasonable" instructions related to the 
control of their work behaviour because they expect such directions to be 
given and fOllowed. This is what Bachrach and Baratz (19'1) call the other, more 
subtle face of power. Power that expresses itself quietly and not in the 
form of a conscious cabal exercising explicit power in decision-making areas. 
Power that resides in the ability to circumscribe overt and covert decision-
making areas to "safe" issues, to mobilize thinking, perception and action 
to specific "biased" directions. To sanctify and normalize their criteria 
of effectiveness as a customary and wholly acceptable part of social interaction. 
Lukes (l97~) argues that a three-dimensional view of power would encompass 
these POints and even expose the contradiction between the interests of 
those exercising power and the real interests of those they exclude. 
The argument that these values and norms within organizations actively 
influence individual and organizational action is clearly exemplified in our 
diScussion of the dimension of supportiveness S Different levels of 
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supportivenessS and different micro-cultures mediated by personality variables 
will influence behaviour for they serve to define what is an acceptable 
strategy. 
Societal values and norms are of equal, if not greater, importance. 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) report the case of the FAS (formerly Famous 
Artists School) which, in 1970, fil~d for reorganization under the bankruptcy 
laws. Because of the manner in which it conducted its affairs it had been 
deemed by societal rules of "fairness" and "justice" not to have fulfilled 
its obligations to its participants. 
The unequal distribution of an ability to define what is 'right" or 
"wrong", "just" or "injust", and other such norms of social and individual 
behaviour was termed by Habermas Herrschaft:domination. He was especially 
concerned with th!s form of "superstruct.ural" domination whereby one group/groups 
in society possess greater power to define the normative structures of thought 
and action. In so doing Habermas attempted to enrich (not to usurp) the 
traditional Marxist insistence on a theory of power which is necessarily 
linked to the material relations of production, itself a variant of the 
dependency aspect of power. While organizational and societal norms may, in 
some instances, be linked directly to the mode of production, it need not be. 
The subordinate role of women in Western society, the designation of forms 
of work as "for women only" or the differentials in a woman's wage, for 
example, represent instances where domination existed prior to the advent 
of capitalistic relations of production. Thus organizational and societal 
norms may confer power on certain groups or individuals, independent of 
the relation of production, the precise emergence of such norms being 
themselves a result of a confluence of\historical traditions of domination, 
of relationships, events, unpredictable chance events, violent discon-
tinUities. This mutual interaction between power, domination and the 
bases Which make such inequalities possible is shown in our next diagram, 
Diagram 8.15, in a series of feedback loops. Here the interaction and power 
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relationships between interest groups is seen to be reciprocally rooted 
in dependency relations, micro-organizational values and traditions 
and macro-societal norms. 
This concept of macro- and micro-structural rules, values and 
beliefs lies at the heart of neo-Marxist critiques (see Perrow, 1979) 
of traditional theories of power which they claim only emphasize the 
dependency aspect of power. While it is accepted that dependency is 
the converse of a form of functional or expert power they argue that 
the assumption of a freely competitive power struggle in the organization's 
domain obscures vital ground rules which have their own independent 
control over action. However, such theorists often argue for what we 
feel is an oversocialized (to borrow Wrong's (1961) term) version of 
man. That the individual is essentially a social being who, as a bearer 
of social relations, is ruled and dominated in the last instance by rules 
of economic power. That power is always a particular type of social 
action that is constructed and acted out by individuals as a ruled 
enactment. The individual in such theories of power becomes a near 
non-entity, wholly encompassed by a network of social relations. He 
" loses a sense of strategic choice, of being the part-determinant of his 
own individual actions. Indeed, his individuality is questionable. For 
the individual then becomes no more than a "bearer" of a particular rationality 
in which an "objective principle" is regarded as a concrete object which 
governs domination; which concerns and grants the prior capacity to be able 
to exercise power (in dependency situations) in the first place. That such 
.. . 
phenomena exist is not disputed; clearly prevailing social, political, 
.. 
economic and ethical values do influel\ce definitions of "vital", "need" and 
"eff'ective performance". Such normative structures do define and circumscribe 
acceptable strategies and ways of behaving, they are manifested in everyday 
life. However, there is little theoretical justification for viewing such 
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structural determination as the totality of influence. Just as man is not 
completely free, he equally is not completely constrained by societal and 
micro-organizational values and beliefs. There is room and space for 
indiVidual interpretation and manipulation of dependency relationships. As 
will be illustrated later on, normative structures, dependency inter-
actions and individual interpretations and creative coping shape and determine 
the specific facets of effective performance. 
We therefore define power generally by saying that A exercises power 
over B when A affects B in a non-significant manner, to the extent that A 
can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do. Such power may refer 
to an ability to control resources which, when agents engage in or refrain 
from practices, produces effects on other agents. It also refers to an 
ability to set parameters in thinking and perception such that certain facets 
of effectiveness may become more vital, either in a substantive or symbolic 
sense than others. It is important to emphasize that we do not define power 
as a successful action of A on B, this would confuse the successful exercise 
of power and potential power, a criticism often levelled at Dahl's original 
conception. It is important to note that the words power and domination 
(Herrschaft) denote an unequal distribution of the power to influence. It 
is also important that as here conceptualized the concepts of power and 
-domination may be applied to any interaction or relationship. In effect, every 
coupling between two individuals or groups of individuals is potentially a 
relationship of power and domination; each is potentially a situation where 
an ine9uality of influence exists. 
The word "legitimation" may also refer to another phenomenon: the 
• process whereby explanations and decisions are made consonant with parti-
cipant values and interests. Janis (1975) uses the term "groupthink" to 
refer to an extreme process of concurrence-seeking among members of a 
cohesive group. Similarly Chaffe (1980) found that despite the emphasis 
on rationality and the use of 'rational' criteria, allocations of 
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important resources, such as funds and equipment, at Stanford University were 
predicted from many of the same variables, such as departmental power and 
student enrollments, that had accounted for allocation outcomes at Illinois 
:, 
and California Universities. Yet because of the decision-making processes 
and apparatus in place, the process was perceived as being much less 
political by the participants at Stanford. That is, where decisions and 
choices are framed in dominant modes of rationality which are consonant with 
participant expectations they become justifiable, meaningful and "objective". 
Organizations can thus be viewed as systems of activity in which 
participants attempt to develop and convince others of rationalizations and 
explanations for these patterns of activity and for their criteria of effect-
iveness. The explanations which are developed are constrained to be "rational" 
in the social context, and there is, in addition, a preference for explanations 
that provide feelings of control and justice. In the micro-political and macro-
societal web of interactions, various interest groups often attempt to develop 
such explanations, rationalizations and legitimation for their desired 
activities and choices which are themselves frequently resolved through the 
use of power. As Pfeffer (1981) points out, there is a necessity to 
differentiate between substantive outcomes of the decision-making process and 
sentient outcomes brought about by symbolic language. The former is often 
determined by the distribution of power in a situation whilst the latter 
serves.to render such power less visible. Further, the symbolic and 
substantive aspects of organizational action are not clearly linked. For 
instance, choices or decisions may precede the development of explanations 
or justification, just as behaviour frequently precedes the development of 
the attitude consistent with behaviour (Bern, 1972). Also, as pOinunout, 
there is a less than perfect correspondence between attitude and behaviour, 
hence the link between justification and explanations for choice and the 
choices themselves can be loose. 
The use of language as a means of legitimation, indeed as a strategy 
for maintaining and/or changing power structures and facets of effectiveness 
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is thus taken as a major variable of study. How does language playa role in 
articulating and establishing criteria of effectiveness? It is here that 
I, ' 
the hermeneutical emphasis of writers like Garfinkel (1967) and Goffman (19~1) 
help to sensitise explanations of individual and organizational action. 
Clearly, the provision and emphasis of information of a certain type will 
influence decision-making. We have ample empirical evidence ,to substantiate 
this hypothesis. But what is perhaps more difficult to document is the 
everyday use of language: words, expressions, phrases which are taken for 
granted within a historical, social and organizational context and which 
reflects norms and deep structures. We contend that this everyday language 
is of vital importance in organizing a mode of rationality in providing a 
cohesive gel to organizational thinking and identity. Apart from the use of 
language in furthering particular definitions of O.E. we shall also highlight 
other political and power strategies in our empirical work. Strategies such 
as the control of agenda items, the use of "objective" outside experts, the 
promotion of "like-minded" persons to positions of legitimate authority, the 
performance of rituals and organizational ceremonies, the display of 
organizationally accepted symbols and so forth. As Peters (1978) has argued 
" ... symbols are the very stuff of management behaviour. Executives, 
after all, do not synthesize chemicals or operate lift trucks; they 
deal in symbols." (p. 10, Peters, 1978.) 
We would add that such dealing in symbols and ceremonies is undertaken by 
all organizational participants and not merely management in the advancement 
of their demands and concept of effective organizational performance. 
We have come to the conclusion of a complex, empirical model of the 
definition, measurement and determinants of O.E. within a technical and 
hermeneutical interest. Our model is an extension of Tinker's CF-set in that 
it extends the concept of O.E. to one of long-run survival, explicately tests 
a weak statement of Ashby's Law and incorporates an analysis of power on 
both micro and macro dimensions. 
The concept of long-run survival as defined above is not similar to the 
- 311 -
crude concept of physical survival which has often been proposed or implied 
in the past (Gibson et -al, 197~) Katz and Kahn, 1978). As argued, we are 
;, . 
not interested in assessing the level of physical survival of the organization 
per se but in the level of long-run need satisfaction. This is because 
organizations are viewed as functional entities which are not set up for 
their own sake but the satisfaction of participant needs. Emphasizing this 
as the normative criterion for O.E. evaluation also describes a possible 
course toward long-run stability of the macro-societal system. As Keeley (1978) 
pointed out generally aversive system consequences which lead to participant 
satisfaction ought not, and in the long-run probably will not be tolerated 
by participants. Micro-organizational and probably macro-societal crises 
could develop due to a large reservoir of llnmet needs and this might lead 
to grave instability within the micro- and macro system. 
Though the criterion O.E. is a univariate one, indicators of the propensity 
to survive are derived on a variety of acts of participant satisfaction with 
production and participation. As such, these measures do not reify the 
organization into an autonomous system that is important for its own sake. 
The definition and indicators of survival are tied to the functional notion 
of participant satisfaction, thus avoiding the imputation of a priori system 
needs or system imperatives which are far removed from participant objectives. 
As Keeley (1978) points out such imputation often reflects implicit value 
judgeme~which are not discussed in detail. For example, Scott and Mitchell 
(1976) argued that the general goals of systems were stability, growth and 
flexibili ty. 
"These goals are fundamental of the organic models of modern organization 
theory; they are derived from the heritage of system theory in the 
biological sciences; and most importantly, they are criteria for 
appraising organizational health." (pp. 59-60, Scott and Mitchell, 1976.) 
Such'goals" are in fact reflections of the misuse of Von Bertalanffy's 
organismic analogy. For there is little justification for these biological 
imperatives when one applies them to collectivities with different purposes. 
For example, an ad hoc organization may not wish to grow or to survive 
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physically in the long-run. Indeed it is such bland application of the 
organismic analogy that has let to a growing list of abstract systemic needs 
that do not relate well to each other. 
The F-set thus incorporates explicitly a normative criterion which may 
be subjected to debate and verification; unlike previous analyses it seeks 
to avoid an illicit smuggling in of undiscussed value biases. It is due 
precisely to the explicitness of its assumptions that we may later build this 
initial theory of O.E. into a critical theory of organizational assessment. 
The weakness of parochial, partial, so-called descriptive models of O.E. are 
hence aVoided. It is accepted that the ultimate death or non-survival of the 
system needs a longitudinal research methodology. However, an attempt has 
been made to overcome this problem by including a measure of the system's 
adaptive capacity, the argument being that this 'is a surrogate measure for 
long-run viability. 
It is further accepted that the F-set does not pinpoint a particular 
feasible strategy as being the optimum for that would involve serious 
theoretical problems e.g. the comparison of interpersonal utilities and 
levels of satisfaction and the adjudication of competing constructions of 
reality. But simple, optimization principles such as those suggested by Rawls 
and adapted by Keeley (1978) or created by Bentham and borrowed by Cummings 
(1977) are parochial and non-generalizable. 
Their difficulties as discussed earli er suggest that a ~QT,.sfi<"t1.9 _ notion 
is more appropriate for a theory of O.E. We have also supplemented and 
complemented Tinker's CF-set with an analysis of how power influences the 
actual choice of particular criteria of effectiveness and particular feasible 
strategies and the subsequent consequences for organizational action. 
However, let us also be clear about the assumptions behind the F-set 
for these will form the object of critical reflection later in the thesis. 
In order that the concept of long-run survival is (onGOmi~nt with need-
satisfaction the theory is predicated on four vital assumptions: 
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(a) it assumes a free movement of participants and their groups, such 
that if a participant does not receive adequate benefits within 
I, ' 
the organization, he is able to withdraw his contributions and join 
alternative coalitions. Hence the continuin'g survival of an 
organization indicates that it is continually able to satisfy the 
needs of those participants who collectively are necessary and 
sufficient to guarantee its survival; 
(b) the corollary of (a) IS tt,Qt ffle non-survival of an organization indicates 
in general that it no longer meets the needs of these essential 
participant groups. An organization ceases to exist only for these 
reasons. An ambiguity creeps in here, for the definition of 
"essential" participants is likely to change depending on whether 
one speaks of systemic continuity or non-continuity. For example, 
skilled workers may be essential participants in a state of health, 
they are essential in the sense of being required for the continued 
production of wealth. However, in a state of non-continuity they 
may not be essential participants in that their demands are of less 
importance. The decision to discontinue could be made entirely by 
another participant group e.g. the state. The analyst must, therefore, 
be extremely cautious when applying the theory of the F-set to evaluate 
the effectiveness of empirical organizations; 
(c) by arguing that such a theory facilitates stability at the macro-
societal level implies that such stability is intrinsically desirable 
and conflict may only be viewed as a disruptive influence; and 
(d) the theory assumes that a definition of satisfaction as given by 
, 
participant actors is sufficient material for analysis. It does not 
inquire into forms of "false consciousness" or "ideology" in the 
Marxian or Habermasian sense. Indeed, such concepts are alien to the 
F-set ideas as presently formulated. 
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Chapter 9: Developing Data Measures of Theoretical Constructs 
9. 0 Introduction 
0' • 
In Chapter 8 we set out in detail a theoretical model of O.E. that 
incorporated both static and dynamic dimensions. In Chapter 7 we described 
the empirical site in some detail and in Chapter 6 we set out the methods 
and process of our research. Here we intend to ~ent in detail the means 
by which we operationalized our theoretical constructs into empirical data 
measures and to assess the statistical validity of the degree of the concept-
data measure correspondence. In this way we seek to discuss the internal, 
the external and the theoretical validity of the model set out in Chapter 8. 
9.1 The System Defined 
As pointed out earlier, our system of investigation is defined as the 
Mayfield General Nurse Training System. This conceptual and empirical system 
of relationships is not identical empirically with the Mayfield Area Training 
System as we have concentrated only on the general course of training. As 
discussed, this choice was made for a number of reasons: (a) the general 
component represented by far the largest contingent of nurse training 
(approximately 50% of the 1,300 learners were in general training) and 
therefore captured a large proportion of the entire learner participant group 
of the Area Training System; (b) there were insufficient expertise, funds, 
effort and time to learn the workings of a complex Area Training System that 
encompassed a wide geographical area, and (c) it was felt prudent to analyse 
the concept of O.E. and corporate. accountability and to develop non-financial 
measures thereof in a more limited empirical setting. The closure of our system 
for investigation was therefore effected at the general nurse training level. 
Essentially, this covers learners studying for the S.R.N. and S.E.N. 
qualifications which are generalized nursing qualifications that equip a nurse 
to work in the main general acute case specialities like medicine and 
surgery. 
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Drawing the boundary of our system round the general component of 
training alone does not in itself present a theoretical ~roblem. The 
closure of a system and the choice of a resolution level of analysis 
depends partly on the insight and purpose of the observer-researcher, 
on eXisting theories about the role and purpose of knowledge and on 
disciplinary traditions governing the study of particular problem con-
texts. As the purpose of this thesis is to test a general argument about 
organizational behaviour, then the main requirement is that a social or 
several social collectivities be the focus of empirical research. That 
such a collectivity may not accord with legal definitions of the entity 
is in this instance less relevant as the general nUrse training system 
functions autonomously and is independent of other courses of training. 
Having delineated conceptually a system for investigation we depict 
the system pictorially ~~ Diagrams 9.1a, 9.1b and 9.1c. The first diagram 
shows the system-environment relationship at the lowest resolution ~evel of 
analysis. The system and its environment are black boxes and only the 
input-transformation-output process is observed. Four main inputs are 
identified, these are the patient's needs for health, nursing recruits, 
funds and information and the main outputs are argued to be satisfaction 
of patient needs, information and qualified nurses. For the time being 
the input-output process is characterized in 'matter-of-fact' terms 
for simplicity, for clearly, one could argue that a nurse training 
system draws in a variety of inputs and produces a multitude of other 
effects, which may be intentional or not. A discussion of the wide-
ranging effects of a nurse training system will be postponed till later 
• \ 
\ 
chapters and here we are mainly concerned with the conceptual task of 
defining our boundaries of analysis. 
'. 
, 
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Information --------------~Health, Satisfaction 
Patient Needs of Patient Needs 
Diagram 9.la: Modelling the System;Environment Relationship 
at the First Resolution Level 
Diagram 9.lb shows the nursing system with its two primary sub-
systems : the education and service sub-systems which are linked by the 
allocation function. As Cbp. 7 demonstrates, DOth sUb-syst~s have their 
own work hierarchies. Broadly speaking, both hierarchies are siDdlar in 
that the jobs with hi9her levels of pay, status and power are administrativ 
jobs and the hi9her one moves up the respective hierarchy, the less 
direct c~ntact one has with the patient/learner within the system. The 
Allocation function at Mayfield is small in terms of the number of staff 
employed and plays essentially an integrative, co-ordinating role. It 
acts as a bUffer ~d as a mediator between the somewhat different objectives 
" : \' 
of both primary sub-systems. All three functions are, however, invel ved in 
, 
the process of nurse .train1~9 and hence the arrow denoting the transfoxmation 
process passess throu9h all three functions. 
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Diagram 9.lc shows the complexity of the nurse training environment at 
Mayfield. In particular, we have tried to highlight specific sub-environ-
ments in such a way as to show that the system and its environment are 
intricately bound; one is in fact the mirror image of the other. Thus, 
learners relate to a specific part of the environment (the learner sub-
environment) and this is in turn related'to other parts of the environment 
and system. We have noted one element within the learner sub-environment, 
that of images developed of nursing and the role of nurses whilst the 
learner was still at school. These expectations or role images of potential 
recruits play an i~ortant role in nurse training for they influence the 
learner's perception of and response to training; and they also partly 
determine the present sexual bias in the co~osition of nurses. other 
elements of the learner sub-environment could be the level of educational 
attainment demanded by the employing institution. Yet another important 
factor is the level of youth employment. This last factor was especially 
important in our research because it was conducted during the period 
1979 - 1981, a period of record levels of youth unemployment. This 
Situation clearly influenced the leaving and staying behaviour among 
learners and the ease with which Mayfield could raise its level of ~ducational 
requirement. In addition, the level of adult unemployment is also an important 
variable because learners require full-time employment once they have qualified. 
In the past, it was traditional that nurses who had finished training would 
be almost automatically employed by the training hospital. There are Signs, 
however, that this may not be the case and a greater competition for' jobs 
is forCing learners to look further afield for post-qualifying employment • 
.. 
The patient sub-environment is ~nother important influence on the 
activity of the nurse training system. For the patients are a section of 
the community which the nurse is supposed to serve. Thus, the activity 
. 
of the nurse training system will be influenced by patient and community 
expectations about the value of the nurse and the kind of care expected. 
• 
-320-
The nurse teacher and the qualified nure's sub-environments are a third 
influence factor. Within this set, we have highlighted in particular the 
~ . 
relation of nurses to their main professional associations and to trade unions. 
The General Nursing Council of England and Wales (to be replaced in 1983 by 
the United Kingdom Central Nursing Council) acts as the chief policy-making 
body for all nurses. It determines the length and type Qf nurse .education, 
sets examinations and certifies not only learners, nurse teachers but also 
nurSing schools as being 'appropriate'. Changes in their policies thus 
affect all nursing schools on a national scale. Another important 'professional' 
association is the Royal College of Nursing (R.C.N.) which represents the 
majority of nurses in negotiations about working conditions, pay etc. with 
the state. other trade union organisations which are beginning to play 
a role in the nursing arena are N.U.P.E. (the National Union for Public 
Employees) and C.O.H.S.E. (the Confederation of Health Service Employees). 
Such insitutions are important parts of the nurs~'s environment because 
they raise de,p issues about society's treatment of its nursing force, 
and ethical questions about the nurse's right to strike. A nurse learner is 
both an employee and a trainee, she is entitled to join a trade union and 
comes within the province of employment-related laws. If she wishes to 
do so, she can join in strike action, an act which clearly contradicts 
the traditional nursing dedication to altruistic ·service. 
Yet another facet of this sub-environment of nurse teachers is the 
influence of nurSing models from North America, in particular the USA. 
The bulk of nurSing research stems from the States and so, in general, do 
new definitions of 'effective' nursing techniques. The much-discussed nursing 
• process and the concept of the nurse practitioner are both ideas that origi-
nally emerged in North American literature and are now influencing nurse 
practice and education at Mayfield. 
Finally, both the qualified nurse and nurse-teacher sub-environments 
are influenced by wider social attitudes about the role of women in the work-
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world. Nursing was and is predominantly a female occupation CMacGuire, 1980) 
~d a large proportion of its workforce is female. The size of this workforce 
is influenced by community and social 'ground rules' about the role of 
mothers,wives, and women in general in the field of work, defined as income-
generating occupations (employment). Prior to the Second World War, nurses 
invariably stopped work after marriage to,start a family. However, career 
.. 
and work patterns of U.K. ;ur";es in the 1970s and early 19HOs have not 
reflected these early trends. The work of MacGuire (1980) shows that a 
significant proportion of qualified, married nurses are returning to work 
on a full-time or part-time basis, thus reflecting a significant change 
in social expectations about the role of wife and mother in the United 
Kingdom. The availability of this labour pool feeds into and is related to 
the overall picture of alternative forms of employment open to nurses, 
both qualified and learner nurses. 
"' .' ... .. 
The medical sub-environment is also hypothesized to be an important 
influence on nursing and nurse education. There is sufficient historical 
evidence to suggest that the tensions between these two professions have 
significantly influenced nursing's attemp~s to gain professional status (see 
Abel-Smith, 1960; White, 1978) and the way in which nurse education is 
presently structured. As will be later argued, nursing has essentially been 
built on the medical model of man and nurse education itself breeds forms 
of discipline which perpetuate the nurse's subordinate role in relation to 
the male doctor. 
The activities of the State are clearly of importance to an analysis of 
the UK nurse training system. Since the National Health Service Act of 1946 
and the nationaliaation of health car~\in Great Britain, the State has played 
\ 
a Vital role in shaping the provision of health services and the organization 
of health education, research and experimentation. ~ignificant Acts of 
Parliament which affect nurse education and our micro-organisation in 
. . ' 
Particular include the Salmon Report (1966) " the 'Bx:i.99S Report n972), the 
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reorganization of the Health Services in 1974, the setting-up of Area Schools 
of Nursing in 1974 and the Merrison Report (1979). In addition, there have 
., . 
been numerous reports governing the issue of nurses's pay, for example, the 
Clegg Report on nursing pay parity. Our documentation of the history of the 
NGH and th~SGH has also revealed how state action can mediate the power 
relations between important interest groups and aid some in their efforts to 
gain greater status and prestige. . 
, 
The nurse, whether as a ~earner or a qualified nurse also relates to 
other health professionals within the health arena, for example, the social 
worker, the physiotherapist, and various welfare specialists. The nurse's concept 
of her role and of her 'rightful area' of competence is clearly influenced by the 
existence of such professio~als and their concept of their roles. There could 
be instances where another professional could be viewed as a competitor or as 
a depository of difficult patient problems. For instance, research suggests 
that the general nurse displays a significant lack of knowledge about psycho-
social care (see Rosenthal et aI, 1980; Kramer, 1974). It could be that 
the existence of these other professionals enables the nurse to 'pass on' 
Psychological and anxiety-ridden problem situations to them. A study of the 
role of these other workers Vis-a-Vis the nurse is thus theoretically valid. 
Finally, the hospital as a sub-environment ~f the nurse training system is 
also Significant. Hospitals have been described as microcosms of society and 
... 
they have long occupied a place in medical sociology. They differ as to the 
specific criteria of effectiveness emphasized (see, Becker and Neuhauser,1975) and 
the specific philosophies of health care employed. These differences in turn 
influence the structure of nurse tra1n\ng. At Mayfield, for example, the 
SGH had a different ward lay-out system from the NGH and this reflected the 
hospital's belief in the importance of a provision of patient privacy. The 
5GB ais~ ~ad a po11~ pf care on a 24-hour baSis. This meant that there 
was to be a continuous, smooth change - over of shifts and there were to be 
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fewer divisions between 'day staff work' and 'night staff work'. The 
SGH WQS staffed by ward receptionists who handled the administrative tasks 
of patient admittance and discharge. In the NGH, this was usually the 
Sister's job. In the NGH, it was learner nurses who dished out a patient's 
food and monitored a ptient's intake; in the SGH it was ward orderlies 
Who performed the actual serving of food.' These differences are not 
trivial differences of procedure for they represent different definitions 
of a nurse's work and reflect the nurse's attempt to appropriate a particular 
area of competence. 
Finally, it should be npted that we have linked all these sub-environ-
ments by a series of arrows because it is believed that they relate to one 
another in mutually interactive ways. Thus, not only does the system relate 
to its environment, but the parts of the environment also affect each other. 
9.2.1 The Choice of Learner Absenteeis& and Turnover as Surrogate Measures 
of Organizational Effectiveness 
This choice was made for several reasons. Firstly, these measures 
represented an indicator of participative behaviour on the part ~f a vital 
interest group in the F-set. The official purpose of a nurse training system 
is to train recruits and to transform them into qualified nurses; were there to 
be a substantial reduction in the size of this interest group, the system would 
in effect run the risk of losing the raison d'etre for its existence. Indeed, 
if the interest group were to withdraw completely from the F-set, the system 
\ 
as such would no longer exist. This same argument could in principle be 
applied to all other interest groups, for the F-set defines all groups who are 
necessary and suff~cient for the identification and survival of the system 
~ 
under analysis. However, it is argued that the interest group represented by 
learners captures the essence of a nurse training system. It is certainly the 
~ 
caSe that were teachers and management to be non-existent, the focal F-set 
Would be radically different; nurse training would be organized on a new 
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transformed basis but the existence and persistence of learners as an interest 
qroup would nevertheless ensure the survival of nurse training as a system. 
Were this interest group to be non-existen~ the very official purpose of our 
system would have been transformed. It was, therefore, felt that theoretically 
these two measures of partOicipative behaviour were valid indicators of the 
.. ' 
long-run propensity of th~ system (as defined) to survive. 
Secondly, these two measures had received a good deal of prominence and , 
publicity in the nursing literature (see Bendall, 1965; Birch, 1975; Clark, 
1975; Franks, 1972; General Nursing Council, 1966; Hegarty, 1975; Hawk, 
1976; Hutcheson et aI, 1979; Kramer, 1974; Revans, 1964; Lunn, 1975; Mercer, 
197q; Moores, 1971; Redfern, 1978; Scott l'1right, 1968; Singh and 
Smith, 1975) There are at least four reasons for this visibility in the U.K. 
(a) learner nurse turnover in the late 50s, 60s, early and mid-1970s was 
considered high and in the period 1965-1975 averaged around 30\ in the 
United Kingdom as a whole; (b) the increased bureaucratization and rationalization,. 
of a nationalized occupation meant that increased comparisons were being made 
between the costs of learner nurse absenteeism to the N.H.S. (and the state) 
and the costs to industry of a high incidence of absenteeism amongst industrial 
workers, (c) learner nurses from a significant part of the ward-based labour 
force in the United Kingdom and Cd) measures of nursing output and effective 
nursing care were far more difficult to develop and implement. 
Given these four reasons, we re-evaluated our choice of absence and 
turnover as measures of participation. We concluded that although much work 
had been carried out on learner turnover, the findings to date were almost 
entirely focused on the personality and personal characteristics of the indi-
vidual learner. Micro-organizational and macro-societal influences were 
largely ignored. The research on absence was similarly in a rather unsatis-
factory state. Despite past research efforts, there was little rigorous 
analysis of the causal influences on absence in general and on learner 
nurse absence in particular. Echoing Nicholson et aI's (1977b) criticisms, 
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we felt that there was again too much emphasis on the individual as a unit 
of analysis and too little on the system as a whole as a complex interaction 
of wider socio-economic and political forces. There was also a sad lack 
of information on the relationship between absence and turnover. Hill and 
Trist (1955) had suggested that absence is an alternative to leaving the 
organization, an alternative which enabled the individual to restore his 
inducement contribution equilibrium. Another view could be that turnover 
and absence are parts of a continuum which the individual possesses. The 
decision to be absent thus predicts a decision to leave, and absence does 
not restore the inducement contribution balance. Nelson (1975) in his 
study of British nurses found some support for this hypothesis of a withdrawal 
continuum. He found that each group of nurses in his study (voluntary 
leavers, stayer~ "absent" and stayers "not absent") experienced job 
adjustment difficulties which differed only in degree and not in kind. The 
stayers "not absent" were the most favourably disposed towards the 
organization and the leavers the least. Yet another view could be that absence 
and turnover are totally unrelated in a consistent fashion. The individual's 
decision to leave a job could depend on his perception of alternative job 
opportunities, the ease and desirability of movement. Much work and analysis 
was, therefore, required to analyse the relationship, if any, between absence 
and turnover in general (see Nicholson et aI, 1977b). Finally, no effort had 
been made in the literature to study the relationship between individual 
acts of participation and acts of production in a holistic theory of 
organizational effectiveness, neither was there any detailed analysis of 
the couplings between measures of O.E. at the individual level and measures 
of O.E. at the systemic holistic level, such as the system's adaptive 
capacity. In view of these arguments, we decided to use measures of learner 
absence and turnover as indicators of the long-run propensity of the system 
to survive. In particular, we were interested in "voluntary" periods of 
absence and "voluntary"turnover. The latter is defined as all forms of 
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leaving decisions apart from official dismissal by the organization. 
list of all the measures used is given below: 
Table 9.1, O.E. Mea.ur •• of P.rticipant (Le.rner) 
Behaviour 
Mea.ure 
1. Learner Turnover 
2. Cro.. Absence Ratio 
3. Frequency of Inception 
of a Spell of Ab.ence 
4. Frequency of Inception 
of a Short-Terlll Spell 
of Ab.ence 
S. Frequency of Inception 
of a Long-Tem Spell 
of'Absence 
Mnemonic 
,.INCEPST 
FINCEPLT 
,Sourc. of 
Infonaation 
Learner ,.il •• 
Allocation Record. 
Learner ltazdexe. 
Learner ltardexe. 
Operationalization Definition 
Turnover i. defined a. 
voluntary termination of a 
l.arner'. e~loyaent contract 
with the organization. C •••• 
of eSi.is.al by the organization 
are excluded fra. the .tudy. 
Le.rner. who voluntarily di.-
continued training after a 
di.ciplineary procedure had be.n 
initiated are however included 
within the .alaple a. the act of 
.eparation initiated levally 
fro. the l.arner. 
Th. nUllber of day. ohsatlt';' #titer I 
po •• ible training day. up until 
the date of completion of 
que.tionnaire (excluding annual 
leave, Spring Bank holiday. 
and comp ... ionate leave). 
The nWllber of absence .pell. 
• the number of total po •• ibl. 
training day. up until the date 
of completion of que.tionnaire. 
The variable ha. a value of 0 
whan no spell. of ab.ence had 
been recorded. 
Learner ltard.xe. The n..t>Ar of ab •• nce .pell. of 
three day. or le.. • the n\llber 
of total po •• ible training day. 
up until the date of completion 
of que.tionn.ire. The variable 
hal a value of 0 when no .hort-
term spells had been recorded. 
Learner ltardexe. The nUlllber of ablence .pell. of 
more than'three day •• the 
nllll1be"r of total po8lible train-
ing days up until the date of 
completion of the que.tionnaire. 
The variable hed a value of 0 
when no long-tem .pell. had 
been recorded. 
Note I all day. were generally recorded a. eight-hour shift 
day. except when a night shift was worked in which case • 
day wa. a ten-hour shift d.y. Due to a reduction of the 
nuning working _ek in the ._r of 1990 .ome of the Uve-
day working week. recorded were actually 37~-hour wrekl in 
instead of forty-hour w~k.. However, this did not in 
general pre.ent a problem a. all calculation. were dOne in 
converted day. and on the ba.is of a five-day working week. 
A 
The questionnaire used to obtain information from leavers in the form of a 
structured interview is ioentical to that sent out as a mailed questionnaire 
and is shown in Appendix 9. 7. 
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9.2.2 The Choice of Measures of Participant Production 
In order to supplement these measures of participation we decided 
to include three individual surrogate measures of learner production. 
Surrogate measures had to be used as the quality of nursing care performed 
by learners could not be assessed directly. The researchers were not 
nurses and did not possess the requisite skills. 
The use of measures of learner nurse performance adopted by the micro-
organization itself such as grades in class, the number of practical assess-
ments passed in the School at first attempt, or grades given on a multi-
faceted ward report were problematic because of the doubtful validity and 
the potentiality of bias in these measures. 
The use of patient evaluation of the quality of care given by a specific 
learner nUr5t was also not feasible due to a variety of reasons. Firstly, 
it is extremely difficult for a patient to clearly identify a learner 
nurse as his/her nurse unless one speaks of a long-stay patient. The 
constant change of staff and the shortness of the length of average 
patient stay make identification difficult. Secondly, it was important to 
try and measure the performance of the system as a whole also rather than 
only the individual nurse's performance. Thirdly, retrospective recall 
on the part of patients (especially those who have left hospital) has 
been known to be subject to distortion. Patients tended to recall 
the more pleasant aspects of their stay and, in some instances, to 
'forget' their traumatic experiences. Fourthly, there were difficulties 
of access as hospitalSin general were and still are wary of taking up 
a patient's time in research. Finally, we did not possess the phYSical 
resources to ineerview patients conqe,rning the performance of some 
309 nurses in our primary sample. 
In view of these problems with patient evaluation it was decided to 
use the level of "professional orientation" as a measure of nurse pro-
ductivity. This concept attempts to measure the extent to which a 
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learner nurse assimilates, agrees with or internalises a given 
cognitive, mental set of values, beliefs and assumptions about "appropriat.e" 
nursing behaviour. The rationale behind the measurement of such cognit~ve 
I, • 
COmponents and the theoretical validity of their status as output measures 
of productivity is grounded in one of the key production objectives within 
the F-set of a nurse training system: that of occupational or professional 
socialization. Professional or occupational schools are charged with 
educating students to be skilled and committed workers who will faithfully 
do the work of their profession or occupation. In essence, their charge is 
to socialize students into a mode of desired action and thought, for the process 
of socialization is as commonly conceived the process by which behaviour, 
skills and value orientations that prepare an incumbent to perform in a role 
are learnt. (See Simpson, 1979). Thus a measure of the technical effectiveness o~ 
such a system of educat~on is the extent to which students do assimilate and 
adopt prescribed behaviour, skills and normative orientations. 
However, such measurement is partly based on an assumption that such a 
set of cognitive values would be translated into reactive behaviour in specific 
empirical situations. The validity of this hypothesis could not, it is 
admitted, be statistically verified as we could not observe the actual 
behaviour of all the nurses sampled. However, it was indirectly verified by 
(a) correlating measures of productivity with measures of partiCipative 
behaviour, the assumption being that were a measur~ of attitude to be 
correlated with a measure of behaviour we would have greater confidence 
in the argument that attitudes in this instance are reasonably consistent 
with action; and (b) by correlating crudely respondents' answers to these 
questions with observations of the quality of nurse-patient interaction on 
the wards. • , 
It was therefore decided to construct three attitudinal scales of 
profeSSional productivity which are shown in Table 9.2 together with a 
measure of statistical reliability, the standardized Cronbach's Alpha 
(McKennell, 1968). The Nursing Questionnaire referred to is that found in 
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Appendix 9.1 and the prefix A identifies the questions as being in 
Section A. 
Measure 
6. Degree of Professional 
Orientation. 
*7. Degree of Identifica-
tion with 
Professional Ideas 
of the School of 
Nursing. 
* 8. P f ro essional Behaviour 
Observed in Self 
Mnemonic 
PROFORN 
IDSCH 
PROBES 
Source 
Nursing 
Questionnaire Items 
A51, A56, A66, A69 
A71, A79, ABO 
As7, A60, A70 
Standardized 
Cronbach's Alpha 
0.44 
0.35 
0.22 
TABLE 9.2: Measures of Participant (Learner) Production Behaviour 
- * Scales discarded eventually 
I . 
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The cut-off point for acceptance of a scale as an empirical measure of 
a theoretical variable was set at 0.40. The standards by which reliability 
coefficients are considered adequate vary. Both McKennell (1968) and 
Nunna1~ (l96q) argue that a value of 0.5 to 0.6 is acceptable at an early 
stage of construct investigation, 0.8 is preferable and 0.9 is considered 
necessary before a psychometric set can be used as a diagnostic tool. 
Because the main purpose of this section of our study was to indicate 
theoretical validity rather than to develop sophisticated measuring 
instruments, we decided to set 0.4 as the minimum acceptability criterion; 
clearly recognizing that our results are but tentative and exploratory 
rather than definitive in any statistical sense of the word. 
Based on this criterion, the scales IDSCH and PROBES were abandoned. 
The removal of both these measures of learner productivity then raised 
questions as to the validity of ~he assumption that PROFORN was a predictor 
of professional behaviour in specific, concrete situations. Based on a detailed 
analysis of the two abandoned scales and on participant observation on the 
wards, it was decided that PROFORN did measure (a) the extent to which 
learners were productive in assimilating specific normative cognitive sets, 
and (b) the extent to which learners would actually apply these principles 
in the absence of fear of criticism from persons in positions of authority. 
However, it must be emphasized that the scale only captures certain specific 
dimensions of what constitutes professional behaviour. In particular, the 
typification of certain patients as favourite patients is not considered an 
infringement of their model of professionalism. 
Thus far our measures of organizational effectiveness have been derived 
from measures of participation and production of a specific participant , 
group. Can such an empirical operationalization be defended in the face of an 
argument that the F-set is a holistic system, of which all identified 
participant groups are necessary and sufficient? Does a measure of the behaviOUr 
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of one of these participant groups predict reliably the action of the whole, 
in its ability to maintain a feasible set of n~d6 in the long-run? 
Previously, in chapter 8, we had argued that in investigating the 
determinants of effectiveness of a micro-organization, the decisional 
., 
behaviour of all participant groups needs to be taken into account. 
Although this has been attempted to a considerable extent, the main emphasis 
" . 
is on measures of organizational effectiveness which are closely linked to 
measures of individual effectiveness in one participant group: learners. 
This decision may be defended on a number of grounds. Firstly, the nature 
and official purpose of the micro-system being studied: a "professional" 
educational institution means that more so than in other micro-systems the 
long-run survival (effectiveness) of the whole is intrinsically coupled with 
the quality of the product being produced - the "quality" of the individual 
nurse. The actions and normative orientations of the learner nurse are one of 
the major, if not ~he main, outputs of the F-set as a whole; such outputs 
being related to the official pur,pose of nurse training and a wider pu~ose 
of health care provision. The effectiveness of the whole'~ is thus embedded 
in the effective performance of the individual parts and in particular in 
the performance of this particular participant group. 
Secondly, we have tended to use the measures of learner participation and 
production as a tracer for analysis of the whole, that is, though our emphasiS 
was on one participant group, we also studied indirectly the partiCipation 
and productive decisions of other participant groups insofar as they related 
& •• 
to our measures of effective organizational functioning. The flexibility and 
longit"udinal benefits of a case-study approach allowed the researchers time 
to see how the actions of other part~ipant groups influenced and interacted 
with the behaviour of learners in such a way as to determine the structure and 
behaviour of the Area Training System as a whole. 
-332-
Thirdly, we supplemented our measures of learner participation and 
production with systemic measures of system's adaptive and productive behaviour. 
These measures will be discussed later and as will be seen they seek to 
measure attributes of the system not of individuals which are hypothesized to be 
facets of the long-run propensity of the organization to survive. We have 
not depended solely on measures of individual effective performance, thus 
recognizing that though necessary such criteria of O.E. are not necessary 
and sufficient. 
In conclusion then, we advance a cautious summary of our defence. It 
is recognized that our empirical operationalization of measures of O.E. 
inClude measures of individual performance and effectiveness but it is felt 
that these are justifiable in view of the official purpose of the system, 
the distinctive analytical status of learners as a participant group and the 
existence of complementary systemic measures of O.E. Equally, however, we 
would admit that such an operationalization has a weakness of theoretical 
inconsistency and that the empirical testing and our subsequent results fall 
far short of a definitive testing of the th~ of the F-set and the empirical 
model set out in chapter B. We did not examine directly the decision 
processes of all participant groups though it is doubtful whether s~~~ an 
ambitious objective would have been achieved within the confines of a 
single study. 
9.2.3 The Choice of Measures of Systemic Adaptive Capacity 
As chapter B argued, the notion of adaptive capacity is a short-run 
I •• 
measure which is hypothesized to be a surrogate indicator of the system's 
degree of requisi~e variety and henc~ a surrogate measure of the organization's 
propensity to remain viab~e in the long-run. It was also argued to be a 
direct measure of the degree to which a viable balance had been achieved in 
the short-run amongst the diverse interests of different participant 
groups. Adaptive capacity is thus conceptualized to be a systemic or 
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holistic measure, an observable attribute of the system as a whole and not 
an attribute of its parts. The concept of adaptive capacity was argued 
to comprise of three components which have already been defined: 
flexibility, adaptability, innovativeness. Table 9.3 shows these measures 
and the statistical measures of reliability. 
Table 9.3: Measures of Systemic Adaptive Capacity 
Measure Mnemonic 
9. Flexibility (Hospital) FLEXW 
Flexibility (School) FLEXSCH 
Flexibility (System) FLEXl 
10. Adaptability (Hospital) ADAPW 
Adaptability (School) ADAPSCH 
Adaptability (System) FADAPl 
11. Innovativeness (Hospital) INNOW 
Innovativeness (School) INNOSCH 
Innovativeness INNOl 
Source 
e7l 
C71 
Factor Analysis of 
Underlying Scales 
I 
C68, C7u 
C68, C70 
Factor Analysis of 
Underlying Scales 
C65, C67 
C65, C67 
Factor Analysis of 
Underlying Scales 
Standardized 
eronbach's Alpha 
0.34 
0.45 
0.44 
0.33 
All three variables, flexibility, adaptability andinnovativeness were initiall 
measured for each separate sub-system: the educational and the service sub-
1, • 
systems. This was done in order to allow for any significant statistical 
difference between the two sub-systems to be analyzed. The variable, 
flexibility was mea~ured by a single item (question); adaptability and 
" innovativeness were measured with three initial items. One was deleted from 
each of these latter scales in order to improve their internal consistency 
and reliability. The Alpha for the measure of adaptability within the service 
Sub-system and the measure of innovativeness within the educational sub-system 
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were low and did not meet our requirements of 0.45; however, the scale measures 
were accepted as in each case, the scale measured reliably (given our 
acceptability criterion) within the other sub-system. 
In order to assess, however, the argument that the constructs of 
flexibility, adaptability and innovativeness were systemic as well as sub-
systemic phenomena, all six sub-scales were subjected to a factor analysis 
using a principal factor analytic method with iterations. Factor analysis 
was chosen as the appropriate statistical technique because it is hypothesized 
that the six sub-scales of ADAPSCH, ADAPW, INNOSCH, INNOW, FLEXSCH and FLEXW 
may be represented by three distinct, underlying hypothetical factors of 
systemic adaptability, innovativeness and flexibility. Factor analysis is 
thus useful in "confirming" this hypothesis because the technique, by 
assuming that the observed variables are linear combinations of some under-
lying source variables (or factors) "exploits" this correspondence to arrive 
at conclusions about the factors. However, it is remembered that such 
empirical statistical confirmation of our technical measures of O.E. are 
strictly limited. This is because factor analysis as a tool begins by 
accepting the theoretician's assumptions that there is a degree of 
correspondence between certain defined systems of variables and underlying 
factors; subsequent empirical resuits might disagree with this initial 
assumption but the onus then lies heavily on the empirical data to dislodge 
the initial assumption. Given the often non-parametric, error prone, unstable 
nature of social science data (see Kim and Mueller, 1978a) the researcher 
must perforce recognize the limitations of using factor analytical methods 
I, • 
of analysis. Further, it should be pointed out that the mathematical 
(logical) properties of the correspondence are such that one causal system of 
.. 
'\ 
factors, always lead to a unique correlation system of observed variables, but 
not vice versa. Therefore, only under very limited conditions can one 
unequivocally determine the underlying causal structure among the factors from 
the correlation among the observed variables. This fundamental indeterminacy 
in factor analysis is due to the indeterminacy inherent in making inferences 
about the causal structures from the correlational structure; it is a logical 
indeterminacy that further warns that the use of the technique and its 
resultant conclusions are but preliminary and non-definitive. 
The factor loadings were furthered obliquely rotated to obtain a 
terminal factor solution. Such a rotation is based on the hypothesis that 
the concepts of systemic adaptability, innovativeness and flexiblity are 
distinct but inter-relate~ facets of systems adaptive capacity. Because the 
underlying factors are hypothesized to be related to one another an 
orthogonal rotation could not be justified. Appendices 9.0la and 9.0lb 
give the unrotated factor loadings, the commonalities (square of factor 
loadings for a particular variable), eigenvalues, cumulative percentage 
of variance explained and the rotated factor loadings. 
In order to derive measures of systemic innovativeness, 'adaptabili ty 
and flexbility it was decided to form factor scales of these concepts by 
using the precise factor score coefficients calculated by the Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences SPSS (see Nie et aI, 1975). The use of 
factor scales as measures of the under~ying factors is fraught with 
theoretical constraints. Kim and Mueller (1978a) point out that factor scales 
are not identical to the underlying factors and that not only are the 
correlations between the hypothetical factor and the corresponding scale 
likely to be much less than 1.0, but also the reiationships among the scales 
were not likely to be identical to the relationships among the underlying 
factors. There is always some indeterminacy associated with creating fact~r 
, . 
scales. Nevertheless, factor scales are parsimonious means of representing 
empirical measure~ Note that adaptability is now measured negatively as 
. \ 
"failure to adapt" and is denoted by the mnemonic FADAPl. 
The question then arose as to the precise form of factor scale 
construction. Tucker (1971) argues that scales produced by the regression 
method do not allow one to correctly estimate the underlying correlation 
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between the hypothesized factors and outside variables. Alwin (1973), 
however, shows that for many research problems the choice of a method of scale 
construction is largely academic as there is a very high correlation among 
the scales produced by different scaling methods. We decided to use the 
precise factor score coefficients calculated by SPSS to create our factor 
scales. An inspection ,of the factor loadings revealed substantial inequality 
in the loadings of specific variables on specific-factors. In order to 
increase the oVerall correlation between the scale and the observed variables 
we used the precise weightings. This we felt was theoretically more precise 
than arbitrarily summing all the variables with substantial loadings and 
giving each a weight of 1. Such a stance is additionally based on the 
proposition that the factor analysis model fits the data exactly in the 
population and that all deviations between the data and the model are based 
on random sampling error. This assumption is arguably valid when one conducts 
a small-sized piece of research of an exploratory nature. Were these 
measures to be subsequently used in replication studies an argument might 
then arise as to its appropriateness. For our pu~ses, we considered 
accuracy a more important attribute in this instance than generality. 
Pearson correlation coefficients~tween these created factor scales 
are given in Table 9.4. As can be seen they differ slightly from the 
factor correlations. The significance levels give us additional info~ation; 
the correlations between FADAPl' _ ~. and innovativeness and between 
flexibility and innovativeness are statistically significant and in the 
. ~ 
expected direction. The unexpected positive correlation between FADAPl 
and flexibility is shown to be statistically insignificant at either the 95\ 
.. . 
or 90\ level. The absence c:L a statistically significant neg~tive correlation 
: 
between systemic flexibility and ~ FADAPl is due in part to the single 
data question used to measure the concept of flexibility and the operating 
nature of the system being studied. It is possible that the use of the statement 
- "People here generally cope well with emergencies, unexpected situations, 
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shortages and breakdowns in the flow of work "- to measure flexibility in a 
hospital and nursing school where such response is programmed, distinguishes 
the concept somewhat from systemic "FADAPI. For in a hospital, responding 
to an "emergency" is no longer a highly non-programned decision. Indeed, 
"emergencies" as socially constructed now form a part of the normal, everyday 
working life of the system. The system thus expects "emergencies" and it 
learns to be flexible in this sense. But the system could still possess a 
host of admiil"istrative, non-urgent, managerial policies which are entrenched 
and impervious to changing environmental demands. 
9.2.4 
Table 9.4",: Pearson 1 s Product Moment Correlation 
Matrix of Facets of Adaptive capacity 
INNOl FADAPl FLEXl 
lNNOl 1.000 -0.2834 0.4424 
n",,302 n=302 
p=o.OOO p=o.OOO 
FADAPl 1.0000 0.0302 
n=302 
p=0.301 
FLEXl 1.0000 
The Choice of Measures of Systemic Productivity 
The preceding discussion has shown how we were unsuccessful in two 
of our attempts to derive a behaviour-oriented measure of learner p~oductivity. 
The scales lDSCH and PROBES were found to be statistically unreliable. 
Only the measure, the degree of "profe'Ssional orientation", measuring the 
extent to which learners had cognitively accepted specific aspects of 
prevailing nursing ideology about appropriate "professional" behaviour, was 
found to be moderately reliable. A final measure was then devised in an 
attempt to measure the degree to which such behaviours were manifested 
12. 
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throughout the Area Nurse Training System. An eight-item scale was constructed 
which had questions relating to the observation by learne.rs of defined 
"professional" behaviour by the three focal participant groups concerned with 
nurse training and which form the appropria~ sub-systems of analysis: 
learners, staff within the educational sub-system and staff within the 
service sub-system. 
Table 9.5 below shows the details of this scale. 
Measure Mnemonic Source Cronbach's 
Level of Professional Behaviour PROBS ASl, AS2, A64, 0.48 
Observed in Training System A66, A67, A70, 
A7S, A79 
Table 9.5: Measure of Systemic Productivity 
This scale was accepted as a measure of the level of productivity 
observed throughout the research system as defined in Diagram 9.14. 
I, 
Al~ha 
We have now completed a detailed examination of our .Ie~en measures 
of organizational effectiveness. Conceptually, they fall into three main 
categories: 
(a) measures of participant participativ~ behaviour 
(b) measures of participant productive behaviour 
(c) measures of system's adaptive capacity. 
As discussed (b) actually had two components: (1) measures of the 
extent to which learners per se were "professionally-oriented" and (2) 
observations by learners of the extent to which they perceived "professional 
behaviour" being exhibited by learners, educational and service staff. 
f, 
In total, th~refore, eleven measures of O.E. were used in the study. 
\ 
Their composition is as follows (mnemonics are given inlrackets): 
Individual-based Measures of the Decision to Participate 
1. Turnover. l TO) 
2. Gross Absence Rate (GAR). 
3. Average Length of Absence Spell (AVLSP). 
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4. Frequency of Inception of a Spell of Absence (FINCEP) • 
5. Frequency of Inception of a Short-term Spell of Absence (FINCEPST) • 
6. Frequency of Inception of a Long-term Spell of Absence (FINCEPLT). 
Individual-based Measures of Decision to Produce 
7. Level of acceptance of a set of defined "professional" standards 
desirable behaviour (PROFORN). 
Systemic-based Measures of System's Adaptive Capacity 
B. Inadaptability of the System (FADAP1). 
9. Flexibility of the System (FLEXl). 
10. Innovativeness of the System (INNOl). 
System-based Measure of the Decision to Produce 
ll. Level of "professional" behaviour observed in the System of Nurse 
Training. (PROBS) 
9.3 The Development of Measures of Systemic Characteristics 
In chapter 8 we outiined four theoretical dimensions of differentiationS, 
integrationS, uncertaintyS and supportivenessS• Table 9.' sho~s in 
detail the construction of data questions to measure three of these four 
theoretical constructs. 
S Differentiation was measured perceptually by two sub-measures PERVAS: 
.perceived sub-goal values of educational staff and PERVAW: perceived sub-goal 
values of service staff. These two sub-measures were designed to illustrate 
the extent to which the values and goals of each sub-system differed from 
and were in conflict with those of the other sub-system.. The higher the 
S 
scores on these two sub-measures the higher is the level of differentiation • 
- ... 
The measure of integration S was again divided into two perceptual 
sub-measures: PRST: perceived relevance of School teaching and PWSC: 
.. 
perceived service and educational co-otdination. These two measures were also 
organized around the concept of differentiation between the educational 
and service sub-systems. Whilst differentiation S measured the extent to 
which such differentiation existed, integration S sought to measure the 
quali~y of the state of co-operation and co-ordination between these two 
Measure 
Differentiation S 
Integration S 
Uncertainty S 
Supportiveness S 
Tahle 9 c. 6 t-Ieasures of Systemic Character1:stics 
Submeasure 
Perceived Sub-goal Values 
of Educational Staff 
Perceived Sub-goal Values 
of Service Staff 
Perceived Relevance of 
Education 
Perceived Service-
Education Co-ordination 
Change of Teaching 
Staff 
Change of Ward 
Allocation 
Mnemonic Source 
PERVAS AIS 
PERVAW AS, A89 
PRST A22, A28, A32, A34, A38 
PWSC A17, A19, A21, A23, A2S 
CTS A68 
CW A33 
Discussed in main body 
of Text 
Standardized 
Cronbach's Alpha 
0.43 
0.67 
0.68 
<" 
w 
.r;,. 
o 
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Our measure of uncertainty S was based on two measures: CTS - change of 
teaching staff and CW - change of ward allocation. An examination of the 
literature (see Birch~ 1975) had shown that frequent unplanned changes of ward 
allocations often introduced organizational uncertainty that caused considerable 
stress amongst learners. However, group interviews with our research sample of 
learners showed that this was not a vital phenomena in their lives, the 
change of educational staff was far more unsettling. For instance, learners 
complained: 
"I don't know where we are with teachers. Every time we come into 
bloCk we get new teachers and even a new senior tutor. It gets 
really confusing and we feel we can't really talk to the teachers 
because we hardly know them." Third year student, S.G.H. Group' 
Interview, April, 1980. 
"We have transferred now to this hosp! tal. We are getting our 
fourth senior tutor in less than six months. It's incredible." 
First year student, S.G.H. and N.G.H. Group Interviews, October, 1980. 
This learner complaint of a frequent change of teaching staff was 
acknowledged by all levels of management within the educational sub-
'systen as tle rapid turnover and change of teaching staff also caused 
considerable stress within their ranks. 
The final systemic dimension' to be measured is the level of 
supportiveness S This was defined as the cultural meaning of the 
organization or micro-system, a systemic dimension that was distinct from the 
level of differentiation 5, integration S and uncertainty S. It is conceptualized 
as a perceptual dimension which resides in the cultural notion and "air" of 
the micro-system. This dimension was hypothesized to have two facets: 
af,filiaticm- and pr0f!uction-centredness. A system could not be described as 
" . 
SUpportive unless Jb.oth participant attitudes and production were being facilitated. 
\, 
Our measures of ~upportiveness 5, therefore, had to measure these two facets. 
In order to derive empirical measures of this theoretical construct, we turned 
first to an analysis of the "organizational climate literature". Here we 
found a large number of climate scales which appeared to be relevant as empirical 
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measures of the degree of supportivenessS . For example, Campbell and Beaty 
(1971) derived ten scales by means of cluster analysis of their original 
questionnaire items. However, these scales together with those of Litwin and 
Stringer (1968) have been shown by subsequent research to be susceptible 
to instability. In order to avoid similar problems we decided to use 
eight climatic measures of systemic supportiveness which had been developed 
by Payne and Pheysey (1971). our choice of scales was based on issues 
which were regarded as significant phenomena by learners and by the 
researcher. This choice resulted in four authority scales, one emotional 
restraint scale, one work interest scale, one personal relation scale and one 
work routine scale. These measures were applied to the two sub-systems under 
study and this then generated 16 sub-systemic measures of supportiveness, 
whose reliability coefficients are shown in Table 9.7. All the coefficients 
were considered acceptable. 
However, it was felt that these eight measures of supportiveness in 
each sub-system could in fact be represented by fewer underlying facets of 
supportivenessS• Accordingly, these 8 sub-systemic surrogate measures 
were factor analysed using principal factoring with iterations and ortho-
gonal rotation. Appendices 9.02a and 9.02b show the factor analytic 
results for the educational sub-system. 
The factors derived from this sub-system may be compared with those 
derived for the service sub-system. These results are shown in Appendices 
9.03a and 9.03b. 
These three factors were strikingly similar to those three which emerged 
from an analysis of the climatic dimensions of the educational sub-system. 
The first,factor was labelled Interper~onal-Hindranc~ (IPHS) being high on 
leader psychological distance and interpersonal aggression; and low on 
management involvement, task involvement, rule orientation and extremely low 
on egalitarianism. The second factor was labelled Afflliative Mutual 
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Table 9.7 Reliabilitl Anal;tsis of Sixteen Sub-scales of Sub-systemic Su~~ortiveness 
Revised 
Standarized Nwnber 
Scale Title Mnemonic Source Cronbach's A1Eha of Items 
1. a. Leaders' Psychological Distance LPDSCH 
1 
0.60 
in Educational Sub-system C9, C2S, C33, C4l, 6 b. Leaders' Psychological Distance LPDW C57 0.59 
in Service Sub-system 
2. a. Questioning Authori ty in QASCH 
J 
0.53 
Educational Sub-system C2, C10, C18, C26, 7 
b. Questioning Authority in QAW C42, CSO, C58 0.59 
Service Sub-system 
3. Egalitarianism in Educational EGALSCH 1 0.71 Sub-system C3, Cll, C27, C35, 7 Egali tarianism in Service EGALW C43, CS1, C59 0.72 
Sub-system 
4. a. Emotional Suppression in EMEXSCH ~ 0.49 Educational Sub-system C5, CU, cn, 4 h. Emotional S~p,.rUM.o('''' ,., EMEXW C37 0.43 
Service Sub-system 
5. a. Management Concern for MISCH ~ 0.73 Learner Involvement in Education Sub-system C4, C12, C20, C28, 8 b. Management Concern for MIW C36, C44, C52, C60 0.74 Involvement in Service 
Sub-system 
6. a. Task Orientation in TASISClI 1 0.57 Educational Sub-system C6. C14. C3C, C46. 6 b. Task Orientation in TASIW C46, C54. C62 0.56 Service Sub-system 
7. a. Interpersonal Aggression in INDAGGS 
J 
0.78 
Educational Sub-system C7. C23, C3l. C39, 7 h. Interpersonal Aggression in INDIIGGW C39, C47, C55, C63 0.79 
Service Sub-system 
8. a. Rules Orientation in RUORSCH 0.48 
Educational Sub-system C8, C16, C24, C32. 8 b. Rules Orientation in RUORW C46, C48, C56. C64 0.4·1 
Service Sub-system 
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Openness (LIBS~ being high on questioning authority, management involvement and 
emotional expression; and low on task involvement, rule orientation, 
egalitarianism and individual aggression. The third factor was labelled 
Formalized Work COncern (CENS) being high on rule orientation, task involvement 
and management involvement; and low on leader psychological distance, 
emotional suppression, egalitarianism, individual aggression and questioning 
authority. 
The results were highly encouraging and indicated that both the service 
and educational sub-system's internal environments were characteriz~d.by 
three robust underlying aspects of supportiveness. 
All three factors, Interpersonal Hindrance, AffiliativeMutual Opennes 
Concern and Formalized Work Concern accorded with our initial hypothesis about 
the nature of the variable supportiveness S; containing both affiliation-
and production-centred dimensions. Finally, it was decided to factor analyse 
_.all sixteen sub-scales to confirm that these three aspects of supportiveness 
were aspects of systemic supportiveness. Appendices 9. 04a and 9. 04b shGW the 
results of this factor analysis. 
An examination of Factors I, 2 and 3 show that they correspond strongly 
on the systemic level to measures of Interpersonal Hindrance (IPHS), Work 
" . 
Concern (CENS) and Affiliative Mutual Openness Concern (LIBS) at the sub-
systemic level. The only change is that whilst before in both the educational 
and service sub-systems Work Concern had lower factor loadings and respectively 
accounted for 17.6\ and 15\ of the variance in the data, at the systemic level it 
accounts for 26.0\ of the variance and has significantly higher loadings. 
This result is most likely due to correlation effects between the two sub-
\ 
systems which were unanalyzed at the sub-systemic level. The factor analysis 
thus indicates that at the systemic level, Work Concern becomes a more 
important predictor of variations in the level of supportiveness S Additionally 
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we have a fourth factor which loads moderately in a positive direction on 
,. 
Management Involvement in School, Egalitarianism in School, Questioning 
Authority in School and loads moderately in a negative direction on Emotional 
S\ifPre.~lon i., .. Sc}aool. This fourth factor thus appears to indicate that certain 
aspects of the educational sub-systemic environment contribute independently 
to supportiveness S. However this factor needs to be treated with caution as it 
does not appear to be a stable factor that will robustly appear with subsequent 
replications and iterations. Only one factor loading is above a value of 0.5 
and four lie in the range 0.4 to 0.5. Overall and Klett (1972) suggest 
that loadings in the region of 0.4 to 0.5 need to be treated with care. The 
amount which this residual factor constributes to an explanation of the 
variance of supportiveness S is also low - only 9.2\. For this reason, it 
was decided to use as measures of supportiveness S three empirical measures: 
Interpersonal Hindrance, Work Concern and Affiliative Mutual Openness Concern. 
9.4: The Development of Measures of Environmental Characteristics 
In chapter 8 we argued that conceptually environments were more 
" . 
satisfactorily conceived as objective influences and forces which create 
and constrain systemic action, forces which exist indepen,dent-of s\ibjC!ctive 
interpretation and enactment on the part of actors. It is not denied that 
subjective enactment of environments will substantially influerice individual 
and systemic behaviour but such perceptions do not render the environment 
a "mythical entity". Ontologically therefore we conceive environments as 
having an existence which is independent of participant perceptions; however, 
such perceptions are believed to significantly influence participant and 
systemic behaviour~ Methodologically,we argued that environments may be 
described via three major attributes - complexity E, illiberality E and 
variability E. Empirically, however, we found the measurement of these 
abstract characteristics highly problematic. 
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During informal interviews with learners no mention was made by them 
of the notion of environmental complexity influencing their behaviour and 
that of the training system as a whole. Apart from a brief acknowledgement 
of the power of the General Nursing Council in determining their context of 
learning and the existence of nursing trade unions, learners often claimed 
that they knew little of "important external factors". The role of the state, 
the changing requirements and demands of patients and the community and the 
.. 
impact of E.E.C. regulations upon their training did not appear as important 
elements in their characterization of the nurse training environment. 
However, there was one element of tne environment which constantly crept 
up in learner discussions - varying levels of resource scarcity. Documented 
eVidence of the importance and influence of resource scarcity is already 
given in the summary of learner interviews given in Appendix 6.1. To summarize, 
a reported inability to recruit sufficient day and night nursing staff led to 
learners perceiving themselves as being treated more as fla pair of hands" 
than nurs~ learners, work stress (especially on night duty), role conflict and 
role ambiguity. These consequences were, however, felt to be highly dependent 
on the ward and shift worked. In short, the scarcity of trained nursing staff 
varied considerably between wards and shifts thus leading to varying perceptions 
of the level of scarcity of trained ward staff within the Area Nurse Training 
system. Ward observations carried out\subsequent to the design of the 
questionnaire substantiated this reported evidence from learners; there were 
wide variations in day staffing levels and workload on a particular ward, such 
levels depending on the ward speciality and work shift. Nevertheless it was 
Observed that especially on night shifts there was often insufficient trained 
'" 
staff 00. duty. In "'addition, certain gt-o:Ups of learners commented on the 
lack of planning ability on the part of ward and school staff. Ward 
planning was felt to be highly inefficient at times as much work was 
rushed through in the morning and afternoons tended to be slack. 
Given these comments, it was therefore decided to devise a measure of 
planning ability of ward and school staff as a surrogate measure for 
environmental illiberality; the argument being that the environment was 
" ' 
hostile in that the system was unable to recruit staff with efficient planning 
abilities. Where learners perceived a high level of efficient planning of 
time on the part of ward or School staff, this was taken to indicate a level 
of environmental liberality, as the system was arguably able to recruit "good 
quality" staff. This association of learner perception of the efficiency of 
staff planning time as a measure of illiberality E and of resource scarcity is 
admittedly weak theoretically but is nevertheless felt to be defensible. An 
objection that learner perceptions of theusuperior's efficiency of time 
planning may not be an accurate reflection of their "true" efficiency may be 
answered by 
(a) the argument that such perceptions are more likely than "actu~l" 
(however, one may determine this) measures of efficient time planning 
and measures of illiberality E to influence individual and systemic 
behaviour, and 
(b) by the corroboration of this perception by independent ward observations 
and subsequent interviews with ward and School management. 
A final item designed as a surrogate measure of illiberality E was 
derived from the comments of learners that despite the scarcity of numbers of 
teaching staff and the lack of ward teaching, the quality of the teaching 
received was felt to be of a satisfactory standard. Resource scarcity now 
had a different aspect - quality as well as quantity. Although the environment 
could be characterized as hostile in its lack of sufficient numbers of 
teaching and nursing staff, learners perceived that the few teachers whom the 
nurse training system possessed did give them a satisfactory level of training. 
In order to capture this qualitative aspect of illiberality E it was decided 
to add an item asking learners to rate the quality of the teaching that was 
given to them. 
In all, five measures were used to measure different aspects of resource 
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scarcity within the Area Nurse Training system. Resource scarcity was 
hypothesized to be a measure of environmental illiberality and hostility. These 
I. ' 
five measures, all measures subjectively via learner perceptions, are as £hown 
below in Table 9.B· with their appropriate reliability coefficients; all of 
which were regarded as acceptable. The variables PANS and PASS have been 
scored negatively and thus in'fact refer· to planning inability rather than 
ability. 
Measure Mnemonic Source Cronbach's AIEha 
1. Scarcity of Nursing Staff 
at Ward Level RSNS AS 
2. Scarcity of Teaching Staff RSS A2, A4 0.61 
3. Planning Inability of Ward Staff PAWS A3, A7 0.45 
4. Planning Inability of School Staff PASS A7 
r 
J 
5. Quality of Teaching QUALTEA All. AI3 O.S't 
Table 9. 8'~ Measures of Illiberality E 
However, these measures of illiberality E are based entirely on learner 
perceptions. Ideally the empirical model set out in chapter S should be 
tested by obtaining direct measures of environmental characteristics via the 
subjective perceptions of all participant groups including ward and School 
management and via "objective" independent measures such as the number of 
changes in the profession, the amount and rate of change in patient demands 
etc. Also we have only been able to obtain measures amenable to 
.. 
" statistical analysis on only one of our conceptualized characteristics of 
environments - illiberality. 
It was highly unfortunate that at the time of the construction of the 
questionnaire access was not gained to large sections of the educational and 
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service managerial levels. Due to the basis on which the researchers were 
admit~ed - to investigate learner selection and wastage, large-scale 
interviewing of management was felt by them to be time-wasting and inconvenient. 
In addition they could not see the logic of the line of questioning. in order 
not to upset these initial relationships with management it was decided not to 
conduct any large-scale detailed questionnairing of managerial staff. As access 
to learners was relatively easier to obtain the researchers decided to concentrate 
on learner perceptions of the environment but to cross-check these perceptions 
whenever possible. Mention has already been made, where appropriate, of cross-
checking ~ia subsequent ward observations. Cross-checking of the validity of 
the five measures of illiberality E was also obtained via limited managerial 
interviewing. 
Given these limitations with our 5 questionnaire measures of illi-
beralityE it was decided to conduct an additional independent analysis of 
the environment of the Area Nurse Training sytem : the expectations of 
potential nursing recruits about nursing and nurse training. We made 
this decision on several grounds. Firstly, it enabled the study of a 
vital part of the environment of the system in a manner which was not 
dependent on participant perceptions. Secondly, the model set out in 
chapter 8 had outlined learner expectations as an important variable 
in explaining O.E. Thirdly, this analysis would enable a deeper 
understanding of the entire process of nurse recruitment. 
Contact was made with the local education authority in November 1980 
and two secondary schools were selected. One was Carter Lodge School, a 
medium-sized comprehensive school in the northern part of Mayfield with school 
children drawn essentially from a neatby council housing estate. The second 
was Silverdale School, a large comprehensive school in the southetnpart of 
Mayfield with schoolchildren drawn from a catchment area of "professional-
class" and "middle-class" private housing. 
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The following groups of students were seen: 
Carter Lodge School 
1 group of "0" level children Cn = 30) 
1 group of "A" level school children Cn = 28) 
Silverdale School 
1 group of "0" level children drawn from the "top band" of 
the school Cn = 28) 
1 group of "0" level children drawn from the "bottom band" 
of the school Cn = 32) 
No "A" level children were seen due to difficulty of access. 
This gave a total sample size of 119 children. Of these their composition 
was as follows: 
Carter Lodge School Male Female Total 
"0" Level children 15 15 30 
., , 
"A" Level children 13 15 28 
58 
Silverdale School 
"0" Level children 21 40 61 
119 
--
The interviewing of these children was done in small groups of fifteen 
to twenty and was performed in an informal manner. This usually took twenty 
minutes during which the researcher explained her interest in their career 
intentions and their views towards nursing. The children were then asked to 
fill in a questionnaire which is shown in Appendix 9.2. This took between ,. 
ten and twenty mi~utes depending on the academic abilities of the children. 
The crucial questions for analysis were questions 7, 8, 9 and 10. These 
questions sought to Ca) arrive at the images which these children·had of 
nursing and Cb) the desirability of working as a nurse. These answers were 
then correlated with the educational aspirations of the children to see the 
I 
'. 
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relationships between images of nursing, the desirability of nursing as a 
career and educational aspirations. Class as a variable was analysed indirectly 
by looking at the differences between responses from the two schools. The 
results of this analysis of the environment of recruits will be discussed in 
the next chapter. 
Wehave now concluded a discussion of ' our operationalization of measures of 
environmental characteristics. We were only able to measure 'illiberality E 
via learner perceptions of resource scarcity and school children's cognitive 
\ 
images of nursing. No qualitative and quantitative measures of complexity E 
or variability E were available. Only measures of illiberality E w~ich depended 
on learner perceptions were used in subsequent , statistical 
analysis. This summary of our operationalization of the environment reveals Q 
major weakness in the empirical testing ~f the model outlined in chapter S. 
Clearly, our measures of environmental states are inadequate as no measures 
of complexity E and vari~ility E were available. Neither were independent 
" . 
counts or "objective" measures of illiberality E developed and used in 
subsequent stotistic.ol _ analysis; all statistical testing used subjective 
perceptual measu~es of illiberality E. Thus our ontological conception of 
objective environmental states was not operationalized within the technical 
interest into empirical measures and tested via statistical means. Hence 
the results to be presented and discussed in the next two chapters can be 
regarded as partial at best.and by no means a definitive test of a weak 
statement of Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety: the original purpose of this 
section of the thesis. 
~ 9. 5 ..;.Th..;.:..;:e~,-::.~..::...:.v-=e:.::::l:.:o;.:!::p:.:m:.:e:.::n.:.;t:.....;o:.:f:.....;M:.:e=-=a=s.::u:::.r.=e.=s~o:.::::f:-..:I;.:,~~t:.:e:.:r::..v:..;e:::n:.:.i::.n:.::g~--=.v-=a=r:.:i:.::ab::::.:l:.:e:.:s_o_f_c_r_i_t_i_c_a_1 
• 
Psychological States and PeYsonal Characteristics 
In chapter B we outlined four variables under the heading of critical 
psychological states. These four were participant satisfaction, par~icipant 
commitment to the coalition, role ambiguity and role conflict. 
r 
11 
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We modified Warret aI's (1979) original scale of job satisfaction and 
developed a scale of sixteen items. Each item covered a different aspect of 
the job ranging from physical working conditions to job responsibility, 
autonomy,to relationships with superiors and subordinates. The details of 
this scale are given below! 
Measure rmemonic Source Cronbach's Alpha 
, .. 
Job satisfaction JOBSAT 01, 02, 03, 04 0.76 
of learner os, 06, 013, 016 
018, 020, 022, 024 
025, 026, 027, 028 
The mean corrected item-total correlation was 0.35 
In addition to this measure of job satisfaction it was further decided 
to construct a measure of the learners' satisfaction with her training. 
The details of the scale are given below: 
Measure Mnemonic Source Cronbach's Alpha 
Training Satisfaction TRAISAT 07, 08, 09, 010 0.64 
of Learner 011, 012, 014, 
017, 019, 021, 
D29 
The mean corrected item-total correlation was 0.30. 
Though the Cronbach's Alpha and the mean corrected item-total 
correlation ~as relatively lower "than the scale for job satisfaction, these 
statistics were still acceptable and fell well within the limits "set for our 
present study. 
The second critical psychological state chosen for analysis is the 
• 
~ 
concept of participant commdtment which was defined as reflecting a strong 
~ . 
belief in the values of the Ddcro-organization, a ~illingness to exert 
considerable effort on behalf of the organization and a definite desire to 
maintain organizational membership. For learners it was felt that there were 
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two conceptually distinct forms of commdtment - (a) to nursing as a 
and "profession" and (b) to nurse training as a worthwhile occupation, career 
desired form of occqpation. 
The scale called Learner Commitment to Nursing as an Occupation was 
compiled from twenty-one items which originated from the study of Taves, 
Corwin and Haas (1963) and ~hich were subsequently used by Ondrack (1975). 
However, neither study provided psychometric data on the scale. Our data 
on this is provided below: 
Measure Mnemonic Source Cronbach's Alpha 
Learner CoBmdtment NCO A36, 
\ 
A37, A39, A4l, A4S, 0.59 
to Nursing as an A49, A54, ASB, A61 
Occupation A62, A6S, A73, A76 
A77, AB1, AB2, AB3 
AB4, AS5, AB6, AB7 
The scale called Leamer Commitment to Nurse Tra1n~g was compiled from a 
variety of sources. Items were selected from those used by Porter et al 
(see Mowday, Steers and Porter, 1979), Birch (1975) and Clark (1975). 
The final scale consisted of nine items as shown below: 
Measure "'!nemonic Source Cronbach's Alpha 
Learner Commitment NTCO A40, A42, A44, O.SB 
to Nurse Training A46, ASO , A53, 
ABB, B3, BB 
The scale was felt to be reasonably internally consistent. 
lWle 5mbiguity is our third intervening variable. It was decided , 
that a single-item measure of role ambiguity as experienced within the 
educational sub-system be designed, together with a two-item measure of the 
degree of role ambiguity designed within the 'service sub-system. The details 
are as follows: 
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Measure Hnemonic Source Cronbach's Alpha 
Role Ambiguity 
in educational sub-system RAS A29 
Role ambiguity in service 
sUb-system RAWA A26, 0.56 
A3l 
The scales for role conflict were again derived from the measures of 
Kahn et al (1964), Rizzo, House and Litzman (1970) and Angle and Perry (1981). 
Two items were used to capture the issues learners raised in their group 
interviews as causing role conflict in their work-worlds. Two 
substantive issues had been raised: the conflict of being a learner and 
a responsible nurse who was paid from public sources of finance; and the 
" . 
conflict between the emphasis on individualized patient care and the mass 
"processing" of both patient and nurse learners. 
These two areas of role conflict were dealt with in our two-item scale 
of Role Conflict. The details are as \follows: 
Measure .1nernoni c Source Cronbach's Alpha 
Role conflict RC A27, A30 0.61 
It was not found necessary to measure role conflict within each sub-system 
as it was often the different role expectations between the two sub-systems 
that generated learner perceived role cOnflict. 
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PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
The personal characteristics of participants were also felt to be 
" . 
important influences on participant satisfaction and on O.E. per see Four 
personal characteristics were analysed. These are discussed below: 
1. Tenure t'tEAR) 
Tenure (tmemonic: YEAR) has long been shown to have an effect on leaving 
and absenteeism behaviour. This was measured as the number of years of 
participation in the training system And essentially 'learners were asked to 
state their year of training. 
2. Type of Course (c.OUItSf) 
Previous research had shown that the type of course undertaken by a 
learner r~sulted in different patterns of withdrawal behaviour (no work 
has been done on productive behaviour) and the work of Clarke(l975), Birch 
(1975) and Redfern (1978) .indicate that usually the higher the grade of 
learner/nurse the ,less the incidence of withdrawal behaviour. 
3. Perceived Alternative Employment Opportunities (PERAEO) 
This was felt to be an important personal characteristic to measure in 
view of the inducement - contribution basis of the contingency theory set out 
in chapter 8. This was measured by a dichotomous item asking learners 
whether they perceived themselves as following another career besides 
nursing. The answer yes was coded 1 and the answer no as o. The source of 
this item was question Bl3. 
4. Positive Conformity to Expectations (CE) 
This was measured by asking learners whether nursing had been better or 
worse than they had expected. This question was measured on a five-point 
, 
(1 to 5) Likert-type scale and formed ~uestion B9 on the primary questionnaire. 
Further information on learner expectations is found in the qualita~ive 
answers of the sub-sample A of 1.22 learners. This sample was administered 
a series of incomplete sentences on the first day of their training which sought 
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to tap their extant images and expectations of nursing and nurse training. 
This series of incomplete sentences is contained in Appendix 9.5. This 
questionnaire grew out of the early series of group interviews with learners 
-already i~ training. An earlier version of the questionnaire is that 
found in Appendix 9.6. 
The questionnaire contained in Appenaix 906 was administered to a sample 
of learners who were already in training during December 1979 to 
February 1980. This sub-sample B consisted of learners from the following 
groups: 
'. 
Year of Training Number of Learners 
First October 1979 (S.R.N.) 25 
" 
. 
Second January 1978 (S.E.N. ) 17 
Second October 1978 (S.E.N. ) 5 
Second May 1978 (SoE.No) 22 
Third February 1978 (S.R.N. ) 21 
Total 90 
Both sets of questionnaires (9.5 and 9.6) seek to tap expectations on 
" . 
a wide series of issues. Section A was intended to discover the motivation 
for choosing nursing as an occupation and the iDlC~ge a person had of it. 
Section B attempted to draw out images of the sub-systems within the Training 
System as a whole and asked about expectations of the educational sub-system 
and of working within the service sub-system. Section C sought to analyse 
the expectations which learners had of significant participant groups such 
as tutors, sister,:patients and doctor~. Section D was to analyse expectations 
\ 
about extrinsic factors of learners' working environment such as pay, night 
duty, hours of working and studying. Section E was to draw out a learner's 
expectations of an ideal/good tutor and nurse. 
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As can be seen, Sections A and E were designed primarily to draw out 
descriptions of what effective nursing meant to learners who after all, 
would be society's future nurses. Sections B to D were intended to 
discover expectations of the system being studied and progressed from a 
lower resolution level of analysis to a higher one with two detailed aspects 
of a learner's participation being analysed: his/her expected relationships 
with other focal participant groups and his/her expectations on the terms 
of participation and exchange. 
In addition Appendix 9.4 helps to obtain biographical information from 
the learner but this was administered to only 1980 cohorts. 
9.6 The Use of Personality Assessment as Measures of Personal Characteristics 
A selection of personal characteristics was made after a review of 
" . the literature and with regard to the formal model of system-environment 
relationships outlined in chapter 8. The review showed that personality 
tests of a wide variety (for a review see "LewiS,and Cooper, 1976) had been 
used in devising appropriate selection packages and in attemptlngto discover 
the "good" nurse, the nurse who would not "waste". These personality tests 
reflected different psychological traditions, methodology and epistemology. 
In this chapter we are concerned with a theory and measures 
of personality which are consistent with a theory of organizational and 
individual behaviour framed at the technical and hermeneutical levels of 
interest. The guiding purpose of theory is thus the explanation, prediction 
and administration aforganizations such that they survive in the long-run. 
Given these parameters it was decided to use measures of personality that were 
both technical, i.e. psychometric and idiographic. Unfortunately the 
\. 
idiographic personality test used: the\Thcmatic Apperception Test has not 
been analysed by the researchers due to a lack of resources. Hence, only 
psychometric measures of certain aspects of personality are available. The 
two psychometric personality tests used were the: 
(a) Eysenck's Personality Inventory; this sets out to measure two major 
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dimensions of personality, extraversion and neuroticism. (Eysenck, 
1964) • (Mnemonic, EP1) and 
11 • 
(b) Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale; this sets out to measure the level of 
internal anxiety or emotionality via a series of items describing what 
are hypothesized to be overt or manifest symptoms of this inner state. 
(Taylor, 1953). (Mnemonic, TAS') 
The choice and use of these two personality tests was based on the 
argument that they reflected and were consistent with a functionalist 
epistemology. Their underlying assumptions on the importance of quantified 
measurement and a hypothetico-deductive method to the study of human 
behaviour clearly place them in the more positivist quadrant of the Burrell 
... 
and Morgan typology. Equally clearly, however, Eysenck's particular 
definition of personality is inconsistent with our concepts of holism in 
that he does not study personality holistically and instead has a "ratomorphic", 
fragmented picture of "The Person". His whole-hearted belief in the virtues 
of factor analysis and his complete disdain of idiographic methods of 
personality assessment is a characteristic peculiar only to himself and is 
not shared necessarily by other psychometrists. Allport, for example, whilst 
valuing the nomothetic approach sees it as inadequate by itself - it must 
be supplemented by idiographic understanding of the unique organization of 
each individual person. At the other extreme, the Skinnerians dispose of 
any notion of dispositions and are concerned simply to study the ways human 
beings build up their responses to stimuli. In other words, the psychometrists 
may share common underlying assumptions but they work on different variations 
of the same theme. Thus, our use of these two psychometric measures reflect 
.. 
an identification of an epistemology \ and method but not a theory. 
OUr use of the TAS does not mean that we agree with the Hullian theory of 
anxiety as a drive or with the Iowa theory that anxiety is a stable, general 
characteristic. The test was chosen because it accorded with the functionalist 
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tenets of. realism, determinism, positivism and nomothetic methodology (see 
Burrell and Morgan, 19J9). Neither do we share Eysenck's single-minded use of 
factor analysis; within a technical and hermeneutical theory of O.E. idiographic 
measures of personality are certainly in order. Our position of the choice 
of these two psychometric measures is thus: 
Ca) they are consistent with a technical-interested theory of O.E.; 
(b) they are measures of public expression on certain types of 
behaviour; such measures being descriptions of behaviour 
rather than reified measures of stable, broad personality traits; 
(c) they are partial'explanations and determinants of behaviour. Thus 
as chapter e shows personal characteristics are but intervening variable 
in a larger, more complex model of system-environment relationships. 
~ , 
Unlike the orthodox psychometrist, we see behaviour as an outcome 
of Situational interactions between the system and its environment, 
whether that system is a person or a personal holon or a social 
holon. Additionally, we do not hold forth that these tests measure 
general traits which are of interest per. se. Instead we seek to 
relate the incidence of such characteristics with observable behaViour 
or other observable consequences. Our aim is thus not to develop a 
theory of personality (we would most certainly rail) but to explain 
variances in behaviour and attitudes ahd D.E.; and 
(d) they are relevant as partial explanations. That is, personality 
tests of the type used are n~t totally useless. Interpreted cautiously 
they could prevent over-generalization and stimulate more encompassing 
theories of organizational behaviour which take into account the 
individual and his contribueion to organizational outcomes. 
Finally, there were secondary reasons for the choice of these particular 
tests. Given the current controversy in trait theory, it was decided to use 
the EPI as considerable empirical work had been conducted with it (Vernon, 1963) 
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and one could more readily assess the empirical and construct validity of the 
test. Secondly the work of Cattell appeared more scientistic than Eysenck's 
\ 
and his work has not been as systematically reviewed. Rather, the reaction of 
most psychologists to Cattell's work appears to be one of incredulity regarding 
the possibility of expressing all aspects of personality in factorial terms 
and bewilderment regarding the huge number.of factors he claims to have 
isolated. Thirdly, we had particularly ~anted to measure anxiety, this 
being generally defined, following Freud, as: 
"A specific state of unpleasure accompanied by motor discharges along 
definite pathways ••• a signal of danger ••• symptoms are created in order 
to remove ••• the situation of danger •••• Anxiety would be the fundamental 
phenomenon and central problem of neurosis." (Freud, 1936) 
Anxiety was felt to be an important psychological phenomenon' because it 
had been observed to influence learner behaviour, especially on the wards and 
it had often been mentioned by learners, teachers, ward staff and patients. 
.. . 
The profeSSion, as a whole had also discussed the consequences and 
prevalence of anxiety. For example the Briggs Committee (1972) had recorded 
the following: 
"We have been struck by the power of the pressures on the trainee 
nurse and some wastage is easy to understand given the highly 
demanding work and the profound and often unpredictable stresses 
associated with it. 
"The changing nature of medical care has added to the strain imposed 
on nurSing and midwifery staff - anxiety about errors in medicine 
dosage, fears of machinery the constant tension in intensive care 
units, the ethical problems of abortion, transplantation and 
resuscitation, uncertainty over rapid decisions to be made in times 
of criSis, the care of an increasing number of patients with mental 
disorders. This last aspect alone places a burden on general 
nurses for which at the moment they often have not been trained. 
The majority of attempted suicide cases are initially dealt with in 
general hospitals. Other aspects of nursing care making particular 
demands upon nursing staff are the treatment of drug addiction, care 
of the old and,demented patients, care of the young chronic sick and 
terminal care. II (Paragraph 581). \ . 
Theoretically, research has shown that anxiety plays a major role in 
\ 
hospital and nurse education. As early as 1964 Revans pointed out that -
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"Hospitals are institutions cradled in aJ)xiety." 
and that this influenced the abs~nce and turnover behaviour of nurses. 
Menzie~ (1~70) classic study argued that a high level of tension, distress 
and anxiety defined in a neo-Freudian manner was associated with nurse 
turnover, short-spell sickness and 'crisis management. She argued that acute 
.. . 
anxiety led to: 
(1) the splitting up of the nurse/patient relationship; 
(2) the depersonalization, categorization and denial of the significance 
of the individual; 
(3) forced detachment and a denial of feelings; 
(4) the attempt to eliminate decisions by ritual task performance; 
(5) a collusive social re-distribution of responsibility and 
irresponsibility; 
(6) idealization and an underestimation of personal development 
possibilities; and 
(7) an avoidance of change. f· J 
These kinds of behaviour were argued to be outward manifestations of defence 
mechanisms ~at were rooted in inner feelings of anxiety and 9uilt. 
A recent study by Birch (1978) further underlines the prevalence of 
anxiety and stress in the general nurse education and training system. Using 
a variety of psychometric and idiographic-based:measures of anxiety, Birch 
argued that nurse learners experience high levels of anxiety which or~ not 
alleviated by prevailing systems of training. Indeed, he argues that the 
current system of general nurse education positively contributes to anxiety 
feelings by failing to prepare learners adequately for the.psychological stress 
, 
inherent in nursihg sick and ill pat~nts. However, Birch did not study the 
behavioural consequences of such anxiety. Neither did he begin from a theory 
.. . 
of the effective functioning of a nurse training system. Be set out only to 
study the prevalence of anXiety, the kinds of anxiety-provoking situations 
and the implications for curriculmn change in general nurse education. 
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Given these pieces of research on the role of anxiety it was decided to 
specifically include tests which attempted to measure anxiety and to see 
the correlation between these measures and our technical ueasures of O.E. 
The third personality construct used was an adapted scale called the 
Learners' Preference for Bureaucracy (Mnemonic : LPB) and it attempted to 
measure the learner's bureaucratic orientation. This construct is 
discussed somewhat separately from the EPI and TAS because its psychometric 
properties have not been tested to the same degree as the other two tests. 
In addition, the author of the scale has not made explicit the personality 
i" 
theory to which he subscribes. Nevertheless, it was felt that the construct 
was of potential value as an explanation of individual and systeDdc behaviour. 
The scale is described by Gordon (1970) as a personality construct 
called "bureaucratic orientation" and is defined as the commitment to a set 
of attitudes, values and behaviours that are characteristically fostered 
and rewarded in a bureaucratic' type of organization. Gordon adopts Weber's 
(1946) classic 'definition of a bureaucracy.: Thus a participant who is 
bureaucratically inclined displays the following five characteristics: 
se~f-subordination, compartmentalization, impersonalization, rule conformity 
and traditionalism. 
-In addition to conducting statistical tests of validity and reliability, 
Go~don (1970) reported results from a study in which the personality construct 
was used to differentiate between "stayers" and "leavers". The site was the 
Boston Oollege and the sample consisted of an entire class of 172 Air Force 
ROTC cadets in the first year of their two-year programme. At the end of the 
first year seventy-seven cadets or 44.7' of the class had resigned or elected 
not to continue. These leavers demon~trated a mean WEPS score of 33.1 which 
was statistically different from the mean WEPS score of 39.3 of the stayers. A b~ 
II , 
serial correlation of the predictive validity of the WEPS against the 
dichotomous withdrawal criterion was significant at p ~ 0.01 and registered 
at 0.44. 
.. 
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Given this. potential linkage between this construct of bureaucratic 
orientation and measures of O.E. it was decided to adapt the WEPS for use 
among learners. A shortened list of twenty-four as opposed to thirty items 
was used and a five-point scale WaS adapted.* The WEPS was renamed the 
Learner's Preference for Bureaucracy (LPB) and the scale is shown as Section E 
in the primary Nursing Questionnaire. 
Table 9.9: Reliability Coeffients for all·Three Personalitv Coefficients 
Variable Mnemonic Source 
Extraversion E34 EPl 
Neuroticism E35 EPl 
·Split-Half 
(Spearman-
Test-Retest . Brown) 
0.88 0.86 
0.94 
0.84 0.90 
0.92 
Note: these statistics were obtained from Eysenck (1964). The test-retest 
coefficients were from a s~le of ninety-two and a sample of twenty-seven. 
The Spearman-Brown coefficients were obtained from a sample of two thousand 
"normal" per 0 s ns. 
Variable· Mnemonic Source Test-Retest 
Taylor Manifest 
Anxiety Scale E33 TAS 0.88 
Note: This statistic was obtained from Taylor (1953). The test-
retest coefficient was from a sample of 179 individuals. 
Variable Mnemonic Source Cronbach's Alpha Standardized Alpha 
Learner Preference LPB WEPS 0.91*' 0.81 
for Bureaucracy Section E 0.81 0.81 
* This makes comparison with Gordon's data slightly problematic as. he used a 
three-point Bcale. However, a five-point scale was more consistent with 
the scorin" . system on the rest of the Likert-type scale measures used in 
the present study. 
~. 
• * This statistic was reported by Gordon (1970) for each of two sauples 
- Peace Cozp Volunteers and high school counsellors. 
